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ABSTRACT 
 
Royal Air Force Bomber Command entered the Second World War committed 
to a strategy of precision bombing in daylight. The theory that bomber 
formations would survive contact with the enemy was soon dispelled and it 
was obvious that Bomber Command would have to switch to bombing at 
night. 
 
The difficulties of locating a target at night soon became apparent. In August 
1941, only one in three of those crews claiming to have bombed a target had 
in fact had been within five miles of it.  And yet, less than four years later, it 
would be a very different story. By early 1945, 95% of aircraft despatched 
bombed within 3 miles of the Aiming Point and the average bombing error 
was 600 yards.  How, then, in the space of four years did Bomber Command 
evolve from an ineffective force failing even to locate a target to the 
formidable force of early 1945?  
 
In part, the answer lies in the advent of electronic navigation aids that, in 
1941, were simply not available. By 1945, electronic aids such as GEE, Oboe 
and H2S were widely in use. Secondary literature on the bombing offensive 
tends to attribute the improvement in bombing performance to the introduction 
of these aids.  
 
However, the introduction of these aids was only part of the story. These aids 
could not, in themselves, circumvent the law that human beings cannot see in 
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the dark. Having reached the target area with the benefit of navigation aids, 
some form of identifying the Aiming Point was necessary if the target was to 
be accurately bombed. Part of the reason for the effectiveness of Bomber 
Command by early 1945 therefore lies in the development of techniques for 
the identification and marking of targets. 
 
Although the development of navigation aids is well documented, the 
development of techniques for target marking has received much less 
attention. The aim of this thesis is to examine this largely neglected aspect of 
the bombing offensive. The key question asked is: what difference did the 
introduction of target marking techniques make to the performance and 
efficacy of Bomber Command?  
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DEFINITIONS AND ABBREVIATIONS 
 
 
Definitions 
 
 
Aiming Point  The point on the ground that is the briefed 
target for the raid. 
 
Blind Bombing Release of bombs without visually 
identifying the target, using navigation aids 
to determine position. 
 
Estimated Weight of Attack  The minimum weight of attack necessary to 
destroy the social and industrial structure 
within selected areas (towns), measured in 
tons of bombs per square mile or tons of 
bombs per population number. 
 
Mean Point of Impact The mathematical centre of the bomb 
distribution. 
 
Point of Aim A point on the ground, marker or pattern of 
markers on which the Main Force were 
briefed to aim. 
 
Probable Radial Error Radius of a circle about the Aiming Point or 
the Mean Point of Impact within which 50% 
of the plotted bomb distribution are located.  
 
Random Error The measure of bomb scatter about the 
Mean Point of Impact 
 
Systematic Error  The distance of the Mean Point of Impact 
from the Aiming Point, measured as a direct 
line.  
 
 
Abbreviations 
 
A&AEE Aircraft and Armament Experimental Establishment 
 
A/C    Aircraft 
 
ACAS    Assistant Chief of Air Staff 
 
ACAS (Ops)   Assistant Chief of Air Staff (Operations) 
 
ACAS (P)   Assistant Chief of Air Staff (Policy) 
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A/Cdre   Air Commodore 
 
ACM    Air Chief Marshal 
 
AGL    Above Ground Level 
 
AI    Airborne Interception  
 
AM    Air Marshal 
 
AOC    Air Officer Commanding 
 
AOC-in-C   Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief 
 
A/P    Aiming Point 
 
API    Air Position Indicator 
 
ASI    Air Speed Indicator 
 
ASL    Above Sea Level 
 
ASV    Air to Surface Vessel 
 
AVM    Air Vice-Marshal 
 
BC    Bomber Command 
 
BBSU    British Bombing Survey Unit 
 
BDU    Bomber Development Unit 
 
CAS    Chief of Air Staff 
 
C-in-C    Commander-in-Chief 
 
CoG    Centre of Gravity 
 
CoP    Centre of Pressure 
 
c.p.d.    Constant Path Difference 
 
COS    Chiefs of Staff 
 
CRT    Cathode Ray Tube 
 
CSBS    Course Setting Bomb Sight 
 
D Arm R   Director of Armament (Research) 
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DBO    Directorate of Bomber Operations 
 
D B Ops   Director of Bomber Operations 
 
D C-in-C   Deputy Commander-in-Chief 
 
DD B Ops   Deputy Directorate of Bomber Operations 
 
D O I(O)   Director of Intelligence (Operations) 
 
D/R    Dead Reckoning 
 
DRC    Distant Reading Compass 
 
ETA    Estimated Time of Arrival 
 
Flg Off   Flying Officer 
 
Flt Lt    Flight Lieutenant 
 
Flt Sgt    Flight Sergeant 
 
Gp Capt   Group Captain 
 
GPI    Ground Position Indicator 
 
HC    High Capacity 
 
HF  High Frequency 
 
HQ    Headquarters 
 
HQBC    Headquarters Bomber Command 
 
I.G.    Inspector General 
 
IAS    Indicated Air Speed 
 
I. E.    Initial Equipment 
 
JIC    Joint Intelligence Committee 
 
JPS    Joint Planning Staff 
 
LNSF    Light Night Striking Force 
 
MAP    Ministry of Aircraft Production 
 
MC    Medium Capacity 
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MEW    Ministry of Economic Welfare 
 
MPI    Mean Point of Impact 
 
MTB    Main Time Base 
 
ORS    Operational Research Section 
 
ORSBC   Operational Research Section Bomber Command 
 
OTU    Operational Training Unit 
 
PFF    Pathfinder Force 
 
P/O    Pilot Officer 
 
PPI    Plan Position Indicator 
 
PRF    Pulse Recurrence Frequency 
 
RE8 Ministry of Home Security Research and 
Experiments Department 8 
 
SABS  Stabilised Automatic Bomb Sight 
 
SASO  Senior Air Staff Officer 
 
SBA  Standard Blind (later Beam) Approach 
 
SBC  Small Bomb Container 
 
SDF  Special Duties Flight 
 
Sgt  Sergeant 
 
SHAEF Supreme Headquarters British Expeditionary 
Force 
 
Sqn Ldr  Squadron Leader 
 
S.S.  ‘Skywave’ Signals  
 
TAS  True Air Speed 
 
TBF  Time of bomb fall 
 
TFF  Target Finding Force 
 
T.I.  Target Indicator 
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TNA  The National Archives, Kew 
 
ToT  Time on Target 
 
TRE  Telecommunications Research Establishment 
 
TV   Terminal Velocity 
 
U/S  Unseviceable 
 
VCAS  Vice-Chief of Air Staff 
 
VHF  Very High Frequency 
 
Wg Cdr  Wing Commander 
 
W/T  Wireless Telegraphy 
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“The constant struggle at night is to get light onto the target. I foresee a never 
ending struggle to circumvent the law that we cannot see in the dark” 
 
Air Commodore Coningham, 9th December 19391 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
On the night of the 1/2 September 1942, 231 aircraft of Royal Air Force 
Bomber Command set out to bomb the town of Saarbrücken in south-west 
Germany. In clear weather, and with the Main Force led in to a target 
illuminated and marked by the Pathfinders, bombing was both accurate and 
disciplined, with a total of 205 aircraft reporting good bombing results2.  
 
Piloting one of the Main Force aircraft that night was Wing Commander Guy 
Gibson, later to become famous as leader of the Dams Raid, then 
commanding a Lancaster squadron in No. 5 Group, Bomber Command.  
Since this was the first occasion on which Gibson had operated behind the 
Pathfinders, he arrived in the target area a little early to observe their 
technique. “Sure enough”, Gibson recalled in his book Enemy Coast Ahead3, 
“the Finders laid their long string of flares, the Illuminators hovered around 
and then dumped bunch after bunch of flares right over the town; the bombs, 
incendiaries at first, began to fall thick and fast, about a thousand tons of 
them. Soon the whole area was one mass of flames.” 
 
The post-raid analysis confirmed Gibson’s impression of the raid, and the 
concentrated attack caused heavy damage4. 
                                                 
1
 Charles Webster and Noble Frankland The Strategic Air Offensive against Germany 1939-
1945, Vol I (Uckfield: The Naval and Military Press Ltd, 2006) [first published, London, HMSO 
1961], p 202. 
2
 The National Archives, Kew (TNA) AIR14/3408 Bomber Command Report on night 
operations, 1/2
nd
 September 1942, 9 September 1942.  
3
 Guy Gibson, Enemy Coast Ahead (London, Bridge Books, 1995), p159. 
4
 TNA AIR14/3408 Bomber Command Report on night operations, 1/2
nd
 September 1942, 9 
September 1942. 
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There was just one problem - the town bombed was not Saarbrücken. The 
Pathfinders had in fact illuminated and marked the small town of Saarlouis, 
some 13 miles to the north-west of Saarbrücken and located in a similar bend 
in the River Saar5. The accuracy of the Main Force attack meant that not a 
single bomb fell on Saarbrücken6. 
 
The unintentional bombing of Saarlouis is an extreme example of one of the 
main issues confronting Bomber Command in the prosecution of the bombing 
offensive during the Second World War: the ability of bomber crews to identify 
targets at night. Indeed, as so succinctly encapsulated by Basil Dickins, 
navigating to the target area was only the first part the story: the second, more 
difficult part, was identifying the target itself once in the target area7. The 
significance of this problem is not easily overstated - all the effort and risk 
involved in mounting a raid comes to nothing if the target cannot be identified 
and then hit. 
 
The scale of the problem confronting Bomber Command had been brought 
sharply into focus a year before the attack on Saarlouis in a disturbing report 
published in August 1941. The Butt Report revealed that of those crews 
claiming to have bombed a target, in fact only one in three had been within 
five miles of it. For targets in Germany, that proportion fell to one in four and 
for targets in the Ruhr, which was frequently affected by industrial haze, the 
proportion was one in ten. In non-moon periods, this percentage fell further 
still. Moreover, these figures only applied to those crews that claimed to have 
                                                 
5
 Named after Louis XIV of France, between 1936 and 1945 the town of Saarlouis was known 
in Germany as Saarlautern in an attempt to conceal the French origin of the town’s name, and 
in some accounts of the raid is referred to as such. 
6
 TNA AIR14/3408 Bomber Command Report on night operations, 1/2
nd
 September 1942, 9 
September 1942. Of the 71 night photographs that were plotted, 70 were centered over 
Saarlouis and the remainder was over a village just outside of it. 
7
Ronnie Shephard Military Operational Research Archive, Laurier Centre for Military Strategic 
and Disarmament Studies, Waterloo, Ontario, Canada (RSMORA) Basil Dickins. ‘Operational 
Research in Bomber Command’, manuscript. Basil Dickins was the Head of the Operational 
research Section at Bomber Command HQ. 
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attacked the target: a third of all crews dispatched did not even claim to have 
reached the target8. 
 
And yet, less than four years after the Butt Report was published, it would be 
a very different story. In the early months of 1945, Bomber Command carried 
out a series of raids on smaller towns in Germany - towns such as Pforzheim, 
Würzburg, Kleve and Hildesheim -  that had not previously been the subject of 
a major attack9. These raids were devastatingly effective.  
 
The attack on Pforzheim was typical of the raids in this series. This raid was 
carried out on the night of the 23/24 February 1945 by a force of 367 
Lancasters10. Both the marking and bombing were exceptionally accurate, 
with a total of 1,825 tons of bombs dropped in a raid that lasted just 22 
minutes. Within 10 minutes of the opening of the attack, an area measuring 
3km by 1.5 km was completely engulfed by a ‘firestorm’ which completely 
destroyed the old city centre. The British Bombing Survey Unit estimated that 
83% of the built up area of Pforzheim was destroyed, this probably being the 
greatest proportion of a town destroyed in a single raid during the war11.   
 
How, then, in the space of four years did Bomber Command evolve from an 
ineffective force failing, in most cases, even to locate a target to the efficient 
and formidable force of early 1945, capable of destroying a town the 
equivalent size of Rugby or Shrewsbury in a single night?  
 
In part, the answer to these questions lies in the advent of electronic 
navigation aids that, in 1941, were simply not available to the crews of 
                                                 
8
 TNA AIR8/1356 ‘Report by Mr Butt to Bomber Command on his Examination of Night 
Photographs’, 18 August 1941. 
9
 Towns in the United Kingdom with similar population sizes include Bracknell, Hastings, 
Rugby, Shrewsbury and Worcester. Source:2011 Census 
10
 TNA AIR14/3411 Raid Report No 846: Pforzheim 23/24 February 1945, dated 23 March 
1945. For a detailed account of the raid on Pforzheim, see Tony Redding, Bombing Germany: 
the final phase. The destruction of Pforzheim and the closing months of Bomber Command’s 
war  (Barnsley: Pen & Sword Aviation, January 2015). 
11
 Sebastian Cox. (ed) The Strategic Air War Against Germany 1939-1945: The official report 
of the British Bombing Survey Unit (London: Frank Cass, 1998). See also Martin Middlebrook 
and Chris Everitt The Bomber Command War Diaries, (Harmondsworth: Viking, 1985), p669, 
which quotes the official report of the British Bombing Survey Unit. 
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Bomber Command. By 1945, navigation and blind bombing aids such as 
GEE, Oboe and H2S were widely available. These aids turned navigation 
from an art into a science. However, this is not to say that these aids solved 
the problem of navigation entirely and it would be some time before the whole 
of the force would be equipped. Moreover, as Basil Dickins observed, the 
difficulties involved in navigating to the target area were relatively small 
compared to the difficulty of identifying the target itself. Part of the reason for 
the effectiveness of Bomber Command by early 1945 therefore lies in the 
development of technologies and techniques for the identification and marking 
of targets. 
 
Although the development of navigational aids is well documented in literature 
about the bombing offensive, the development of technologies and techniques 
for target marking has received much less attention. The aim of this thesis is, 
therefore, to examine this largely neglected aspect of the bombing offensive, 
with a view to understanding and quantifying the contribution that the 
development of target marking techniques made to the effectiveness of the 
bombing offensive. It is essentially a technical study of the techniques 
employed and the results achieved in the context of the night bombing 
offensive conducted by RAF Bomber Command12.  
 
Part of the aim of this thesis is to address some of the questions raised by the 
development of target marking techniques in the bombing offensive. The key 
question asked is: what difference did the introduction of target marking 
techniques make to the performance and efficacy of Bomber Command? It is 
this question that underpins the whole of the thesis, and much of the following 
is intended to provide an answer to that question. However, other questions 
arise along the way including why, given that a pathfinding technique was a 
regular feature of night raids made by the German Air Force from mid-1940 
onwards, such techniques were only introduced by Bomber Command 
                                                 
12
 It is recognised that specialist target marking techniques were also developed for use in 
daylight raids towards the end of the Bombing Offensive. However, whilst sharing some 
similarities with target marking techniques uses at night, those techniques were in other 
respects significantly different with different characteristics. For that reason, target marking 
techniques for daylight raids have been omitted from this study.   
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comparatively late in the offensive? Questions such as these are not 
addressed in secondary literature on the subject, and seeking to answer those 
and other questions here contributes to a wider understanding of the bombing 
offensive. In asking and answering these questions, the thesis will quantify the 
contribution that the development of target marking techniques made to the 
improvement in performance achieved by Bomber Command throughout the 
bombing offensive and will invite us to rethink current explanations in 
secondary literature about the efficacy of Bomber Command at that time.  
 
A considerable amount has been written about the prosecution and outcomes 
of the bombing offensive, both in primary and secondary literature. Within this 
body of literature, the subject of target marking does of course feature 
extensively, albeit almost exclusively in descriptive rather than analytical 
terms. It is therefore necessary at the outset to define where this thesis sits in 
relation to the existing literature on the bombing offensive, and to describe 
how the approach taken in this thesis differs from that in the existing literature 
on the subject. In this context, it is logical to begin with the two officially 
published documents on the bombing offensive: the Air Historical Branch 
narrative (AHB narrative)13 and the official history of the bombing offensive,  
The Strategic Air Offensive against Germany 1939 -194514.  
 
The AHB narrative was written in 1950 and is in six volumes covering the 
genesis and entire duration of the offensive. Although all six volumes discuss 
the development of target marking techniques, Volume 4, Part II The 
Experimental Force, is of particular relevance15. This covers the introduction 
of the first electronic navigation and blind bombing aids, as well as the target 
marking techniques that were associated with the introduction of those 
devices. It also charts the formation of the Pathfinder Force and the 
development of the techniques that would become the mainstay of the 
operational techniques employed by Bomber Command in the later part of the 
                                                 
13
 TNA AIR41/42 Air Historical Branch narrative:The RAF in the Bombing Offensive against 
Germany, 6 Volumes. 
14
 Webster and Frankland The Strategic Air Offensive 
15
 TNA AIR41/42 Air Historical Branch narrative:The RAF in the Bombing Offensive against 
Germany, Volume VI, Part II. 
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offensive. At one level this volume of the AHB narrative covers some of the 
ground that this thesis will examine. 
 
The AHB narrative is, as the title implies, primarily a descriptive history of the 
bombing offensive. There is an element of analytical explanation: Sebastian 
Cox points in particular to the first volume as combining narrative with 
analytical insight16. However, in relation to target marking, this analytical 
element does not extend to a detailed assessment of the relationship between 
the characteristics of the navigation aid employed and the profile of the target 
marking technique associated with it. For example, the AHB narrative 
dismisses the initial averaging technique using H2S as being ‘for various 
reasons’ not very successful but does not go on to explain what those 
reasons were17. One of those reasons related to the Principle of Cumulative 
Dispersion which, as explained later in this thesis, is absolutely fundamental 
in determining the effectiveness of all target marking techniques but to which 
H2S was particularly prone as a direct consequence of the very principles on 
which it worked. The AHB narrative does not make that connection. The 
omission of such important concepts, whilst understandable in the context of a 
historical narrative, does not explain how target marking worked or, by 
extension, how it contributed to the prosecution of the bombing offensive. 
 
This is not to in any way diminish the value of the AHB narrative. As Christina 
Goulter points out, the AHB narratives have provided the foundation for many 
scholars’ work and that, without them, ‘our feel for the scope of the RAF’s 
contribution to the Allied war effort would be much more limited’18. However, 
whilst the AHB narrative refers to many of the techniques examined in this 
thesis, it does not do so in any detail, particularly in respect of the technical 
aspects of those techniques. Consequently, whilst the AHB narrative provides 
                                                 
16
  Sebastian Cox ‘Setting the Historical Agenda; Webster and Frankland and the Debate over 
the Strategic Bombing Offensive against Germany, 1939-1945’,in Jeffrey Grey (ed) The Last 
word? Essays on Official History in the United States and British Commonwealth, (Westport 
CT:Praeger, 2003),page 149. 
17
 TNA AIR41/42 TNA AIR41/42 Air Historical Branch narrative:The RAF in the Bombing 
Offensive against Germany, Volume VI, Part II. 
18
 Christina J.M. Goulter, British Official Histories of the Air War, in Grey (ed) ‘The Last 
word?’, p159.  
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a convenient framework within which to examine the development of target 
marking techniques, it leaves plenty of scope to examine the technical 
aspects associated with those techniques and to further our understanding of 
the role played by target marking in the bombing offensive. 
 
If the AHB narrative may be considered as being primarily a descriptive 
history of the bombing offensive, the official history produced under the 
auspices of the Cabinet Office is of a different order. Published as four 
volumes in 1961 following a lengthy and troubled gestation period, the official 
history is widely regarded as being the best single analysis of the British 
strategic bombing offensive. The reason for this, according to Cox, lies in the 
historical and literary skills of the authors, Sir Charles Webster and Noble 
Frankland, and the analytical framework established for the book by 
Frankland in his earlier research in the Air Historical Branch. This leads Cox 
to suggest that, in terms of depth of research and the rigor of analysis, the 
official history compares favourably with many of the other British official 
military histories19. 
 
In the conclusion of his essay on the official history, Cox describes that work 
as being ‘unrivalled’ as a guide to the development of the operational 
techniques employed by Bomber Command. This is undoubtedly the case, 
insofar as no other single publication before or since has described these 
techniques in a similar level of detail. But “unrivalled” is a comparative term 
and, as Goulter reminds, official histories do not necessarily represent the 
definitive word on particular subjects20.    Thus, the official history is not, and 
neither was it intended to be, definitive in terms of the operational techniques 
employed by Bomber Command. The official history does include detailed 
descriptions of target marking techniques and, in general terms, relates them 
to the various navigation and blind bombing aids that were available. 
However, the primary purpose in describing those techniques was to inform 
                                                 
19
 Sebastian Cox, Setting the Historical Agenda; Webster and Frankland and the Debate over 
the Strategic Bombing Offensive against Germany, 1939-1945 in Grey (ed) The Last word? 
page 159. 
20
 Christina J.M. Goulter, British Official Histories of the Air War in Grey (ed) The Last word? 
page 133. 
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the progression of the strategic air offensive against Germany as part of 
narrating and then explaining the history of that offensive. The robust 
analytical approach taken in writing the official history was therefore primarily 
directed at the prosecution, purpose and outcomes of the bombing offensive, 
rather than the techniques that underpinned it. 
 
It follows that the analysis of the operational techniques employed by Bomber 
Command in the official history was limited to that necessary to inform the 
main purposes of that document in terms of analysing the progression and 
outcome of the bombing offensive. To give just one example, the official 
history describes the Shaker target marking technique in the context of the 
resultant improvements in bombing accuracy but principally as a prelude to 
explaining that the results did not conform to Air Ministry expectations before 
the introduction of the GEE navigation aid upon which the Shaker technique 
was predicated21. No attempt is made, however, to relate the results achieved 
using the Shaker technique to the technical characteristics of the GEE 
navigation aid. By not addressing this causal link, the official history does not 
provide a comprehensive understanding of the contribution made by the 
Shaker target marking technique to the bombing offensive. For similar 
reasons, the same is also true of the other target marking techniques 
employed by Bomber Command and the navigation aids with which they are 
associated. 
 
Consequently, the AHB narrative and the official history only take us so far in 
our understanding of the role played by target marking techniques in the 
prosecution of the bombing offensive.  There remains levels of detail relating 
to the development of those techniques that sit below the level of analysis 
provided by the AHB narrative and the official history. It is within these 
additional layers of detail that the technical reasons behind the characteristics 
and limitations of the navigation aids upon which target marking techniques 
relied are to be found. It is these characteristics and limitations that in turn 
dictated the profile of the various target marking techniques and, ultimately, 
                                                 
21
 Webster and Frankland The Strategic Air Offensive, pages 387 to 397. 
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the results that could be achieved using them. In order to fully understand the 
development of target marking techniques and the contribution they made to 
the bombing offensive, it is therefore necessary to descend into these layers 
of detail that sit below the AHB narrative and the official history. The intention 
of this thesis is to work within these lower layers of detail and build upon the 
analysis in the AHB narrative and the official history.  
 
The same also applies to secondary sources on the bombing offensive. The 
history of Bomber Command during the Second World War has been 
extensively documented in secondary literature. The scope covered by this 
literature encompasses the whole spectrum of the bombing offensive, ranging 
from the high-level strategic conduct of the offensive22 to personal accounts of 
the aircrew involved on bombing operations23. Within this spectrum, there are 
descriptions of the tactics adopted by Bomber Command, the equipment used 
and the techniques evolved to make best use of the equipment available. 
There are also detailed accounts of individual raids24, or groups of raids25, 
together with commentaries on the outcome of those raids, and on the 
success and failures of the bombing offensive as a whole. The literature 
contains numerous references to the target marking techniques employed by 
Bomber Command. These references tend to reflect the broad spectrum 
covered by the available literature, ranging from wider concepts such as the 
formation of the Pathfinder Force to descriptions of the target marking 
                                                 
22
 For example, Max Hastings Bomber Command (London: Michael Joseph Ltd, 1979); Denis 
Richards The Hardest Victory: RAF Bomber Command in the Second World War (London, 
1994), Robin Neillands The Bomber War: Arthur Harris and Allied Bomber Offensive 1939-
1945 (London: John Murray, 2001) and, more recently, Richard Overy The Bombing War; 
Europe 1939-1945 (London: Allen Lane, 2013).
 22
 For example, Leonard Cheshire, Bomber 
Pilot (Hutchinson, London and St Albans 1943), Guy Gibson, Enemy Coast Ahead  and John 
Searby The Everlasting Arms (London:Kimber, 1988). 
23
 For example, Leonard Cheshire, Bomber Pilot (Hutchinson, London and St Albans 1943), 
Guy Gibson, Enemy Coast Ahead  and John Searby The Everlasting Arms (London:Kimber, 
1988). 
24
 Of particular relevance to target marking, these include Martin Middlebrook. The 
Peenemunde Raid 17/18 August 1943 (, London: Penguin Books 1988: first published Allen 
Lane, London 1982) and a number of works on the Dresden firestorm raid, including David 
Irving The Destruction of Dresden (London: Futura Publications, 1980: first published 1963) 
and Frederick Taylor Dresden: Tuesday, 13
th
 February 1945 (London, 2004). 
25
 These works describe some of the major ‘battles’ undertaken by Bomber Command, 
including Alan Cooper Air Battle for the Ruhr (Shrewsbury: Airlife Publishing Ltd, 1992), 
Martin Middlebrook The Berlin Raids: R.A.F. Bomber Command Winter 1943-44 (London 
Penguin Books, 1990: first published Viking, 1988) and Kenneth Lowe Inferno: The fiery 
destruction of Hamburg 1943 (New York, NY: Scribner, 2007). 
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techniques adopted for individual raids. Furthermore, some elements of the 
literature include detailed technical descriptions of the equipment associated 
with target marking techniques - in particular, the main navigation aids26 - 
whereas some elements of the available literature include descriptions of the 
principal target marking techniques themselves27. 
 
Within this extensive body of literature, the development of target marking 
techniques is a largely neglected subject. In particular, there is a tendency in 
secondary literature to attribute the improvement in bombing accuracy 
achieved by Bomber Command in the later years of the offensive to the 
introduction of navigation aids. For example, in his book Hardest Victory, 
Denis Richards, in referring to the Battle of the Ruhr in 1943, states that 
“Oboe and H2S had without doubt set new standards of bombing accuracy” 
but makes no reference to the role played by the target marking techniques in 
securing that improvement28. Norman Longmate, commenting on the 
improvements in accuracy in the closing months of the war, ascribes this to 
the increased range of GEE, Oboe and G-H as the Allied forces advanced in 
Europe29. In his book, The Bomber War, Robin Neillands devotes a chapter to 
“The scientific air war, 1939-1942”, in which the basic characteristics of GEE, 
Oboe and H2S are explained. However, whilst the formation of the Pathfinder 
Force is covered in a later Chapter, the development of target marking 
techniques does not come in for the same level of attention30. More recently, 
Richard Overy has observed that the introduction of Oboe and H2S 
contributed to raising the average accuracy of the attacking force and 
provides relative statistics for attacks using these two devices. However, 
                                                 
26
 In particular, Michael Cumming Beam Bombers: The Secret War of No.109 Squadron 
(Stroud, Gloucestershire: Sutton Publishing, 1998), which covers the development of Oboe 
blind bombing device, and Sir Bernard Lovell, Echoes of War: The Story of H2S Radar 
(Bristol: Adam Hilger, 1991). 
27
 These include Gordon Musgrove Pathfinder Force: a History of 8 Group (London: 
Macdonald and Jane’s Publishers, 1976) and Sean Feast The Pathfinder Companion: War 
Diaries and Experiences of the RAF Pathfinder Force: 1942-1945 (London: Grub Street, 
2012). 
28
 Richards, D. The Hardest Victory: RAF Bomber Command in the Second World War 
(London, 1994), p169. 
29
 Longmate, N. The Bombers: The RAF Offensive against Germany, 1939-1945 (London: 
Hutchinson, 1983), p330. 
30
 Neillands, R. The Bomber War: Arthur Harris and Allied Bomber Offensive 1939-1945 
(London:John Murray, 2001), Chapter 3, p 60 to p78. 
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despite noting that concentration could be lost if the Pathfinders missed the 
aiming point, there is no attempt to relate the relative accuracy achieved using 
Oboe and H2S to the target marking methods employed in association with 
them31. 
 
There is an inherent assumption in these works that navigating to the target 
was in itself sufficient and little attention is paid to the mechanics of delivering 
bombs onto the target. Even where reference to target marking is made, there 
is no attempt to establish a causal link between target marking techniques 
and the concepts of bombing accuracy and concentration. For example, the 
conclusion to the official history, whilst acknowledging that Bomber Command 
had received new equipment in the form of radar aids and had devised more 
efficient tactical methods through the creation of the Pathfinder Force, does 
not make the association between the two32. This thesis will show that such 
assumptions have resulted in an incomplete and inaccurate understanding of 
the capabilities of Bomber Command, and have therefore contributed to a 
misunderstanding of the strategic and tactical employment of the bomber 
force during that period.  
 
It is acknowledged that the basic techniques employed by Bomber Command 
for marking targets sometimes do receive mention - those known by the 
familiar codenames of Newhaven, Parramatta and Wanganui. Occasionally, 
reference is even made to specific target marking techniques: for example, in 
describing the ‘firestorm’ raid on Dresden in February 1945, several authors 
describe or even make direct reference to a technique known as the “5 Group 
fan”, a technique fundamental to the generation of the Dresden firestorm that 
is the focus of their work33.  
                                                 
31
 Overy The Bombing War; Europe 1939-1945, page 347. 
32
 Webster, C and Frankland, N. The Strategic Air Offensive, Vol iii, page 286. 
33
 More correctly referred to as Sector Marking, the “5 Group fan” was a technique developed 
by No. 5 Group Bomber Command in which each individual aircraft bombed the Target 
Indicators on a different compass heading and using different time delays for bomb release, 
thus spreading the bomb pattern in a fan shape originating from the A/P. Using a combination 
of high explosives and incendiaries, this technique was highly effective in creating the 
widespread fires necessary to generate a ‘firestorm’.  Both Irving The Destruction of Dresden 
and Taylor Dresden: Tuesday, 13
th
 February 1945 describe this technique in detail in these 
works. 
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However, little coverage has been devoted to the development of those 
techniques, or the extent to which those techniques contributed to the 
effectiveness of the bombing offensive. Where on occasion reference is made 
to such techniques - as in relation to the Dresden ‘firestorm’ raid - reference is 
typically and understandably made solely in the context of specific raids, with 
no attempt to place the technique described into context in terms of its 
evolution and effectiveness.  Rarely, if ever, is it explained why a particular 
target marking technique was chosen and how it worked in practice.  
 
The latter point leads to a wider question about the reaction of policy makers 
to the experience and improved performance gained from the employment of 
target marking techniques, and how the evolution of these techniques 
influenced the choices made by policy makers in the employment of the 
bomber force. This is an important, but hitherto neglected, element of the 
debate concerning the use of Bomber Command for area bombing rather than 
against precision targets such as oil and transportation. This in turn leads to a 
further question about the relationship between policy-making, operational 
experience and the introduction of new technologies. Although that 
relationship is alluded to in secondary literature in terms of the introduction of 
navigation aids, little attention has been devoted to the development of target 
marking techniques in that relationship. This thesis will address these 
questions, and place the development of target marking techniques into 
context in the relationship between the technological capability of Bomber 
Command and the options thereby presented to policy-makers for the 
deployment of the bomber force. 
 
Still less attention has been devoted to the evolution and refinement of target 
marking techniques in the light of experience, or to the development of those 
technologies essential for the deployment of those techniques. In particular, 
no attempt has been made in secondary literature to define the precise 
relationship between the navigation or blind bombing aid used and evolution 
of target marking techniques.  The inherent characteristics of those aids 
largely dictated the target marking technique that could be used in conjunction 
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with them, and this in turn had a significant effect on bombing accuracy and 
concentration. Although this relationship is sometimes referred to in 
secondary literature in general terms, this thesis will define that relationship, 
not only in terms of the technical reasons that underpin it, but also in terms of 
the tactical implications for the conduct the bombing offensive and the 
effectiveness of the respective target marking techniques. 
 
Although a number of journal articles have been published covering topics 
peripheral to the development of target marking techniques, none of these 
relate directly to target marking techniques.  Thus, the journals of the Royal 
Institute of Navigation, the Institute of Electrical Engineers and the 
Operational Research Society have all featured articles of broad relevance to 
the topics covered in this thesis: for example, articles published by the 
Institute of Electrical Engineers on the GEE and Oboe electronic navigation 
aids have informed the descriptions of those devices in this thesis, and the 
Royal Institute of Navigation published articles on the navigation technique of 
dead reckoning that is in part relied on in lieu of a description of that technique 
in Chapter 1 of this thesis34 . Similarly, the Royal Air Force Air Power Review, 
the Royal Air Force Historical Society and the Journal of Strategic Studies 
have featured numerous articles covering aspects of the bombing offensive, 
particularly in relation to the leadership and strategic aspects of the bombing 
offensive35, but have published none that directly address the development of 
target marking techniques.  
 
A number of published and unpublished theses have covered aspects of the 
development of target marking. Of these, the two most relevant are the 
Master of Arts and doctoral theses of Rex F.Cording. The former, ‘Press on 
Regardless: A history of the origins and achievements of the R.A.F.’s 
                                                 
34
 Alec Aylife, ‘The development of Airborne Dead Reckoning: Part I – Finding the Wind’, The 
Journal of Navigation, 54, (May 2001) p 223-233 and ‘The development of Airborne Dead 
Reckoning: Part II – Staying on Track’, The Journal of Navigation, 54, (October 2001),p463-
476. 
35
 Sebastian Cox, ‘Sir Arthur Harris and some Myths and Controversies of the Bomber 
Offensive’, RAF Historical Society Journal, (2010), 47, p11-12 and Randall T.Wakelam, 
‘Bomber Harris and Precision Bombing – No oxymoron Here’, Journal of Strategic Studies, 
2012, 14 (1). 
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Pathfinder Force 1916-1945’, is in two parts36. The first part deals at length 
with the deficiencies in the R.A.F. before 1939, and includes sections on 
bombing photography, training and navigation. The second part deals 
specifically with the formation of the Pathfinder Force, with sections on the 
experience of Bomber Command in the early war years and on “1942; The 
Year of Experimentation”. In this latter respect, the structure is similar to that 
adopted in this thesis.  
 
However, the coverage of the thesis is wide ranging and the style adopted by 
Cording is largely descriptive. This scatter-gun approach touches upon many 
aspects of the bombing offensive, including those that have no tangible 
association with the subject of target marking in the bombing offensive or 
which are at most incidental to the development of the techniques involved: 
for example, Cording devotes considerable wordage in speculating as to why 
Group Captain Cheshire was vetoed by Air Vice Marshal Bennett for a role in 
the Pathfinder Force, and to the use of the GEE navigation aid in the post-war 
Canberra aircraft. Indeed, Cording’s main focus is the formation of the 
Pathfinder Force and the personalities involved, such that the technical 
aspects of target marking do not feature until the end of the thesis and then 
not prominently. 
 
The same focus is repeated in Cording’s doctoral thesis37. Titled ‘The Other 
Bomber Battle: An examination of the Problems that arose between the Air 
Staff and the AOC Bomber Command between 1942 and 1945 and their 
Effects on the Strategic Bomber Offensive’, the main focus of the thesis is the 
clash of personalities between Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Harris, AOC 
Bomber Command, and Group Captain Sydney Bufton, Deputy Director (later 
Director) of Bombing Operations at the Air Ministry. The thesis does not deal 
with the technical aspects of target marking but does examine the debate 
surrounding the formation of the Pathfinder Force is some detail. However, 
                                                 
36
 Rex F. Cording, ‘Press on Regardless: A history of the origins and achievements of the 
R.A.F.’s Pathfinder Force 1916-1945’ University of Canterbury, MA Thesis 1992. 
37
 Rex F. Cording, ‘The Other Bomber Battle: An examination of the Problems that arose 
between the Air Staff and the AOC Bomber Command between 1942 and 1945 and their 
Effects on the Strategic Bomber Offensive’, University of Canterbury, PhD Thesis 2006. 
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again consistent with the main focus of the work, the analysis concentrates 
upon the clash of personalities between the individuals involved. In doing so, 
the thesis fails to set the debate into the proper context, specifically in terms 
of the ramifications for the continuation of the strategic bombing offensive 
should results then being achieved not improve. It also fails to place the 
outcome of the debate, namely the formation of the Pathfinder Force, into the 
context of the remainder of the offensive, including the subsequent 
development of target marking techniques by other Groups.  
 
Some aspects of target marking are also covered in the Robert Owen’s 
doctoral thesis, ‘Considered Policy or Haphazard Evolution? No 617 
Squadron RAF 1943-1945’38.  That thesis is primarily concerned with the 
means and motives behind the wartime role of No 617 Squadron, and looks 
beyond the well-known operations with which the squadron is usually 
associated39. The thesis is arranged chronologically and two chapters cover 
the period when No 617 Squadron, under the leadership of Group Captain 
Leonard Cheshire, experimented with low-level target marking40. This would 
later develop into the target marking techniques developed by No. 5 Group 
Bomber Command and which are considered in detail in Chapter 7 of this 
thesis. 
 
Consistent with the main focus of Owen’s thesis, those chapters are largely 
devoted to the debate surrounding a role for No 617 Squadron following the 
costly low-level raids on the Dortmund-Ems Canal and pending the availability 
of the Tallboy bomb for high-level precision bombing. The reference to the 
development of target marking techniques by the squadron is made in the 
context of the decision to employ the experience of the squadron in low-level 
attack firstly against CROSSBOW sites and then aero-engine factories. This 
explains that the low-level marking technique was developed in response to 
the failure of conventional techniques using proximity markers dropped using 
                                                 
38
 Robert Malcolm Owen, ‘Considered Policy or Haphazard Evolution? No 617 Squadron RAF 
1943-1945’ University of Huddersfield, PhD Thesis 2014. 
39
 Principally the Dams Raid of May 1943 and the attacks against the Tirpitz battleship in 
1944. 
40
 Chapter 2 (September 1943 – January 1944) and Chapter 3 (February 1944– May 1944) 
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Oboe. However, whilst these target marking techniques are described in 
some detail, the main focus of the work is the search for a suitable role for the 
squadron rather than the technical aspects of the target marking techniques. 
Thus, there is no analysis of why the techniques were successful compared 
with the conventional techniques used initially. Moreover, for understandable 
reasons given the scope of the thesis, it does not go on to explore the 
evolution of the low-level target marking technique developed by No 617 into 
wider application by No 5 Group and ultimately into the highly efficient 
techniques that fall under the general description of ‘offset’ marking’. 
 
In summary, two key points arise from this examination of the literature on the 
bombing offensive. Firstly, nowhere in this extensive body of literature is the 
technical aspect of target marking covered in detail: for example, 
considerations that are vital to the effectiveness of target marking, such as the 
concepts of ‘Systematic Error’, ‘Point of Aim’, ‘Probable Radial Error’ about 
the ‘Mean Point of Impact’ and the ‘Principle of Cumulative Dispersion’, as 
well as factors affecting the visibility of Target Indicators and relationship 
between the navigation aid and the profile of target marking techniques, either 
do not feature in this literature or, if they do, are given only cursory mention. 
This thesis fully addresses these considerations as a means of determining 
the effectiveness of target marking. Moreover, nowhere in this body of 
literature is the contribution of target marking to the outcome of the bombing 
offensive considered as a separate entity. It follows that this thesis breaks 
new ground by addressing an element of the bombing offensive that is not 
covered in existing literature, at least to the level of detail to which this thesis 
descends in seeking to understand the technical aspects that underpin the 
techniques of target marking and ultimately the contribution of target marking 
to the outcomes of bombing offensive.  
 
This thesis will show that the development of target marking techniques was 
dependent upon the employment of technologies that, at the time, were 
innovative and at the cutting edge of known science. It will be shown that the 
development and success of target marking techniques came about by 
combining the best technologies available at the time - navigation aids, Target 
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Indicators and flares, as well as the aircraft involved. This examination will be 
set in the wider context of the increasing use and reliance of technology at 
that time, not only in terms of military applications, but also in terms of the 
progression of society at large. In this respect, the thesis will reference and 
build upon the work of authors such as David Edgerton41, Guy Hartcup42 and 
Richard Overy43 on these issues. These authors explain the contribution 
made by advances in technology to Allied victory in all aspects of the Second 
World War, including major advances in major technologies such as the jet 
engine and the atomic bomb. This thesis will cite the development of target 
marking techniques as a lesser-known but nonetheless important example of 
the exploitation of technological advance to improve operational performance 
and efficiency.  In doing so, this thesis will also explore the counter-argument 
that the evolution of existing techniques using known technologies is more 
important than the introduction of new technologies of unknown effectiveness 
and as such will complement the existing literature on the evolution of 
operational research by authors such as Maurice Kirby44 and Randall 
Wakelam45, and David Edgerton’s arguments that the exploitation of existing 
technologies has been underrated46.    
 
Although the advancement in navigation aids and other technologies was 
crucial to the development of target marking techniques, this thesis will 
nonetheless recognise that the employment of those techniques on bombing 
operations necessarily involved the human factor and that this was itself 
fundamental to the outcome in terms of bombing accuracy and concentration. 
For example, some of the most widely used target marking techniques 
required bomb aimers to quickly identify, under the stress of operational 
conditions, the Mean Point of Impact of a constantly changing group of Target 
Indicators. The difficulties associated with this requirement, and the 
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 David Edgerton Britain’s War Machine (London: Penguin Books Ltd, 2012). 
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 Guy Hartcup The Effect of Science on the Second World War (Basingstoke, Hampshire: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2003). 
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 Richard Overy Why the Allies Won, (2
nd
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associated errors resulting from the ‘Principle of Cumulative Dispersion’47, had 
a significant impact on the concentration of bombing, which in turn was a 
major factor in the outcome of raids. However, whilst the importance of 
concentration is sometimes referred to secondary literature, this human 
element in the causal link between concentration and target marking is not 
made.  
 
The principal sources used in compiling this thesis are contemporary reports 
and correspondence held in The National Archives. In particular, from 1941 
onwards the Operational Research Section at Bomber Command (ORSBC) 
produced a series of reports and memoranda relating to bombing 
performance. Included within these are reports specifically relating to the 
performance of the navigation and blind bombing aids then in use, as well as 
reports covering the results achieved using the various target marking 
techniques. The statistical evidence provided by these reports has been relied 
upon to provide the factual basis to inform the discussion of the main issues. 
The vast majority of these documents are of a highly technical nature and 
generally are not referred to in secondary literature on the Bombing Offensive.  
 
Much of the historical context has been provided by the private papers of Air 
Chief Marshal Sir Charles Portal (Chief of Air Staff 1940 -1945)48, Air Chief 
Marshal Sir Arthur Harris (Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief Bomber 
Command 1942-1945)49, Air Commodore Sidney Bufton (Director/Deputy 
Director of Bomber Operations, Air Staff 1941-1945)50, Lord Cherwell51 and 
Sir Henry Tizard52. These individuals each played an important role in the 
conduct of the bombing offensive and each made an important contribution to 
the development of target marking techniques.  Additional information and 
perspectives have been sourced from published biographies of the above, as 
well as the autobiographies and biographies of others involved in various 
                                                 
47
  In relation to target marking, the Principle of Cumulative Dispersion states that, if successive aircraft 
aimed at the M.P.I. of all the markers visible, the aggregate M.P.I. was itself subject to a cumulative 
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aspects relating to target marking, including Air Chief Marshal Sir Wilfrid 
Freeman53 (Vice Chief of Air Staff 1940-1942), Marshal of the Royal Air Force 
Sir John Slessor54 (As Air Marshal John Slessor, Air Officer Commanding No 
5 Group Bomber Command); Air Vice Marshal Donald Bennett55 (Air Officer 
Commanding No 8 Pathfinder Group Bomber Command) and Air Commodore 
John Searby56 (as Wing Commander John Searby, a “Master Bomber” with 
No 8 Pathfinder Group).  
 
Information about the wider context of the bombing offensive has been taken 
from a number of published works, notably the four volumes of The Strategic 
Air Offensive against Germany 1939-1945 by Charles Webster and Noble 
Frankland57. In addition to the Raid Reports held in The National Archives, 
material relating to individual raids has been found in The Bomber Command 
War Diaries: An operational reference book by Martin Middlebrook and Chris 
Everitt58 and from various books relating to specific operations or series of 
operations. 
 
Any discussion on target marking techniques requires a firm understanding of 
the bombing and navigation aids on which they were based. Indeed, as will be 
shown in this thesis, the overall profile of each target marking technique was 
derived from the characteristics of the particular bombing or navigation aid 
employed. It follows that, in order to understand how these techniques were 
developed, it is first necessary to understand the technology and science 
behind each bombing or navigation aid. A technical description of these aids 
to the level of detail necessary to fully understand how they functioned 
requires a considerable amount of text. Consequently, the approach adopted 
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here is to provide a summary of the main characteristics of each bombing or 
navigation aid in Chapter 2 to assist the reader in understanding the 
discussion that follows, but to refer the reader to detailed technical description 
of these devices in other publications for additional information.   The principal 
sources for the technical descriptions in Chapter 2 are documents held in The 
National Archives, but additional information has been taken from a number of 
published works, including Beam Bombers: The Secret War of No.109 
Squadron by Michael Cummings59 and Echoes of War: The Story of H2S 
Radar by Sir Bernard Lovell60, as well as articles published by the Institute of 
Electrical Engineers. 
 
In order to achieve the aims stated above, this thesis will examine the 
development of target marking techniques in a number of discrete sections 
based on key topics. This approach as been adopted in deference to the 
technical nature of the subject matter, it being considered that the 
compartmentalisation of the text into discrete topics best facilitates the 
detailed explanation of and discussion about the technical aspects of the 
bombing offensive. It is acknowledged that this approach makes it more 
difficult to place these discrete topics into context with one another and the 
bombing offensive as a whole, and that a certain amount of repetition 
between sections becomes necessary. It is also recognised that the 
alternative approach, that of chronological narrative of the development of 
target marking techniques, would enable the development of target marking 
techniques to be charted in relation to the progress of the bombing offensive 
over time and would provide a wider context in which to place those 
developments.  
 
The relative advantages and disadvantages of these two approaches were 
carefully evaluated at the outset. However, the essence of this thesis is an 
examination of the highly technical techniques involved in target marking, and 
as such priority must be given to ensuring that these technical issues are 
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properly examined and their individual contribution to the bombing offensive 
fully understood. Consequently, on balance, it is considered that the 
advantages gained in adopting a thematic compartmentalisation approach 
outweigh any disadvantages in terms of disruption to the chronological 
narrative. 
 
The individual sections in this thesis are devoted to those events, individual 
techniques and technologies identified as being most salient to the 
development of target marking techniques during the course of the bombing 
offensive. The following is a short summary of the contents of each individual 
chapter. 
 
Before Target Marking 
 
This Chapter benchmarks the bombing performance of Bomber Command 
before the development of target marking techniques. This is based principally 
on the findings of the Butt Report. Published in August 1941, the Butt Report 
revealed the scale of the problem confronting Bomber Command at that time 
in terms of the accuracy of night bombing. The Butt Report is of fundamental 
significance to the development of target marking techniques in that, some 
commentators argue, the findings of the Butt Report acted as a catalyst for 
improvements in navigational techniques and were influential in the formation 
of the Pathfinder Force. This Chapter examines the findings of the Butt Report 
in detail, and considers how those findings influenced subsequent events 
impacting upon the development of target marking techniques. 
 
Blind Bombing 
 
This Chapter examines the bombing performance of the principal blind 
bombing aids (GEE, Oboe, H2S, G-H, S.S.LORAN) used during the bombing 
offensive. The Chapter includes a brief technical description of these blind 
bombing aids, with emphasis on the limitations associated with each. The 
main purpose of this Chapter is to benchmark the performance of the principal 
blind bombing aids when used in isolation and thereby enable a comparison 
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to be made when used in conjunction with target marking techniques in later 
chapters. This Chapter will therefore address one of the key questions asked 
by this thesis, in terms of the results that Bomber Command might have 
achieved without the introduction of target marking techniques. A secondary 
purpose of this Chapter is to introduce the reader to the main blind bombing 
aids on which the various target marking techniques were based and which 
are discussed in later chapters. This Chapter will also place the development 
of the principal blind bombing aids in the context of existing literature on the 
importance of new technology on the conduct and outcome of the Second 
World War. 
 
Early Target Marking Techniques 
 
This Chapter briefly describes the first attempts by Bomber Command at 
target marking during the period 1940 to 1941, before offering a comparison 
with the techniques employed by the Luftwaffe’s specialist target finding unit 
Kampfgruppe 100. The main part of the Chapter describes in detail the 
development of the first dedicated target marking technique used by Bomber 
Command (Shaker), with the emphasis on the relationship between that 
technique and the particular characteristics of the GEE navigation aid on 
which it relied. The results achieved using the Shaker technique are examined 
in order to provide a benchmark against which the results achieved using later 
target techniques on the same target set can be compared, and thereby 
demonstrate the direct relationship between the characteristics of particular 
navigation aids and the results achieved by target marking techniques that 
relied upon it.  
The formation of the Pathfinder Force 
 
The formation of the Pathfinder Force in August 1942 is one of the most 
significant events - if not the most significant event - in the development of 
target marking techniques. Indeed, as No.8 (PFF) Group61, the Pathfinder 
Force is inextricably linked to the development of target marking techniques 
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throughout the bombing offensive. This Chapter details the debate 
surrounding the formation of the Pathfinder Force, including the role played by 
key individuals in that debate. The Chapter includes a review of the debate 
surrounding the creation of the Pathfinder Force in secondary literature, and 
discusses the proposition that the concept of a target finding force was under 
consideration earlier and more widely than generally acknowledged in 
secondary literature.   
 
Pathfinder Force target marking techniques 
 
This Chapter comprises a technical description and appraisal of the principal 
target marking techniques developed by the Pathfinder Force (Newhaven, 
Parramatta, Wanganui). Particular emphasis is given to the evolution and 
refinement of these techniques in the light of operational experience, and to 
the relationship between the characteristics and accuracy of each tecqhniue 
and the navigation aid used. This Chapter introduces the important concepts 
of the “Systematic Error” and the ‘Principle of Cumulative Distribution’, and 
details the attempts made to minimise the errors caused by these factors 
through the development and evolution of the target marking techniques 
throughout the remainder of the bombing offensive. The Chapter examines 
the effect on bombing performance following the introduction and subsequent 
development of these target marking techniques.  
 
No 5 Group Pathfinding Techniques 
 
As the bombing offensive progressed, No. 5 Group Bomber Command 
increasingly developed its own target marking techniques, a capability that 
would eventually culminate in No.5 Group effectively operating as an 
independent force and which would enhance the tactical freedom of the 
bomber force. This Chapter describes the development of target marking 
techniques by No 5 Group (Visual Groundmarking, Offset, Line, Sector) and 
attempts an objective assessment of the relative merits of the techniques 
adopted by this Group and the Pathfinder Force. With the use of comparative 
data, this Chapter explores the proposition that the target marking techniques 
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developed by No. 5 Group were superior in terms of accuracy and 
effectiveness compared with those used by the Pathfinder Force, notably in 
relation to precision attacks in the build-up to OPERATION OVERLORD. The 
relationship between the respective Group Commanders of No 5 Group and 
the Pathfinders (and their relationship with Harris), one of the most interesting 
aspects of the bombing offensive, is also discussed. 
 
The role of the Master Bomber 
 
First used for guiding small-scale precision raids from mid-1943, the role of 
the ‘Master Bomber’ became increasingly used to guide large-scale attacks by 
the Main Force as the bombing offensive progressed.  Some of these raids - 
such as the attack on the research establishment at Peenemünde in August 
1943 - were significant because of their individual outcome. Others - such as 
the firestorm raid on Darmsdadt in September 1944 - reflected the ever-
increasing capability of Bomber Command to devastate large urban areas. 
This section traces the evolution of the role of Master Bomber from its 
inception in 1943 to the conclusion of the bombing offensive, and assesses 
the contribution made by this tactic to the effectiveness of bomber operations. 
The role of the Master Bomber was not confined to any one of the target 
marking techniques described in earlier Chapters, and for that reason is 
considered separately in this Chapter.  
  
Conclusion 
 
The cumulative findings of these individual topic-based sections provide a 
comprehensive understanding of the development of target marking 
techniques during the course of the bombing offensive, which makes it 
possible for an informed assessment to be made of the contribution that the 
development of target marking techniques made to the effectiveness of the 
bombing offensive.  
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CHAPTER ONE: BEFORE TARGET MARKING 
 
The purpose of this Chapter is to ‘benchmark’ bombing accuracy before the 
advent of any navigation aids or target marking techniques. The performance 
of Bomber Command using traditional navigation techniques will then be 
compared with the performance achieved with the benefit of navigation aids 
and various target marking techniques in later chapters. This chapter will also 
explain some of the basic principles relating to the navigation of aircraft, and 
explore the extent to which features on the ground are visible at night.  
 
Bomber Command entered the Second World War committed to a strategy of 
precision bombing in daylight. Pre-war tactics were based on the assumption 
that well flown self-defended bomber formations would survive contact with 
the enemy and enable precision bombing of purely military objectives. 
Consequently, the vast majority of pre-war training took place in daylight, with 
the emphasis on formation flying and precision bombing from moderate 
altitudes and with an average of only 8% of training sorties taking place at 
night1. The theory that self-defended bomber formations would survive 
contact with the enemy was soon dispelled, as early operations in daylight 
during the opening months of the war incurred prohibitive losses. It rapidly 
became apparent that, if Bomber Command was to play any sort of role, it 
would have to switch to bombing at night. 
 
                                                 
1
 TNA AIR14/57 Bomber Command Annual Training Report, 1938. 
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At first, Bomber Command proceeded on the basis that bombing at night 
required no change in the overall strategy. Indeed, Air Commodore 
Coningham, AOC No 4. Group, told Bomber Command in February 1940 that 
‘…the accuracy of night bombing will differ little from daylight bombing’2. 
However, there would be an early and growing realisation that Bomber 
Command lacked the capability to successfully attack precision targets at 
night and this led some, notably Charles Portal as Commander in Chief of 
Bomber Command and then as Chief of Air Staff, to advocate that these 
prime targets should only be attacked on moonlit nights3. On other nights, 
Portal considered, it would be better to attack industrial areas rather than 
precise objectives and this has led several commentators to identify this as 
one of the first steps towards ‘area bombing’4. Nonetheless, as Portal’s 
biographer observes, Portal never lost sight of the superiority of precision 
bombing if that could be achieved and initially there remained a belief that 
such targets could be successfully attacked if weather conditions were 
favourable5. 
 
Despite the initial optimism expressed in some quarters, including Portal, the 
reality was starkly different. The first attempt at night bombing - on the 
Hornum seaplane base on the island of Sylt - had been a complete failure 
when, notwithstanding reports of accurate bombing by the crews taking part, 
                                                 
2
 Webster and Frankland The Strategic Air Offensive, Vol iv Appendix 6, p212. Letter from 
Coningham to Groom. 
3
 TNA AIR2/4474 Letter C-in-C Bomber Command to Air Ministry dated 16 July 1940. See 
also Webster and Frankland The Strategic Air Offensive, Vol i, p150. 
4
 Peter Gray, The Leadership, Direction and Legitimacy of the RAF Bomber Offensive from 
Inception to 1945 (London: Continuum International Publishing Group, 2012), p169. 
5
 Denis Richards, Portal of Hungerford (London, 1977), p307. 
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no damage was visible following photographic reconnaissance6.  The warning 
signs were already there for those who cared to look. The raid had taken 
place in moonlight against a coastal target, with strict instructions to the 
Groups to send only the most experienced crews. Nonetheless, nearly 20% of 
crews taking part failed to locate the target at all, and no visible damage was 
inflicted on the target itself. The Bomber Command report on the raid reached 
the inescapable conclusion that: “The operation does not confirm that as a 
general rule, the average crews of our heavy bombers can identify targets at 
night, even under the best conditions…. “7. The report went on to conclude 
that: “Our general opinion is that under war conditions the average crew of a 
night bomber could not be relied upon to identify targets at night except under 
the very best conditions of visibility, even when the target is on the coast or a 
large river…..if the target has no conspicuous aids to its location, very few 
inexperienced crews would be likely to find it under any conditions”. It was not 
an auspicious start of the night bombing campaign. 
 
Nor was this the first warning that finding targets at night would be 
problematic. From the very first night of the war, Whitley bombers of No. 4 
Group had been groping their way in the darkness over Germany engaged on 
leaflet dropping. The Group Commander - the same Air Commodore 
Coningham who a month earlier had declared that the accuracy of night 
bombing will differ little from daylight bombing - was already aware of the 
difficulties that his crews were experiencing and was sufficiently concerned to 
                                                 
6
 TNA AIR14/2782 Report on air operations against the German Air Station on the night of 
19/20
th
 March 1940, dated 10 April 1940. A total of 50 aircraft took part in the raid, with 41 
crews reporting that they had located the target. 
7
 Ibid. Also quoted, in part, in Hastings Bomber Command, p82.  
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report as much to Bomber Command Headquarters8. Indeed, the warning 
signs were present even before the outbreak of war. In the last two years 
before hostilities, 478 Bomber Command aircraft engaged on night cross-
country exercises over England force-landed away from their bases having 
become lost9. If these crews, using ‘Bradshaw navigation’10 and with towns 
and cities illuminated, became lost with such regularity it should not have 
been surprising that crews were unable to locate to navigate accurately over 
blacked-out enemy territory.  
  
The problem of finding a target at night was two-fold. First, the crew had to 
navigate to the general area of the target using dead-reckoning11. The 
principles of dead-reckoning are set out in the Manual of Air Navigation 
(AP1234) published in 193812, but essentially requires two vectors, i) the 
course and airspeed of the aircraft and ii) the direction and speed of the wind. 
The former gave the theoretical position of the aircraft in conditions of zero 
wind and is therefore known as the air position vector; the latter being known 
as the wind vector. These vectors were computed to produce a third vector, 
this being the track and ground speed of the aircraft. It was this third vector 
that dictated the progress of the aircraft over the ground13.  
 
                                                 
8
 Webster and Frankland The Strategic Air Offensive, Vol i, p212. 
9
 TNA AIR14/57 Bomber Command Annual Training Report, 1938. 
10
 ‘Bradshaw navigation’ was derisory RAF slang for the practice of following railway lines as 
a means of navigation, named after George Bradshaw, the inventor of the railway timetable. 
11
 Usually abbreviated to D/R. Also known as ‘Deduced Reckoning’. 
12
 TNA AIR20/1905 Manual of Air Navigation (AP 1234),1938 (Reprint). See also Aylife, The 
development of Airborne Dead Reckoning: Part I – Finding the Wind, Part II – Staying on 
Track, p463-476. 
13
 Eric Cropper. Back Bearings: a Navigator’s Tale 1942 to 1974 (Barnsley: Pen & Sword 
Aviation, 2010), p19. 
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The principal difficulty with D/R navigation is the calculation of the wind vector 
which not only changes over time, but usually differs in both strength and 
direction at various altitudes. The only practical means of calculating the wind 
vector is to compare the air position vector with a known ground position. 
Consequently, D/R navigation can only be continued with any degree of 
accuracy if the position of the aircraft can be confirmed by ‘taking a fix’. Prior 
to the introduction of electronic and radar navigation aids, the principal 
methods of taking a fix were by map reading; astro-navigation (using a 
sextant); and radio-direction finding. However, map reading relies upon a 
clear sight of the ground, whereas both astro-navigation and radio-direction 
finding were difficult and lengthy processes, and ultimately unreliable. 
Moreover, at best, astro-navigation and radio-direction could only get an 
aircraft to the target area14. 
 
Notwithstanding the difficulties involved, calculating the wind vector is 
essential to D/R navigation because the heading needs to be adjusted to 
make good the desired track. Moreover, any errors in dead-reckoning due to 
an inaccurate wind vector are cumulative over distance and it was found that 
D/R navigation on its own produced errors of 10% of the distance flown, 
equating to errors of 30-40 miles for most targets in Germany15. It follows that 
the significant errors in navigation during early bombing operations largely 
resulted from the inaccurate forecast of wind vectors compounded by the 
                                                 
14
 Webster and Frankland The Strategic Air Offensive, Vol i , p210. 
15
 TNA AIR14/2693 Operational Research Section Bomber Command (ORSBC) Report No 
S.252 The effect of the development of navigational and blind bombing techniques of the 
efficiency of bombing operations during World War II (Aug 1941 – May 1945), dated October 
1945. 
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inability of crews to calculate the true wind vector by checking ground position 
with a reliable fix.   
 
Having navigated to the general area, the second problem was locating the 
particular target. As early as May 1939, Sir Edgar Ludlow-Hewitt, at that time 
Commander in Chief of Bomber Command, observed that it was important to 
know ‘exactly what type of target was worthwhile allotting for attack at night…’ 
although nothing was done to resolve that question before hostilities 
commenced16. Consequently, Bomber Command transitioned to a night force 
with little or no understanding of the visibility of targets at night. 
 
The task of determining the visibility of targets at night fell to the Whitley 
crews of the early leaflet raids. The reports of the crews taking part were a 
portent of the difficulties soon to be faced by Bomber Command. In October 
1939, Air Commodore Coningham reported that the ability of crews to see a 
target depended upon the state of the moon and the weather; whether the 
target was blacked out or self-illuminating; the height at which the aircraft was 
flying; and the dazzle from searchlights17. In moonlight, it was found that 
areas of water became self-illuminating by reflection of the moonlight and that 
large rivers, canals and lakes could be seen from above 12,000ft. Small 
rivers, on the other hand, were not visible above 8,000ft whereas railway lines 
were visible at certain angles from a ‘surprising height’. Small towns could be 
                                                 
16
 Webster and Frankland The Strategic Air Offensive, Vol i  p113. 
At that time, Sir Edgar Ludlow-Hewitt was C-in-C Bomber Command. 
17
 Webster and Frankland. The Strategic Air Offensive Vol i, p206. Report by Air Commodore 
Coningham to Bomber Command 11
th
 October 1939. 
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seen from heights to 4,000ft to 6,000ft, but separate buildings were not visible 
from above 3,000ft to 4,000ft. 
 
However, on dark nights with no moon, only crews flying at low level could 
distinguish land from water, and only self-illuminating objects such as blast 
furnaces were visible at height. The solution, ventured Air Commodore 
Coningham, was a timed run to the target from visible features nearby 
although, when tried in January 1940, bombing runs at 6,000ft from ten, 
fifteen and twenty miles produced errors of 1,200 yards, 4,480 yards and 
5,280 yards respectively18. In the light of this report, the later optimism 
expressed by Air Commodore Coningham about the accuracy of night 
bombing, referred to above, is difficult to reconcile.      
 
As early as November 1940, Bomber Command was already well aware that 
only one third of aircraft despatched reached their targets19.  By early 1941, 
there was growing realisation within the Air Staff that it was futile to attempt 
the destruction of precision targets in anything other than moonlit nights. A 
paper produced in April 1941 by the Deputy Director of Bombing Operations 
(D.D.B. Ops) accepted that successful attack on specific targets at night can 
only be undertaken in clear moonlight and, it followed, that for three-quarters 
of each month it was only possible to obtain satisfactory results by 
concentrated attacks of working class and industrial areas in selected towns. 
It was further accepted that it was a matter of the greatest difficulty to find 
                                                 
18
 Webster and Frankland The Strategic Air Offensive Vol i. p209 Report on trials on 18
th
, 20
th
 
and 26
th
 January 1940. The technique of offset bombing, or more correctly offset marking, 
would be used with considerable success by No. 5 Group later in the conflict, as discussed in 
Chapter Six. 
19
 TNA AIR14/64 Minutes of the Group Navigation Officers Conference, 12 November 1940. 
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these selected towns on moonless nights unless they were located on or near 
water20.  This was essentially the same conclusion that Bomber Command 
had itself reached exactly a year beforehand following the first night bombing 
attack of the war21. 
 
By mid-1941, not only was there a general acceptance within the Air Staff and 
Bomber Command that the average crew was unable to locate precision 
targets other than in perfect conditions22, there were growing doubts about the 
accuracy of bombing in other quarters. One of those concerned was Lord 
Cherwell, the personal scientific advisor to the Prime Minister, who on his own 
initiative commissioned an independent investigation into the matter. This 
investigation was carried out by Mr David Bensusan-Butt, an economist in the 
Statistical Section of the War Cabinet secretariat23 and his report, known as 
the Butt Report, was to have far reaching consequences for the outcome of 
the bombing offensive.   
 
The Butt Report was issued to Bomber Command on 18 August 194124. The 
report examined “about 650” photographs taken during night bombing 
                                                 
20
 Webster and Frankland The Strategic Air Offensive, Vol iv, p137. Paper on bombing policy 
by D.D.B. Ops dated 24
th
 April 1941, attached with minor revisions as an appendix to the 
Ministry Directive dated 9
th
 July 1941. 
21
 See the description above of the attack on the sea-plane base at Hornum on the 19/20 
March 1940. 
22
 Webster and Frankland The Strategic Air Offensive, Vol iv ,p137. Paper on bombing policy 
by D.D.B. Ops dated 24
th
 April 1941, attached with minor revisions as an appendix to the 
Ministry Directive dated 9
th
 July 1941 
23
 Overy.  The Bombing War; Europe 1939-194, p267. 
24
 TNA AIR8/1356 ‘Report by Mr Butt to Bomber Command on his Examination of Night 
Photographs’ 18 August 1941. 
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operations between 2 June and 25 July 194125.  The statistical conclusions of 
the Butt Report, set out in a summary right at the beginning, were as follows: 
 
 
1. Of those aircraft recorded as attacking their target, only one in three 
got within five miles. 
 
2. Over the French ports, the proportion was two in three; over Germany 
as a whole, the proportion was one in four; over the Ruhr, it was only 
one in ten. 
 
3. In the Full Moon, the proportion was two in five; in the new moon it was 
only one in fifteen. 
 
4. In the absence of haze, the proportion is over one half, whereas in 
thick haze it is only one in fifteen. 
 
5. An increase in the intensity of A.A. fire reduces the number of aircraft 
getting within five miles of their target in the ratio three to two. 
 
6. All these figures relate only to aircraft recorded as attacking the target; 
the proportion of the total sorties which reached within five miles is less 
by one third (original emphasis). 
                                                 
25
 The figure of “about 650” photographs is derived from the summary of the Report. 
However, the key findings of the Report are mostly based on a sample of 633 photographs, 
with a slightly higher total of 649 photographs used solely in the analysis of the ‘Effects of 
Haze’ – the additional six photographs reckoned in this part of the Report relate to alternative 
targets.  
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Thus, of the total sorties dispatched only one in five got within five miles of the 
target, i.e with[in] the 75 square miles surrounding the target26. The magnitude 
of this error is neatly encapsulated by Norman Longmate who, making a 
comparison with London, observed that a bomb aimed at the Houses of 
Parliament would have been counted as being on target if it had landed on 
Streatham Common, Hammersmith Broadway or the East India Dock Road27. 
The findings of the Butt Report are therefore a grim indictment of the 
capability of Bomber Command at that time.  
 
In most accounts of the bombing offensive, reference to the Butt Report is 
confined to this headline result and to the debate that followed28. However, for 
the purposes of benchmarking the effect of target marking, the detailed 
findings of the Report are of particular importance and it is therefore 
necessary to conduct a forensic examination of them. 
 
The main text of the Butt Report sets out the basis for the statistical analysis, 
beginning with a brief description of the methodology. In this context, it is 
explained that the 650 photographs relate to 28 targets, 48 nights and 100 
separate raids29. The Butt Report then reviews of the success of attacks over 
the period as a whole, confirming that the total number of photographs 
                                                 
26
 Although the figure 75 square miles’ is used in the Report, the actual area of a target area 
having a radius of 5 miles is 78.55 square miles. 
27
 Longmate. The Bombers, p121. 
28
 Hastings. Bomber Command, p.p 108-109; Longmate. The Bombers) p.p. 120-122: 
Neillands. The Bomber War: Overy. The Bombing War; Europe 1939-1945 (Allen Lane, 
London 2013), p.p. 267-268; Richards. The Hardest Victor,, p.p. 96-97; Anthony Verrier The 
Bomber Offensive (Pan Books, 1974), p.p. 133-135. 
29
 The 28 targets attacked are not specified in the Report, although some indication of these 
targets is given later in the Report where the targets are divided into target groups.  
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purporting to represent the target, target area or believed target area was 633. 
Of this total, 326 (51%) were not plotted; 113 (18%) were plotted outside the 
target area and 194 (31%) were plotted inside the target area (see Fig 1/).  
Not Plotted
51%
Plotted outside 
target area
18%
Plotted inside 
target area
31%
Butt Report Percentage of photographs 
within the target area
 
Fig 1/  Butt Report: Percentage of photographs within the target area 
 
The conclusion reached in this part of the Butt Report is that only about one 
third of aircraft claiming to reach the target actually reach it30. No doubt 
realising the significance of this conclusion, the Butt Report then makes two 
very important qualifications to this figure: 
 
a) that the figure of one third (and all other percentages in the Butt 
Report) relates to aircraft recorded as having attacked the primary 
target, not to the total aircraft dispatched. During the period covered by 
the Butt Report, a total of 6,103 aircraft were dispatched but only 4,065 
claimed to have attacked the primary target: – 66% of those 
                                                 
30
 The figure of ‘about one third’ is the 31% of photographs plotted within the target area. 
 48 
 
dispatched. Thus, the Butt Report concluded, of the total number of 
aircraft dispatched only one fifth actually reached the target. 
 
b) That by defining the target area as having a radius of five miles, an 
area of over 75 square miles is taken31. This must mean, the Butt 
Report observes, that for any town other than Berlin the vast majority of 
the target area consists of open country. It therefore follows that the 
proportion of aircraft actually dropping their bombs on built up areas 
must be very much less than the roughly one third of aircraft reaching 
the target area. 
 
 
The majority of the Butt Report is devoted to the analysis of those factors 
affecting the success of attack, namely ground features, moonlight, haze, 
cloud, and Anti-Aircraft fire. In terms of the subsequent development of target 
marking techniques, the first four factors are of particular relevance and it is 
therefore helpful to consider the findings of the Report in relation to these 
factors in more detail. 
 
In relation to ground features, the sample was too small to allow analysis of 
how easily individual targets could be found and therefore the Butt Report 
divided the targets into five groups: French ports32; German ports33; the 
                                                 
31
 As indicated above, although the phrase ‘over 75 square miles’ is used in the Report and is 
retained here, the actual area of a target area having a radius of 5 miles is 78.55 square 
miles. The origin of the choice of five miles as the target area is not clear. A later report by the 
Operational Research Section of Bomber Command implies that the choice of five miles in 
the Butt Report was an arbitrary one. 
32
 Brest, Lorient and La Pallice 
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Ruhr34; All Germany35; and All targets. The effect of ground features on the 
ease with which these target groups could be found is then presented in the 
following table and shown here in Fig 2/ below36: 
 
 
 
 
 
Photographs 
 
 
Target Groups 
 
 
No. of Raids 
 
Total 
 
 
In  
Target 
 
 
% 
In Target 
 
French ports 9 94 60 64 
German Ports 21 91 16 18 
Ruhr 38 225 21 9 
All Germany 91 539 134 25 
All targets 100 633 194 31 
 
Table 1/ Butt Report: target groups 
                                                                                                                                            
33
 Bremen, Emden, Hamburg and Kiel 
34
 Cologne, Dortmund, Duisburg, Dusseldorf, Essen, Hamm, Schwerte 
35
 Unlike the other groups, the individual targets in this group are not specified in the Report. 
However, targets in Germany other the ports and the Ruhr attacked during this period 
included Berlin, Frankfurt and Hannover. Source: The Bomber Command War Diaries 
36
 The presentation of this table is slightly modified here to facilitate representation in 
diagrammatic form, although the statistical contents remain unaltered. 
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Fig 2/ Butt Report: Percentage of photographs within the target area by target type 
 
The Butt Report then analysed the relative success with which targets were 
reached in three phases of the moon cycle: full moon, half moon and new 
moon37. To this was added the effect of haze, for which purposes all 
references to haze were classified into 3 categories based upon the 
classification in crew reports: 
 
(1) ‘Nil’ or ‘slight’ or ‘clear’, etc = Nil 
(2) ‘Some haze’, ‘hazy’, etc  = Medium 
(3) ‘Thick haze’, ‘very hazy’, etc = Thick 
 
By combining the phase of the moon with the amount of haze, the report 
arrives at what are termed as the ‘nine states of visibility’. Taking the degree 
                                                 
37
 In each case, the moon period was defined as the night of that phase (full, half and new) 
and three nights before and after. 
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area by target type
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of success (say 60-70%) attained in Full Moon conditions with Nil haze as a 
value of 100, the Report summarises the results for the ‘nine states of 
visibility’ as follows and shown here in Fig 3/ below38: 
 
 
Moon 
 
Haze 
 
 
Nil 
 
 
Medium 
 
Thick 
Full 100 40 23 
Half 100 32 7 
New 40 (4) (3) 
 
Table 2/ Butt Report: the 9 states of visibility 
  
 
                                                 
38
 For reasons that are not explained, this table in the Butt Report reverts to the description of 
haze found in the pilots reports rather than the descriptions of ‘Nil’, Medium’ and ‘Thick’ 
provided by the Meteorological Branch, and as used in the preceding table. For consistency, 
the latter have been retained here. The figures in brackets are based on too small a sample to 
be significant. 
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Fig 3/ Butt Report: Percentage of photographs within target area by state of visibility 
 
Next, the Butt Report conducts a similar exercise in relation to the effect of 
cloud cover. As with the effect of moonlight and haze, the level of cloud cover 
is divided into categories according to the forms rendered with the 
photographs. The three categories are: 
 
(1) Little = nil, clear, slight, one tenth to three tenths cloud cover39 
 
(2) Medium = medium, cloudy, four tenths to six tenths cloud cover 
 
(3) Heavy = dense, heavy, seven tenths to ten tenths cloud cover 
 
                                                 
39
 This is another example in the Report where the categories set out in the table differ from 
those set out in main text. For the sake of clarity, the categories used in the table here have 
been matched with their respective description in the main text. The Report follows the then 
practice of measuring cloud cover in ‘tenths’, since replaced by the ‘Okta’ (eighths) as the 
standard measure of cloud cover. 
0
20
40
60
80
100
Nil
Medium
Thick
Ratio 
in 
relation
to 
Full Moon
with
Nil Haze
Haze 
Butt Report Percentage of photographs 
within target area by a state of visibility 
Full
Half
New
 53 
 
Using these categories, the following results were obtained and shown here 
as Fig 4/ below. 
 
                                                 
40
 This table was based upon a smaller sample of reports (353 photographs, compared to 633 
in most cases, or 649 in one case)  and the Butt Report acknowledges is therefore less 
reliable. The numbers in brackets are based on a sample too small to be significant. 
 
Moon 
 
Cloud Amount 
 
Successful Photographs Taken
40
 
 
 
In Target Area 
 
Total 
 
No. In 
Target 
Area as 
Percentage 
of Total 
 
Full 
 
 
Heavy 
Medium 
Little 
 
1 
7 
64 
 
19 
15 
116 
 
(5) 
(46) 
55 
 
 
Half 
 
Heavy 
Medium 
Little 
 
2 
3 
43 
 
16 
13 
91 
 
(12) 
(23) 
47 
 
 
New 
 
Heavy 
Medium 
Little 
 
- 
1 
4 
 
17 
19 
47 
 
(0) 
(5) 
8 
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Table 3/ Butt Report: effect of cloud cover 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
Little 
Medium 
Heavy 
total 
%
In 
Target 
Cloud cover 
Butt Report Percentage of photographs 
within target area by cloud and phases of 
the Moon and cloud cover 
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Fig 4/ Butt Report: Percentage of photographs within target area by cloud and phases of the 
moon 
 
The Butt Report was concerned with locating a target area of some 75 square 
miles whereas target marking techniques would relate to the identification of a 
specific Aiming Point (A/P). Nonetheless, the same basic principles relating to 
the visibility of the ground at night apply equally to both. Consequently, in 
 
All Phases 
 
Heavy 
Medium 
Little 
 
3 
11 
111 
 
52 
47 
254 
 
6 
23 
44 
 
 
Total 
 
 
125 
 
353 
 
35 
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relation to target marking, perhaps the key finding in the Butt Report is the 
importance of ground features on the percentage of aircraft reaching the 
target area, particularly the presence of distinctive water features such as 
docks. Also significant is the effect of the haze, given that industrial haze was 
an ever-present feature over many German cities. During the full or half moon 
periods, the analysis of the ‘nine states of visibility’ showed that even the 
presence of medium haze significantly reduced the number of aircraft 
reaching the target area. In conditions of a new moon and thick haze, even 
assuming no cloud cover, very few aircraft got within five miles of the target. 
In the context of the improving German defences at this time, which would 
shortly force Bomber Command to abandon large scale operations during the 
full moon period, the performance of Bomber Command during the ‘nine 
states of visibility’ demonstrates the scale of the task facing those charged 
with finding a target at night and therefore the value of target marking 
techniques. 
 
Based on the findings summarised above, the Butt Report made a number of 
recommendations for further study. These can be distilled down into two key 
recommendations: 
 
1/ That, whilst the figures in the report should not be rejected ‘without 
enquiry’, it was very desirable that they should be checked in every possible 
way and that such an enquiry should be carried out, and 
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2/ That a statistical branch should be formed under a fully trained 
statistician to assess night photographs and provided with sufficient clerical 
staff to maintain records and carry out the computations involved. 
 
The Butt Report was the first to statistically analyse the performance of 
Bomber Command in relation to the various factors that affected visibility of 
the ground at night. In this respect, it is difficult to underestimate the 
importance of the Butt Report. This is not to say that the Butt Report should 
be taken as in any way definitive - indeed, the Butt Report did not itself claim 
to be infallible - but wherever there is possibility of error in the results, the Butt 
Report is quick to explain why the results are considered to be a good 
indication of the true outcomes. 
 
Even with this caveat in mind, the results in the Butt Report are nothing short 
of startling, and none more so than the overall finding that only one in five of 
the total sorties dispatched got within five miles of a target measured as over 
75 square miles. The importance of the Butt Report has been questioned by 
Richard Overy, who contends that its significance can easily be 
exaggerated41.  However, it is beyond the remit of this thesis to enter that 
debate. The purpose of referring to the Butt Report in detail here is that it 
represents the first scientific attempt to quantify the performance of Bomber 
Command. Moreover, although some at Bomber Command sought to 
challenge the findings of the Report - the Official History records that the 
Commander in Chief Bomber Command, at that time Sir Richard Pierse, 
                                                 
41
 Overy. The Bombing War; Europe 1939-1945, p268. 
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opined that “ I don’t think at this rate we could have hoped to produce the 
damage which is known to have been achieved” – the accuracy of the 
statistical findings have not been seriously challenged. These findings 
therefore provide a reliable statistical benchmark for the performance of 
bomber command without electronic navigation aids and before the 
introduction of organised target marking. 
 
It is a truism that the first stage to solving any problem is to acknowledge that 
the problem exists. The Butt Report had achieved this first stage - albeit 
begrudgingly within Bomber Command itself - but it was next necessary to 
solve the problem now acknowledged to exist. As described above, one of the 
recommendations of the Butt Report was that a statistical branch should be 
formed under a fully trained statistician to assess night photographs and this 
ultimately led to the formation of the Operational Research Section in Bomber 
Command (ORSBC). Throughout the remainder of the bombing offensive, 
ORSBC would undertake extensive research into the accuracy and 
effectiveness of bombing and target marking techniques, the findings of which 
are extensively relied upon in this thesis42. 
 
Between November 1941 and April 1942, ORSBC published a series of 
reports on the performance of Bomber Command in terms of target 
identification. The purpose of the analysis was to identify those features most 
commonly relied upon by crews to identify a target and, therefore, to better 
understand the errors crews were making in target identification. Although 
                                                 
42
 For a detailed description of the formation and history of the Operational Research Section 
at HQ Bomber Command, see Dickins. ‘Operational Research in Bomber Command’ and 
Wakelam, The Science of Bombing.  
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ORSBC produced reports on the accuracy of bombing at regular periods until 
the end of the war, the three reports detailed here were the only reports 
produced by ORSBC that adopted the same five mile target area used in the 
Butt Report. Furthermore, each of these reports considered the difficulties of 
target identification in conjunction with bombing accuracy, presented the data 
in essentially the same format and related to periods when no navigation aids 
were available. All subsequent ORSBC reports on overall bombing accuracy 
used a three mile target area as the basis for analysis and, for the most part, 
presented the data in a different format to that used in these reports. All 
subsequent ORSBC reports also covered periods during which at least one 
navigation aid was in operational use. It is therefore convenient to consider 
these three reports as a series for the sake of comparison with the findings in 
the Butt Report.  
 
The first, albeit preliminary, analysis conducted by ORSBC considered 
operations carried out in October 194143.  This analysis showed that 12% of 
aircraft plotted were within 5 miles of the target and a further 8.5% within 6 to 
10 miles. Of those crews claiming to have identified the target, photographs 
showed that 26% were within 5 miles of it, with a further 17% crews within 6 to 
10 miles. Those crews unable to identify the target (48%) cited poor visibility 
due to haze and cloud cover as the main reasons. 
 
The features given by the crews as the means of target identification were 
variously given as follows: 
                                                 
43
 TNA AIR14/1758 ORSBC Memorandum No.19 “Preliminary Note on Questionnaire relating 
to Target Identification”, 19 November 1941,. The ‘Questionnaire’ was the insertion of three 
questions relating to target identification on the pilots post raid forms. 
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Feature 
 
 
No. of times given 
Rivers 27 
Docks 18 
Coastline 11 
Railways 2 
Lakes 2 
Promontory 1 
Autobahn 1 
 
Table 3/ ORSBC Report: features given by crews as means of target identification Source: 
TNA AIR14/1758. ORSBC Memorandum No.19 ‘Preliminary Note on Questionnaire relating to 
Target Identification’, 19 November 1941. 
 
Commenting on these findings, the ORSBC report made three observations: i) 
that rivers made particularly unreliable landmarks; ii) that coastlines were a 
more reliable guide but could be deceptive, and iii) that views of docks were 
not decisive. The general conclusion drawn was that reliance should not be 
placed on one feature alone, but should be based on a number of features in 
conjunction.  
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The second analysis on target identification conducted by the ORSBC was a 
more comprehensive undertaking44, the stated purpose of which was to 
identify which ground features provided the greatest help in identifying targets. 
The report found that two factors affected the degree of success achieved in 
identifying targets: i) the weather conditions, and ii) the height at which the 
aircraft flew. In relation to the former, it was noted that only on three 
occasions where there was thick haze or cloud did the crews claim to have 
identified the target – and on none of these were the crew proved correct by 
the photograph. Similarly, of those crews claiming to have identified the target 
in conditions of moderate cloud or haze, the photographs showed only 16% to 
have been within 5 miles.  
 
In the remaining instances where crews claimed to have identified the target, 
visibility was described as good (84%). Nonetheless, only 55% of these crews 
were correct in their claim. Moreover, on one of the nights within the period 
covered45, visibility was exceptionally good. On this night, of those crews 
claiming to have identified the target, 91% were proved to be correct. If this 
raid is discounted from the figures, the percentage of crews claiming to have 
reached the target which actually did so falls from 48% to 35% - a figure 
consistent with that reached in the Butt Report. 
 
In relation to the height at which aircraft flew, the investigation showed that 
there was little difference in the ability of crews to identify targets at altitudes 
above 13,000ft. However, below that height, smaller ground features such as 
                                                 
44
 TNA AIR14/1758 ORSBC Report 31 ‘The Visual Recognition of Ground Features as an Aid 
to Target Identification at Night’, 14
th
 February 1942. 
45
 The night of 28
th
/29
th
 December 1941 
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bridges and breakwaters became discernable, and this provided valuable 
evidence of position. 
 
The main body of the report was devoted to the reliability of various ground 
features in identifying targets, beginning with an overall appreciation of the 
benefit of relying on more than one feature for this purpose. The results were 
set out in the following table. 
 
 
No. of ground 
features identified 
 
 
Total No. of 
aircraft returning 
photos 
 
No. of photos 
showing target 
area 
 
% of aircraft 
returning photos 
within target area 
 
1 86 28 38 
2 53 25 47 
2+ 28 23 82 
 
Table 4/ ORSBC Report: ‘Percentage of aircraft within target area by number of features 
identified’. Source: TNA AIR14/1758 ORSBC Report 31 ‘The Visual Recognition of Ground 
Features as an Aid to Target Identification at Night’, 14 February 1942. 
 
It may be seen from the above results that the percentage of aircraft within the 
target area increases with the number of ground features identified, with a 
significant increase when two or more ground features are identified. This 
reflects the importance of regular position fixes, cross referenced with two or 
more ground features, to accurate D/R navigation. However, it may also be 
noted that the proportion of crews that identified more than one ground 
 62 
 
feature is almost the inverse of the percentage within the target area. 
Although not identified directly in the report, this relationship is likely to have 
been the basis for the recommendations that followed. 
 
The implications of these findings were crucial to the eventual introduction of 
target marking. In order to positively identify a target by means of two or more 
ground features, crews would need to spend a significant amount of time in 
the target area searching for those features. However, as these results 
showed, relatively few crews were in fact identifying more than two ground 
features and therefore achieving the commensurate accuracy in target 
identification. 
 
The report then examined the effectiveness of specific ground features in 
identifying targets46. The results were again expressed in a table, reproduced 
here as Table 5/, and shown diagrammatically as Fig 5/ below: 
 
 
Feature 
 
 
Total Photos 
 
Photos in 
target area 
 
 
% 
A Docks 61 32 52 
B Rivers 47 8 17 
C Coast47 39 20 51 
                                                 
46
 The report does this both in the main body of the report and in an Appendix, which gives 
specific examples where each ground feature was relied upon by crew. For convenience, 
these considerations are amalgamated here, and the format in which the information 
presented altered. 
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D Town 11 6 55 
E Breakwaters 9 6 67 
F Lakes 9 2 22 
G Bridges 6 3 50 
H Railways 4 1 25 
I Canal 3 3 100 
 
Table 5/ ORSBC Report: ‘Effectiveness of specific ground features in identifying targets’. 
Source: TNA AIR14/1758 ORSBC Report 31 ‘The Visual Recognition of Ground Features as 
an Aid to Target Identification at Night’, 14 February 1942.  
 
0
50
100
A B C D E F G H I
 
Fig 5/  ORSBC Report:’ Effectiveness of specific ground features in identifying targets’. 
Source: TNA AIR14/1758 ORSBC Report 31 ‘The Visual Recognition of Ground Features as 
an Aid to Target Identification at Night’, 14 February 1942. 
 
 
The report noted that, despite the popularity with crews for pinpointing 
position, only 17% of pinpoints based solely on rivers were correct. As with 
the previous report, coastal features and docks appeared to be a fairly reliable 
                                                                                                                                            
47
 This category included bays, estuaries and promontories, but not breakwaters. 
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means of target identification but the report considered that lakes did not 
make particularly good landmarks.  The report does not consider other 
features in any detail but offers the general observation that railways were 
only correctly identified in conjunction with another feature and that, of the six 
instances where towns were correctly identified, only on two occasions were 
the towns identified in isolation and without corroboration by another landmark 
feature - on both occasions, this was in good visibility.   
 
On the basis of this analysis, the report offered five conclusions: 
 
i) In order to identify a position, at least two and preferably more ground 
features should be recognised and their relative position checked. 
 
ii) Rivers are a very unreliable landmark, but bridges may sometimes 
make them less so. 
 
iii) Coastal targets are the most easily recognised, docks being the most 
frequently mentioned and most reliable feature. 
 
iv) The size of ground features such as rivers, lakes and coastal features 
are frequently misjudged from height, and 
 
v) Small rivers, lakes and canals are so numerous in Germany and so 
easily confused that little reliance can be placed upon them. 
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In closing, the authors considered that the report served to emphasise the 
“immense difficulties” which confronted crews in the task of recognising their 
targets at night. The report goes to express the view that little success could 
be expected unless the weather is reasonably good, but that in favourable 
conditions it ought to be possible for a larger proportion of aircraft to reach 
their targets than were doing so. 
 
The final report in this series covered the period between December 1941 and 
February 194248. This report differed from the preceding reports in that for the 
first time an attempt was made to assess the number of aircraft which, having 
reached the five mile target area, then went on to reach the target itself.  
During this period, 60% of crews claimed to have reached the target. 
However, only 45% of the photographs showing ground detail were plotted 
within the five mile target area, such that only 27% of the total sorties 
dispatched actually reached within 5 miles of the target. The report then 
categorised this overall result in relation to levels of illumination and cloud 
cover, with the findings as follows and shown here as Fig 6/ below: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
48
 TNA AIR14/2692 ORBCS Report S.45 ‘Success of bombing operations as shown by night 
photographs Dec.41 – Feb 42’, 22 April 1942. 
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Weather  
Conditions 
 
 
Illumination 
 
Total 
Sorties 
Despatched  
 
No. 
Claiming 
Attack 
 
No. of 
photos 
showing 
ground 
detail  
 
 
No. of 
photos 
showing 
target area  
 
% 
 
% 
June – 
Nov 1941 
 
 
 
No or Slight 
Haze or 
Cloud 
 
Bright 
 
 
484 
 
347 
 
154 
 
105 
 
68 
 
50 
 
Moderate 
 
 
49 
 
37 
 
25 
 
14 
 
56 
 
33 
 
Dark 
 
 
163 
 
120 
 
90 
 
46 
 
51 
 
39 
 
 
 
Moderate 
Haze or 
Cloud 
 
 
Bright 
 
 
442 
 
321 
 
22 
 
8 
 
36 
 
36 
 
Moderate 
 
 
205 
 
152 
 
17 
 
2 
 
12 
 
23 
 
Dark 
 
 
761 
 
500 
 
45 
 
9 
 
20 
 
14 
 
 
 
Thick Haze or 
Cloud 
 
 
Bright 
 
 
1252 
 
672 
 
30 
 
5 
 
17 
 
8 
 
Moderate 
 
 
172 
 
73 
 
11 
 
3 
 
27 
 
10 
 
Dark 
 
533 
 
 
222 
 
37 
 
2 
 
5 
 
5 
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Table 6/ ORSBC Report; percentage within target area. Source: TNA AIR14/2692 ORBCS 
Report S.45  “Success of bombing operations as shown by night photographs Dec.41 – Feb 
42”, 22
nd
 April 1942. 
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Fig 6/   ORSBC Report: ‘Comparative charts for June - Nov 1941 and Dec 1941 - Feb 1942’. 
Source: TNA AIR14/2692 ORBCS Report S.45  ‘Success of bombing operations as shown by 
night photographs Dec.41 – Feb 42’, 22 April 1942 
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Comparison of these results with the two previous ORSBC reports indicates 
that, in overall terms, there was a modest improvement in bombing 
performance during this period. It may be noted that in conditions of no or 
slight haze or cloud the percentage of aircraft claiming to have attacked that in 
fact reached the target area had risen to 50% irrespective of the moon period. 
However, in conditions of moderate or thick cloud cover, especially on dark 
nights, the percentage of crews claiming to have attacked reaching the target 
area was consistently low. Moreover, these figures relate only to those aircraft 
claiming to have attacked. Measured against the total number of aircraft 
dispatched, the performance was even lower. 
 
The report then goes on to estimate the degree of concentration in space on 
the target itself by determining the distance of the plotted photographs from 
the A/P49. This was achieved by plotting the percentages of the total 
photographs within a given circle around the target against the area in square 
miles around the A/P. The results were plotted on a graph as curves, 
repeated for different weather conditions, the shape of which close to the 
origin showed the concentration in space around the A/P. This graph is 
reproduced below as Fig 7/, in which the ‘x’ axis is the area in square miles 
around the aiming point and the ‘y’ axis is the percentage of photographs 
within a given circle around the target50.  
                                                 
49
 In the context of bombing performance, the term ‘concentration’ is usually used to describe 
the number of aircraft bombing within a given time period. However, in this report, 
‘concentration’ is used in relation to the distances of plotted night photographs from the 
Aiming Point. 
50
 For purposes of comparison with the Butt Report, an area of 75 miles around the aiming 
point corresponds to a distance of five miles from the target. A distance from the target of one 
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Distribution of plotted photographs around the target
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Fig 7/ ORSBC Report: Distribution of plotted photographs around the target. Source: TNA 
AIR14/2692 ORBCS Report S.45 ‘Success of bombing operations as shown by night 
photographs Dec.41 – Feb 42’, 22
 
April 1942. 
 
In good weather conditions (i.e no or slight haze or cloud) and irrespective of 
moon period, the shape of the curve was consistently steep close to the 
origin, indicating good concentration around the A/P. In conditions of 
moderate cloud cover with bright moonlight, this shape was still evident but 
less pronounced. On dark nights with moderate cloud cover and on all nights 
with heavy cloud cover, the shape of the curves was shallow throughout. It 
may also be seen that, of those aircraft that reached within 5 miles of the 
target, 75% actually got within 2.5 miles. In good conditions, about 25% of 
aircraft that reached the target actually got within 1 mile of the A/P but that 
when there was cloud cover this figure fell below 10%.  
 
                                                                                                                                            
mile equates to an area of 3.142 square miles and a distance of 3 miles to an area of 28.3 
square miles. 
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To put these figures into perspective, it should be remembered that these 
percentages relate only to those aircraft known to have reached the target 
area. In conditions of thick haze or cloud cover, it was still the case that only 
5% of aircraft dispatched reached the target area. Moreover, these figures 
related only to the five mile target area, a notional area equivalent to 78 
square miles.  
 
The ORSBC report next looked at the percentage of aircraft that attacked 
‘useful’ areas whether within the designated target area or not.  For this 
purpose, the report categorised the type of country revealed in night 
photographs into three categories; i) useful targets, these being built up areas, 
docks and marshalling yards; ii) outskirts and villages, and iii) open country, 
this being classed as ‘wasted effort’. The results are set out in the following 
Table 7/ below51. 
 
 
Weather 
Conditions 
 
 
Illumination
52
 
 
Percentage of photos taken with bombing showing 
 
 
Useful Targets 
 
 
Villages & outskirts 
 
 
Open Country 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Bright 
 
 
49 
 
12 
 
39 
 
Moderate 
 
37 
 
10 
 
53 
                                                 
51
 The figures in brackets indicated where ORS deemed the sample too small to be 
significant. 
52
 The original version of this table in the ORS report did not contain an average of results in 
all conditions of illumination. This has been added to facilitate the visual presentation of the 
data.  
 71 
 
No or slight haze or 
cloud 
 
 
 
Dark 
 
 
41 
 
16 
 
43 
 
Average 
 
 
42.33 
 
12.66 
 
45.00 
 
 
 
Moderate haze or 
cloud 
 
Bright 
 
 
19 
 
0 
 
81 
 
Moderate 
 
 
8 
 
38 
 
54 
 
Dark 
 
 
7 
 
17 
 
76 
 
Average 
 
 
11.33 
 
18.33 
 
70.33 
 
 
 
Thick haze or cloud 
 
 
Bright 
 
 
7 
 
4 
 
89 
 
Moderate 
 
 
(40) 
 
(0) 
 
(60) 
 
Dark 
 
 
9 
 
18 
 
73 
 
Average 
 
 
18.66 
 
7.33 
 
74.00 
 
Table 7/ ORSBC Report: percentage of aircraft that attacked ‘useful’ areas. Source: TNA 
AIR14/2692 ORBCS Report S.45 ‘Success of bombing operations as shown by night 
photographs Dec.41 – Feb 42’, 22 April 1942. 
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The results obtained by averaging the percentage of photos for the average of 
each category in all weather conditions can be presented visually, in Fig 8/ 
below; 
 
No or slight haze or cloud
Useful Targets
Villages and
outskirts
Open Country
 
Moderate haze or cloud
Useful Targets
Villages and
outskirts
Open Country
 
 73 
 
 
Thick haze or cloud
Useful Targets
Villages and
outskirts
Open Country
 
 
 
 
Fig 8/ Percentage of photos taken with bombing showing useful targets in relation to villages 
& outskirts and open country. Source: TNA AIR14/2692 ORBCS Report S.45 ‘Success of 
bombing operations as shown by night photographs Dec.41 – Feb 42’, 22
 
April 1942. 
 
The results presented in this table are interesting because they represent the 
first attempt to quantify the acknowledgement made in the Butt Report that not 
all of the five mile target area used as the measurement of bombing 
performance comprised worthwhile targets. The results suggest that even in 
clear conditions, somewhat less than half of the bombs dropped during this 
period by aircraft claiming to have attacked fell on useful targets and 
approaching half the bombs fell in open countryside. In anything other than 
clear conditions, somewhere approaching three quarters of all bombs dropped 
by aircraft claiming to have attacked fell in open countryside and only 19% fell 
on useful targets. Again, it should be remembered that these figures only 
include aircraft claiming to have attacked, representing approximately two 
thirds the total number of aircraft dispatched.   Although the results shown 
above must necessarily be treated with some caution, the overall trend tends 
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to support the pattern emerging in other ORSBC reports that bombing 
performance at this time deteriorated markedly in anything other than clear 
conditions. 
 
The series of reports produced by ORSBC in relation to target identification 
are significant because they represent the first scientific attempts to 
understand the reasons underlying the findings of the Butt Report. It is also 
significant that the findings of these reports, in terms of the percentage of 
crews that actually reached the target area, are generally consistent with the 
findings of the Butt Report. The three reports produced by ORSBC therefore 
not only confirmed the findings of the Butt Report, they defined the nature of 
the problem faced. 
 
In essence, the Butt Report and the ORSBC reports confirmed that the 
average crew was unable to locate a target other than in good visibility, either 
because ground features could not been seen due to cloud or haze or 
because the altitude at which the sortie was flown precluded recognition of the 
smaller ground features necessary to provide cross checks of position. This 
was compounded by the fact that the small rivers, lakes and canals are so 
numerous in Germany and so easily confused that little reliance could be 
placed upon them. The difficulty faced by bomber crews was that the basic 
tenet of navigation, that of Dead Reckoning, was dependent upon the 
identification of successive landmarks, without which cumulative errors 
equating to 10% of the distance flown errors resulted in less than 10% of 
aircraft getting within five miles of a target of 75 square miles. The result was 
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that even under optimum conditions, less than 50% of bombs dropped were 
falling on useful targets and that in conditions of thick haze or cloud three 
quarters of bombs dropped were falling on open country. If the bombing 
offensive was to be taken to Germany with any prospect of success, some 
means of assisting average crews to reach the target was needed. Electronic 
navigation aids such as GEE and H2S would ultimately provide the answer. 
However, having reached the target area, crews would be faced with similar 
problems in locating the actual A/P. The following chapter will examine the 
extent to which electronic navigation and blind bombing aids were able to 
provide the answer to that particular problem. 
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CHAPTER TWO: BLIND BOMBING 
 
 
The previous chapter demonstrated that, in the absence of any form of 
navigation aid, only two thirds of the aircraft dispatched by Bomber Command 
claimed to have attacked a target having an area of 75 square miles and that 
even in the best weather conditions only one half of all crews claiming to have 
attacked the target actually got within five miles of it. That level of bombing 
performance was clearly inadequate, either in terms of being able to 
accurately hit precision target sets such as oil and communication, or to 
achieve the concentration in time and space necessary to make what would 
later become known as ‘area attacks’ effective. The base reasons for the 
cumulative failures to reach the target area were due to weather conditions 
and the human factor - as Air Commodore Coningham had put it, the inability 
to circumvent the law that humans cannot see in the dark1. One potential 
means by which bombing performance might have been improved was 
therefore to remove the human factor - to bomb ‘blind’ using bombing aids 
that functioned irrespective of the nine states of visibility. This chapter will 
assess the bombing performance of Bomber Command in terms of accuracy 
and concentration achieved using the main blind bombing devices in isolation. 
These devices are, in order of introduction into operational use: GEE, Oboe, 
H2S, G-H and S.S LORAN. For the purpose of this exercise, ‘blind bombing’ 
is defined as bombs dropped purely on the basis of information provided by 
the device being used, with no visual sighting of the target at any stage.  
                                                 
1
 Webster and Frankland The Strategic Air Offensive, Vol I, p202. 
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The concept of an accurate blind bombing device is the ‘holy grail’ of the 
bomber commander, in that at one stroke it largely removes the two greatest 
causes of bombing error from the equation: the vagaries of the weather and 
human error. The latter includes factors already discussed, including the 
limitations of the human eye when it came to visually identifying targets at 
night, and factors to be discussed later, such as the requirement for a bomb 
aimer to assess quickly the Mean Point of Impact (M.P.I.) of a mass of target 
markers. Furthermore, a bomber force in which each aircraft is equipped with 
its own blind bombing device greatly simplifies the planning of bombing 
operations and, by removing the need for some aircraft to carry target 
markers rather than bombs, increases the bomb lift capacity of the bomber 
force. These, then, are the reasons why Bomber Command would have 
preferred to rely upon blind bombing as the method of choice were that 
possible.  
 
The primary purpose of this chapter is to quantify the effectiveness of blind 
bombing as a benchmark against which bombing performance with target 
marking techniques can later be compared. The quantification of the results 
achieved with blind bombing will be undertaken in relation to each blind 
bombing device in turn, using a combination of contemporary assessments of 
bombing accuracy (where available) and discussion on the practical 
limitations arising from the characteristics of each device.  This in turn will 
enable an estimate to be made as to whether the employment of blind 
bombing techniques alone could have achieved the same outcomes as were 
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achieved using target marking techniques. It is acknowledged at the outset 
that this can only be an estimate because, for reasons that will become 
apparent, blind bombing on a large scale never became part of the bombing 
offensive. Such an assessment is, however, necessary in order to understand 
why in practice blind bombing turned out not to be the panacea for the 
bomber commanders and why it became necessary for Bomber Command to 
adopt target marking as standard in bombing operations, and in doing so to 
accept the limitations and disadvantages associated with target marking 
techniques.   
 
A secondary purpose of this Chapter is to place the development of 
technologies associated with target marking techniques in the context of the 
importance of and reliance upon technology during the Second World War. 
This Chapter will therefore refer to work by authors such as David Edgerton, 
Guy Hartcup and Richard Overy on this subject and, citing the example of the 
cavity magnetron, will place the technologies used in target marking 
techniques into the context of the contribution made by other, better known 
technological development during this period.  
 
With these objectives in mind, it is possible to now turn to the assessment of 
the main blind bombing devices in terms of accuracy and concentration 
achieved. 
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GEE 
 
The first of these navigation aids was GEE. The GEE system was sometimes 
referred to in contemporary documents as “TR1335” or “Gee”, with the use of 
the term GEE only coming into more widespread use in mid-1942.2. For 
consistency, the term “GEE” is used here throughout. 
 
The GEE system employed the principles of hyperbolic navigation, in which 
the difference in timing between the reception of two signals are used to 
calculate the distance from ground stations and from these produce a series 
of lines of constant path difference (c.p.d.) between the two ground stations3. 
In the GEE system, these c.p.d. lines were referred to as ‘position lines’. The 
GEE system typically employed three ground stations, one ‘Master’ and two 
‘Slave’ stations, each of which transmitted pulsed radio signals: the Master 
station transmitted the ‘A’ pulse, the Slave stations the ‘B’ and ‘C’ Pulses 
respectively. These pulsed transmissions produced a series of position lines, 
these being known as the A-B and A-C position lines. The series of position 
lines thus produced, known as a Grid4, were marked on ‘lattice charts’. 
Measuring the time difference between the Master and Slave stations for both 
the A-B pulse and the A-C pulse gave the respective position lines and, by 
plotting the intersection of the two position lines on the lattice chart (see Fig 
10/ below), a location was revealed that could be one of only two possible 
                                                 
2
. The circumstances behind the false designation of TR1335 are described in R.V. Jones 
Most Secret War, (Ware, Hertfordshire: Wordsworth Editions Limited, 1998), p.p.215 to 222 
and in Alfred Price Instruments of Darkness, (London: Macdonald and Jane’s, 1977), p.p. 98 
to 104.   
3
 TNA, AIR10/3910 The “GEE” System Manual. Unless otherwise stated, the description of 
the GEE system here is derived from that document. 
4
 The term “GEE” was derived from the use of these grids. 
 80 
 
positions. Any form of additional navigation could then be used to eliminate 
one of those positions and therefore determine the correct position of the 
aircraft at the time that the fix was taken. 
 
 
Fig 9/  GEE Lattice chart. Note that the angle of cut between the A – B  position lines (red) 
and the A – C position lines (green) decreases with range, with the results that the area of the 
diamond lattices shapes increase in area with range (the significance of which is explained 
below). Source: TNA, AIR10/3910, The “GEE” System Manual. 
The GEE system suffered from the two systematic disadvantages, the first 
being limited range. The precise coverage achieved by GEE varied according 
to atmospheric conditions but, due to the refraction of radio signals in the 
earth’s atmosphere, was a little in excess of optical. GEE coverage was 
normally calculated on the basis of ‘safe’ cover, this being the coverage that 
may be expected other than in abnormal conditions i.e on 90% of occasions. 
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In conditions of safe cover, the maximum range of GEE was circa 350 to 400 
miles. 
The second systematic disadvantage associated with GEE is that accuracy 
declined with the ‘angle of cut’5 and therefore with range. Trials to assess the 
accuracy of GEE showed a strong correlation with the law of probability6, and 
it was therefore usual to express the accuracy of GEE in terms of an ellipse 
within which 50% of the plots fell – the  ‘50% ellipse’7. It should be noted, 
however, that the 50% ellipse related to GEE fixes plotted and not to the 
position of bombs dropped using the device. The latter were subject to other 
influences acting upon the fall of the bombs, such as ballistics, trajectory and 
cross trail8, and consequently did not necessarily conform to an elliptical 
pattern. A hypothetical 50% ellipse is shown in Fig 12/ below. 
  
                                                 
5
 In relation to GEE, the ‘angle of cut’ is the angle at which the two position lines subtend at 
any given point.  
6
 TNA AIR14/1313 Memorandum from Headquarters Bomber Command to Headquarters No. 
3 Group, 5 January 1942. These trials were carried out by the specially formed No.1418 Flight 
in 1942, using the Mull of Galloway as an approximation of the range and angle of cut that 
would be experienced over the Ruhr. 
7
 An ellipse is defined as a regular oval shape resulting when a cone is cut by an oblique 
plane that does not intersect the base. In the measurement of bombing accuracy, the error 
ellipse is an oval shape within which any given percentage of the bombs fall.  
8
 ‘Cross Trail’ was the path taken by a bomb or marker through the air after release in relation 
to the direction in which the aircraft was travelling at the moment of release, and taking into 
account the effect of wind on the bomb or marker as it fell. 
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Fig 10/ Hypothetical 50% GEE ellipse. Source: TNA, AIR10/3910, The “GEE” System Manual 
 
The ratio of the major and minor axis of the ellipse, and the direction in which 
the axis lie, could be calculated for any given point in a GEE system and 
therefore some measure of the accuracy of the system at that point found. 
The geometrical accuracy9 of the GEE chain at any point may be described 
by constructing on a lattice chart the smallest ellipse that passed through the 
four corners of the diamond formed by two pairs of intersecting position lines, 
and then plotting the fixes within that ellipse. The position lines on a lattice 
chart were spaced 0.1 GEE units apart, such that the area of the ellipse thus 
created varied according to the spatial separation of the position lines at that 
particular point.  
Lower angles of cut resulted in longer lattice diamonds and, since the length 
of the axes of the ellipse was derived from the four corners of the lattice 
diamond, the area of the ellipse increased at low angles of cut. It therefore 
followed that the accuracy of GEE declined as the angle of cut reduced. Given 
that the angle of cut decreased with range from the ground stations, it further 
followed that the length of the axes increased with range from ground stations 
and therefore that accuracy decreased with range from the ground stations. In 
general terms, the minor axis of the ellipse increased in proportion to the 
range and the major axis approximately in proportion to the square of the 
range. In addition, the inclination of the major axis to the line adjoining the 
point to the Master decreased inversely with range. 
                                                 
9
 Geometrical accuracy is that due to the station and aircraft positions, and does not allow for 
any decrease in signal strength.  
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Although designed as a navigation aid, it was also possible to use GEE to 
home onto to a specific position, and therefore as blind bombing device. Trials 
to establish the accuracy of GEE as a blind bombing device, using the Mull of 
Galloway as an approximation of the range and angle of cut that would be 
experienced with targets in the Ruhr10, were carried out by a specially formed 
unit, No.1418 Flight11, in accordance with recommendations made by 
ORSBC12. The results indicated that, if applied to Essen as a target, blind 
bombing by GEE using a constant line of approach would result in 90% of 
bombs falling within an ellipse measuring sixteen miles long by two and a half 
miles at its widest. In the event, this was to prove optimistic. 
 
The first operational use of GEE purely as a blind bombing device took place 
on the night of 22/23 April 194213.  The results from this raid, together with the 
results from other raids where individual aircraft were known to have released 
their bombs purely on the basis of GEE co-ordinates, were assessed by 
ORSBC in a report dated 18 May 194214. The report measured the standard 
deviation of the position shown by aerial photographs of where the bombs 
dropped from the position indicated by GEE co-ordinates. This technique 
enabled the results of several raids to be directly compared, and shown 
visually using the GEE lattice for Essen as zero and plotting the standard 
                                                 
10
 TNA AIR14/1313, Letter from the Under Secretary of State to Air Officer Commanding-in-
Chief Bomber Command, 31 December 1941. 
11
 TNA AIR14/1313, Memorandum from Headquarters Bomber Command to Headquarters 
No. 3 Group, 5 January 1942. 
12
 TNA AIR14/1769, Operational Research Section Report S.26 “Operational use of GEE II – 
Proposed Experiments for GEE Development Flight’, 7 January 1942.    
13
 Middlebrook and Everitt The Bomber Command War Diaries, p259. This raid, on Cologne, 
was carried out by 69 GEE-equipped aircraft.  
14
 TNA AIR14/1769, Operational Research Section Report S.47, “Operational accuracy of 
blind bombing with T.R.1335, March and April, 1942”, 18 May 1942.  
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deviation of each bomb plot in relation to zero. The resulting diagram is shown 
as Fig 11/ below. 
 
 
 
 
Fig 11/ Map showing standard deviation from the GEE co-ordinates of bombs dropped using 
GEE as a blind bombing device. The position of the bombs dropped, expressed as a standard 
deviation from the GEE co-ordinates of the target, are shows symbols (circle for Essen; 
square for Cologne; triangle for Dortmund). The arrows attached to the symbol show the 
heading of the aircraft at the time of bomb release. Source: TNA, AIR14/1769, Operational 
Research Section Report S.47, “Operational accuracy of blind bombing with T.R.1335, March 
and April, 1942”, 18 May 1942.   
 
 
These results showed that the accuracy achieved by blind bombing with GEE 
on operations was three times worse than that achieved in operational trials 
carried by No.1418 Flight, and that the bomb density to be expected by blind 
bombing was therefore about 10% of that estimated from the results obtained 
in the trials. On the basis of the results obtained on operations, ORSBC 
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estimated that for targets in the Ruhr and for Cologne about 50% of the 
bombs dropped would be within 5 miles of the target15 and about 10% within 2 
miles.  
 
Although this represented a significant improvement over the results 
presented in the Butt Report, this represents the maximum achievable using 
GEE as a blind bombing device. It is clear from the evidence in this report 
that, when used solely as a blind bombing device, GEE was incapable of 
consistently hitting a target area of 3 x ½ miles upon which the Air Staff had 
based the concept of Estimated Weight of Attack.  
 
OBOE 
 
“Oboe” was a generic name for a series of radar blind bombing aids based 
upon the measurement of distance by ground stations16. The following relates 
only to those versions of Oboe based upon the principle of the “Circle of 
Constant Path Range”17.   
 
Oboe was based on the fact that a radar pulse travels in a straight line and at 
                                                 
15
 The reference to an area of 5 miles is unexplained and somewhat curious, given that 
ORSBC were instrumental in switching to the 3 mile zone and used that standard in other 
reports during this period.  
16
 Cumming. Beam Bombers: The Secret War of No.109 Squadron. The name “Oboe” 
originated with the Telecommunications Research Establishment, where scientists involved in 
the development of the early versions of the equipment described the note produced by the 
system as similar that produced by the musical instrument. The system had previously been 
referred to as “Howler Chaser”, but this term was dropped in favour of the tem “Oboe”.  
17
 Ibid. These versions were Oboe Mks l, II and III. Earlier versions of Oboe, known as “Blind 
Bombing Cherbourg” and “Trinity” respectively, were essentially experimental versions that 
employed a different technique for tracking the path of the aircraft and which saw only limited 
operational use.  
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a constant speed18. It was therefore possible for a radiolocation station on the 
ground to constantly measure the distance between that ground station and 
an identified aircraft with an extremely high degree of accuracy. Thus, an 
aircraft could be made to fly along an arc at a constant distance from a ground 
station, this arc being the circumference of a circle the radius of which would 
be the distance between the ground station and the target. This circle was 
known as the Circle of Constant Path Range .The radius of the circle flown by 
the aircraft could then be adjusted to the exact distance from the ground 
station to the target, known as the “Geographical Range”, and the aircraft 
controlled to be accurately tracked over the target. This first ground station 
was known as the tracking station, or more usually as the “Cat” station. 
A second ground station, located at least one hundred miles away from the 
first and in such a manner that the base line was formed between the two, 
measured the range of the aircraft and the ground speed component along 
the line from the ground station to the target, and from this information 
monitored the progress of the aircraft along the Circle of Constant Path Range 
until the aircraft reached the point at which the bombs should be released in 
order to hit the target. The exact release point would first have to be 
calculated in relation to the aircraft’s height, ground speed and the trajectory 
of the bomb after release according to the type of bomb load carried. When 
this exact position was reached, the second ground station signaled the 
navigator in the aircraft to release the bombs. This second ground station was 
                                                 
18
 TNA AIR20/1471 ‘Oboe – how it works”, a Telecommunications Research Establishment 
paper dated 2
nd
 July 1943’, and TNA AVIA7/917 HQ No. 60 Group ‘The History of Oboe, 1940 
to 1945’. See also F.E.Jones, ‘Oboe – A Precision Ground-Controlled Bombing System’, 
Journal of the Institute of Electrical Engineers, vol 93, part IIIA, no 2, 1946 and A.H. Reeves, 
‘Oboe: history and development’, Journal of the Institute of Electrical Engineers, special issue 
on historical radar, October 1985. Unless otherwise stated, the description of the OBOE 
system here is based upon these documents. 
 87 
 
known as the release station, or more usually as the “Mouse” station19.  
The operational technique for using Oboe was as follows20. The Circle of 
Constant Path Range along which the aircraft was to be controlled to the 
target was an arc A -T, where A is the starting point and T is the target. 
Position A was typically about 10 minutes flying time from T. Each aircraft 
would navigate individually to a pre-determined position just short of position 
A, known as the Waiting Point, and when instructed to so would approach 
position A from a direction perpendicular to it. A series of morse signals would 
then indicate when the aircraft should turn onto the arc A-T.  
Once broadly established on the arc A - T, the control of the aircraft was 
achieved by wireless transmissions.  When the aircraft was exactly on track, 
the pilot received a steady continuous tone his headphones (the “equisignal”). 
Deviation from track was defined by a series of dots and dashes 
superimposed on the steady tone - dashes if the aircraft was closer to the 
ground station than the correct track; dots if the aircraft was further away from 
the ground station than the correct track. The limit of this fine control 
represented a deviation of 175 yards on either side of the track: when this limit 
was reached, the equisignal disappeared completely, and only clear dots and 
dashes were heard.  
                                                 
19
 TNA AVIA7/917 HQ No. 60 Group “The History of Oboe, 1940 to 1945”. The term “Mouse” 
derived from an earlier version of Oboe that was based largely on the German “X-Gerät” 
equipment for the “X-Verfahren” blind bombing system. This early version of Oboe used the 
reversible clock principle, that was itself based on the mechanical clock used in the X-Gerät 
system. The ticking of the mechanical clock in the latter had reminded the salvage party 
recovering the X-Gerät system from a crashed bomber as a “Mickey Mouse” clock and the 
term Mickey Mouse was subsequently adopted for the electrical clock that formed part of the 
early version Oboe. Abbreviated to “Mouse”, the term came to be used for the release station 
in Oboe as well as for similar devices in other systems (such as G-H).  By the simple 
expedient of association of ideas, the tracking station then became known as “Cat”.  
20
 This description of the operational technique for using Oboe is a summary of the key 
elements. 
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Instructions from the “Mouse” station were transmitted to the aircraft by 
means of a steady tone keyed at intervals by the letters A,B,C and D. These 
signals warned the navigator of time to target, with A =10 minutes; B = 8 
minutes; C = six minutes; and D = three minutes, this last signal also being 
the warning that the timing for the bomb release was about to begin. At the 
exact moment the release point was reached, the “Mouse” station issued the 
release signal, which consisted of a further warning of five "dots" followed by 
a “dash” (the Morse letters ‘5T’). Upon receipt of this signal, the navigator 
pressed the bomb release. The principle of the Oboe system is shown 
diagrammatically in Fig 12/ below. 
 
Fig 12/ The Oboe principle. Source: TNA AVIA7/917, “The History of Oboe, 1940 to 1945” 
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The practical application of these principles did, however, present a number of 
technical issues. These may be summarized as relating to; i) range; ii) 
number of aircraft that could be controlled by the ground stations; iii) angle of 
cut; iv) frequency modulation; vi) the measurement of ground speed; and vii) 
calculation of the trajectory of the bomb after release. The most significant 
issues were those relating to range and the number of aircraft that could be 
controlled by the ground stations. These two issues are discussed in more 
detail below. It should however be noted that, in addition to these technical 
issues, the successful operation of Oboe required very accurate flying, not 
only in terms of keeping the aircraft precisely on track, but also because the 
calculations required in terms of the bomb release relied upon achieving a 
precise groundspeed, altitude and heading at the point of release. Any 
significant deviation from the specified values for any of these variables would 
introduce a random error above the systematic limits of accuracy of the 
system. 
 
The range of Oboe was limited by the fact that radar pulses travel in straight 
lines and therefore tangential to the surface of the earth. Consequently, the 
range at which Oboe remained effective was limited to a little over optical and 
depended upon the altitude at which the aircraft was flying21. Range increased 
with altitude such that, at an altitude of 28,000 ft, the maximum range at which 
                                                 
21
 Theoretically, because radar pulses travel in straight lines, the range of Oboe was purely 
that possible by line of sight. However, in practice and as with the GEE radio pulses, a limited 
amount of refraction of the radar pulses occurred and accordingly the range of Oboe slightly 
exceeded that possible purely by line of sight. 
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Oboe signals could be received was in the region of 270 miles22, just sufficient 
to cover the Ruhr and Cologne but not key targets in northern and southern 
Germany. Moreover, although in pure radar terms the accuracy of Oboe was 
not affected by range, one effect of increasing range was to reduce the ‘angle 
of cut’. In relation to Oboe, the angle of cut was the angle at which the pulse 
recurrence frequencies were received by the aircraft in relation to the 
respective ground stations. The accuracy of Oboe was broadly inverse to the 
angle of cut, being particularly pronounced in relation to range errors at low 
angles of cut.    
 
It should also be noted that the maximum range of Oboe could only be 
achieved by flying at high altitude, typically at 28,000ft or above. None of the 
heavy or medium bombers used by Bomber Command could reach that 
altitude23. Furthermore, as an aircraft approaches its maximum (or absolute) 
ceiling, there is a tendency for it to become longitudinally and laterally less 
stable, such that the maximum altitude at which an aircraft remains fully 
controllable is somewhat lower than its stated absolute ceiling24.Since the 
                                                 
22
 In an attempt to overcome this range limitation, a ‘repeater’ system was developed whereby 
the pulse signals were relayed to the bombing aircraft by another flying along the line 
between each ground station and the target. The ‘repeater’system did not see widespread 
operational use’ 
23
 Richards The Hardest Victory, Appendix III, p356. The best service ceiling of any of the 
heavy bombers was that of the Avro Lancaster which could reach 22,500ft.The service ceiling 
of the Handley Page Halifax was 18,200ft (later versions 20,000ft), with that of the Short 
Stirling being circa 16,500ft. The service ceiling of the Vickers Wellington was 19,600ft. The 
service ceiling of the de Havilland Mosquito Mk IV, this being the version in service when 
Oboe was introduced, was 33,000ft. Later versions of the Mosquito could reach 39,000ft. 
Performance figures for the service ceiling of bomber aircraft of the period vary between 
available sources, but those quoted above are consistent with the range of figures quoted in 
other sources and consequently are considered reliable.  
24
 In this context, ‘fully controllable’ means the ability of the aircraft to accept the minor control 
inputs from the pilot necessary to achieve the precise values of groundspeed, height and 
heading required by Oboe.  
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accuracy of Oboe depended largely on accurate flying, the effective operating 
altitude of the heavy and medium bombers was significantly below that 
required to use Oboe as a blind bombing device over Germany.   
 
The only aircraft in Bomber Command service capable of reaching the 
required altitude at the time Oboe was introduced was the de Havilland 
Mosquito which, with a service ceiling considerably in excess of 28,000ft, was 
not approaching its maximum ceiling at the altitudes normally required for 
Oboe operations and therefore remained fully controllable about all axis at 
that altitude. However, the Mosquito could only accommodate a bomb load of 
4,000lb, approximately one third of the bomb load typically carried by the 
heavy bombers on raids to the Ruhr25.  
 
One of the major limitations with the early versions of Oboe was that one 
ground station was only able to control aircraft at a rate of approximately one 
every ten minutes. Controlling more than one aircraft simultaneously could 
therefore only be achieved with additional ground stations, with each pair 
working on a different frequency. A system was later developed using 
different pairs of frequencies, each pair of frequencies being known as a 
“Channel”. In this system, known as ‘K Oboe’26, three channels were allocated 
to Oboe and therefore at best Oboe operations were limited to just three 
stations being used at any one time. Consequently, even with ‘K’ Oboe, the 
maximum number of aircraft that could be controlled was approximately one 
                                                 
25
 Richards The Hardest Victory, Appendix III, p356. 
26
 ‘K’ for coincidence, so-called because a coincidence valve was the key feature of the anti-
jamming circuitry in this version of Oboe. 
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every three to four minutes27. 
 
As a blind bombing system, Oboe was largely devoid of systematic errors. 
The most likely source of error with the Oboe system was therefore flying 
error, in terms of maintaining the correct tracking, groundspeed and altitude. A 
report by ORSBC issued in January 1945 calculated that the average tracking 
error was 35 yards28; the average groundspeed error at the operational height 
of 28,000 feet was 4.0 mph; and that the average height variation was 202 
feet. The report concluded that these errors were insignificant29. 
 
In the absence of systematic error and with only minor random errors, Oboe 
was an extremely accurate blind bombing device. Evidence regarding the 
operational accuracy of Oboe as a blind bombing device only became 
available from December 194330, following large scale use of the device for 
precision attacks against CROSSBOW targets in northern France31. At a 
conference in April 1944, ORSBC reported that, over Northern France, Oboe 
as a blind bombing device had a Probable Radial Error of 150 yards from an 
altitude of 12,000ft and 300 yards at an altitude of 25,000ft. In this context, the 
shorter range enabled Oboe to be used at a lower altitude than was possible 
over Germany although any commensurate benefit in accuracy was to some 
                                                 
27
 A later version of Oboe, ‘Delta Oboe’, was under development which would have enabled 
any number of aircraft to be controlled at any one time, but this did not become operational 
until after the Second World War. 
28
 The tracking error was the lateral distance from the exact Circle of Constant Path Range. 
Note this related to tracking and not the heading of the aircraft. 
29
 TNA AIR14/4602, Operational Research Section Report S.202 ‘Oboe Flying Errors and 
Bombing Accuracy’, January 1945. 
30
 As opposed to evidence in relation to the accuracy of Oboe for target marking for which, 
prior to that date, Oboe had principally been used.  
31
 CROSSBOW targets were the launching sites for the V1 flying bomb. 
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extent offset by the high angle of cut over Northern France. It was also 
reported that, over the Ruhr, the Probable Radial Error was 400 yards at an 
altitude of 28,000ft32.    
 
However, notwithstanding the accuracy of bombing with Oboe, the significant 
operational limitation imposed by the ability of the system to control aircraft at 
a rate of (at best) approximately one every three to four minutes severly 
limited the value of Oboe as a blind bombing device.  There was clearly a role 
for Oboe to play in terms of small scale precision attacks, and in this role 
Oboe made an important contribution to countering the threat of the V1 
weapon and in the preparations for OPERATION OVERLORD33. However, 
the limitation imposed by the relatively modest bombload carried by the de 
Havilland Mosquito, together with the limit on the number of aircraft that the 
sytem could handle at any one time, ensured that the use of Oboe as a blind 
bombing device was incapable of delivering the weight and concentration of 
bombs required to achieve the Estimated Weight of Attack considered by the 
Air Staff as being necessary to destroy the social and industrial structure 
within selected areas. 
 
H2S 
 
H2S was a centimetric navigation and blind bombing radar system carried 
                                                 
32
 TNA AIR14/2687 Operational Report Section Report B108, ‘Minutes of meeting to discuss 
OBOE PERFORMANCE held at A.W.A.S. on 5.4.44 at 14:30 hours’, 10
 
April 1944.  
33
 OPERATION OVERLORD was the invasion of France in June 1944.  
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within the aircraft34.   
 
The H2S system exploited the fact that radiated microwave signals travel in 
straight lines at a constant speed and are reflected back (known as echoes or 
returns) from suitable surfaces as 'diffuse reflection' or 'scatter' i.e. in many 
different directions. The pattern of diffuse reflection varies according to the 
characteristics of the surface with which the incident signal (i.e that 
transmitted by the radar device) comes into contact. The strongest returns are 
generated when three reflecting surfaces are located at right angles to one 
another, which causes the incident signal to return along its own path (known 
as 'backscatter'). This juxtaposition of right angles is known as a 'corner 
reflector', and occurs in varying degrees according to the characteristics, or 
'reflective qualities', of the surface.   
 
Built up areas contain a large number of corner reflectors and therefore have 
good reflective qualities. Open countryside tends to have fewer corner 
reflectors and produces less 'backscatter', such that the reflective qualities are 
not as good as built up areas. As a surface, water acts as a mirror and 
produces no ‘corner reflectors’, such that the incident signal is reflected away 
at an angle of 90 degrees and produces no backscatter. Water is therefore a 
poor reflector of microwave signals. The reflective qualities of the various 
surfaces are illustrated in the Fig 13/ below. 
 
                                                 
34
 See Lovell, Echoes of War for a detailed account of the history and development of H2S.  
 95 
 
 
Water. No corner reflectors, resulting in no backscatter. 
 
 
Open countryside. Few corner reflectors, resulting in moderate backscatter. 
 
 
 
Built-up areas. Numerous corner reflectors, resulting in strong backscatter. 
Fig 13/  H2S: The reflective qualities of different surfaces. Source: The Lovell Papers, 
Imperial War Museum. 
 
The varying strength of radar responses could be translated into varying 
degrees of brightness when displayed on a cathode ray tube (C.R.T.) which, 
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in the H2S system, was presented as a radial time base referred to as the 
Plan Position Indicator (P.P.I.). H2S exploited the difference in the relative 
strength of radar responses between built up areas, open countryside and 
water to 'map' the terrain below the aircraft on the PPI (see Fig 14/ below). 
However, because H2S relied on diffuse reflections, not all of the objects on 
the surface produced a return, such that the response shown on the PPI was 
only an approximation of the shape of the object.    
 
Fig 14/. H2S: Plan Position Indicator. This image of the Zuider Zee (now the Ijsselmeer) 
demonstrates the relative strength of radar responses between open countryside and water. 
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The Zuider Zee and adjoining lakes (De Fleussen and the Slotter Meer) show as dark areas, 
whereas the surrounding countryside and the Zuider Zee Dam are brighter. This image was 
taken in 1944 using a Mk III H2S, in which the resolution was considerably sharper than in 
earlier versions, although even so the ground returns in the centre of the P.P.I. obscure a 
large area of the picture. Source: The Lovell Papers, Imperial War Museum. 
 
Moreover, because microwaves travel in straight lines, they are prevented 
from reaching (and therefore being reflected by) the area behind the first 
reflecting object encountered. This area is then said to be ‘in shadow’. This 
has two implications. Firstly, where the response comprises a series of 
objects (such as the response from a town), the response will not include 
returns from all of the objects within it, such that the shape of the response as 
a whole (i.e the town as a whole) will be distorted. It follows that the shape of 
a town as shown on the P.P.I. would not correspond with the shape of the 
town as shown on a map. This distortion was more pronounced at shallow 
angles of look (i.e the angle between the aircraft and the object on the 
ground) and therefore more pronounced at greater range from the object. 
Secondly, where the object is shielded by high terrain (such as a town in a 
valley), part of or even the whole of that town may be in shadow at shallow 
angles of look. These were both systematic disadvantages of H2S as a blind 
bombing device. 
 
The problems encountered at shallow angles of look were, however, less 
significant than those encountered at steep angles of look. In order to provide 
all-round coverage, it was necessary for the H2S scanner to rotate through 
360 degrees and that the transmission/reception of the microwave signals 
was not interrupted by the structure of the aircraft. In the heavy bombers with 
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which Bomber Command was equipped35, the only suitable location was 
immediately aft the bomb bay. The ideal shape for the scanner was a full 
parabaloid, but the limited ground clearance aft the bomb bay precluded the 
installation a full parabaloid and therefore the scanner in the early versions of 
H2S was a truncated or 'sliced' parabaloid.  The main deficiency with the 
truncated parabaloid scanner was the difficulty in maintaining a satisfactory 
image on the P.P.I. as the angle of look increased which, at close range, was 
a mixture of gaps, fades and heavy ground returns. The problem was 
particularly acute within the crucial 10 mile range or "bombing scale" where 
the target could be completely obscured by heavy ground returns in the form 
of a “ground return ring” emanating from the centre of the P.P.I. 
 
Another disadvantage with H2S as a blind bombing device was the problem of 
‘slant range’. In early versions of H2S, the radial distance from the centre of 
the P.P.I. was linearly related to the range of the target from which the radar 
response was received. Compared with a normal map, the P.P.I. picture 
would therefore be distorted since the 'slant range’ is only equal to the actual 
range (‘ground range’) at zero altitude. The difference between slant range 
and ground range decreases with distance from the object but increases with 
altitude. Since the typical height of bombing operations was between 15,000ft 
and 20,000ft the discrepancy between slant range and ground range was 
significant. In later versions of H2S, the discrepancy between ground range 
and slant range was to some extent overcome by a 'scan corrected display' 
which automatically corrected the picture on the P.P.I. to take account of slant 
                                                 
35
 At that time, these were the Short Stirling, Handley Page Halifax and the Avro Lancaster.  
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range.  
 
In addition to these disadvantages, the early versions suffered from the 
disadvantages of sharing in the pitch and roll of the aircraft due to the rigid 
mounting of the scanner. Consequently, at steeper angles of bank and pitch, 
the scanner would alternately receive no returns and then be swamped by 
ground returns as the position of scanner changed relative to the ground. 
Later versions of H2S were gyroscopically ‘roll stabilised’ to mitigate this effect 
up to angles of bank of 30. 
 
As a general principle, the resolution achieved on any radar device improves 
as the width of the microwave wavelength decreases. This principle is shown 
illustratively in Figure 15/ below. Microwave wavelengths are categorized into 
'bands' - all the bands used by H2S were ‘centimetric’ wavelength bands. 
During the Second World War, versions of H2S were produced in the 10 
centimetre36 wavelength band (within the 'S-band' of 7.5cm to 15cm 
wavelengths): the 3 centimetre wavelength band (within the 'X-band' of 2.5 to 
3.8 com wavelengths) and the 1.25 centimetre wavelength (within the 'K-band' 
of 1.1cm to 1.7 cm wavelengths).  
                                                 
36
 Although usually referred to as 10 Centimetre in relation to H2S, the ‘S’ band version of 
H2S actually operated on a wavelength of 9.1 centimetres.  
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Wider wavelengths showing two towns as a single return. 
 
 
 
 
Narrow wavelength showing two towns as two separate returns. 
Fig 15/ The effect of reduced wavelength on image resolution. Source: The Lovell Papers, 
Imperial War Museum 
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The early versions of H2S (MkI and MkII) produced a beam width of 6 
degrees. The reduction in the microwave wavelength required an increased 
power output from the cavity magnetron, this only being achieved in later 
versions of H2S such as the MkIII, (which produced a beam width of 3 
degrees) and the Mk VI (which produced a beam width of 5/8 degrees). It 
follows that the earlier versions of H2S, particularly the Mk 1 and Mk II that 
operated on S-band wavelengths, provided comparatively poor resolution 
which made the identification of ground returns more difficult.   
 
The issues outlined above, although significant, do not cover all of the 
disadvantages of H2S as a blind bombing device but provide some indication 
of the difficulties faced in seeking to use H2S in that role. Initial assessments 
of the accuracy of bombing using H2S indicated that, due to the limitations 
inherent within the H2S system, the Probable Radial Error of bombs dropped 
roughly equated to the mean radius of the target; that is to say that, on 
average, 50% of bombs dropped would fall within the built up area of the 
target, irrespective of the actual size of the target area37. There was, 
consequently, a definite correlation between the area of the target and the 
concentration of bombing achieved when using H2S. However, these 
assessments were based upon information obtained from raids in which Mk II 
H2S was used both for blind bombing and groundmarking. A more reliable 
                                                 
37
 TNA AIR14/2686 Operational Research Section Report S111 ‘Accuracy of H2S as a blind 
bombing device’, 16 December 1943 and TNA AIR14/2687 Operational Research Section 
Report S189 ‘H2S Blind Bombing Accuracy – 1
st
 October 1943 to April 30
th
 1944’, 13 August 
1944 
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indication of the value of H2S purely as a blind bombing device is therefore 
provided by two trial raids conducted specifically to establish the accuracy of 
H2S in that role: the first against Ludwigshafen, and the second against 
Brunswick.   
 
The raid against Ludwigshafen, on the night of 17/18 November 1943, was 
carried out by a force of 85 aircraft from No.8 Pathfinder Group38. Of those 
bombs dropped blindly using H2S alone, 60% were within the built up area of 
Mannheim-Ludwigshaven and 50% were within 1.5 miles of the A/P39. The 
range error was calculated to be three times that of the line error, an 
indication of the problem of allowing for ‘slant range’. In general, the results 
achieved were consistent with those previously obtained suggesting that, 
notwithstanding that the Ludwigshaven raid was carried out by the 
experienced H2S operators of the Pathfinder Force, an average of 50% of 
bombs within the built up area of the target was approaching the maximum 
that could be achieved using the MkII version of H2S purely as a blind 
bombing device.  
 
The raid on Brunswick was out carried on the night of 12/13 August 1944 by 
324 aircraft purely using Mk II H2S and with bombsights rendered 
                                                 
38
 The formation of No. 8 Pathfinder Group is discussed in more detail in Chapter 4. 
39
 TNA AIR14/2686 Operational Research Section Report S112 ‘The H2S Blind Bombing 
Attack on Ludwigshaven, 17/18 November 1944’, 18 December 1943. 
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inoperative40. The raid was conducted solely by Main Force squadrons with 
no Pathfinders taking part and without the dropping of any marker flares. The 
ORSBC Report on this raid estimated that 2.5% of those aircraft that attacked 
were within 1 mile of the A/P; 10% within 2 miles; and 14% within 3 miles41. 
The remaining 73.5% were beyond three miles from the A/P but, due to the 
lack of photographic cover, could not be precisely plotted. Photographic cover 
did however reveal that at least 50 aircraft aimed their bombs at a factory 
some 10 miles south-west of Brunswick which, it was suggested, gave similar 
returns on H2S to Brunswick itself42.  
 
The TRE continued to improve the resolution achieved with H2S with the Mk 
III, which operated on the X-Band wavelength and entered operational use in 
November 194343. The Mk III also featured improvements such as a scan 
corrected display and roll stabilisation. However, as will be shown later in this 
thesis, the introduction of Mk III H2S did not alter the fundamental relationship 
between Probable Radial Error and the mean radius of the target achieved 
using Mk II H2S. The K-band H2S MkIV did provide sufficient resolution to be 
viable as a blind bombing device but did not enter operational use with 
Bomber Command during the Second World War44. Consequently, throughout 
the entire Bomber Offensive, H2S was never capable of achieving the 
                                                 
40
 TNA AIR14/848 Operational Research Section Report (unnumbered) ‘Night raid on 
Brunswick – 12
th
/13
th
 August 1944’, 14 September 1944. This report confirms that 379 aircraft 
were dispatched on the raid, with 324 claiming to have attacked. 
41
 Ibid. 
42
 Ibid 
43
 Lovell, Echoes of War: The Story of H2S Radar, Chronology of Radar Developments, page 
xix. 
44
Ibid, page 256.  
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accuracy and concentration necessary to achieve the Estimated Weight of 
Attack. 
 
G-H 
 
G-H was a radio blind bombing aid based upon the "H principle" or "twin-
range principle" of location determination45. 
 
The "H principle" involved two ground stations, each consisting of a 
transmitter and receiver (the “transceiver”), with a second transceiver in the 
aircraft. In order to establish its position, the aircraft would transmit a pulse 
(‘transmission pulse’) to the two ground stations. At the moment of reception, 
the transceiver at each ground station would be triggered into sending back a 
pulse (‘echo pulse’) on a different frequency from the transmission pulse, from 
which the position of the aircraft could be calculated by measuring the range 
to each ground station46. The "H principle" or "twin-range principle" of location 
determination is shown diagrammatically in Fig 16/ below. 
 
 
                                                 
45
 TNA AIR10/3359 Gee-H Navigator’s Manual. Unless otherwise stated, the description of 
the G-H system here is derived from that document.  
46
 This was the opposite of the Oboe navigation system, in which transmissions from two 
ground stations triggered pulses in the aircraft under control. For this reason, G-H is 
sometimes described as “Oboe in reverse”. 
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Fig 16/ The "H principle" or "twin-range principle" of location determination. Source: TNA 
AIR10/3359 Gee-H Navigator’s Manual. 
 
The G-H navigation aid utillised much of the oscilloscope display and the 
receiver unit in the existing GEE navigation aid and was designed to operate 
on the same frequencies as the GEE navigation aid (between 20 and 
85 MHz), so that the existing receiver and display equipment in the GEE 
system could be used without modification47. The time taken between the 
sending of the transmission pulse and the receipt of the echo pulse, 
representing twice the distance between the aircraft and the ground station, 
could then be measured. 
 
The systematic errors associated with G-H were confined to a limited number 
of variable factors, including: inputting the correct Wind Velocity; accurate 
achievement of the True Height and correct groundspeed; and the aircraft 
                                                 
47
 For this reason, G-H is sometimes referred to as Gee-H or GEE-H, although the hyperbolic 
GEE navigation system itself played no part in the operation of G-H. 
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being both on the correct track and the correct heading at the point of release, 
with errors in heading being more significant than errors in track. In practice, 
the main faults with G-H were largely side-effects of re-using the existing GEE 
equipment, not least in the limitation imposed by using the relatively low 
frequency at which GEE operated. 
 
The G-H system was first used operationally on the night of 3/4 November 
1943, when 36 aircraft attacked the Mannesmannrohrenwerke in 
Düsseldorf48. The accuracy possible with G-H was immediately apparent, with 
a Probable Radial Error of only 750 yards and with no significant systematic 
errors49. However, this raid was by way of an operational trial and it was not 
until mid-1944 that G-H came into full operational use with No.3 Group of 
Bomber Command50. Thereafter the accuracy of G-H remained consistently 
high throughout its operational use, with an average Probable Radial Error of 
450 yards and an average distance of the M.P.I. from the A/P of 150 yards in 
the period October-December 194451. 
 
However, despite these advantages, G-H played only a relatively minor role in 
the bombing offensive and equipped (at most) one-third of the aircraft in one 
                                                 
48
 TNA AIR14/1446 Operational Research Report S120 ‘G-H Attack on Düsseldorf 3
rd
 
November 1943’, 7 November 1943.  
49
 Ibid. 
50
 TNA AIR2/5462 Operational Research Section Report S211 ‘An analysis of G-H raids 
(October-December 1944)’, 1 March 1945. The first large-scale attack mounted by No.3 
Group using the G-H ‘formation leader’ technique was mounted on the 18
th
 October 1944, 
with the town on Bonn the target’ 
51
 Ibid. The period October-December 1944 is the last in which comprehensive information is 
available, subsequent reports on G-H performance by the Operational Research Section 
concentrating on those raids where specific systematic or random errors resulted in poorer 
than average accuracy. 
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Bomber Command Group52. Moreover, G-H could only be used by a 
maximum of 80 aircraft at any one time and therefore its value as a blind 
bombing device by individual aircraft, either by day or at night, was limited. 
This meant that the role of G-H as a blind bombing device was confined to 
daylight formation attacks. This in turn imposed a number of operational 
constraints including, crucially, that the weather was clear at the bombing 
height in order to facilitate formation keeping, which dictated that G-H attacks 
could only be mounted when the cloud tops did not exceed 17,000ft (this 
being the maximum operational height at which the G-H signals could be 
received over the target areas)53. Consequently, G-H formation attacks could 
only take place within a narrow weather ‘window’ which, given the weather in 
Northern Europe, significantly reduced the value of G-H as a blind bombing 
device.  
 
LORAN 
LORAN54, an abbreviation for Long Range Navigation, is a family of radio 
navigation systems that employ the principles of hyperbolic navigation, and 
therefore operate on the same principle as GEE55. Two versions of LORAN 
were evaluated by Bomber Command during the Second World War: the 
‘Homing Chain’ and the ‘Skywave Synchronization Chain’, the latter more 
usually referred to as “S.S. LORAN”. The former was found not to offer any 
advantages over GEE and consequently was little used, although S.S. 
                                                 
52
 Ibid 
53
 Ibid 
54
Although now largely superseded by GPS navigation systems, LORAN remains in limited 
use worldwide as a back-up to those systems, particularly for sea-borne traffic 
55
 The principles of hyperbolic navigation are described in Appendix 2 in relation to GEE, and 
are therefore not repeated here. 
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LORAN was used operationally for navigation and as a blind bombing 
device.56 
 
S.S. LORAN differed from GEE principally in that it employed a lower 
frequency which, because lower frequency signals are refracted more easily 
in the earth’s atmosphere, could be received considerably in excess of optical 
and therefore at a much greater range than was possible with GEE. The lower 
frequencies used also enabled a greater ‘baseline’ between ground stations, 
resulting in position lines that were nearly parallel and thereby increasing the 
angle of cut at longer ranges. In consequence, with S.S.LORAN the angle of 
cut was greater than 70 over all of the coverage and the maximum accuracy 
was over Germany and the occupied countries57.   
 
S.S. LORAN made use of radio signals (known as “skywave signals”) 
reflected from the lowest of a number of ionized layers in the Earth’s upper 
atmosphere (see Fig 17/ below).  This layer, known as the “Abnormal E” or 
“1st E” layer, only occurs during the hours of darkness and consequently S.S. 
LORAN did not function outside these hours.  
                                                 
56
 TNA, AIR10/4170 LORAN Airborne Equipment (AN/APN4): Operator’s Manual of 
Instruction, May 1944 and TNA. AIR14/1650, Manual for Operation of Airborne LORAN”, 
September 1943. This description of S.S.LORAN is derived from these two documents. 
57
 In contrast, with GEE the angle of cut decreased with range and GEE was most accurate at 
short ranges, including over Britain.  
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Fig 17/ Principle of Skywave Synchronization Chain. Source: TNA, AIR10/4170 “LORAN 
Airborne Equipment (AN/APN4): Operator’s Manual of Instruction”, May 1944 
 
S.S. LORAN comprised two pairs of ground stations, each comprising one 
Master and one Slave ground stations, spaced over 1,000 miles apart58. The 
frequencies operated by the ground stations were locked in pairs with the 
position lines for each pair of ground stations shown on lattice charts similar to 
those used with the GEE. Each pair of frequencies was referenced by a single 
integer number known as a ‘RATE’, of which there were seven RATES within 
in the LORAN system as a whole; S.S. LORAN operated on RATES 4 and 5 
only. The locking of frequencies in pairs meant that, unlike with the GEE 
system, with S.S.LORAN it was not possible to take readings on two position 
lines simultaneously, such that each fix obtained was a “running fix” in relation 
to one position line. It was therefore necessary for the operator to switch to 
the other RATE position line to obtain a second running fix and to take into 
account the time delay between the two running fixes in order to determine 
the position of the aircraft at the time the second fix was taken. The attendant 
                                                 
58
 The RATE 4 stations were located at Port Erroll, Scotland (Master) and Bizerta, Tunisia 
(Slave), and the RATE 5 stations were located at Oran, Algeria (Master) and Appolonia, Libya 
(Slave). 
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time delay was an important consideration in terms of the use of S.S. LORAN 
as a blind bombing device59.  
 
S.S LORAN had an effective range in the region of 1,400 miles, and therefore 
included all of Germany and the majority of mainland Europe (although 
coverage did not extend to the North Sea or English Channel). In trials60, S.S. 
LORAN was found to have a probable 50% radial error of 2.1 miles averaged 
over the whole coverage, consistent with the fact that the position lines in S.S. 
LORAN were nearly parallel. The trials also indicated that there was no 
significant systematic error within S.S. LORAN and that the probable 50% 
radial error of 2.1 miles was due to random errors comprised of the variations 
with skywave signals and manipulation errors61.  
 
The value of S.S. LORAN as a blind bombing device was limited by the 
relatively poor accuracy over the entire coverage and by the complications in 
bombing technique arising from the necessity to take a ‘running fix’. However, 
from August 1944, S.S. LORAN was used operationally by the Light Night 
Striking Force (LNSF – part of No.8 Group Bomber Command62) for ‘nuisance 
                                                 
59
 An experienced S.S.LORAN operator could reduce the time delay between two running 
fixes to 30 seconds, although an aircraft travelling at 200 miles per hour would travel over 1½ 
miles in that time. 
60
 TNA AIR14/1869 Operational Research Section Report S.195 ‘S.S. LORAN Trials’, 13 
December 1944. The trials were carried out by the Bombing Development Unit. 
61
 The manipulation errors, i.e those caused by the operator, were calculated in the ORSBC 
report to account for 1.8 of the 2.1 total probable 50% radial error. Since the manipulation 
errors were constant over area, the standard deviation was deemed to arise from variations in 
the skywave signals. 
62
 For more information on the Light Night Striking Force, see Feast The Pathfinder 
Companion and Musgrove Pathfinder Force. 
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raids’ on major German towns, notably Berlin63. The purpose of these raids, 
undertaken by small numbers of Mosquito aircraft, dictated that accuracy was 
not the priority and accordingly no attempt was made to analysis of the 
accuracy achieved by S.S. LORAN as a blind bombing device. To the extent 
that S.S. LORAN effectively guaranteed that the small number of bombs that 
could be carried by the Mosquitoes would fall within a large built-up area in 
any weather conditions, the device made a useful contribution to the bombing 
offensive. However, even to a lesser extent than GEE, S.S. LORAN was 
incapable of providing Bomber Command with a blind bombing device of 
sufficient accuracy to obviate the need for target marking.  
 
The above appraisal of the blind bombing devices available to Bomber 
Command during the Second World War demonstrates that they varied 
considerably in their application and effectiveness. The two devices based on 
the principles of hyperbolic navigation, GEE and S.S.LORAN, were not 
sufficiently accurate and GEE was also compromised by its comparatively 
short range.  The airborne radar device, H2S, was not limited by range but 
similarly was not sufficiently accurate. On the other hand, the two radar 
devices based upon the measurement of distance using ground stations, 
Oboe and G-H, were extremely accurate but only a limited number of aircraft 
could use them at any one time and for most of the bombing offensive were 
limited by the short range at which they could operate. These characteristics 
and shortcomings ensured that these blind bombing devices, even had they 
                                                 
63
 TNA AIR25/2044 No.571 Squadron Operational Record Book. The use of S.S. LORAN as a 
blind bombing device is also referred to in Musgrove. Pathfinder Force: p207 and in Appendix 
VII. 
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been available in sufficient quantity to equip the entire bomber force, would 
not have been able individually or cumulatively to deliver the Estimated 
Weight of Attack considered necessary to destroy the social and industrial 
structure within selected areas. 
 
In practice, at no stage during the bombing offensive were any of these blind 
bombing devices available in sufficient quantity to equip the entire bomber 
force. This in part was due to the timing in which these various devices were 
introduced into service and their effective lifespan once in service. The first 
blind bombing device to be used operationally, GEE, did not enter service 
until early March 1942 and enjoyed an effective operational life of less than 
six months, by which time enemy jamming had rendered GEE ineffective over 
Germany and any potential for blind bombing had been denied64. No blind 
bombing devices were available to Bomber Command between the jamming 
of GEE in early August 1942 and the introduction of Oboe and H2S in January 
1943, and large-scale blind bombing attacks using G-H did not commence 
until October 1944. Consequently, for over half the bombing offensive65, 
Bomber Command had no blind bombing devices available and for much of 
the remainder there were periods where one or more of the blind bombing 
                                                 
64
 TNA, AIR20/8593, R. Cockburn, The History of TRE and Alfred Price, Instruments of 
Darkness; the History of Electronic Warfare (London: William Kimber & Co. Limited, 1977). 
The jamming of GEE had commenced on the 4
th
 August 1942 using temporary makeshift 
transmitters although, because of their low power, these were only fully effective beyond the 
GEE horizon. With the introduction of purpose designed jamming equipment towards the end 
of 1942, the jamming of GEE became completely effective over the whole of occupied Europe 
until the introduction of GEE MkII which, with the ability to select and change frequencies 
when airborne, enabled the worst of the jamming to be avoided. 
65
 Excluding operational trials and the limited use of the early versions of Oboe, the blind 
bombing devices described in this Chapter were available over a period of 34 months out of a 
bombing offensive lasting 69 months. 
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devices had either not yet entered operational use or their effective lifespan 
had already elapsed.   
 
Moreover, the common denominator between all of the blind bombing devices 
available to Bomber Command was that, at least when first used 
operationally, they were only available in sufficient quantity to equip a small 
proportion of the force66. In the case of GEE, only one third of the bomber 
force was equipped with the device when it was introduced into service and at 
no point during the five months when GEE remained effective over Germany 
was more than 80% the bomber force was equipped with it67. Similarly, when 
H2S was introduced into service in early 1943, only 12 sets of the equipment 
were available and by July 1944 still only 40% of sorties were carried out by 
aircraft equipped with H2S68. The point is academic in the case of Oboe and 
to some extent G-H, neither of which could be operated by more than a few 
aircraft at any one time in any event, although the introduction of G-H was 
postponed until such time as sufficient sets were available to equip enough G-
H leaders to guide large formations. It follows that even if these devices had 
proven to be sufficiently accurate as blind bombing devices, for much of the 
bombing offensive the proportion of the bomber force equipped with them 
would not have been able to deliver the Estimated Weight of Attack 
considered necessary to destroy the social and industrial structure within 
                                                 
66
 S.S.LORAN was known not be sufficiently accurate before being introduced into 
operational use and for that reason was only ever contemplated for a limited role with the 
LNSF. 
67
 TNA AIR14//2693 Operational Research Section Report S252 “The effect of the 
development of navigational and blind bombing techniques on the efficiency of bombing 
operations during World War II”, October 1945. 
68
 Sir Arthur Harris Despatch on War Operations 23
rd
 February 1942 to 8
th
 May 1945 (London: 
Frank Cass,1945), Appendix A, paragraph 84, page 72. 
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selected areas using only aircraft so equipped. Furthermore, the corollary 
resulting from the piecemeal introduction of these various blind bombing 
devices was to create an imbalance in capability within the bomber force, in 
which a minority enjoyed the benefit of blind bombing devices that was denied 
to the majority. 
 
It is therefore apparent that at no point in the bombing offensive was the stage 
reached where Bomber Command was equipped with a blind bombing device 
that would enable each individual aircraft, or even a sizeable proportion of the 
force, to independently bomb targets with sufficient accuracy to provide the 
required degree of concentration in both time and space. The inevitable 
conclusion is that until and unless all aircraft could have been equipped with 
an accurate blind bombing device, some form of target marking technique 
was essential to guide the aircraft not so equipped, and which comprised the 
majority of the bombing force, to the target. The logical solution was to take 
advantage of the various electronic and radar devices available that, whilst 
not adequate for blind bombing, nonetheless possessed characteristics that 
could be utilised to guide aircraft not so equipped to the target. Indeed, the 
Official History suggests that some form of target-finding force “….had 
become inevitable from the moment that GEE was introduced”69. The 
following Chapters will explore how Bomber Command evolved target-
marking techniques based upon the electronic and radar aids described 
above, and the effect that the introduction of those techniques had on the 
performance of Bomber Command.    
                                                 
69
 Webster and Frankland The Strategic Air Offensive Volume 1, p418. 
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However, before turning to the development of those target marking 
techniques, the opportunity is taken here to consider the contribution made by 
technology in the development of those techniques and, by extension, the 
contribution made by technology to the bombing offensive. The importance of 
technology in warfare has been the subject of much secondary literature, 
particularly in terms of the significant advancements made in technology 
during the Second World War. In his book Britain’s War Machine, David 
Edgerton describes the Second World War as “an experts’ war”, not just 
between experts on opposing sides but, referring to the political aspects of 
scientific research and debate, also between experts on the same side70. The 
importance of technology is also one of the key themes explored by Guy 
Hartcup in his book The Effect of Science on the Second World War71. The 
approach taken by Hartcup is to analyse the contribution made by some of the 
more significant technologies developed during the Second World War, albeit 
the overall conclusion reached is at best a tentative one.  A more convincing 
analysis of the importance of technology in the Second World War is provided 
by Richard Overy in his book Why the Allies Won72, and reaches the clear 
conclusion that the development and use of technologies formed one of 
reasons why the Allies won the Second World War. More recently, in his book 
How the War was Won: Air-Sea Power and Allied Victory in World War II,73 
Phillips O’Brien concluded that the outcome of the conflict was not determined 
                                                 
70
 Edgerton Britain’s War Machine, p123. 
71
 Hartcup The Effect of Science on the Second World War 
72
 Overy Why the Allies Won 
73
 Phillips O’Brien, P.P. How the War was Won: Air-Sea Power and Allied Victory in World 
War II , (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015) 
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by the major land battles but through predominance in air and sea power, in 
which the science lead held by the Allies was a crucial factor. 
 
The development of technologies in association with target marking 
techniques in many ways embodies the issues discussed in the above 
mentioned works. Nowhere is this better illustrated than in the development of 
the cavity magnetron.  The cavity magnetron was a device capable of 
producing a microwave signal of sufficient power to generate a radar 
response. The H2S system utilised the cavity magnetron to generate 
microwaves in the centrimetric wavelength band of sufficient power to provide 
the range and image resolution necessary for the system to be of use as a 
navigation and bombing aid.  
 
The development of the cavity magnetron is a microcosm of the development 
of technology in the Second World War as described in literature on this 
subject, in terms of the importance of the technology - Hartcup concludes that 
the cavity magnetron was an invention probably even more important than the 
atomic bomb74; its derivation from civilian organisations – an example of, as 
Edgerton terms it, a modern weapon that was the product of the civil 
imagination, in that the cavity magnetron was developed largely by teams at 
Birmingham University and the Cavendish Laboratory at Cambridge75; and as 
an example of what Edgerton refers to as “an experts’ war” in which experts 
outside of government clashed with those within it and experts battled 
                                                 
74
 Hartcup The Effect of Science on the Second World War, p185. 
75
 Edgerton Britain’s War Machine, p123. 
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politicians within the politically charged debates76. In relation to H2S, the 
debate centred on the risk that the use of H2S in bomber aircraft would 
inevitably result in an example of the cavity magnetron falling into enemy 
hands77.  
. 
Similar assessments may also be made in relation other technologies upon 
which target marking techniques relied, notably those based upon hyperbolic 
navigation (GEE) and the principle of the “Circle of Constant Path Range” 
(Oboe). In this sense, the development of technology associated with target 
marking techniques is representative of that of many technologies used in the 
Second World War. For that reason, the causal relationship between the 
characteristics of the navigation/bombing aids employed and the target 
marking techniques used in association with them, which the following 
Chapters will demonstrate, is itself a reflection of the importance of technology 
in the Second World War. It is the employment of the first of these 
technologies in association with target marking, GEE, that attention is now 
turned. 
                                                 
76
 Ibid. 
77
 For details of this debate, see Lovell, Echoes of War  and Price Instruments of Darkness  
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CHAPTER 3: EARLY TARGET MARKING TECHNIQUES  
 
The previous chapter concluded with the proposition that the piecemeal 
introduction of various blind bombing devices throughout the course of the 
bombing offensive created an imbalance in the ability of parts of the bomber 
force to locate targets, the corollary being that the adoption of some form of 
target marking technique was both essential and inevitable. In this context, 
the Official History observes that the introduction of GEE had automatically 
led to the position whereby the part of the force equipped with it would always 
be better equipped for target finding than the remainder1. This Chapter will 
describe how Bomber Command evolved the first target-marking technique, 
known as Shaker, based upon the electronic aid GEE. The development of 
the Shaker technique represented uncharted territory for Bomber Command, 
and the principles on which this technique was based formed an intrinsic part 
of some of the more advanced techniques developed as the bombing 
offensive progressed. Consequently, the evolution and performance of the 
Shaker technique is considered in some detail in this Chapter in order that the 
lessons learned in the development of that technique and the improvements 
subsequently secured with later target marking techniques may be properly 
appreciated. However, it is first necessary to put this advance into context by 
reference to the ad hoc and improvised attempts at target marking that had 
taken place up until that point.  
 
                                                 
1
 Webster and Frankland The Strategic Air Offensive, Vol I ,p418. 
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By the outbreak of the Second World War, the use of flares to illuminate a 
target was already an established part of the tactics for night bombing. The 
Royal Air Force Manual of Air Tactics (Manual) of November 19372 contained 
a section devoted to night bombing which acknowledged the difficulty of 
identifying an objective “not contrasted with its surroundings” and the good 
definition of conspicuous objects on the ground from the air in undiffused 
moonlight. The Manual also noted that a characteristic of night bombing is 
that, although a target is often visible from overhead, it cannot be seen during 
the run-up to it and that, when using flares, from directly above ground detail 
could be obscured by the prominence of the flare in the foreground. The 
sequence of attack advocated by the Manual was therefore to locate the 
target by means of parachute flares and then, once the objective was 
identified, to turn and drop a marker bomb. The aircraft was then to make a 
second turn and release the bombs with the aid of the marker bomb.  This 
tactic, it should be remembered, relates to attacks made by individual aircraft 
that had navigated to the target area without any outside assistance. 
However, the Manual did include a tantalising reference to the use of fast 
independent aircraft flying ahead of the main bomber force for the purpose of 
dropping parachute flares over the target to lead bombers to their objective, 
and so relieve them of the necessity of dropping their own flares.   
 
If the above sounds like a system for target marking, the reality was 
something different. At that time, Bomber Command possessed two types of 
parachute flare, the 4.5” and the 5.5” flares, usually referred to as 
                                                 
2
 TNA AIR10/1430 Royal Air Force Manual of Air Tactics AP1234, November 1937. The 
section on night bombing is within Chapter V. 
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‘reconnaissance’ flares. Both types could illuminate the ground for a distance 
of 1,000 yards from their optimum operating height of 1,500 to 2,000 feet 
above ground level. However, whilst the optimum illumination in terms of both 
coverage and detail visible was readily achieved at the altitudes flown in 
peacetime, at the altitudes required in wartime conditions the delay set on the 
time fuze caused the flare to ignite significantly above the optimum height.  
The illumination provided by these parachute flares was therefore much 
reduced and, because these flares were not ‘hooded’, from above the glare 
from the flare in the foreground tended to obscure the ground detail. 
 
The other drawback was the so-called ‘marker bomb’ which, at that time, was 
the standard 4lb incendiary bomb3. Tests conducted at the Aeroplane and 
Armament Experimental Establishment (A&AEE) at Martlesham Heath had 
established that batches of 15 such incendiary bombs would be visible from a 
distance of 8 to 10 miles, and remained visible for 15 minutes4. Consequently, 
although it was noted that at distance ground features could not be discerned 
by the illumination created, the incendiary bomb would provide a good point of 
aim. The obvious implication of these findings - that one batch of such 
incendiaries could not distinguished from a similar batch of incendiaries 
placed elsewhere by another aircraft, and which would be an equally good 
point of aim for following aircraft - was not addressed by the A&AEE. 
 
Indeed, there is no record of any such experiments being undertaken to verify 
whether the attack sequence for night bombing set out in the Manual actually 
                                                 
3
 The saga of the development of a true ‘marker bomb’ is detailed in Chapter Five.  
4
 TNA AVIA18/501 Report by the Aeroplane and Armament Experimental Establishment 
‘Incendiary bombs – Investigation of value as Mark Bombs in Night Bombing’, 15 June 1937.  
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worked under operational conditions.  This may be explained by the fact that, 
at the outbreak of hostilities, the bomber force was considered by the Royal 
Air Force to be ‘daytime’ force, with the bomber reliant upon the mutual 
protection afforded by good formation keeping to defend itself. When the 
fallacy of this tactic was rapidly exposed in early operations, and Bomber 
Command turned to the cover of darkness for protection, the lack of 
experimentation in night bombing tactics meant that it was woefully 
unprepared for a night offensive. It therefore initially fell to individual 
squadrons and, indeed, individual crews to experiment with their own tactics 
for illuminating targets.  
 
At the forefront of these experiments were the squadrons in No.4 Group 
which, equipped with the Armstrong Whitworth Whitley aircraft, specialised in 
night bombing. At this early stage, experiments centred on the use of the 4.5” 
reconnaissance flare by individual aircraft to illuminate the target for their own 
benefit, in which flares were dropped in the vicinity of the target on the first run 
and the bombs dropped in the light provided by those flares on a second run5. 
The technique was rarely successful, partly because the flare did not burn 
long enough and had usually bunt out before the aircraft could return to 
complete the bombing run, exacerbated by the fact that the bomb sight then in 
use – the Course Setting Bomb Sight (CSBS) - required a lengthy straight and 
level approach at a pre-determined altitude and airspeed6. Mostly, however, 
the technique failed because, as discussed previously, the standard of 
                                                 
5
 Hugh Melinsky Forming the Pathfinders: the career of Air-Vice Marshal Sydney Bufton 
(Stroud, Gloucestershire: The History Press, 2010), Chapter 4, p26. 
6
 TNA AIR14/941 Instruction Notes on the Course Setting Bomb Sight Mark VIIIA. This 
version of the CSBS was functionally identical to the Mark IX. 
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navigation was such that the aircraft were generally not in the vicinity of the 
actual target and as such the ability or otherwise of a flare to adequately 
illuminate the target area was entirely academic. In his book Bomber Pilot, 
Group Captain Leonard Cheshire describes a typical raid during this period in 
which, having reached the Estimated Time of Arrival (ETA) for the target area, 
a flare was dropped which only showed “…..trees, woods, fields vaguely and, 
I thought, hills, but nothing else: nothing to show whereabouts we were”. After 
dropping a succession of flares over a period of nearly two hours, Cheshire 
was still unable to positively identify the target7. 
 
It was also a Whitley squadron of No. 4 Group, No.10 Squadron based at 
Dishforth, that on the night of 17/18 May 1940 organised possibly the first 
attempt to mark a target for other crews using flares8. The squadron was 
commanded at that time by the one of the RAF’s best-known characters, 
Group Captain W.E. Staton, who detailed his best crews to drop flares and 
fire Verey lights9 over the target (an oil refinery at Bremen) to guide other 
aircraft of the two Dishforth-based squadrons. The success of this experiment 
is difficult to assess. The Squadron ORB confirms that oil refineries at Bremen 
were attacked on this night but provides no further details, although 
Middlebrook and Everitt state that some fires were started10.  Shortly after this 
raid took place, Staton was succeeded as commanding officer of No.10 
                                                 
7
 Cheshire, Bomber Pilot p.p.48 to 54. Cheshire was a Pilot Officer with No.102 Squadron at 
the time of the raid described in Bomber Pilot. 
8
 TNA AIR27/141 No.10 Squadron Operations Record Book. This first attempt at target 
marking is described in Hastings Bomber Command, p85. 
9
 Verey lights were a distress flare, named after the inventor Edward Wilson Very (1847–
1910), an American naval officer who developed a single-shot breech-loading snub-nosed 
pistol to fire the flare. Also known Very flares, Verey lights (note correct spelling is ‘Verey’, 
rather ‘Very’) were fitted as standard in RAF aircraft for use as both distress flares and the 
signal ‘colours of the day’ when challenged.    
10
 Middlebrook and Everitt The Bomber Command War Diaries, p44. 
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squadron by (then) Wing Commander S.O.Bufton, who instigated the practice 
of picking the best crews in the squadron to lead each attack11 and who would 
later play a key role in the formation of the Pathfinder Force.   
 
Independently of the attempts made by the Dishforth-based squadrons, the 
two Whitley squadrons based at neighbouring Driffield conducted their own 
experiments in target marking. In June 1940, the two squadrons were briefed 
to attack a troop concentration about 35 miles inland from Rotterdam12. After 
the briefing, it was suggested by F/O ‘Jimmy’ Marks13 that every crew made a 
time and distance run from the centre of Rotterdam, easily identified by the 
fires still burning from the bombing of the port by the Luftwaffe on the 14 May, 
and that at the ETA over the target each aircraft dropped a flare and fired a 
Verey light. Despite ideal weather conditions and assurances from all the 
aircrew that took part that a careful time and distance run was made14, the 
first attempt failed and not one of the aircraft taking part saw the flares or 
Verey lights from the other aircraft. On a second attempt, only the four best 
crews were to drop flares at the end of the time and distance run. On this 
occasion, four flares and four Verey lights were visible within three to five 
seconds following the end of the time and distance run, one of which was 
                                                 
11
 Melinsky Forming the Pathfinders, p58. 
12
 TNA AIR27/655 No 77 Squadron Operations Record Book. 
13
 Later, as a Wing Commander and C/O of No. 35 Squadron, ‘Jimmy’ Marks would play a 
pivotal role in the early operations of the Pathfinder Force. For more information on the career 
of ‘Jimmy’ Marks, see William Anderson, Pathfinders (Jarrolds, 1946) and Feast  The 
Pathfinder Companion. 
14
 Amongst the aircrew taking part on this raid was the (then) Pilot Officer Leonard Cheshire 
(although no mention is made of these attacks in his biography Bomber Pilot.) and (then) Pilot 
Officer ‘Hamish’ Mahaddie. As a Group Captain, ‘Hamish’ Mahaddie would later play a 
significant role in the Pathfinder Force and would later record his experiences in a book: 
Mahaddie, H. Hamish: the story of a Pathfinder (Shepperton: Ian Allen, 1989).    
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reported to have pinpointed the target. This flare was then reinforced by other 
crews and an accurate attack was claimed15.  
 
It is symptomatic of these early attempts at target marking that they were 
carried out at unit level, sometimes at the instigation of relatively junior 
officers. Moreover, there is no evidence to suggest that the squadrons at 
Driffield were aware of the similar experiments carried out by the squadrons 
based at neighbouring Dishforth, notwithstanding that both bases were within 
No. 4 Group.  
 
Just prior to these ad hoc experiments taking place, a conference had been 
held at Bomber Command Headquarters to discuss tactical questions16. At the 
suggestion of the Commander-in-Chief, then AM Charles Portal, No.4 Group 
was requested to experiment with the use of specially picked crews to drop 
flares to guide following aircraft. On the 3rd June 1940, during a raid on the 
Homberg oil refinery near Duisburg, two flare carrying aircraft were timed to 
arrive over the target 30 minutes before the remainder of the force. Each of 
these aircraft carried 30 flares, compared with the normal compliment for a 
Whitley of six, and remained in the target area continuously dropping flares. 
Due to the limitation of the flares then in use, the flare dropping aircraft were 
restricted to a maximum height of 6,000ft, the resulting increased risk faced 
                                                 
15
 TNA AIR27/655 No 77 Squadron Operations Record Book. This experiment is also 
described in at least three secondary sources: Chris Blanchett From Hull, Hell and Halifax: an 
illustrated history of No.4 Group, 1937-1948 (Hersham, Surrey Midland Publishing, 2nd 
Edition, 2006); Michael Bowyer Pathfinders at War (Shepperton: Ian Allen Limited, 1977); and 
Mahaddie Hamish: the story of a Pathfinder. The account in each is essentially the same 
although, because it is based upon the experience of Group Captain Mahaddie, who as a 
Pilot Officer with No. 77 Squadron took part both of these raids, credence can be attached to 
this account. 
16
 TNA AIR14/787 Notes of a conference at Headquarters Bomber Command on Monday 6
 
May 1940 to discuss certain tactical and other questions. 
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being acknowledged as a necessity with this technique. The experiment was 
repeated on the following night. 
 
The experiment was not a success17. The crews of the main bombing force 
complained that the number and distribution of flares was confusing and 
made it difficult to identify the target. The consensus of opinion amongst these 
crews was that they preferred to use their own flares to enable them to locate 
the target. A further objection was that the flare carrying aircraft were required 
to drop a number of flares in order to locate the target themselves before 
dropping a concentration of flares to guide following aircraft. If the initial flare 
dropping aircraft were unable to locate the target before the arrival of the 
following aircraft, the flares dropped to locate the target were liable to confuse 
the crews of those aircraft. Conversely, if the flare dropping aircraft located 
the target quickly, either the flares would burn out before the following aircraft 
arrived or they would be obliged to remain in the target area for a lengthy 
period. At a time when there no navigation aids to assist crews in precise time 
keeping, this was a significant issue. 
 
The experiment also raised issues that would surface again later in relation to 
target marking techniques. The view expressed by Air Commodore 
Coningham was that the technique “….savours of putting too many eggs in 
one basket…”on the basis that, if the flare carrying aircraft failed to arrive, the 
whole of the attack may be delayed or disorganised. It was also explicitly 
recognised that success depended upon the initial flare dropping aircraft 
                                                 
17
 TNA AIR14/106 Memorandum Air Commodore Coningham. AOC No. 4 Group, to AM 
Portal, C-in-C Bomber Command, 7 June 1940.  
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being able to identify the target correctly and that, if the ‘first shot’ was not on 
the correct target, the following aircraft would be misled. In this respect, Air 
Commodore Coningham observed that even if the main body of attackers 
sighted flares ahead that did not mean that the flare carrying aircraft had 
correctly identified the target. Coningham also commented that previous 
attempts to indicate the target using selected crews to drop incendiary bombs 
suffered from the same problem. His recommendation to Portal was to advise 
against further experiments at that time and that individual aircraft should 
continue to locate targets for themselves, believing that a concentration of 
individually navigated aircraft arriving over the target in a short space of time 
would result in an unmistakable beacon of flares and/or a conflagration18. 
 
This was an interesting experiment, and one which even at this early stage 
identified the main issues that would later become associated with target 
marking, namely: the importance of the relative timing of the marking and 
main force elements; the need for a distinctive marker for the A/P; and the risk 
that an error in marking the target could lead the entire attack astray. There 
are two other significant aspects of this experiment. The first of these is the 
date of June 1940. As discussed below, the evolution of target marking 
techniques by Bomber Command is widely considered to be in response to 
the employment of a specialist target finding unit by the Luftwaffe19. However, 
the unit concerned - Kampfgruppe 100 - did not operate in the target finding 
                                                 
18
 Ibid 
19
 For example, M.Chorlton The RAF Pathfinders: Bomber Command’s Elite Squadrons 
(Newbury, Berkshire: Countryside Books, 2012), page 13; Hastings Bomber Command, p190; 
Melinsky Forming the Pathfinders, p67; Overy The Bombing War; Europe 1939-1945, p290; 
J. Stubbington, Kept in the Dark: The denial to Bomber Command of vital Ultra and other 
intelligence information during World War II (Barnsley: Pen & Sword Aviation, 2010), p118. 
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role until September 1940, some three months after the experiments by No 4 
Group20. The second significant aspect is that the experiment was suggested 
by AM Portal. Whilst there is no record of Portal’s response to the results of 
this experiment, he would later as Chief of Air Staff play a crucial role in the 
formation of the Pathfinder Force (although how pro-active a role will be 
discussed later). The instigation of this experiment is therefore an early 
indication that Portal may have harboured doubts about a tactic whereby each 
aircraft individually located the target was capable of delivering the results 
required. Indeed, at the same conference at which he instructed No.4 Group 
to undertake experiments using specially selected crews to lead attacks, 
Portal had also stated that some form of marker bomb was essential to obtain 
accuracy and asked that No.3 Group experiment with the use of marker 
bombs21. This is further evidence that Portal was early to recognise the need 
for some form of target marking and explain why he ultimately supported the 
formation of the Pathfinder Force. 
 
The first coordinated attempt to mark a target took place on the night of 16/17 
December 1940, when 134 aircraft attacked Mannheim22. This raid, prepared 
under the code-name OPERATION ABIGAIL RACHEL,  was important in the 
wider context of the bombing offensive, in that it was the first occasion on 
                                                 
20
 Kenneth Wakefield, The first Pathfinders; the Operational History of Kampfgruppe 100, 
1939-1941 (Crécy Books Ltd, 1992), p102. Wakefield explains that a target finding role had 
long been envisioned for Kampfgruppe 100 but that it was not until September 1940 that the 
technique was actually employed.  
21
 TNA AIR14/787 Notes of a conference at Headquarters Bomber Command on Monday 6
th
 
May 1940 to discuss certain tactical and other questions. At that time, the term ‘marker bomb’ 
still meant the 4lb incendiary bomb. No. 3 Group was chosen because the Wellington aircraft 
with which the Group was equipped was the most suited to accommodate a mixed load of 
incendiary and H.E. bombs. 
22
 TNA AIR14/2670 Night Bomb Raid Sheets Vol VII, December 1940; AIR24/200 Bomber 
Command Operations Record Book; Middlebrook and Everitt, The Bomber Command War 
Diaries,p111. 
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which a city centre itself was the A/P and therefore the first so-called ‘area 
raid’23. The plan to concentrate the largest possible number of aircraft on a 
single target, OPERATION ABIGAIL, had been specifically sanctioned by the 
War Cabinet on the 12 December 1940 as ‘an experiment’24, with Mannheim 
(codenamed ‘Rachel’) selected from the list of three cities authorized for 
attack25.  The ABIGAIL plan called for the attack to be opened by a force of 
Wellingtons from No.3 Group flown by the ‘most experienced crews available’ 
and armed only with incendiaries, with the following crews instructed to take 
as their A/P the fires raised by this initial force26.  This raid is therefore a 
significant milestone in the development of target marking techniques as 
being the first occasion whereby crews of the Main Force were relieved of the 
responsibility of locating the A/P. 
 
The raid took place in clear conditions during the full-moon period, and 75% of 
the aircraft dispatched claimed to have reached the target27. Initial reports 
suggested that the majority of bombs had fallen in the target area with the 
town centre said to have been “left in flames”28, although subsequent 
reconnaissance photographs indicated a wide dispersal. This was confirmed 
                                                 
23
 For the background to this raid, which was effectively a reprisal for the Luftwaffe raids on 
Coventry and Southampton, see Webster and Frankland The Strategic Air Offensive, Vol I, 
p.p.225 to 227. 
24
 TNA CAB65/16/12. The three targets authorized for attack were Bremen (codenamed 
“Jezebel”); Düsseldorf (codenamed “Delilah”); and Mannheim (codenamed “Rachel”).  
25
 TNA AIR20/5195 Bomber Command Operations Order No.127, 13 December 1940. 
26
 TNA AIR20/5195 Bomber Command Operations Order No.126, 4 December 1940. 
27
 TNA AIR14/2670 Night Bomb Raid Sheets Vol VII, December 1940; AIR24/200 Bomber 
Command Operations Record Book; Middlebrook and Everitt The Bomber Command War 
Diaries,p111. The Night Bomb Raid Sheet and the Bomber Command Operations Record 
Book do not agree on the number of aircraft taking part in this raid and the figure quoted here 
represents the higher of the two. If the lower figure is used, 62% of aircraft dispatched 
claimed to have reached the target. 
28
 TNA AIR24/200 Bomber Command Operations Record Book, 16/17 December 1940. 
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by reports from Mannheim, which indicated that the largest fires were not in 
the city centre but in the residential suburbs29.  
 
The inevitable conclusion was that the initial wave of fire-raisers had not been 
accurate, and this led to the first wider debate about the value of target 
marking. Pierse suggested that the fires started outside the target area had 
“led the following crews astray”, and that the operation orders had been too 
rigid in requiring crews to aim at the fires started by the initial wave. Air Vice-
Marshal Bottomley, who had recently assumed command of No.5 Group, 
agreed and considered that the initial fire-raising attack constituted ‘an added 
risk of failure’ because the fires might be in the wrong place or they might be 
decoys started by the Germans30. Air Vice-Marshal Coningham31 took a 
different view, believing that the principle of an initial fire-raising force was 
sound and that the Germans, who employed a specialist fire-raising force, 
“had the right method”32. Indeed, he went further, claiming that “Bomber 
Command could do equally well, and better, if we pick our best units and 
specialise on similar lines”33. In view of Coningham’s comments following his 
own Group’s experiment with target marking, where he had recommended 
that such techniques not be pursued, his apparent volte-face only six months 
later may initially appear surprising and even disingenuous. However, the 
more generous explanation might be that Coningham had come to believe 
                                                 
29
 TNA AIR41/40 Air Historical Branch Narrative: The RAF Bomber Offensive against 
Germany; Vol II Restricted Bombing Sept 1939- May 1941. This document contains a 
translation of the contemporary report produced by the city of Mannheim. 
30
 TNA CAB65/16/12 Memo Bottomley to Bomber Command HQ, 26 December 1940. 
31
 Air of Authority - A History of RAF Organisation. Arthur Coningham was promoted from Air 
Commodore to (Acting) Air Vice-Marshal on 12 September 1940 and confirmed as Air Vice-
Marshal on 14 April 1942. 
32
 TNA CAB65/16/12 Memo Bottomley to Bomber Command HQ, 26 December 1940. 
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that, in order to obtain similar results to those achieved by the Luftwaffe, it 
was not sufficient to simply select the best crews and that it was necessary 
employ a specialist unit to carry-out the initial fire-raising role.  
 
The ‘right method’ to which Coningham referred was the use by the Luftwaffe 
of Kampfgruppe 100 in the role of an “Anzünder-gruppe” or “Beleuchter-
gruppe”  - a fire-raising group, tasked with starting fires to guide other aircraft 
to the target area34. The Luftwaffe had been quick to appreciate the difficulties 
in locating a target on moonless nights or in conditions of heavy cloud cover, 
even if that target was at relatively short range and as large and distinctive as 
London. To overcome these difficulties, from September 194035 the inclusion 
of Kampfgruppe 100 as an Anzünder-gruppe was a regular (but not ever-
present) feature of Luftwaffe night raids, relying on incendiary bombs to 
illuminate the target area by means of fires - a technique known as 
“Azünderleistung”, literally ‘Fire Control Method’. There were, however, 
significant differences between the Fire Control Method employed by 
Kampfgruppe 100 and the experiment conducted by Bomber Command in 
OPERATION ABIGAIL RACHEL.  
 
The first key difference was that the fires started by Kampfgruppe 100 were 
intended to illuminate the target area and were not intended to act as points of 
aim for the following crews. Indeed, for the first few months of Beleuchter-
gruppe operations, Kampfgruppe 100 aimed at specific targets and carried a 
mixed load of incendiary and high explosive bombs. It was not until December 
                                                 
34
 Until that time, Kampfgruppe 100 had been employed on precision attacks (mostly on 
aircraft factories) using the X-verfahren blind bombing device, with mixed results. 
35
 Wakefield The first Pathfinders,p102 
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1940 - ironically about the time that OPERATION ABIGAIL RACHEL took 
place - that Kampfgruppe 100 routinely carried all-incendiary loads36. This is 
perhaps best illustrated in relation to the attack on Coventry on the night of 
night of 14/15 November 1940, for which Kampfgruppe 100 was allocated 
aiming points on the east side of the city whereas other Luftwaffe units were 
allocated specific factories as targets37. The spatial separation of these 
specific targets clearly indicates that the role of Kampfgruppe 100 was 
confined to guiding other aircraft to the general target area, on arrival at which 
crews identified their own specific A/P. 
 
The second key difference is that rather than concentrating these fire-raising 
aircraft in time at the start of the raid38, the technique employed was to space 
the aircraft of Kampfgruppe 100 at intervals of between two and five minutes 
throughout the raid, in between which the aircraft of other units would make 
their attacks. Moreover, whereas the ABIGAIL plan called for the attack to be 
opened by the fire-raising force, Kampfgruppe 100 not always timed to be the 
first over the target.  
 
The final, and perhaps most significant difference, is that Kampfgruppe 100 
was guided to the target area by a blind-bombing device. Kampfgruppe 100 
                                                 
36
 Ibid, p129. The first attack on which Kampfgruppe 100 carried an all-incendiary load was 
that on Sheffield on 15/16 December 1940, that being the night before OPERATION ABIGAIL 
RACHEL. 
37
 Norman Longmate Air Raid: the bombing of Coventry, November 1940, 
(London:Hutchinson, 1976), Chapter 3 and Winston G. Ramsay (ed), The Blitz: Then & Now, 
Vol II, Battle of Britain Prints International Limited, 1988. For example, Kampfgeschwader 27 
were allocated the Alvis aero-engine works and Kampfgeschwader 55 the Daimler Works. 
38
 Although it usual for aircraft of Kampfgruppe 100 to begin arriving close to the start of the 
raid, it was not always the case that these were first aircraft timed to arrive over the target.  
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was the only unit equipped with X-verfahren39, a blind bombing device that 
employed a series of intersecting radio beams to release the bombs 
automatically, giving a theoretical accuracy of 300 yards at a range of 180 
miles40. The use of X-verfahren effectively ensured that the incendiaries 
dropped by Kampfgruppe 100 would fall in the general target area and avoid 
the dispersion of attack that undermined OPERATION ABIGAIL RACHEL.  
 
Although the ‘fire-raising’ technique developed by Kampfgruppe 100 had a 
significant influence on the fire-raising technique adopted in OPERATION 
ABIGAIL RACHEL and, indeed, the formulation of British bombing policy in 
1941/1942, the success achieved by Kampfgruppe 100 in the fire-raising role 
was overestimated at the time. On no occasion is this better illustrated than in 
the infamous attack on Coventry on the night of 14/15 November 1940, which 
was one of the most concentrated raids undertaken by the Luftwaffe during 
this period and caused damage significantly in excess of anything achieved 
by Bomber Command at that time. This raid, carried out under the codename 
of Mondscheinsonate (Moonlight Sonata)41, was deliberately mounted during 
a period of ideal weather conditions with good visibility and bright moonlight. 
In the event, notwithstanding that the Beleuchter aircraft of Kampfgruppe 100 
were all timed to arrive over the target in the first hour of the raid, 103 of the 
total of 552 aircraft dispatched failed to reach the target42. In another raid that 
                                                 
39
 This device is sometimes erroneously referred to in secondary literature as X-Gerät, this 
being the term for the equipment carried in the aircraft. The correct term for the system as a 
whole, including the ground transmitting stations, is X-verfahren. 
40
 The X-verhahren system was influential in the development of the early Oboe systems 
‘Blind Bombing Cherbourg’ and ‘Broody Hen’. 
41
 This operation is usually referred to in British sources as Mondscheinsonate (Moonlight 
Sonata) but also appears as “Mondscheinserenade” (Moonlight Serenade) in some 
documents.  
42
 Ramsay (ed), The Blitz: Then & Now, Vol II. 
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took place a few nights later in similarly good conditions, against Birmingham 
on the 19/20 November 1940, a total of 83 aircraft out of 439 dispatched failed 
to reach the target43. Consequently, notwithstanding the employment of a 
specialist target finding force on these two raids, 19% of those aircraft 
dispatched failed to reach the target, a figure not significantly different from 
that achieved by Bomber Command in OPERATION ABIGAIL RACHEL under 
similarly favourable weather conditions.  
 
Therefore, despite possessing an accurate blind bombing system employed 
by a specialist target finding force, ‘fire-raising’ on the scale provided by 
Kampfgruppe 100 was not in itself sufficient to provide an unmistakable 
beacon to guide the main force to a target. On those occasions where the 
‘Fire Control Method’ employed by Kampfgruppe 100 did prove successful, 
the target was nearly always located close to a prominent water feature, such 
as the distinctive bends of the River Thames through London or the docks of 
Bristol, Southampton and Liverpool. Against inland targets such as Coventry 
and Birmingham that lacked distinctive landmarks, the Luftwaffe was equally 
as reliant upon good weather conditions as Bomber Command, 
notwithstanding the ‘pathfinders’ of KG100 had the benefit of the X-verfahren 
system. Moreover, the overall accuracy, or rather the inaccuracy, of German 
raids was known to the British at this time. In his comments on the Butt 
Report., Portal had remarked that that 24% of aircraft had reached their 
targets44.     Therefore, Kampfgruppe 100 was a dubious role model on which 
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 Ibid. 
44
 TNA AIR/1356 Minute CAS to Prime Minister, 11 September 1941. 
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to base Bomber Command’s own fire raising techniques and, later, on which 
to base arguments for the creation of the Pathfinder Force. 
 
In the event, Bomber Command would have to wait another year before it 
possessed a blind-bombing device of its own and could seek to emulate what 
some believed to be the ‘the right method’ employed by Kampfgruppe 10045. 
In the interim, Groups and squadrons continued with the use of flares by 
individual aircraft or, at most, by individual squadrons, and it was not until a 
year after Portal had initiated the first experiment in the use of specially picked 
crews to drop flares to guide following aircraft that the idea was raised again. 
On this occasion, the messenger was the Inspector General (I.G.) of the 
Royal Air Force, at that time none other than the former Commander-in-Chief 
of Bomber Command, Air Chief Marshal Sir Edgar Ludlow-Hewitt. In a letter 
dated 15 May 1941 to the then current incumbent of the post of C-in-C 
Bomber Command, Air Marshal Sir Richard Pierse, the I.G. described 
conversations that he had had with aircrew on the subject of flare dropping46. 
The I.G. explained that ‘they all agreed that the flares were extremely good’ 
and that ‘a flare dropped by another aircraft anywhere ahead of them was of 
far greater value to themselves than a flare dropped by their own aircraft”. The 
I.G. also noted that one unit (emphasis added) recognised the value of 
dropping flares for one another and exploited that advantage by arranging that 
each aircraft would in any event drop all of its flares whether it wanted them 
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 This was the GEE navigation aid – see Chapter 2. 
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 TNA AIR14/106 Letter dated 15 May 1941 from Air Chief Marshal Sir Edgar Ludlow-Hewitt 
to Air Marshal Sir Richard Pierse, C-in-C Bomber Command. 
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for itself or not, so as to assist following aircraft47. The I.G. gathered that this 
unit routed its aircraft closely, so as to get the maximum benefit from the 
flares. Other squadrons, it was noted, despite recognising the value of flares, 
had not made any special arrangements to take advantage of it. It is 
instructive to note that idea of a more co-ordinated approach to the dropping 
of flares had arisen as a result of discussion with operational aircrew and that, 
although all crews recognised the value of flares, only one unit had made any 
attempt co-ordinate their use.  
 
The I.G. had concluded his letter by suggesting that the C-in-C may consider 
the use of flares to guide following aircraft a point worth pursuing, to which 
Pierse’s response was to request each Group to summarize its use of flares48.  
Although it transpired that all Groups used flares, the technique varied 
considerably. In No.1 Group, one squadron had experimented with the tactical 
use of flares as suggested by the I.G. with good results, although generally it 
was considered that flares should be used by individual aircraft to assist in 
pin-pointing the location of the target. This Group also indicated that due to 
minimum operational height of 16,000 ft now employed it had modified the 
standard 4.5” flare so as to give it a longer delay so as to burn at 3-4,000 ft 
over the target49. No. 3 Group found that flares were more beneficial to 
following aircraft than the aircraft that dropped the flare but, in ‘GOODWOOD’ 
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 Although not specifically identified by the I.G., this is likely to have been No.10 Squadron, 
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type operations where numerous aircraft were involved, crews did not like 
using flares when uncertain of their position because of the risk of misleading 
other aircraft50. The specialist night-bombing No.4 Group confirmed that it was 
experimenting with the tactical use of flares as suggested by the I.G, 
commenting that success depended upon a concentration of flares, and was 
modifying the bomb cells in the wing of its Whitley aircraft to accommodate 
flares as a more efficient means of dropping them than the vertical stowage in 
the fuselage. The response from No.5 Group was more circumspect, given 
that the Group had relatively little experience in their use51. However, in 
principle, the Group agreed in principle with the method proposed by the I.G.  
 
It is evident from these responses that by mid-1941 there was already a 
considerable body of experience and opinion within Bomber Command 
regarding the use of flares for target finding, and that tactics were being 
modified in response to changing operational requirements. However, these 
experiments were still taking place at unit level and there was no attempt to 
co-ordinate findings or develop tactics for target marking. Moreover, it was 
apparent that improved defences were by this time forcing aircraft to operate 
at higher altitudes, at which not only were the then standard flares ineffective 
in illuminating ground detail in the target area, but from which ground features 
en route were not discernible and navigation to the target more difficult. As the 
Butt Report was soon to show, Bomber Command was therefore still in the 
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 At this time, the strength of the bomber force employed on any particular raid was denoted 
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position whereby the standard of navigation was such that the aircraft were 
generally not in the vicinity of the actual target, in which case the value of 
tactics along the lines of those mentioned by the I.G. was entirely academic.  
 
Moreover, the difficulty of locating the target was just one of several problems 
facing Bomber Command at this time. The extent and scope of these 
problems is succinctly captured in a paper titled ‘Facing Facts’ produced in 
December 1941 by Air Vice-Marshal Baldwin, AOC No 3 Group52. The paper 
began with the observation that the considerable improvement in results 
following the increase in strength of Bomber Command had failed to 
materialise. Baldwin advanced two main reasons for this failure: the scattered 
nature of the attacks, and the lack of concentration of such damage as was 
effected. The causes that led to that “somewhat haphazard method of attack” 
were said by Baldwin to have been an inability to navigate to the selected 
objective, a failure to locate the objective even when the navigation proved 
accurate to within a few miles of the A/P and a failure to hit the A/P assuming 
that it could be identified.  According to Baldwin, in the order of priority in 
which he considered they were influencing the effectiveness of attacks, these 
failures could be attributed to a lack of training, inaccurate weather forecasts, 
the effectiveness of enemy defence measures and a lack of adequate 
technical aids. The paper produced by Baldwin is therefore a convenient 
vehicle through which to briefly explore the problems facing Bomber 
Command at the end of 1941 and thereby provide the context in which target 
marking techniques would be developed. 
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In his paper, Baldwin’s concerns in relation to lack of training were focused on 
the poor supervision of inexperienced pilots once they reached operational 
squadrons53. However, there were also wider concerns within Bomber 
Command in relation to the quality of navigation training. By late 1941, 
navigation training was about to undergo somewhat of a transformation. In 
February 1939, in response to a suggestion from the Air Ministry that 
Observers should be responsible for navigation, the C-in-C of Bomber 
Command had declared that “navigation is not difficult” and that there was “no 
earthly reason why Captains should not be masters of this simple subject”54.  
As a result, early Bomber Command operations had been mostly conducted 
with the pilot(s) having responsibility for navigation. Subsequently, as 
described by Jerrod55, there was an increasing realisation that navigating an 
aircraft at night required a specialist. Consequently, from 1942 onwards, 
navigation was generally undertaken by specialist navigators within crews 
composed increasingly of role specialists. 
 
Nevertheless, at the end of 1941, navigation remained a problem. In a letter to 
the Air Ministry dated 17 April 1942, Harris complained that he was  “not at all 
happy” about the standard of navigation in Bomber Command and pressed for 
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the appointment of Station Navigation Officers at every base and the 
formation of a Directorate of Navigation within the Air Ministry56. 
 
Harris’ letter of the 17 April 1942 was in fact a follow up of a wider-ranging 
letter on the subject of navigation sent to the Air Ministry a month before.57 
The Air Ministry response, interestingly penned by Freeman rather than Portal 
himself, is unlikely to have been to Harris’ liking58. The Air Ministry claimed to 
have always recognised the importance of air navigation but rejected the idea 
of a Directorate of Navigation, suggesting that it was neither necessary nor 
justified. Instead, some re-organisation within the Air Ministry was proposed to 
enhance the profile of navigation, together with the re-establishment of a 
Bomber Development Unit to focus on the study of navigation problems. The 
Air Ministry also proposed the establishment of squadron navigation officers, 
suggesting that they should be observers or navigators, and confirmed that a 
higher standard of navigation training was being given at Operational Training 
Units. However, as a parting shot, Freeman opined that the failure to find 
targets had been largely due to weakness in tactical study and tactical 
planning, and that the “righting of that failure rest primarily in your hands”. 
This led Freeman to conclude his response by indicating that the most 
pressing need was for an effective means of initial identification and marking 
of the target, and that a properly constituted and well-trained target finding 
force was the primary requirement. 
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Harris did not let that response lie unanswered, and immediately questioned 
Freemans opening comment that the Air Ministry had always recognised the 
importance of Air Navigation as being unsupported by factual evidence59. 
Harris then countered Freeman’s criticism of the lack of tactical study and 
planning, pointing to the establishment of the Operational Research Section 
within Bomber Command and the increased use of night photographs. 
Indeed, Harris went further, suggesting that the failures in tactical study and 
planning were due to the failure of the Air Ministry to allocate appropriate 
personnel to the task. However, Harris saved his most acerbic comment to 
the suggestion that the failure to navigate to the target was primarily due to 
errors in tactics, commenting that that statement alone shows an “apparent 
inability to appreciate the first importance of air navigation”.  
 
This exchange of correspondence is interesting, occurring as it did at a time 
when the formation of a target finding force was the subject of much debate 
(see Chapter 4). It demonstrates a general acceptance that the quality of 
training was in need of improvement, just as Baldwin had indicated in his 
paper, but that this was just one part of a wider problem. Another part of that 
problem, also identified by Baldwin, was that of weather forecasting. 
 
The difficulty in terms of weather forecasting for Bomber Command 
operations was that the weather systems generally travelled from west to 
east. Thus, weather forecasters were able to predict with some accuracy 
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conditions over Bomber Command’s bases by studying approaching weather 
conditions to the west and over the Atlantic but, as Baldwin observed, did not 
have the necessary information to predict conditions over the Continent60. As 
a result, inaccurate forecasts over the planned route and target area failed to 
predict cloud cover, wind strength and wind direction. These were factors 
essential to accurate D/R as well as pinpointing the target. Baldwin’s 
recommendation was the creation of long-distance Weather Reporting Flights 
and these would later materialise as the highly successful “Pampa Flights” 
carried out by the specially formed 1409 (Met) Flight61. However, in late 1941, 
inaccurate weather forecasting remained a significant problem facing Bomber 
Command.  
 
In relation to the increased effectiveness of the enemy defences, Baldwin’s 
point was the simple and obvious one: they had forced the bomber aircraft to 
fly at heights from which it was not possible to identify ground features at 
night, even in conditions of good visibility62. Baldwin’s concern in this respect 
appears to have been directed at bombing accuracy but, for the reasons set 
out earlier, the difficulty caused by not being able to recognise ground 
features also holds true for navigation. 
 
The final factor identified in Baldwin’s paper was the lack of adequate 
technical aids63. The first deficiency identified was the absence of an efficient 
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flare. At that time, Bomber Command was using the 4.5” reconnaissance 
flare64. This was a cordite bomb which ignited when drawn from a canister by 
a parachute65, the deployment of which was controlled by a time fuze 
activated instantaneously at the point of release. The ignited flare fell at a rate 
of 500ft/min below the parachute, and could illuminate the ground in a white 
light for a distance of 1,000 yards from its optimum operating height of 1,500 
to 2,000 feet above ground level66. The time activation period of the time fuze 
remained constant, such that the altitude at which the flare ignited was directly 
related to the altitude of the aircraft at the point of release: the higher the initial 
release, the greater the altitude at which the flare ignited. Consequently, as 
the operational altitudes increased in response to improving German 
defences, the delay set on the time fuze caused the flare to ignite significantly 
above the optimum altitude, with the result that the illumination provided by 
these parachute flares was much reduced.  The need identified by Baldwin 
was therefore for a flare that opened at a height above ground which 
optimized the illumination provided.  
 
The 4.5” reconnaissance flare was not ‘hooded’, such that the upward glare 
would dazzle the bomb aimer and prevent ground detail from being seen. 
Moreover, the presence of ground haze would diffuse the light produced by 
the flare and exacerbate the upward glare. This was entirely counter-
productive to the purpose of dropping the flares in the first instance.  
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The principal requirement that Baldwin identified was therefore for a ‘hooded’ 
flare67. Even though a hooded flare was operational in America in 1941, the 
development of a hooded flare for Bomber Command did not begin until early 
1943 and a hooded flare was not introduced into operational use until January 
1944. The delay was caused by experimentation in establishing the shape 
and form of the parachute, which also served as the ‘hood’. The main issue 
was finding a material of sufficient opacity to reduce the upward glare but 
which, in the quantity adequate to provide a parachute of a surface area 
capable of supporting the flare at the required rate of descent and shielding 
the upward glare, was sufficiently thin to be accommodated within the casing 
and yet strong enough not to tear on release. The production version that 
emerged was a 7” reconnaissance flare suspended on a parachute having an 
area of 18 square feet68. Once introduced into operational use the hooded 
flare represented a significant improvement on the ordinary 4.5” 
reconnaissance flare. The reduced glare resulting from the use of the hooded 
flare was a significant factor in the success of the Newhaven technique in the 
last year of the bombing offensive (see Chapter Five) and in particular the 
low-level target marking techniques developed by No 5 Group, a key 
component of which was the illumination of the target area by flares dropped 
‘blind’ from a high level by aircraft equipped with H2S (see Chapter Six). 
 
                                                 
67
 TNA AIR14/1939 Letter Air Vive-Marshal Baldwin to Air Marshal Sir Richard Pierse,7 
December 1941 
68
 TNA AIR10/2393 Air Publication 1661H, Vol 1 ‘PFF Special Marker Equipment’, October 
1944. The correct technical nomenclature of this projectile was ‘Flare, a/c, Reconnaissance 
4.5”, Hooded, No 2, Yellow/Air’, although the abbreviated term ‘hooded flare’ is used 
throughout this thesis. 
 144 
 
In almost a side-note, Baldwin also expressed the hope that improved 
wireless aids would very shortly be forthcoming and enable “more accurate 
tracks to be flown”69. Baldwin did not go into further detail, but a letter from 
Bomber Command in March 1942 referred to the “science” of navigation as 
having progressed far beyond the “railway line stage” (‘Bradshaw’ navigation) 
and that the failure of crews to reach and locate targets was due to a lack of 
suitable navigation equipment70. The paper went on to suggest that the Air 
Position Indicator (A.P.I) should be given the highest priority as a necessary 
adjunct to GEE in order to solve the “other half” of the D/R navigation problem 
(i.e. beyond the range of GEE). 
 
Although not by any means comprehensive, ‘Facing Facts’ encapsulates the 
main problems facing Bomber Command at the end of 1941. A number of the 
recommendations made by Baldwin would materialise later in the bombing 
offensive, notably the ‘Pampa Flights’, the hooded flare and the A.P.I., and 
these would go some way to solving the problems identified in this paper.  
However, whilst the anticipated improvement in results had failed to 
materialise in 1941 using existing methods, the reasons for that failure 
remained. It was the very problems identified in ‘Facing Facts’ that Bomber 
Command sought to address by the introduction of target marking and, by the 
start of 1942, Bomber Command was about to employ the first of the 
recognised target marking techniques: that known as ‘Shaker’.   
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The first step towards the ‘right method’ had been taken when the first 
operational trial of Bomber Commands first navigation aid - GEE - took place 
on the night of the 11/12 August 1941. However, on the following night, a 
GEE-equipped aircraft was lost on operations and fearing that the device may 
be compromised even before being introduced into widespread service, 
operational trials were hastily curtailed71. Nonetheless, GEE appeared to offer 
much promise and Bomber Command began preparing for its entry into 
operational service. The clear expectation was that GEE would have a limited 
operational life before being subject to countermeasures, with the most 
sanguine estimates being in the region of three to six months. Accordingly, in 
December 1941 ORSBC produced a report that considered the operational 
use of GEE72, noting in introduction that “its value will be great” and that it was 
“especially important that it should be used at the outset to the maximum 
advantage”. The report recognised that new tactical possibilities would arise 
from the introduction of the instrument, and that it was “clearly desirable that 
careful consideration should be given to the planning of the operations”. 
 
The report was quick to point out that GEE enabled the exact time and 
direction of attack to be laid down within narrow limits and that operations 
could be planned so that within a few minutes a very large weight of bombs 
could be dropped. The resultant concentration was recognised as increasing 
the damage caused to industrial areas through overwhelming civil defence 
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services but was also fundamental to the possibilities that followed, none of 
which would have been possible without the accurate timing offered by GEE 
navigation.  
 
The first of these possibilities was concentrated flare dropping. It was 
suggested in the report that on nights with good visibility it would be possible 
to attack small targets which had been identified by concentrated flare 
dropping by a small number of GEE equipped aircraft carrying a large number 
of flares, timed to arrive over the target before the main attack in order to 
illuminate the target area73. It was acknowledged that the timing and general 
planning of such operations would need to be carefully worked out, which 
would subsequently prove to be more involved than was perhaps envisaged 
at the time. However, the technique of concentrated flare dropping described 
was, in effect, the rudiments of target marking techniques that later became 
standard74.   
 
A second possibility was blind bombing. With the accuracy of GEE expected 
at that time75, the ORSBC report suggested that GEE should prove effective 
on raids on targets covering about one square mile76, even in conditions of 
dense cloud. Moreover, it was suggested that in conditions of haze but no 
cloud, the fires started by GEE equipped aircraft would be visible as a guide 
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to non-GEE equipped aircraft following. Here, then, was a principle that in a 
modified form would also form the basis of target marking techniques that 
later became standard77. 
 
A third possibility was ‘attack by fire’. Acknowledging from the outset that 
concentration would be even more important if an attack by fire was to 
overcome the civil defence services, ORSBC nonetheless considered that it 
would be possible to plan an attack such that a large number of GEE 
equipped aircraft could drop their incendiaries within a few minutes of each 
other, thereby starting a conflagration that following non-GEE equipped 
aircraft could aim at78. This concept would later form the basis of the Shaker 
target marking technique (see below). 
 
This report from ORSBC79 is significant because, some three months before 
the first large scale use in operations, the tactical possibilities offered by GEE 
were recognised as extending beyond purely an aid to navigation. The report 
also clearly appreciated that the main advantage offered by GEE was the 
concentration of attacks in time and space, and that it was this, more than any 
other factor, that opened up the tactical possibilities of opening attacks with 
concentrated flare dropping or attack by fire. In so doing, this report 
foreshadowed the development of target marking techniques that would later 
underpin the remainder of the bombing offensive. Moreover, whilst it was 
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believed at the time that GEE would be sufficiently accurate for blind bombing, 
the emphasis was on techniques that would enable GEE equipped aircraft to 
assist other aircraft not so equipped to locate the target. It therefore follows 
that even before GEE was used operationally, there was a recognition that, at 
least until such time as the entire force was equipped with device, the true 
value of GEE beyond a navigation aid was not as blind bombing instrument, 
but rather as an aid to target marking.    
 
This report had been prepared entirely on the initiative of ORSBC, and had 
been sent to Air Vice-Marshal Robert Saundby, SASO at Bomber Command 
on the 2 December 1941 under cover of a minute from B.G.Dickins, Head of 
ORSBC commenting that’ ‘I do not know to what extent the special 
operational use to which GEE might be put has been considered, but it has 
occurred to us that a Memorandum on the subject might be useful80. The 
reply, from Air Commodore Williams, Deputy SASO, indicated that “This is the 
first time that I have seen a detailed paper on the possible operational 
employment of “Gee”. It is very useful and I am sure will form the basis for 
drawing up a detailed programme of experiments”81. 
 
It is not clear whether the ORSBC Reports had been given wider circulation 
outside Bomber Command, but in January 1942 the Air Staff produced a 
detailed note on the employment of GEE that came to broadly similar 
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conclusions82. The Air Staff considered that, on the estimates of the accuracy 
then expected from the device, GEE would be most effectively used in 
carrying out ‘heavy, concentrated and continuous bombing of a few selected 
area targets in Western Germany’. The plan outlined in the note was, in 
summary, the destruction of the homes, factories, commercial premises and 
warehouses of the key workers and employees living in the selected areas; 
the key workers and employees themselves; and the general morale of the 
people living and working in the selected areas and adjoining towns. This plan 
was called UNISON. 
 
The UNISON plan was not itself new, and had been outlined in general terms 
by the Air Ministry in a letter dated 25 October 194183 with the detailed plan 
issued a month later84. The plan proposed incendiary bombing attacks against 
individual towns in Germany, to be repeated until the ‘Effective Weight of 
Attack’ had been reached85. Each attack would be opened by a fire raising 
echelon in order to saturate the defences and start a conflagration that would 
act as a beacon ‘so distinctive as to be impossible for the enemy to simulate 
by decoys’ to guide the ‘main force’ following86. It was recognised that the 
success of the plan depended upon on the weight of incendiaries dropped by 
the fire raising echelon. For that reason, the UNISON plan required that the 
                                                 
82
 TNA AIR14/695 Area Attack Employing ‘GEE’, dated 16 January 1942. This note was 
tabled by D/B. Ops at a meeting on the 17 January 1942 to discuss the operational 
employment of GEE. 
83
 TNA AIR14/696 Letter D.C.A.S. to C-in-C Bomber Command 25 October 1941, with outline 
plan attached. 
84
 TNA AIR14/696 Bomber Command Instruction No.58, 10 November 1941.  
85
 The ‘Effective Weight of Attack’ was the effort estimated to be required for the destruction 
of each of the town selected for attack. The Effective Weight of Attack for four key towns - 
Essen, Cologne, Duisberg and Dusseldorf -  was set out in an Appendix to the note. 
86
 The concept behind UNISON was also not new, and had been tried a year previously as 
part of ABIGAIL RACHEL. 
 150 
 
initial fire raising force was comprised of ‘heavy’ bombers in order to maximise 
the number of incendiaries carried, for which 60,000 was stipulated to be 
dropped over a 20 minute period. Moreover, it was recognised that success 
also depended upon the ‘skill and determination’ of the initial fire raising 
echelon in finding the target. 
 
The Air Staff note of the 16 January 1942 did, however, propose a slight 
variation to the original UNISON plan in that the initial fire raising echelon was 
also to include a small number of GEE equipped aircraft carrying a 100% load 
of flares. It was also proposed that the Main Force, timed to arrive 45 minutes 
after the initial fire raising echelon, would be preceded by a similar number of 
GEE equipped flare carrying aircraft, or that GEE equipped aircraft should 
drop flares at fixed times throughout the main force attack. The expectation 
was that, by using this technique, the GEE equipped aircraft would be able to 
bomb (in clear or cloudy conditions) an area measuring 3 x one half miles, 
and that the Main Force would be able to drop their bombs within the confines 
of a built up area covering 20 square miles. The Air Staff note believed that by 
using GEE it would be possible to operate effectively on an average of 20 
nights per month87 and that, assuming a bombing efficiency of 50%, it was 
suggested that operations against the four selected towns could be completed 
in one to two months. 
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The operational use of GEE was the subject of a conference held at Bomber 
Command Headquarters on the 17 January 194288. The conference first 
considered how best to employ GEE in various weather conditions, both in 
terms of leading non-equipped aircraft and for blind bombing. The conclusion 
reached was that blind bombing using GEE should only occur in conditions 
whereby non-equipped aircraft would be unable to locate the target even with 
the assistance of GEE-equipped aircraft. In all other conditions, i.e. where the 
ground would be visible from operational altitudes, GEE should be used to 
lead non-equipped aircraft to the target.  
 
The conference next considered how best GEE could be used to lead the 
bombing force to the target, with consideration given to fire raising and the 
dropping of flares. In relation to the latter, the conference acknowledged that 
there was considerable uncertainty about the best technique for the use of 
flares to guide ‘follower’ aircraft. Accordingly, the conference agreed that trials 
should be undertaken as soon as the accuracy of GEE had been 
established89.  
 
The task of drawing up detailed plans for these trials fell to ORSBC, which on 
the 24 January 1942 issued a report setting out proposals for a trial based 
largely upon the dropping of single 4.5” flares by a number of aircraft 
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equipped with GEE90. Taking up this recommendation, Bomber Command 
confirmed in a letter to No.3 Group dated 30 January 194291 the desirability of 
determining the best method of employing GEE fitted aircraft to assist the 
main striking force92 and that it was particularly important to evolve sound 
tactical principles for the employment of this “new and revolutionary” device in 
order that the maximum use may be made of it before effective 
countermeasures were developed. The letter went on to confirm that of the 
techniques outlined by ORSBC, i.e. fire-raising and concentrated flare 
dropping, it was the technique for the latter which required investigation in 
terms of the relative advantages of using individual flares; groups of flares, 
both in sticks and bundles; the optimum number of flares to have burning over 
a target at any one time; and the operational value of searcher flares93 and 
coloured flares.  
 
Instructions for the trial were issued on the 4 February 1942, although the trial 
itself did not take place until 13 February.94. The trial, known as 
“CRACKERS”, used Sulby station on the Isle of Man as the ‘target’95 and took 
place in ideal conditions. The trial was divided into four phases involving GEE 
equipped Wellington aircraft dropping individual flares or sticks of six bundles 
                                                 
90
TNA AIR14/3293 Operational Research Section Report S30 ‘The operational use of Gee III: 
The use of flares in conjunction with GEE’, 24 January 1942. 
91
 TNA AIR14/695 Letter Bomber Command Headquarters to AOC No. 3 Group, 30 January 
1942. In this letter, GEE was referred to throughout as T.R. 1335. 
92
 The terminology used in this letter is interesting, in that this is clearly based upon an 
underlying concept of dividing the bomber force into a ‘main force’ and, whilst not expressly 
termed but by implication, a differently equipped ‘target finding force’. 
93
 Searcher flares were a more powerful version of the standard reconnaissance flare. 
94
 TNA AIR14/695 No. 3 Group Exercise Instruction No.1, 4
 
February 1942. 
95
 Sulby station was selected because the range and ‘angle of cut’ in relation to the ground 
stations was broadly similar to that for targets in the Ruhr, and consequently was expected to 
provide a realistic simulation of the strength and accuracy of the GEE signals received. 
 153 
 
of flares at one minute intervals, onto which non GEE equipped aircraft were 
to attempt to home.     
 
The results from “CRACKERS” were discussed at a conference at No. 3 
Group Headquarters on the 15 February 1942, and reported to Bomber 
Command Headquarters in a memorandum that same day96. It was generally 
agreed that the individual flares were not sufficiently bright to illuminate the 
target, but that bundles of flares spaced approximately one mile apart gave 
excellent results, enabling crews to pick out a sizeable target from 12-15,000 
ft.. The overall conclusion of the conference was that the best technique for 
the use of GEE would be to illuminate the target with sticks of flares from zero 
hour to z+10, with further GEE equipped aircraft dropping full incendiary loads 
at z+5. It was recommended that any aircraft in these echelons that positively 
identified the target should drop coloured flares. It was further recommended 
that the main striking force of non-GEE equipped aircraft began arriving at 
zero hour in order to take advantage of the flares being dropped and to assist 
in spreading of the conflagration caused by the GEE equipped incendiary 
aircraft. 
 
In view of a systematic error with the GEE pulse in the first trial, Air Marshal 
Baldwin97 decided that a further trial was required. This second trial, 
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“CRACKERS II”, took place on the 19 February 1942 with the railway station 
at Brynkir in North Wales as the target98. Phase One of the trial was to be a 
scaled-down repeat of CRACKERS. Phase Two was the bulk-dropping of 
flares by a Stirling aircraft.   
 
The weather for the CRACKERS II exercise was clear, but with ground haze, 
with the moon in the first quarter99. The dropping of flares in Phase One was 
again considered helpful in enabling the following aircraft to home onto the 
target from 20 to 30 miles away, but the best results were obtained by the 
sticks of 11 bundles of 4 flares at 5 second intervals dropped by the Stirling 
aircraft. It was agreed that the latter illuminated the ground ‘really well, if 
anything, could have been dropped with greater spacing without reducing the 
illumination of the ground100. The recommendation was that attacks led by 
GEE equipped aircraft should open with an echelon of 8 flare carrying aircraft, 
each dropping 12 bundles of 3 flares at 10 second intervals, thereby giving a 
line of illumination of six miles101. Further echelons of three GEE equipped 
aircraft would then follow at 3 minute intervals until z+20.   
 
The outcome of the CRACKERS trials and the recommendations in terms of 
the operational techniques for the employment of GEE were forwarded to the 
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Air Ministry on the 23 February 1942102. The Air Ministry considered that the 
method of illumination proposed may prove insufficient in operational 
conditions and that greater intensity of illumination may be achieved if the first 
aircraft to see the target dropped coloured flares, and then following aircraft 
confined their flares to the immediate vicinity of the target103. However, 
commenting post-war on Harris’ Despatch on War Operations, Group Captain 
Bufton implies that the Air Staff had more fundamental concerns about the 
value of the “CRACKERS” trials104. In his comments, Group Captain Bufton 
suggests that the Air Staff were of the view that experiments to investigate the 
possibilities of flare concentration were not sufficiently exhaustive and that 
better potentialities of the scheme might have been obtained if more 
experiments had been carried out with concentrations of flares rather than 
sticks of flares. The opinion of the Air Staff was that some of the difficulties 
subsequently experienced when GEE became operational could have been 
overcome if the optimum employment of flares had been determined by more 
extensive trials and if a target finding force had been formed to drop flares on 
the basis of a carefully devised and developed technique relying on flares 
dropped by GEE to locate the area, visually dropped flare concentrations to 
illuminate the target and the laying of an initial and substantial concentration 
of incendiaries. The letter dated 26 February 1942 is, however, the only 
formal response found from the Air Staff in relation to the CRACKERS 
exercises and it would appear that Group Captain Bufton’s comments were 
made with the benefit of hindsight and without foundation.  
                                                 
102
 TNA AIR14/695 Letter C-in-C Bomber Command to D/CAS, 23 February 1942. 
103
 TNA AIR14/695 Letter D/CAS to C-in-C Bomber Command, 26 February 1942. 
104
 TNA AIR2/9726 Comments of Group Captain Bufton on Harris’ Despatch on War 
Operations.  
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Based upon the outcome of the CRACKERS exercises, on 21 February 1942 
Bomber Command HQ issued a memorandum to the Groups formalising the 
procedure for operations using GEE105. The attacking force was to be divided 
into three sections. Section 1, to be known as ‘the illuminators’, comprised 20 
GEE equipped Wellingtons from No.3 Group carrying flares only, the sole 
purpose of which was to illuminate ground detail sufficient for the next section 
to identify the A/P106. This first section would later become known as the ‘3 
Group Flare Force’. The second section, to be known as ‘the target markers’, 
comprised GEE equipped aircraft from Nos. 3, 4 and 5 Groups carrying 
maximum possible number of incendiaries, to be dropped as closely as 
possible on the A/P as illuminated by the first section. The third section, to be 
known as ‘the followers’, was to comprise non-GEE equipped aircraft from all 
Groups107. This technique was codenamed ‘Shaker’ and was the first true 
target marking technique. The basic Shaker technique, ‘illuminators’ 
preceding ‘target markers’ to be followed by the ‘main force’, would remain as 
the foundation of many target marking techniques throughout the bombing 
offensive. 
  
In the interim, without even waiting for the outcome of the “CRACKERS” trials 
or, indeed, conducting ‘sufficiently exhaustive’ trials of their own, the Air Staff 
                                                 
105
TNA AIR14/695 Memorandum from Headquarters Bomber Command to Nos. 1,3, 4 and 5 
Groups, 21 February 1942.  
106
 The memorandum stipulated that 8 aircraft should drop flares at zero hour, the remainder 
at 3 minute intervals until z+12. This was essentially the same procedure for opening the 
attack as recommended following the CRACKERS exercises, the only difference being that 
the duration of the illumination period was reduced from z+20 to z+12. 
107
 This last section was the equivalent of the ‘main force’ referred to the Air Staff note dated 
16
th
 January 1942. 
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had on the 14 February 1942 issued a new directive to Bomber Command 
predicated on the introduction of GEE 108. The new directive confirmed that, in 
the opinion of the Air Staff, the introduction of GEE would confer upon 
Bomber Command the ability to concentrate its effort to an extent not 
previously possible. The introduction of GEE should, the directive continued, 
be regarded as a revolutionary advance in bombing technique, so that during 
the period of its effective life as a target marking device it would enable much 
more effective results to be achieved (emphasis added). The directive 
accepted that it was unlikely, even under the best possible conditions, that the 
period during which GEE remained effective would exceed six months. The 
directive therefore considered it a matter of ‘first importance’ that the 
advantages conferred by GEE were exploited to the full in the limited period 
available before counter-measures could be developed and accordingly 
authorised the maximum effort possible. The directive included a list of 
selected area targets within the range of GEE109 and indicated that the 
‘cardinal principle’ which should govern the use of GEE from the outset should 
be the concentration upon one target until the effort estimated to be required 
for its destruction had been achieved110. The directive confirmed that, of these 
                                                 
108
 Webster and Frankland The Strategic Air Offensive, Vol iv, Appendix 8, p418. Directive Air 
Vice-Marshal N.H.Bottomley (Deputy Chief of Air Staff) to Air Marshal J.E.A. Baldwin (Acting) 
Air Officer Commander-in-Chief, Bomber Command, 14 February 1942 In the wider context of 
the bombing offensive, it was this Directive that formally initiated the policy of ‘area bombing’ 
and for that reason is sometimes known as the ‘area bombing directive’. 
109
 For this purpose, the directive assumed that GEE had a range of 350 miles from 
Mildenhall in Suffolk, one of the main No 3 Group bases at that time, although why this 
location was chosen is not explained given that the range of GEE was measured from the 
ground stations.  
110
 This was the UNISON plan. The four selected towns listed as primary industrial areas, all 
within the Ruhr, were Essen, Duisberg, Dusseldorf and Cologne. These were same four 
towns listed in the Air Staff note of the 16 January 1042. The effort estimated to be required 
for the destruction of each of these towns was set out on Annexe C of the directive. In relation 
to Essen, covering an area of 70 square miles and with a population of 650,000 people, this 
was given as 1,000 tons of bombs on the basis of 7 tons per square mile or 1,600 tons per 
800 of the population, in both cases assuming 50% efficiency. 
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targets, Essen was the most important and therefore suggested that Essen 
should be attacked first in order that maximum benefit could be derived from 
the element of surprise.   
 
The Directive also recognised that only a small proportion of the force would 
be equipped with GEE during its effective life, and that it was therefore also a 
matter of ‘first importance’ that tactical methods for the employment of GEE 
for target marking were developed and applied to the maximum effect 
possible. In that context, the Directive referred to the Air Ministry letter dated 
25 October 1941 in which the principles and scale of attack using incendiary 
weapons was set out111.   
 
Authority to commence operations using GEE from the 15 February 1942 had 
already been given in a letter from the Air Ministry dated 4 February 1942112. 
However, before GEE and the Shaker technique was to be tried on the 
difficult target of Essen, it was decided to conduct an experiment with the use 
of flares against a lightly defended target113. The target chosen was the 
Renault factory at Boulogne-Billancourt, just to the west of Paris, which was 
attacked on the night of 3/4 March 1942. The plan of attack called for the 
massed use of flares, although GEE was not yet operational and therefore 
this was not to be the full Shaker technique114. The attack, carried out at very 
                                                 
111
 The principles and scale of attack using incendiary weapons set in the letter dated 25
th
 
October 1941 would become formalised as the UNISON plan – see above. 
112
 TNA AIR14/695. Letter from Air Commodare Baker, D.B.Ops, to Air Officer Commanding-
in-Chief Bomber Command, 4 February 1942.  
113
 TNA AIR14/695 Memorandum Headquarters Bomber Command to Headquarters Nos 1, 
3, 4 and 5 Groups, 21 February 1942. 
114
 TNA AIR14/695 Letter D.B.Ops, Air Ministry to Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief Bomber 
Command, 26 February 1942 
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low level, was successful with over 90% of photographs showing ground 
detail within one mile of the target. Post raid reconnaissance confirmed that 
significant damage had been caused to the factory115. Bomber Command fully 
recognised that the challenges presented by attacks on Essen and elsewhere 
would be significantly greater than those faced at Billancourt. However, the 
purpose of the raid was to test the flare technique and in that respect the 
experiment had been a resounding success. This would later result in the 
Billancourt raid being prayed in aid of the formation of a Target Finding Force.  
 
The first operational use of the full Shaker technique took place on the night of 
8/9 March 1942 when 211 aircraft attacked Essen116. This raid was the first in 
a series of 12 major attacks on Essen over the following three months led by 
GEE equipped aircraft using variations of the Shaker technique117.  Further to 
the trials carried out by No.1418 Flight, the approach to the target would be 
along the ‘B’ lattice lines and the error ellipse would cover the major part of 
the built-up area118. This in theory would ensure that all aircraft would pass 
within one mile of the target.  
 
In accordance with the Bomber Command HQ Memorandum dated 21 
February 1942, the attacking force comprised three sections: ‘illuminators’, 
                                                 
115
 TNA AIR14/3408 Bomber Command Report on Operations, night 3
rd
/4
th
 March 1942. 
116
 TNA AIR14/3408 Bomber Command Report on Operations, night 8
th
-9
th
 March 1942. 
Although modest in scale in comparison with operations later in the bomber offensive, in 
accordance with the 14 February Directive this was a maximum effort raid at the time. 
117
 TNA AIR14/1769 ORSBC, Note on attacks on Essen March 8/9
th
 – June 8
th
/9th, 24 July 
1942, and Middlebrook and Everitt The Bomber Command War Diaries,p254. The single 
exception was on the night of 6
th
/7
th
 April 1942 when the attack was carried out using the 
Samson technique of blind-bombing using GEE. 
118
 TNA AIR14/695 Loose Minute, Wing Commander Saye to S.A.S.O. Bomber Command, 28
 
February 1942.  Wing Commander Saye proposed that, because of the complexities involved, 
the planning of all GEE operations should be carried out at Bomber Command Headquarters. 
 160 
 
‘target markers’ and ‘followers’119. The illuminators each dropped a stick of 
flares six miles in length, with the centre of the stick aimed at the target. In 
order to avoid being distracted by decoys, these flares were to be dropped 
‘blind’ using GEE and therefore only the most experienced GEE operators 
were assigned the role of illuminator120. The sticks of flares were intended to 
illuminate an area six miles in length by one mile wide, parallel to the main 
axis of the GEE ‘error ellipse’. Sufficient aircraft were allocated to this role to 
maintain illumination throughout the initial phase of the attack, this being 
known as the ‘flare period’. The ‘target markers’, again all GEE-equipped and 
carrying all-incendiary loads, were timed to arrive during the ‘flare period’ 
using the same ‘B’ lattice line as the illuminators. However, the ‘target 
markers’ were to aim visually using in the light of the flares dropped by the 
illuminators, with the intention of starting an unmistakeable conflagration to 
identify the target for the non-GEE equipped ‘followers’.  
 
The Shaker technique employed in the raids against Essen remained 
essentially unchanged throughout the series. The main focus for 
experimentation was the duration of ‘flare period’, which varied between 15 
and 45 minutes without, it would appear, making much difference to the 
outcome. On the fourth raid in the series, on the night of 25/26 March 1942, a 
few specially selected crews were equipped with red flares which were to be 
dropped only if the target was positively identified. However, despite 
conditions offering good visibility, this innovation did not prevent a significant 
proportion of the bombs dropped from being aimed at a decoy site at 
                                                 
119
 TNA AIR14/695 Memorandum from Headquarters Bomber Command to Nos. 1,3, 4 and 5 
Groups, 21
 
February 1942. See above. 
120
 TNA AIR14/3408 Bomber Command Report on Operations, night 8
th
/9
th
 March 1942. 
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Rheinberg, 18 miles outside Essen. Although not successful on this occasion, 
this refinement of the Shaker technique foreshadowed principles that would 
later form the foundation of standard pathfinding techniques in which ‘visual 
markers’  dropped specially coloured flares (and, later, Target Indicators) on 
an A/P illuminated by white flares121.  
 
The results achieved using the Shaker technique in this series of raids on 
Essen were disappointing and were set out in a detailed note produced by 
ORSBC dated 24 July 1942122. In the first eight raids in the series, 90% of 
bombs fell at distances of between 5 and 100 miles from the target and, in 
three of those raids, no bombs fell within five miles of the A/P123. Only three of 
the raids resulted in any damage in Essen itself, and on no occasion was 
significant damage caused to the Krupp works. Although bombs did result in 
significant damage to other towns in the Ruhr, it was not the result envisaged 
or hoped for following the introduction of GEE .The main issue was one of 
timing. The common denominator linking the three most successful raids was 
that the flares were more concentrated than in the other raids. The best 
concentration of flares was achieved in the raid on the 1/2 June and 
considerable damage was caused, if not to Essen, but to other towns in the 
Ruhr (including considerable damage to the Thyssen Steel Works in 
Hamborn) 124. The lesson drawn by ORSBC from this series of raids was that 
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 This sequence would later form the basis of the ‘Newhaven’ technique employed by the 
Pathfinders.  
122
 TNA AIR14/1769 ORSBC Note on attacks on Essen March 8/9
th
 – June 8
th
/9
th
, 24 July 
1942 
123
 TNA AIR8/688 Summary of Bomber Command Reports on Germany since 1 March 1942, 
undated. 
124
 This raid was the second of the ‘Thousand Bomber’ raids.  
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concentration of flares in both time and space was essential for a successful 
attack125. 
 
One of the other main concerns related to the bomb aiming carried out by the 
‘target markers’. At this stage in the bombing offensive, few crews included a 
specialist bomb aimer and in most crews bomb aiming was carried out either 
by the second pilot or the navigator. Moreover, the bomb sight in use at this 
time was still the CSBS, which required a long setting up procedure and 
bombing run. Consequently, in the GEE-equipped ‘target markers’, this 
necessitated the navigator to leave the GEE indicator at the crucial time in 
order to operate the bomb sight, such that it was not possible for the navigator 
to confirm the aircraft’s position using GEE close to the target itself. The 
immediate consequence of this was to deny one of the main advantages of 
GEE in terms avoiding decoys or misplaced fires from preceding aircraft.   
 
The ORSBC note went on to make a number of recommendations for future 
operations. The first suggestion, in view of the issue with navigators leaving 
the GEE indicator to take up bomb aiming duties, was that specialist bomb 
aimers should be part of every crew and that protocols for crew cooperation 
be devised, particularly between pilot, navigator and bomb aimer. A further 
suggestion, in response to comments from aircrews that the industrial haze 
throughout the Ruhr caused flares to create glare that obscured ground detail, 
was that the illuminators should drop flares not on Essen itself, but on a 
prominent landmark nearby. The ‘target markers’ could then drop their 
                                                 
125
 TNA AIR14/1769 ORSBC, Note on attacks on Essen March 8/9
th
 – June 8
th
/9
th
, 24 July 
1942. 
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incendiaries on the basis of a ‘time and distance’ run from the landmark thus 
illuminated.  
 
However, the most far-reaching recommendation was the need for a marker 
bomb. The suggestion put forward by the ORSBC was that marker bombs 
should be dropped by crews that included experienced GEE operators and 
bomb aimers, and that were fully trained and well practised in crew 
cooperation. It was recommended that the aircraft should be equipped with 
every available aid to accuracy, including Oboe, which at that time was still in 
development. ORSBC went so far as to suggest a plan of attack for the use of 
marker bombs in which, following the initial dropping of flares by the 
‘illuminators’ using GEE, visually aimed marker bombs would be dropped by 
specialist crews at intervals throughout the attack sufficient to ensure that at 
least one marker bomb was visible at all times. Other aircraft would drop 
incendiaries by aiming at the marker bombs. 
 
In suggesting this plan, ORSBC had identified the importance of a distinctive 
marker to guide ‘the followers’ to the A/P. The Shaker technique had only 
been successful to any degree in attacks on Essen where the initial flares had 
been well concentrated and therefore provided a distinctive point of aim for 
the ‘followers’. The major drawback with the idea put forward by ORSBC was 
the lack of an effective marker bomb. Such devices were in development but 
not in operational use at that time. In the event, GEE became subject to 
enemy jamming before the plan of attack outlined by ORSBC could be tried 
although the basic structure - the visual aiming of a distinctive marker using 
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illumination provided by the ‘blind’ dropping of flares – would later become a 
standard technique where weather conditions permitted sight of the ground 
(when it would be generally known as ‘visual groundmarking’).      
 
Although the Shaker technique had not proved successful in attacks on the 
Ruhr, it was used with some success elsewhere. In the most effective attack 
in which the Shaker technique was used, against Cologne on the night of 
13/14 March 1942, some 58% of bombs fell within 3 miles of the A/P. On this 
occasion, the Shaker plan worked reasonably well with 17 of the 20 
illuminators dropping flares blindly using GEE. The first flares went down 
within 30 seconds of the specified time and with only one short break 
illumination was continuous for the first 30 minutes of the raid. It is significant 
that this was a dark night with no moon and drifting medium cloud, and that 
this was one of the earliest attacks using GEE. This level of performance had 
only been achieved once before against this target, in perfect weather 
conditions and with a full moon, in July 1941, when 60% of the bombs were 
within the target area. It is a measure of the success achieved using the 
Shaker technique on this occasion that the average bombing performance on 
dark nights against this target was closer to 10% within the target area126.    
 
The other significant consideration was that the Shaker technique was 
restricted to targets within GEE coverage. Outside of that coverage, whilst the 
core principles of the Shaker technique could still be applied - ‘illuminators’, 
‘target markers’ and ‘followers’ - the initial flare dropping element would need 
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 TNA AIR14/695 Operational Research Section Report S.54 ‘Review of Operational Use of 
T.R. 1335 March-May 1942’, 5 July 1942. 
 165 
 
to be conducted visually with the inherent risk of bomb aimers being unable to 
identify the A/P or being misled by decoys. This problem was not of such 
consequence where the target was easily identifiable due to conspicuous 
ground features, such as Lübeck and Rostock, both of which were coastal 
ports and which experienced the two most successful attacks during this 
period127. However, the location of the target, and moreover the visual 
identification of the A/P, remained problematic where the target lacked 
prominent ground features: for example, a short series of raids in May 1942 
against Stuttgart, a particularly difficult target to locate due to its position 
within a series of deep valleys, was a complete failure due to the presence of 
ground haze and an effective decoy site128. 
 
Despite these shortcomings, the Shaker technique was a significant step 
forward and resulted in a tangible improvement in the overall efficiency of 
Bomber Command. In the six months prior to the introduction of GEE, the 
average efficiency of Bomber Command, defined as the percentage of aircraft 
despatched which bombed within three miles of the A/P, was static at 23%129. 
In the six months following the introduction of GEE, which therefore included 
the entire period during which the Shaker technique was employed, the 
average efficiency rose to 30%, reaching a peak of 33% in June 1942 before 
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 For a full description of the raids on Lübeck and Rostock, see Webster and Frankland The 
Strategic Air Offensive, Volume 1, p.p. 391-395, and  Middlebrook and Everitt The Bomber 
Command War Diaries:,p.p. 251, 259-260.  
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 Middlebrook and Everitt The Bomber Command War Diaries, p.p.264-265. 
129
 TNA AIR14/2693 Operational Research Section Report S.252 ‘The Effect of the 
development of navigational and blind bombing techniques on the efficiency of bombing 
operations during World War II (Aug 1941-May 1945)’, October 1945. 
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falling back towards the end of the period (largely due to GEE being jammed 
at the beginning of August 1942)130.  
 
To what extent was this improvement in efficiency the result of the Shaker 
technique? There can be no doubt that a significant part of this increased 
efficiency was due the improvement in navigation resulting from GEE, which 
resulted in a greater proportion of the force navigating to within a few miles of 
the target. However, at no point in this period was more than 80% of the 
bomber force equipped with GEE and in the early part of the period the 
proportion of the force so equipped was considerably below that level131. It 
must therefore be assumed that the Shaker technique assisted those crews 
not equipped with GEE in locating the target area, and in that sense 
contributed to the overall improvement in efficiency. Moreover, in view of the 
fact that this period covered the largely unsuccessful series of raids on Essen, 
and noting also that efficiency fell back again when GEE became unavailable 
over Germany, the improvement in overall efficiency during this period can in 
substantial part be attributed to the Shaker target marking technique. 
 
The period covered by this Chapter includes the first, tentative attempts at 
target marking at unit level to the introduction of Shaker, the first dedicated 
target marking technique. The early experiments with the dropping of flares by 
individual aircraft or at unit level had proved totally inadequate. The fire-
raising technique, so avidly seized upon by Bomber Command in the 
mistaken belief that it was ‘the right method’ when employed by the Luftwaffe, 
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 Ibid. 
 167 
 
also proved disappointing. The Shaker technique, although a significant 
advance on earlier attempts at target marking and reasonably successful 
against ‘easy’ targets, did not prove adequate when used against heavily 
defended targets. This was particularly true in the Ruhr where the 
combination of industrial haze and the absence of ground features defeated 
the use of flares unless an exceptional concentration was achieved. The other 
difficulty faced by bomber Command was that the Ruhr, whilst on the optimum 
‘line of shoot’, was at the extreme range of GEE coverage with 
correspondingly high angles of cut, such that GEE was not sufficiently 
accurate to routinely achieve the required concentration of flares. 
Consequently, on the majority of occasions illumination of the target area was 
neither adequate nor continuous, such that the ‘target marker’ crews, who 
were required to aim visually in the light of the flares, were rarely able to 
discern the A/P.   
 
The significance of the Shaker technique in terms of the development of 
target marking techniques lies in the lessons learned from its failures rather 
than the success that it achieved. The main lesson learned was the 
importance of establishing a distinctive marking of the A/P. On those 
occasions where the Shaker technique was successful, the illuminators had 
achieved a significant concentration of flares. ORSBC had identified the 
importance of a providing a distinctive marker for the A/P and this had led to 
the recommendation to develop a marker bomb. In the form of the Target 
Indicator in particular, marker bombs of various descriptions would later 
become an essential component of target marking techniques.  
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However, a distinctive marker bomb was of no value, and indeed could be 
entirely misleading, if not placed in the correct position. This was also 
recognised and led to the suggestion that the vital task of dropping the marker 
bomb was undertaken not only by specialist crews, but by a specialist role 
within those crews. As target marking techniques became ever more 
complicated as the bombing offensive progressed, role specialisation became 
essential with perhaps the most specialist, and difficult, task being that being 
the dropping of the ‘marker bomb’ on the A/P (a role that would later become 
known as the ‘primary visual marker’). The Shaker technique provided an 
early indication of the importance of role specialisation in bomber crews and 
the lesson learned would, through the establishment of bomb aimers as 
standard within heavy bomber crews, also contribute to an overall 
improvement in the efficiency of Bomber Command. 
 
The lessons learned from the Shaker technique laid the foundations for the 
development of more advanced target marking techniques. These new 
techniques would not themselves rely on GEE for the initial target location; as 
expected, the operational life of GEE over Germany barely lasted six months 
and, with that, the Shaker technique fell by the wayside. The new target 
marking techniques would rely on a new generation of navigation aids - 
principally Oboe and H2S - and would benefit from vastly improved 
pyrotechnics. These new techniques would also need to solve two problems 
that the Shaker technique did not address: target marking beyond the optical 
range of ground stations and techniques for conditions in which ground detail 
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was not visible. However, before detailing the development and performance 
of those techniques, it is necessary to consider the debate surrounding the 
formation of the specialist target marking force that would eventually employ 
them – the Pathfinder Force.    
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CHAPTER FOUR: FORMATION OF THE PATHFINDER FORCE 
 
 
Although the formation of the Pathfinder Force (PFF) is identified in many 
accounts of the bombing offensive as being one of the factors leading to a 
significant improvement in bombing performance from 1943 onwards, in most 
cases such reference is made en passant with only the briefest description of 
the events that led to the formation of that force. Where reference is made to 
the formation of the PFF, it is usually in the context of the relationship 
between Harris as C-in-C of Bomber Command and the Air Staff in general, 
and one individual in particular:- Group Captain Sydney Bufton who, as 
Deputy Director of Bombing Operations (D.D.B.Ops), is usually held as being 
the prime advocate of what he termed a ‘Target Finding Force’1.  The latter 
was also the focus of the chapter devoted to the formation of the Pathfinder 
Force in the doctoral thesis by Rex F. Cording2. However, these accounts 
ignore the wider context underlying the debate surrounding the formation of 
the PFF and fail to acknowledge the important, and in some cases crucial, 
role played by a number of other individuals within the Air Staff, Bomber 
Command and elsewhere. This Chapter analyses the events leading to the 
formation of the PFF, identifying the contributions made by various individuals 
in that debate or, in places, where key individuals failed to intervene at critical 
points. This Chapter will show that far from being the ‘one man crusade’ 
                                                 
1
 For example: Hastings Bomber Command, p.p.190 to 191; Richards The Hardest Victor, 
p.p. 145 to 146; and Anthony Verrier The Bomber Offensive (London: Batsford,1968), p148. 
2
 Rex F. Cording, The Other Bomber Battle: An Examination of the Problems that arose 
between the Air Staff and the AOC Bomber Command between 1942 and 1945 and their 
effects on the Strategic Bomber Offensive, PhD Thesis, University of Canterbury, New 
Zealand, 2006. 
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sometimes portrayed, the need for a specialist target finding force was a 
widely held view both within the Air Staff and Bomber Command, and had 
been so for a considerable period of time before the PFF was born. The 
Chapter will explore the reasons why the gestation period of the PFF was so 
lengthy and the birth so painful. The approach taken in this Chapter is to firstly 
identify the contributions made to the debate by various individuals in a 
broadly chronological order, and then to identify the key issues and themes 
that arise.   This examination will set into context the debate surrounding the 
formation of the PFF, in particular the belief held by the Air Staff that a target 
finding force was one of several measures necessary to improve the 
performance of Bomber Command and therefore preserve the concept of a 
strategic bombing offensive as an integral part of the overall Allied strategy. 
The Chapter will conclude with a review of the references to the formation of 
the PFF in secondary literature, through which it will be shown that this 
important topic has either been largely overlooked or misrepresented by 
authors and commentators. 
 
The concept of a specialist target finding force was not itself new. Neither was 
the concept uniquely a British one, with a target finding force having been a 
feature of German night raids on Britain since September 1940. The Luftwaffe 
unit engaged in that task, Kampfgruppe 100, did not mark the target using 
flares but used the ‘Fire Control Method’ to illuminate the target area by 
means of fires3. Consequently, although the concept of a specialist target 
finding force was not new, the concept of a specialist force to provide a 
                                                 
3
 Wakefield The first Pathfinder, p102. 
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specific point of aim for following aircraft was innovative. In some respects, 
the formation of a specialist target finding force arose de facto with the 
introduction of GEE, given the disparity in the ability to locate targets between 
the minority of aircraft equipped with the device and the majority not so 
equipped. Indeed, the Official History suggests that some form of target-
finding force “….had become inevitable from the moment that GEE was 
introduced”4.  
 
However, the concept of a target finding force was under consideration long 
before navigation aids such as GEE were introduced. The earliest reference 
to a target finding force appears to date from August 1940 when Portal, then 
C-in-C Bomber Command, proposed using aircraft flown by specially picked 
crews who would locate the target with parachute flares and drop the marker 
bomb as close as possible to it5.  Shortly afterwards, in late 1940, the idea of 
a target finding force arose out of the debate following the failure of 
OPERATION ABIGAIL RACHEL (see previous chapter).  Although some, 
including Air Vice-Marshal Bottomley, had considered that the initial fire-
raising attack constituted ‘an added risk of failure’ through fires starting in the 
wrong place, Air Vice-Marshal Coningham had taken a different view, 
believing that the principle of an initial fire-raising force was sound and that 
Bomber Command would improve if “we pick our best units and specialise on 
similar lines [to the Luftwaffe]” 6. The significance of this comment is the 
reference to both ‘best’ and ‘specialise’, two concepts that were to central to 
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 Webster and Frankland The Strategic Air Offensive, Vol I,p418. 
5
 TNA AIR14/106 Letter from Headquarters Bomber Command to the Under Secretary of 
State, Air Ministry, 20 August 1940. 
6
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the debate surrounding the formation of the Pathfinder Force that was to 
follow and which, it would appear, had led him to change his views about the 
efficacy of target marking. 
 
There is further anecdotal evidence that the creation of a target finding force 
was under consideration at the Air Ministry at this time. In his autobiography 
Pathfinder7, (then) Air Vice-Marshal Donald Bennett, who would lead the 
Pathfinder Force throughout the bombing offensive but who at that time was 
engaged in the Atlantic Ferry8, refers to an occasion when he was invited to 
meet with the Director of Bombing Operations (D.B. Ops), Air Commodore 
John Baker, and his Deputy, at that time Air Commodore Aubrey Ellwood. In 
his autobiography, Bennett claims to have pointed out that if a force of 
experienced navigators were to be given better equipment than available in 
ordinary bomber aircraft, and if they were given “fireworks of some description 
with which to attract the main force to the target, it should be possible for them 
to act as leaders and get the whole of the bomber effort on at least some of 
the target”. Bennett goes on to claim, somewhat immodestly, that this was 
“the first seed which I sowed on the subject of the Path Finder Force which 
subsequently was to turn Bomber Command from failure to success”.   Setting 
aside Bennett’s overstated claim, and notwithstanding that no record of this 
meeting has been found, the personnel involved were all in post at that time 
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and there is no reason to suggest that the meeting did not take place9. This 
supports the contention that the concept of a target finding force was under 
discussion in late 1940/early 1941.  
  
At the same time, it also appears that the concept of a target finding force was 
gaining ground at grass roots level. In January 1941, D.A.C.Dewdney, the 
advisor to Bomber Command on the oil offensive, embarked on a tour of 
operational units to discuss with aircrew first hand the apparent inability to hit 
oil installations. Dewdney reported a widespread belief amongst aircrew that it 
was necessary for the target to be marked by specially picked crews to start 
fires to guide following aircraft. The overall impression reached by Dewdney 
was that there was a need for more effective means of identifying targets10.  
 
The creation of a specialist target finding force had been one of the 
suggestions made by Lord Cherwell in response to the Butt Report11. In 
September 1941, Cherwell had written to Churchill advising that Bomber 
Command should “…re-examine most carefully making specially expert 
navigators, or bombers equipped with special navigation aids, fly ahead of the 
main body to light fires in the right region for the rest to home on”, adding “as 
the Germans do”. A copy of Cherwell’s paper had been passed to Portal, who 
declared himself entirely in agreement with Cherwell as to the ‘supreme 
importance’ of improving navigational methods. The training of expert fire-
                                                 
9
 Circumstantial evidence, largely from Bennett’s own autobiography, would suggest that this 
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10
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1 February 1941. 
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raising crews along the lines of KG100 and the development of marker bombs 
were among the actions that Portal proposed in his response to Churchill’s 
request for action following the publication of the Butt Report, although Portal 
did point out that the C-in-C of Bomber Command considered that it would be 
‘tactically unwise’ to rely upon special fire raising crews until more accurate 
navigation aids were available12. Portal was also keen to stress that, as he put 
it, “it is not generally realised that the German technique was only really 
successful either under good weather conditions when navigation to the target 
area would have a been a relatively simple matter for any reasonably trained 
crew – e.g. Coventry – or against short range or fringe targets where good 
geographical features enabled following crews to obtain fixes which guide 
them to the target, apart altogether from the fires raised e.g London, 
Southampton, Plymouth, Bristol, Swansea, Liverpool”.  It would therefore 
appear that Portal was acutely aware of the limitations of the fire-raising 
technique and that, whilst anxious to provide a positive response to address 
Churchill’s concerns, was also anxious to manage expectations. As discussed 
below, Lord Cherwell would later return to the subject of a target marking 
force.   
 
Portal was himself already on record as supporting the concept of a target 
finding force. As early as August 1941, Portal had written to Sir Henry Tizard, 
then working at the Ministry of Aircraft Production, concerning the future use 
of GEE13. Portal was mindful that GEE would initially only be available in 
limited numbers, and suggested to Tizard that the best option may be to use 
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GEE to emulate the method employed by Kampfgruppe 100. His proposal 
was therefore that the limited number of GEE sets should be used by 
specially selected and trained crews who would create fires in the target area 
to guide the remainder of the bomber force. It is interesting to note that 
Portal’s letter pre-dated receipt of the Butt Report and was therefore the result 
of pro-active tactical foresight rather than any reaction to criticism of existing 
methods. 
 
Neither was Portal alone at the Air Ministry in holding these views; Squadron 
Leader Morley at Bomber Operations 1 was of a similar mind. In the same 
month that Portal had written to Tizard, Morley produced a lengthy 
assessment of the night bombing policy being pursued by Bomber Command 
in which he noted, inter alia, that the German fire-raising crews were both 
specially equipped and specially trained for the task14. In Morley’s view, the 
fires started by these specialist crews acted as a “…..first class marker 
beacon to the main force….” and he strongly urged that Bomber Command 
should adopt similar tactics. Although OPERATION ABIGAIL RACHEL 
subsequently showed that fire-raising was not in itself a reliable method of 
target marking, this does not detract from the essential point that Morley was 
making, namely that the crews undertaking that task should be specially 
trained and equipped.  
  
Nor was the concept of forming a specialist target finding force confined to the 
Air Ministry: by late 1941, the possibility of forming a specialist target finding 
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force was also under consideration within Bomber Command. On the 1st 
November 1941, the Navigation Section produced a paper entitled ‘The 
Problem of Navigating to, Locating and Bombing of a Target by Night’15. 
Having identified the potential errors arising from D/R navigation, map reading 
at night and astro navigation, the paper proposed a solution in the formation 
of ‘Squadrons specially trained and equipped for the task of target location’. 
The paper stressed the importance of crew selection and recommended that 
the hand-picked crews be equipped with the latest navigational aids and radio 
equipment as a matter of priority. This paper was circulated to the AOC’s of 
Nos. 1, 3, 4 and 5 Groups. The responses received are interesting in the 
context of the debate that was to follow later. 
 
Air Vice-Marshal Oxland, AOC of No. 1 Group, agreed that there was “…..a 
strong case for the formation of a target marking force. The possibility that the 
target locators will make a mistake and lead the ‘followers’ astray is admitted 
but it is considered that occasional, perhaps frequent, successes might 
counter balance the failures’16.  Air Vice-Marshal Carr, who had taken over 
from Air Vice-Marshal Coningham as AOC No.4 Group in July 1941, agreed 
that previous attempts using selected squadrons acting a fire-raisers had not 
always been successful, noting that some crews were of average efficiency. 
He concluded that ‘……target finding Squadrons composed of selected and 
specially trained pilots, assisted by all the aids to navigation presently 
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available, seems to be the best solution, and to offer the most favourable 
prospect of successful target location’17. 
 
The AOC’s of Nos. 3 and 5 Groups took a different view. Air Vice-Marshal 
Baldwin, AOC of No. 3 Group, admitted the need for selected crews to lead 
bombing raids but opposed the formation of target locating squadrons, citing 
the loss of experienced crews from front-line squadrons and a lowering of 
esprit-de-corps. In his view, crews selected to lead raids should be drawn 
from normal front-line squadrons18. Air Vice-Marshal Slessor, AOC No. 5 
Group, strongly opposed the formation of specialist target finding squadrons, 
perceiving problems with training and questioning why crews could not be 
trained to find their own targets19. His preferred solution, which was already 
standard procedure within No. 5 Group, was that the best individual crews 
were selected as raid leaders.   
 
The paper produced by the Navigation Section at Bomber Command is 
significant, not least in terms of its timing. The debate surrounding the 
creation of a Target Finding Force is usually painted in secondary literature as 
being between the Air Staff and Bomber Command, sometimes being 
personalised as being a battle of minds between Bufton and Harris.  By way 
of example, Hastings describes the debate surrounding the creation of a 
Target Finding Force as “…one of the most bad tempered debates of the war 
between the Air Ministry and Harris”, adding that “Harris reserved his most 
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virulent disdain for the Air Ministry’s Directorate of Bomber Operations” (i.e 
Bufton)20. Neillands simply refers to the debate as being between Harris and 
Bufton21. Similarly, Richards focuses almost exclusively on the roles played by 
Bufton and Harris but makes brief reference to Portal’s involvement22. Overy 
takes a broader view and brings Freeman into the picture, but the focus is 
again on the battle of words between Harris and Bufton23. The common 
denominator, however, is that none of these authors make reference to the 
views held by others within Bomber Command that were contrary to that 
expressed by Harris in the debate surrounding the creation of a Target 
Finding Force.  The paper produced by the Navigation Section confirms that 
support for the formation of a specialist target marking squadrons was held 
within some elements of Bomber Command even before the debate was fully 
engaged. This dispels any credence to the suggestion that the idea of a 
Target Finding Force was the sole preserve of the Air Staff and places a very 
different emphasis on the debate that was to follow.  This paper not only 
moves the debate about the formation of a target finding force forward by 
nearly six months but, more significantly, pre-dates the involvement of those 
who would later be central to the debate when it was fully engaged in the 
Spring of 1942. 
 
One of those to receive a copy of the Bomber Command paper was (then) 
Group Captain Bufton, who co-incidentally had taken over from Air 
Commodore Ellwood as D.D.B.Ops on the very day on which the Bomber 
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Command paper was issued and who would later emerge as the true 
advocate of the formation of a Target Finding Force. An experienced bomber 
pilot, Sydney Osborne Bufton had commanded No. 10 Squadron, where he 
had been a keen advocate of the flare-dropping technique pioneered by the 
Whitley squadrons in No.4 Group (see Chapter 3)24. Bufton welcomed the 
Bomber Command paper, commenting that even if targets were not located 
on every occasion, Bomber Command would be no worse off than by using 
the then current methods25. Bufton was, however, confident that if conditions 
made it possible for targets to be identified and marked, then there was every 
possibility that the bomber force would become an effective force. He urged 
that the scheme be given a trial which, in his view, would achieve such results 
as to bring about a change of mind among the Group Commanders that did 
not support the ideas set out in the Bomber Command paper. Bufton then 
took the opportunity to expound his own ideas relating to a Target Finding 
Force, including the concepts of locating crews close together to facilitate 
discussion and the organic development of tactics, and the desirability that the 
Target Finding Force should be equipped with the same aircraft type in order 
to simplify raid planning. These ideas would later become familiar and well-
rehearsed in the debate surrounding the formation of a Target Finding Force.  
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The formation of special squadrons to ‘initiate raids and start fires’ was also 
proposed by ORSBC in a memorandum dated 22nd December 194126. 
ORSBC pointed out that the misidentification of the target was a serious 
matter which had ‘…been responsible for much misdirected effort’. It was the 
opinion of the ORSBC that such mistakes were less frequently made by the 
more experienced crews, and on that basis strongly encouraged that the best 
use was made of the knowledge and experience of these crews. It was 
therefore suggested that the best crews should be formed into special “crack” 
squadrons specifically to undertake the task of identifying and using 
incendiaries to provide a beacon for following crews. Interestingly in the 
context of the debate to follow, ORSBC suggested that, if possible, there 
should be one such squadron in each Group but that one alternative could be 
to designate the two best crews in each squadron for fire raising duties.    
 
The foregoing demonstrates that by the end of 1941 the concept of a 
specialist Target Finding Force had been under consideration in many 
quarters over a considerable period of time, but without ever progressing 
beyond the idea stage. The Official History suggests that this may in part have 
been due to the lack of a suitable navigation aid and partly because the Royal 
Air Force distrusted the idea of elite squadrons27. However, the concept of a 
specialist Target Finding Force was already well known at the time when the 
operational introduction of GEE was being discussed in late 1941. If the 
availability of a navigational aid was considered a prerequisite to the formation 
of a specialist Target Finding Force, the opportunity to form such a force was 
                                                 
26
 TNA AIR14/3062 Operational Research Section Memorandum M88 ‘The success of night 
bombing attacks: an appreciation’, 22
 
December 1941. 
27
 Webster and Frankland The Strategic Air Offensive, Vol I, p419. 
 182 
 
open to Bomber Command at that time but was not taken. Moreover, by the 
time that the Pathfinder Force was eventually formed in August 1942, GEE 
had ceased to be effective over Germany and the opportunity to initiate a new 
era of target marking to optimise the impact of GEE, on which so much hope 
had been placed, was lost.   
 
Bufton lost no time in setting out his views on the need for a Target Finding 
Force and on the 5 November 1941, even before formally taking up his 
position at the Air Ministry, he drafted a memorandum entitled ‘Suggestion for 
increasing efficiency of night attack’ in which he compared the approach of 
two different squadrons to the task of target finding28. Both of the squadrons 
were well known to Bufton. The first, No.405 Squadron, was newly 
established with little operational experience. The other squadron was No. 10 
Squadron, which Bufton had previously commanded and was one of the 
pioneers of the flare dropping technique developed by the Whitley squadrons 
of No. 4 Group. Bufton became aware that the inexperienced crews of No.405 
Squadron were sent out individually and were relying on unconfirmed 
sightings of bodies of water such as coastal inlets, canals and bends in rivers 
to locate targets. These were the very features that ORSBC had found to be 
unreliable navigational landmarks. The result was that few crews were 
accurately locating the target. By contrast, the experienced No.10 Squadron 
had developed the technique whereby crews arrived in the target area at 
approximately the same time and proceeded to drop flares, with a Verey light 
being fired when the target was positively identified (see Chapter 3). By using 
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this technique, the least experienced crews were guided to the target area by 
the more experienced crews.  
 
Bufton considered the difference in technique between these squadrons to be 
analogous to the difference in the target finding ability between experienced 
and inexperienced crews throughout Bomber Command as a whole. He 
recognised that the results produced by the flare dropping tactics employed 
by a few individual squadrons would be too small to improve the overall 
efficiency of the bomber force. His idea was therefore to apply the flare 
dropping technique used by No. 10 Squadron on a larger scale to serve the 
whole of Bomber Command by employing a dedicated Target Finding Force 
composed of the best crews, and which would specialise in locating and 
marking the target. Bufton considered that the employment of a Target 
Finding Force would obviate the necessity for an initial fire raising attack, but 
that the most effective results would be achieved by using extensive flare 
dropping to provide a focus for the incendiary attack and to ensure that no 
aircraft were diverted by decoy fires.   
 
This first memorandum was followed by a Minute dated 20th November 1941 
in which Bufton expanded upon his ideas for a specialist target finding force29. 
This Minute addressed the issue of creating a specialist unit within a 
Command comprised of individual squadrons, each operating as an entity in 
its own right and each believing, rightly or wrongly, that it was as good as if 
not better than other squadrons. Bufton was quick to acknowledge that these 
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squadrons may be disinclined to rely on other squadrons to find the target, 
and that Groups may be reluctant to have its squadrons led to a target by 
aircraft of another Group. In response to these concerns, Bufton drew an 
analogy with other military operations. ”No Military Commander….”, Bufton 
pointed out, “…if he intended to capture a town, would hand a rifle to each of 
his thousand men and tell them to get on with it in their own way”. And yet 
this, in Bufton’s view, was exactly was Bomber Command was doing by 
sending out individual squadrons, and even individual crews within those 
squadrons, to attack targets with no co-ordination of effort. “He would 
organise his forces… ”, Bufton continued, “….giving each unit a special job 
with special equipment so that the co-ordinated effort of them all produces a 
maximum effort”. Bufton’s idea was to apply the concept of a specialist role 
with specialist equipment to the bombing offensive. In that context, he 
believed it inevitable that some crews performed above the average and that 
some fell below the average. Bufton believed that, if a target was to be found 
at all, those crews of above average ability would be most likely to find it. He 
therefore suggested that the top 10% of crews should be given any new 
navigational aids that might become available and formed into a specialist 
target finding force to locate targets for the average and below average crews. 
Bufton conceded that some may argue that such a scheme would have a 
depressing effect on the remaining 90% of crews, but he himself believed that 
the reverse would be the case. He believed that these crews would aspire to 
be selected for the Target Finding Force and, in raising their own performance 
in order to be selected, the efficiency of the whole would be improved.    
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Bufton submitted his ideas to the Director of Bombing Operations (D.B. Ops), 
Air Commodore John Baker, on the 20 November 194130. Baker considered 
that Bufton’s ideas were worth pursuing, and suggested that his Minute of the 
5 November and the Memorandum of 20 November be welded into a single 
paper in a form that could be sent demi-officially to S.A.S.O. Bomber 
Command31. The resulting paper, dated 29 November 1941, was Bufton’s 
outline for a Target Finding Force32. The paper began with a historical review, 
in which it was pointed out that the standard of target finding by crews had 
declined as a result of experienced crews trained pre-war being replaced by 
crews having undertaken shorter training periods. This drop in crew standards 
has been exacerbated by the creation of a searchlight belt which had forced 
aircraft to fly at a height which made the recognition of ground features more 
difficult, and at which the standard flare then in use was ineffective. This 
historical review was followed by a review of tactics in which Bufton noted that 
the application of tactics tended towards individual attack, and that the few 
attempts to lead attacks by a fire-raising force had not been well organised 
and had consequently been ineffective. The remainder of the paper was 
devoted to tackling what Bufton believed to be the great difficulties of the ‘last 
20 miles’ to the target, in which Bufton expounded his ideas on the creation of 
a Target Finding Force of flare dropping aircraft comprised of above average 
crews. It is clear that Bufton was developing his ideas because, for the first 
time, the paper contained details about the composition of such a force, which 
it was suggested should comprise four of five squadrons. The paper also 
                                                 
30
 Ibid Minute D.D.B.Ops to D.B.Ops,‘Tactical Developments – Bomber Command’, dated 20 
November 1941. 
31
 Ibid Minute D.B.Ops to D.D.B.Ops dated 22nd November 1941. 
32
 Ibid Paper dated 29
th
 November 1941, ‘Increase in striking power by application of tactics’. 
 186 
 
stressed the importance of co-ordinating the flare dropping force, indicating 
that it was essential that the crews were briefed together to ensure that 
timings were calculated on the same basis.   
 
This important paper was the first to set out Bufton’s ideas for the creation of 
a Target Finding Force for wider circulation. Although the ideas and concepts 
set out in this paper would continue to be refined, the basic elements of the 
proposed Target Finding Force are included and would remain effectively 
unchanged in the debate to follow. It may be noted that the ideas set out in 
this paper share some similarities with that produced by the Navigation 
Section at Bomber Command on the 1st November 1941, particularly in 
relation to the need for specially picked crews equipped with the latest 
navigation aids. Consequently, at this point in November 1941, there was 
considerable consensus between the Air Staff and Bomber Command in 
terms of the need for a Target Finding Force. However, although Bufton sent 
a copy of his paper to Bomber Command33, there is no record of a reply being 
received and there the matter rested for some months. 
 
In order to understand the reasons why the proposal to create a Target 
Finding Force was being pursued at this stage, and also to place the debate 
to come into context, it is necessary to briefly review the position of the 
bombing offensive at this time34. The winter of 1941/42 has been described as 
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the nadir of the bombing offensive. Losses were on the increase, and by 
November were close to the magical figure of 5%, beyond which the 
continuation of the offensive became unsustainable. Pierse had been sacked 
as C-in-C Bomber Command when his misreading of the weather forecast for 
the night of the 7/8 November 1941 led to the loss of 37 aircraft, 12% of the 
force sent and more than double the previous highest for a single night’s 
operation35.  The ‘conservation Directive’ had been issued on the 13 
November 1941 and operations were drastically curtailed36. For much of this 
period, Portal was in Washington for the first Anglo-American conference and, 
pending a permanent replacement for Pierse, Air Marshal Baldwin was Acting 
C-in-C Bomber Command. At the same time, questions about the value of the 
bombing offensive were being raised in Parliament, not least because of the 
significant proportion of industrial resources allocated to it in relation to the 
results achieved, as revealed by the Butt Report. The claims from the Royal 
Navy for additional allocation of aircraft for the Battle of the Atlantic were ever 
present, in addition to which events in North Africa and the Far East placed 
further demands on the aircraft that were available. The bombing offensive 
was therefore under close scrutiny at this time and, unless results improved, a 
serious question mark hung over the continuation of the offensive. 
 
However, there was light at the end of the tunnel. Portal had been busy in 
Washington, and had recruited Air Marshal Harris, then heading the British 
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Delegation there, as the new C-in-C Bomber Command. Harris took up his 
new position on the 22 February 1942, by which time the ‘conservation 
Directive’ has been lifted and a new Directive authorising the employment of 
the bomber force without restriction was in place37. The bomber force that 
Harris inherited now possessed a new navigation aid - GEE - and comprised 
a greater proportion of the new heavy bombers. Moreover, there was now the 
prospect that Bomber Command would be joined in its efforts by the United 
States Army Air Force, which would provide added impetus to the bombing 
offensive. Consequently, whilst fully aware of the seriousness of the political 
situation facing them, it seemed to the Air Staff that if the current storm of 
criticism could be weathered, then the potential of the bomber could still be 
realised. The creation of a Target Finding Force was perceived by the Air 
Staff as being one means by which to unlock that potential. 
 
In the interim, the formation of a Target Finding Force had been raised again 
in January 1942, this time not in its own right but as an adjunct to another 
proposal being advanced by the Air Staff: - the formation of a Bomber 
Development Unit (BDU).  In a minute to Air Vice-Marshal Norman Bottomley, 
Deputy Chief of Air Staff, dated the 28 January38, Baker suggested that the 
nucleus of a Target Finding Force should be established simultaneously with 
a BDU. Baker’s idea was for a force of some six squadrons, each equipped 
with “every possible navigational aid”, including some not necessarily 
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available to the whole Command39. This would, Baker considered, rapidly 
bring about a marked increase in the efficiency of the selected squadrons, 
which in turn would inevitably result in a raising of the standard throughout the 
Command. Baker noted that there was potentially already a BDU and a 
Target Finding Force available in the GEE development flight and the GEE 
equipped squadrons of No. 3 Group40.   Baker suggested that the scheme 
should be discussed with A.C.A.S (T) and Tizard before introducing it to 
Bomber Command.    
 
The Air Staff were understandably keen to ensure that the seriousness of the 
situation was not lost on the new C-in-C of Bomber Command. On the 27 
February 1942, Baker wrote to Bottomley expressing concern that Harris 
might not be aware of the political and strategical issues facing Bomber 
Command and suggesting that a brief discussion with Portal would 
immediately make the position clear41. Baker then offered an intriguing insight 
into the Air Staff view of Bomber Command, which he considered was not a 
well-knit team presumably, in his view, due to the lack of imaginative, 
coordinated and positive direction and control. With an eye to the main 
chance of getting the Target Finding Force idea in front of Harris at the 
earliest opportunity, Baker attached a copy of a paper produced by Bufton 
that referred to the political situation and explained why tactics that may have 
proved successful in the early days of the bombing offensive were now 
ineffective against improved German defences. Bufton urged “most strongly 
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and with the utmost conviction” that a Target Finding Force should be formed 
immediately and that the “dead wood throughout Bomber Command” should 
be cut away, and “so tighten the sinews of control that the bomber force may 
be wielded and directed as a dynamic, flexible and hard hitting instrument”. 
Perhaps sensing that some of the wording in Bufton’s paper was not exactly 
diplomatic, Baker left it to Bottomley’s discretion whether Portal should see it, 
but added that in his own view ‘something along these lines’ should be put in 
front of the C-in-C if Bomber Command was to achieve the high aims of the 
Air Staff plans. 
   
There is no record to indicate whether Bufton’s paper was shown to Harris, 
but it is known that the issue of a Target Finding Force did come to the C-in-
C’s attention at this time from another source.  The criticism in the House of 
Commons and the House of Lords of Bomber Command’s achievements had 
also prompted Lord Cherwell to return to the subject of a Target Finding 
Force. In a letter to Portal dated 27 February 194242, Cherwell lamented the 
lack of experimentation to determine how more bombs could find their targets. 
His principal argument was, nonetheless, that Bomber Command should be 
able to rely upon ten to twenty bombers to get to what he termed “the right 
place”. His proposed solution was that one of the bomber groups should be 
tasked with finding the target and that “with an active minded man of the 
Slessor type in charge, with a fairly free hand to try out all sorts of flares, etc 
as well as varying forms of tactics, it seems to me that a great deal might be 
achieved”. His nomination of Air Vice-Marshal Slessor for the leadership of 
                                                 
42
 CCL Portal Papers, 1942. File 9, 3A Letter Cherwell to Portal, 27 February 1942. 
 191 
 
such a force is interesting in the light of the latter’s subsequent admission that 
he did not favour the creation of a Target Finding Force. In his reply, Portal 
indicated to Cherwell that he personally supported the idea and that he was 
referring it to Harris who, he considered, ‘had a very active mind on this kind 
of subject’43.  
 
Portal forwarded Cherwell’s letter to Harris on the 1 March 194244 but, 
whatever his expectations of Harris’ ‘active mind’ may have been, the opening 
lines line of his response could not have been encouraging.  “I seldom find 
myself in disagreement with you over such matters”, Harris began45, “but this 
time I am. Long ago, in 5 Group, I adopted the practice of sending picked 
crews first, in order to illuminate the targets for the rabbits”. On taking over at 
Bomber Command, Harris found that all Groups now adopted that tactic. 
Harris then explained that he could see no way of filling one particular group 
entirely with superior crews, not least because to transfer such crews from the 
other groups would have the most “appalling effects” on the morale of the 
remainder. It seems likely that Harris’ response took in earlier correspondence 
relating to the formation of a Target Finding Force, because reference is 
made to issues (such as transferring crews from other Groups) that were not 
part of Cherwell’s proposals. Nonetheless, the battle lines for the debate to 
follow were now set.  
 
It is again not clear how widely Harris’ views were devolved through the Air 
Staff but, in early March 1942, concerned at the lack of progress, Baker asked 
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Bufton to summarise the arguments in support of the creation of a Target 
Finding Force.  On the 11th March 1942, Bufton provided a detailed response 
which built upon the ideas outlined in previous papers and also took the 
opportunity to comment upon recent bombing operations46. Bufton stressed 
that it would be impossible to achieve the required degree of concentration 
unless the flare force and the incendiary force had a common working basis 
and understanding. The only solution, in his view, was to have a Target 
Finding Force that was well drilled, of high morale and of the highest quality. 
Bufton was now proposing a Target Finding Force comprised of six squadrons 
from No. 3 Group47 and suggested that these squadrons, which were located 
close together on airfields around the Cambridgeshire/Suffolk/Norfolk border, 
should maintain the closest liaison and operate as one force, and that if 
necessary their geographical disposition could be made closer.  Bufton 
advised that the commanders of these squadrons should be selected for their 
initiative, imagination and enthusiasm, and that the selected squadrons 
should be reinforced with one or two first class crews from each squadron in 
Bomber Command. Bufton suggested that the force should be under the 
control of a specially selected officer with operational experience and the rank 
of Group Captain, a comment that makes it difficult to avoid the conclusion 
that Bufton was lining himself up for that role. Bufton also pointed to the 
increase in the morale of crews following the Billancourt raid48, and opined 
                                                 
46
 TNA AIR20/4782 Memorandum Bufton to Baker, 11 March 1942. 
47
 Although not expressly stated in Bufton’s paper, these squadrons were part of the ‘3 Group 
Flare Force’ and were largely equipped with the GEE navigation aid. 
48
 As detailed in Chapter 3, the Billancourt raid served as an operational trial of the large scale 
of use of flares in advance of their use as part of the Shaker technique. The trail was a 
success and, partly because it followed a long period of poor results for Bomber Command 
and partly due to the minimal loss of aircraft, it resulted in a significant uplift on the morale of 
the crews. 
 193 
 
that the success resulting from the increased efficiency following the creation 
of a Target Finding Force would produce a similar uplift in morale. Bufton 
concluded by expressing the opinion that, even with the use of GEE, the 
present offensive will ‘fall down’ unless there was a change in methods and 
that it was essential that the target finding force should be formed at once.      
 
Although there is no evidence to demonstrate that this paper was sent to 
Bomber Command, it is reasonable to assume that it was because Baker and 
Bufton attended a conference of the Group Commanders at High Wycombe 
on 13 March 1942 at which the proposal to create a Target Finding Force was 
discussed49.  The events surrounding this conference are the subject of much 
reporting in secondary literature on the subject of the formation of the 
Pathfinders although much of this, including the oft-mentioned confrontation 
between Bufton and Harris at a meeting in the latter’s office before the 
conference opened, is unsubstantiated. This reported confrontation arose 
when Harris commented that crews taken from front-line squadrons to form a 
corps’ d’elite would lose their chance of promotion, in reaction to which Bufton 
is said to have thumped the table and exclaimed: “Sir, you will never win a 
war like that: these people don’t know if they will be alive tomorrow and 
couldn’t care less about promotion”. At that, Harris is said to have looked at 
his watch, declared that it was time for lunch and walked off. It is then said 
that Harris, in opening the conference, remarked that he had called the 
conference to discuss the very emotive subject of a Target Finding Force and 
that “I was almost assaulted in my office over this matter this morning”.  Harris 
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is then reported to have gone on to say “I need hardly tell you that I am totally 
opposed to the idea, but I wouldn’t mind hearing your views”. According to 
these accounts, the conference voted unanimously against the idea of 
creating a Target Finding Force, and Baker and Bufton returned to the Air 
Ministry ‘with their tails between their legs’50. 
 
The Minutes of the conference held on 13 March 1942 tell a less dramatic 
story, and cast some doubt over the veracity of the version of events as 
recalled by Bufton and subsequently relied upon in some secondary literature 
on the subject. The first observation to make is that the conference was not 
called specifically to discuss the creation of a Target Finding Force. Indeed, 
the subject of the Target Finding Force came towards the end of the agenda 
51. There is nothing in the Minutes to suggest that Harris confined himself to 
stating his own views in introducing the subject. In fact, the Minutes show a 
much more balanced approach, in which Harris outlined both the reasons for 
and against the formation of a Target Finding Force. The Minutes do however 
record that the Group Commanders present, which included the AOC’s of 
Nos. 1, 3, 4 and 5 Groups, each stated that if the best crews were ‘creamed-
off’ from their squadrons little would remain except very inexperienced crews, 
although the Minutes do not record what effect the Group Commanders 
believed this would have on bombing performance. The Minutes do not record 
what conclusion, if any, was reached on the issue.  
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One the most interesting aspects of this conference are the views of the 
Group Commanders. As set out above, Oxland (AOC No. 1 Group) and Carr 
(AOC No.4 Group) had previously supported the idea of a Target Finding 
Force when proposed by the Navigation Section of Bomber Command the 
previous November. Air Vice-Marshal Baldwin, AOC of No. 3 Group, had 
opposed the formation of target locating squadrons but had also admitted the 
need for selected crews to lead bombing raids. Only Slessor, AOC of No. 5 
Group, remained consistent in opposing the formation of a Target Finding 
Force.  It is noteworthy that the topics under discussion at this conference 
included the results of the Billancourt raid, in which an early form of target 
marking proposed by Bufton himself was employed with considerable 
success. The conference was therefore held at a time when the currency of 
target marking was high, and before the limitations of the Shaker technique 
had been revealed in operations. Consequently, there is nothing to explain the 
apparent volte face of Oxland and Carr on the subject other than, perhaps 
uncharitably, a lack of integrity and professionalism in the face of Harris’ 
strength of personality as C-in-C. 
 
One generally accepted sequence of events now has a chance encounter 
between Bufton and Harris on the steps of the Air Ministry in the days 
following the conference at Bomber Command HQ52. As Bufton arrived at the 
Air Ministry on the 16 March 1942, Harris’ Bentley drew up and, as Bufton 
                                                 
52
 Bufton himself gave a detailed account of that encounter to the Proceedings of the Royal 
Air Force Historical Society, Issue No 6 – September 1989 but versions of it have appeared in 
secondary literature before and since. To give just three examples, both Melinsky, Forming 
the Pathfinders, p68, and Henry Probert Bomber Harris; His Life and Times, (London: 
Greenhill Books, 2001) p226 recite this version of events in some detail. A truncated version 
appears in Hastings Bomber Command, p191. However, the AHB Narrative makes no 
mention of this encounter. 
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stepped aside and saluted, Harris is reputed to have said; “Good morning, 
Bufton, what are you going to do to me today?”. Bufton’s reply of “Well. I didn’t 
plan to do anything. Sir” was followed by an invitation from Harris “Well, if 
you’ve got any ideas, please write to me”. Having been supported by all his 
Group Commanders in his opposition to a Target Finding Force at the 
conference only a couple of days previously, it may be speculated that Harris’ 
invitation was hardly intended to re-open the debate. However, Bufton wasted 
no time in taking up the invitation and the following day sent a detailed, three-
page letter setting out his ideas about a Target Finding Force. It is sometimes 
claimed in secondary literature that the letter of 17 March 1942 was the 
opening salvo in the Target Finding Force debate but, as detailed above, that 
is evidently not the case53. Nonetheless, that letter was the first in a series of 
correspondence between Bufton and Harris on this matter and, for that 
reason, deserves detailed analysis here.   
 
Perhaps being mindful of Harris’ distrust of the Air Ministry, Bufton makes it 
clear in the introduction to his letter that the idea of a Target Marking Force 
had been maturing for a considerable time, and that the ideas had been 
developed as a result of experience in operational units as well as in the Air 
Ministry54. Bufton then confirmed that the question of target location had been 
given a great deal of thought as a result of the poor results indicated by night 
photographs, and that the immediate solution appeared to be the placing of a 
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large concentration of flares over the target by selected crews. At the same 
time, Bufton noted, the Air Ministry had advocated the fire raising technique 
which, if it was to be successful, relied upon the initial fire raising party placing 
a sufficient concentration of incendiaries in the correct place to provide an 
unmistakable conflagration. The formation of a Target Finding Force, using 
flares to locate the target for the initial fire raising party and so assist them in 
providing an unmistakable conflagration, was a natural progression of the fire 
raising technique.  
 
Bufton next made his key point. Citing his own operational experience, Bufton 
expressed the view that individual squadrons and Groups were parochial in 
their outlook, such that ideas on tactics were not widely discussed and that, 
so long as these squadrons were widely dispersed, no discussions on tactics 
would take place and no headway made in devising the best techniques. 
Bufton’s strongly held view was that tactics could only be worked out by the 
units themselves but, by locating a number of squadrons close together and 
giving them sole responsibility for target marking, these squadrons would 
devise their own methods in a very short space of time. It was also Bufton’s 
view that, once the initial methods had been devised, concentrating the target 
marking squadrons together would facilitate the rapid development of those 
techniques, taking full advantage of new navigation aids such as Oboe and 
H2S long before these became widely available throughout Bomber 
Command. This would, Bufton argued, enable attacks to be made not only 
against the primary targets in the Ruhr but also against specific targets such 
as oil refineries and the ball-bearing plants at Schweinfurt. Associated with 
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this idea of locating target marking squadrons close together was the creation 
of a ‘Bomber Development Unit’ to evaluate the various techniques devised at 
squadron level. 
 
By the time this letter was written, Bufton was aware of the arguments against 
the creation of a Target Finding Force and he now sought to address those 
arguments. Acknowledging that the creation of a Target Finding Force would 
result in the dilution of the remaining squadrons, Bufton countered this by 
suggesting that the urgency of obtaining immediate results, both for 
strategical and political reasons, was such that there was a need to reinforce 
the target finding squadrons with good crews from other squadrons. However, 
Bufton calculated that this would amount to no more than one crew per front 
line squadron and that further replacements could be recruited direct from 
OTU’s, and therefore would not be recurring. Similarly, Bufton did not 
consider the effect on promotion prospects to be a significant issue, and 
considered that this was outweighed by the inability to effect decisive 
concentration, particularly in the “critical period” at that time and the “….urgent 
necessity of providing conclusive evidence of the value of our strategic 
bomber force to counteract political and other forces which are aiming at its 
disruption”.   
 
In conclusion, Bufton commented that Bomber Command’s tactics had come 
full circle since the initial reliance upon individual operational skill to a 
complete reliance upon the GEE navigation aid. In addition to maximising the 
potential of that device whilst in operational service, Bufton was acutely aware 
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that the use of GEE could be denied to Bomber Command within a few 
weeks, leading to a reversion to former ineffective tactics. His suggestion was 
therefore that a Target Finding Force be formed to maximise the value of 
GEE, and to remain as a spearhead once the use of GEE had been denied to 
Bomber Command. 
 
This letter is notable as much for its emphasis on the political and strategical 
importance of improving the performance of Bomber Command as for the 
advocacy of the tactic of target marking. In that respect, it follows the Minute 
dated 27 February 1942 from Baker to Bottomley, stressing the importance of 
making Harris aware of the political and strategical issues facing the bombing 
offensive. The clear inference is that, form the Air Ministry perspective, there 
was more at stake than just improving the performance of Bomber Command. 
The use of phrases such as the “critical period” and the reference to other 
forces aiming at the disruption of the strategic bomber force is a clear 
indication that the Air Ministry viewed the creation of a Target Finding Force 
as essential to preserving the role of Bomber Command in the wider strategy 
of the war, and to prevent it from being relegated to a supporting role in 
support of the Army or subordinated to the Navy in the Battle of the Atlantic. 
The political and strategic issues underlying the formation of a Target Finding 
Force add yet another dimension to the debate, and one that has not been 
fully explored in secondary literature.  
 
In April 1942, further criticism of the bombing policy was received in a note 
from the Joint Intelligence Committee (J.I.C.).  In a response to the Air Staff 
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jointly prepared with the Director of Intelligence, Operations (D. of. I.(O))55, 
Bufton affirmed that the bombing policy had recently been subject to criticism 
and that, unless results rapidly improved, would again be subject to close 
scrutiny. The paper indicated that study of the results achieved by the 
German ‘blitz’ in the winter of 1940/41 had revealed the importance of 
concentration of bombing if good results were to be achieved and noted that, 
where the Luftwaffe had persisted in attacks when weather conditions were 
unfavourable, concentration of bombing had not been achieved. The paper 
commented that much of Bomber Command’s effort had been wasted in 
conditions which did not allow concentration to be achieved and that, even in 
good weather conditions and with the use of the GEE navigation aid, the 
necessary concentration still had not been achieved. The paper suggested 
that even with the benefit of navigation aids only a small proportion of crews 
possessed the necessary combination of ability and determination to locate 
and mark a precise point, and that it was essential that these crews were co-
ordinated into one unit in order to ensure that the target was unmistakeably 
marked for the remainder. The paper concluded with a stark warning; if results 
fell below expectations, there was a “…very grave risk of our striking force 
being subjected to a constitutional change which disregards the accepted 
principles of the role of a bomber force. This might prove calamitous in spite 
of an apparent justification for the disintegration of Bomber Command. There 
are powerful agents at work to bring this about.”  
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This paper was sent to Air Vice-Marshal Norman Bottomley, Deputy Chief of 
Air Staff, who in turn forwarded it to the Vice-Chief of Air Staff (V.C.A.S.), Sir 
Wilfrid Freeman. In the accompanying Minute56, Bottomley indicated that he 
was strongly in favour of the proposal to create a Target Finding Force but 
that Harris had not reacted favourably when the proposal had been put to him. 
Harris was, as Bottomley quoted, still going through the “whole gamut of 
experimentation of bomber tactics” with the new GEE navigation aid before he 
would make any decision. Bottomley suggested that, with the life of GEE 
expected to be relatively short, a decision must very soon be made on 
“whether or not a specially trained and constituted Target Finding Force is 
necessary to achieve the concentration which is essential to the success of 
our operations”. 
 
At about the same time, Freeman received a response from Baker to the 
comments made by the J.I.C. 57.  Having responded to the detailed points 
raised by the J.I.C., Baker returned to the underlying issue of the increasing 
criticism of the strategic bombing offensive being voiced not only in the other 
services and departmental circles, but also by the public. These could not, he 
opined, be countered with promises of future results or by the meagre results 
achieved in the past. The difficulty, Baker believed, was the failure of Bomber 
Command to appreciate the need for closer tactical direction and control of 
the bomber force in face of the increasing strength of enemy defences. To be 
successful, he went on, attacks would require co-ordinated tactical direction 
as well as determination and technical skill, and this could only be achieved if 
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each operation was controlled at Command level in conjunction with a Target 
Marking Force. Baker considered that the strategical situation was a critical 
and urgent one and that, although Harris was not convinced that a drastic 
change in methods was necessary, Bomber Command could not afford to 
experiment with minor variations on the old individual tactics.  Harris’ 
concerns in relation to the creation of a corps d,elite were noted, but Baker 
considered that in the situation then prevailing this and other parochial 
matters did not apply, and that in any event the successful operation of a 
Target Finding Force would have an immediate effect on the morale of the 
whole Command. Baker concluded with the assertion that the problem of 
tactical control and co-ordination of the bomber force was the most imperative 
if future bombing policy was to be effective. 
 
In the meantime, Bufton’s letter of 17 March had not elicited a response from 
Harris, and so in early April the Directorate of Bombing Operations tried 
another approach and sought to exploit contacts still held with those having 
recent operational experience to gain support for the creation of a Target 
Finding Force58. A paper was produced, essentially repeating the arguments 
set out in Bufton’s letter of 17 March, setting out the advantages of a Target 
Finding Force together with the objections that had been made against it, and 
asking two questions: did the recipient agree with the proposal to form a 
Target Finding Force on the basis outlined, or were the objections sound 
enough to abandon the scheme? The paper was endorsed with a note from 
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Portal59, stating that: “The corps d’elite principle is only bad when all units 
have the same job. The T.F.F. has a different job and would therefore be 
regarded as a specialist force and not a corps d’elite.” A total of sixteen 
responses were received60, all strongly supporting the creation of a Target 
Finding Force.  
 
Notwithstanding that the request for views on this matter was accompanied by 
a promise of confidentiality, Bufton sent copies of these replies to Harris under 
cover of a letter dated 11 April 194261. Commenting upon the unanimity of 
thought in these letters and that the views expressed confirmed the Air Staff 
view so completely, Bufton opined that the replies represented the truest 
commentary that could be obtained on the proposition of a Target Finding 
Force. Although it was perhaps disingenuous on Bufton’s part to renege upon 
the promise of confidentiality in sending these replies to Harris, the latter’s 
subsequent criticism that Bufton had broken Service conventions by 
contacting officers without going through the Air Officer Commanding is 
unfounded: Portal was himself aware of the approach and indeed had 
contributed to it. In relating these events in his book Bomber Harris: His life 
and Times, Probert refers to comments made in Harris’ Despatch on War 
Operations as indication of the resentment Harris felt following Bufton’s 
actions and considers Harris’ subsequent response to Bufton (the letter dated 
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17th April 1942 – see below) to be “remarkably restrained” in the 
circumstances 62.  
 
This time, Harris did respond but not before again seeking the views of his 
Group Commanders during a conference held on the 16 April 1942. Harris 
began his response, dated 17 April 194263, by stating that he had a “fairly 
open mind” on the subject of a Target Finding Force but that he was not yet 
convinced by the arguments put forward. Harris went on to say that, whilst he 
appreciated and paid attention to the “lads that really do the work” (surely a 
carefully worded dig towards the Air Staff), that his Group Commanders were 
unanimously against the idea, as were the majority of station commanders. 
The counter-suggestion then put forward was that using the evidence of night 
photographs, the squadrons in each Group producing the best results would 
be designated as the Target Finding Force for the following month. This would 
have the benefit of engendering competition between squadrons to displace 
the squadrons holding the title of Raid Leaders during the preceding month. 
Harris continued by expressing the view that, generally speaking, when the 
target can be seen at all it is being correctly found and that the progressive 
development of GEE technique had led to the majority of bombs landing in 
built up areas of the Ruhr usefully close to the intended target. In those 
circumstances, Harris concluded, he was not prepared to accept all the very 
serious disadvantages of a corps d’elite in order to secure possibly some 
improvement on methods which are already proving reasonably satisfactory.   
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This last point underlines the essential difference between Bufton and Harris 
in terms of their respective views on the relative value of precision bombing 
and area bombing.  The Official History makes this point very clearly, 
commenting that a key difference pervading the whole debate about the 
creation of a Target Finding Force was that Bufton envisaged that Bomber 
Command should be attacking precision targets but recognised that the area 
bombing was a preparatory phase through which Bomber Command would 
inevitably have to pass before it could perfect the technique of precise attack. 
Harris, on the other hand, regarded area bombing as an end it itself and, if 
pursued vigorously enough, as a means of winning the war. The Official 
History contends that the whole future tactical development of Bomber 
Command hung between these two extremes of opinion and that it was the 
ultimate aim of the bombing offensive which conditioned the processes of 
design, scientific investigation and production of equipment for, and the 
training of, operational aircrews64. However, the Official History fails to point 
out that a Target Finding Force (and target marking techniques) could serve 
two masters. Consequently, the formation of a Target Finding Force was not 
in itself a necessary precursor to precision bombing: as shown in Chapter Six, 
it was the application of those target marking techniques using the technology 
available at the time which ultimately dictated operational tactics and, 
therefore, potentially the overall strategy. 
 
Bufton was not about to let the matter drop there and, taking Harris on his 
word that he had an ‘open mind’ on the subject, in a letter dated 8 May 1942 
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challenged the notion that existing methods were “proving reasonably 
satisfactory”65. Bufton had a point. It is difficult to reconcile Harris’ view that 
existing methods which are already proving reasonably satisfactory with a 
letter sent to Oxland, AOC of No. 1 Group, in which Harris describes the 
bombing of Rostock on the night of 23/24 April 1942 as “Hopeless”66. In 
support of his argument, Bufton referred to recent attacks on three targets: 
Essen, a heavily defended German target within GEE range; Rostock, a 
lightly defended German target outside GEE range; and Gennevilliers, a 
lightly defended and easily located short range target. In relation to Essen, 
90% of all photographs plotted showed bombs dropped between five and one 
hundred miles from the target. In relation to Rostock, 78% of photographs 
plotted were further than five miles from the target. The night photographs for 
the raid on Gennevilliers showed that only 12% of aircraft claiming to have 
reached the target had in fact done so. Bufton suggested that these results, 
all achieved under better weather conditions than could normally be expected, 
proved that it was not possible to provide an unmistakable conflagration when 
‘second class’ crews were mixed in with the ‘first class’ crews in the initial 
attack. These results proved, he argued, that the first class crews must be co-
ordinated in one body not as a corps d’elite, but as specialist experts essential 
to the success of large scale operations. 
 
Bufton then took the opportunity to respond to Harris’ objections to the 
creation of a Target Finding Force, and to comment on Harris’ suggestion of a 
Raid Leader scheme. This, considered Bufton, was flawed in that the efforts 
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of the good crews in the designated squadron would be vitiated by the less 
efficient crews marking places other than the target, thereby leading to a 
dispersion of effort. The other fundamental flaw, according to Bufton, was that 
inferior squadrons would be led to the target by the designated squadron, with 
the result that the inferior squadron would become the designated squadron 
the following month. The scheme also suffered from defects that the number 
of first class crews in the leading squadron would be insufficient to start an 
unmistakable conflagration, and that the geographical separation of the 
squadrons would prevent the organic growth of tactical methods and 
techniques. Bufton concluded his letter with two suggestions that were hardly 
likely to endear him to Harris. Firstly, he questioned, in terms, whether the 
matter of the Target Finding Force had been put to the Station Commanders 
impartially and with a full appreciation of the critical situation facing the 
bombing offensive.  Not content with that, Bufton then asserted that the 
objection to the Target Finding Force was a manifestation of a wider issue, 
this being a conflict of ideas between older officers  with wider experience and 
a growing number of younger officers with recent operational experience. It 
may be imagined that that Bufton’s closing remark, in which he hoped Harris 
would not “take objection to the frankness of these views, which are born only 
of a very great concern for the success of the Bomber Force”, was more likely 
to have had the opposite effect.    
 
Harris did not reply to this letter. However, the Senior Air Staff Officer at 
Bomber Command, Robert Saundby, requested that the figures quoted by 
Bufton were checked. The officer given that unenviable task, Wing 
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Commander Ops 1.b N W Marwood-Elton, reported on the 11 May 1942 that 
Bufton’s figures were essentially correct67. Although Marwood-Elton was able 
to claim that the ever-present haze over Essen was a contributing factor to the 
poor results there, he was forced to concede that the failure of the Rostock 
and Gennevilliers raids were harder to explain and “constitute a good 
argument for a target locating force”. Expressing his own views on the 
creation of a Target Finding Force, and no doubt aware of Harris’ views on the 
subject, Marwood-Elton attempted a delicate balancing act. Acknowledging 
that the crews which found the target strengthened the morale of a squadron, 
he considered that if these crews were placed in a Target Finding Force the 
number of ordinary crews finding the target despite faulty navigation, bad 
weather and decoys would increase. On the other hand, he concluded, 
somewhat implausibly and without any explanation, the number of crews not 
finding the target due to enemy defences would also increase. On that basis, 
Marwood-Elton reached the somewhat incongruous conclusion that, on 
balance, Bomber Command would not be much better off. However, 
incongruous or not, this conclusion clearly met with Harris’ approval and the 
paper was annotated with “No further action”. 
 
On 20 May 1942, the report by Mr Justice Singleton for the Defence 
Committee on the Bombing of Germany was published (the ’Singleton 
Report’)68. The terms of reference of the Singleton Report were: 
 
                                                 
67
 TNA AIR14/3523 Loose Minute, Marwood-Elton to Saundy, dated 11 May 1942. 
68
 TNA AIR8/1015 Report by Mr Justice Singleton for the Defence Committee on the Bombing 
of Germany, 20 May 1942. The copy in TNA is marked ‘C.A.S. Personal Copy’. 
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In the light of our experience of the German bombing of this country, 
and of such information as is available of the results of our bombing of 
Germany, what results are we likely to achieve from continuing our air 
attacks on Germany at the greatest possible strength during the next 
six, twelve and eighteen months respectively. 
 
Lurking beneath these stated terms of reference was the unasked question, 
and one which the urgency and importance attached by the Air Staff to the 
formation of a Target Finding Force was already playing no small part: was a 
better use of the resources employed in the bombing offensive possible?  
 
Singleton began his report by exploring results using T.R.133569, noting some 
of the difficulties that had arisen in target locating notwithstanding the use of 
that navigation aid. As part of his investigations, Singleton interviewed two 
officers from Bomber Command of “great experience” and found that they 
were “completely satisfied with the accuracy of T.R.1335 provided that it is 
used by a specially trained crew” (emphasis added). The officers had qualified 
this by indicating that it was only in the last few miles that difficulties were 
encountered and that these could only be overcome by “determination and 
will power”. Singleton then made the observation that not all crews were of the 
same calibre, and that the officers he interviewed were “firmly convinced of 
the desirability of a specially trained Target Finding Force” which, they 
believed, would “lead to greatly increased efficiency in bombing”. Singleton 
declined to offer his own opinion on the matter but instead offered an overall 
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 T.R.1335 was the technical reference for the GEE navigation aid, and has been retained in 
the context of this report. 
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conclusion that results “ought to have been much better than they appeared 
to have been” and that there was a feeling “in some quarters” that it had “not 
yet been shown how effective an instrument a bomber force can be, and that 
great improvement in results ought to be sought”. 
 
What led Singleton to raise the matter of the formation of a Target Finding 
Force in his report? One clue may be found in the conclusion to the report, 
where Singleton indicates that Air Commodore Baker had arranged for 
Singleton to see various people who could help the inquiry. Singleton also 
makes reference to various documents being made available to him and it is 
reasonable to assume that these were provided by Baker. As detailed above, 
as Director of Bombing Operations at the Air Staff, Baker was a strong 
proponent of the formation of a Target Finding Force and it is likely that the 
people Baker arranged for Singleton to see were known by Baker to be of a 
similar mind. Given the language used by Singleton, in particular in relation to 
the difficulties caused by aircraft not equipped with T.R.1335, which was one 
of the main reasons advanced in support of a Target Finding Force, it is also a 
reasonable assumption that Singleton had seen the papers produced by the 
Air Staff on that matter. If that was indeed the case, that Singleton did not lend 
his own support to the formation of a Target Finding Force must have come 
as a disappointment to the Air Staff. 
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The day after the Singleton Report was published, the Air Staff issued a paper 
that openly criticised the tactical direction of the bombing offensive70. The 
formation of a Target Finding Force was not in itself central to the criticisms of 
Bomber Command raised in this paper, which centred on staffing issues and 
the lack of central control of the bomber Groups. However, the paper also 
complained that suggestions made by the Air Staff on tactical issues were 
ignored and, in that context and without directly referring to a Target Finding 
Force, repeated the need for a; 
 
 ‘special force composed of the most able and determined crews. This force, 
with every new navigational and scientific aid at its disposal, would develop its 
own specialised technique for fulfilling its role of finding, illuminating and 
marking the target for the less skilful crews which constitute the large majority 
of the bomber force.’ 
 
Although these were not new ideas, they heralded the first contribution to the 
debate by a further and influential senior official at the Air Staff: the Vice-Chief 
of the Air Staff, Sir Wilfrid Freeman. Although the paper was largely prepared 
by the Directorate of Bombing Operations, Freeman had recommended a 
number of changes to the draft. These changes did not specifically relate to 
the creation of a ‘special force’ but were made in order to strengthen the 
wording of the paper, commensurate with Freeman’s view that “I think your 
only way with Bert is to treat him rough”71. This would not be the last time that 
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 CCAC Bufton Papers, 3/14 Air Staff paper, ‘The Tactical Direction of the Bomber Force’, 21 
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Freeman’s more direct approach would feature in the debate surrounding the 
creation of a Target Finding Force. 
 
A few days after this paper was issued, the Air Staff returned to the theme of 
a Target Finding Force.  In a paper dated 25 May 1942 entitled The Target 
Finding Force72, the main arguments in support of a Target Finding Force 
were again rehearsed. This paper was in effect a re-working of Bufton’s letter 
of the 17 March 1942, with little in the way of additional detail but with the 
inclusion of two new points. The first of these new points, taking up a theme 
central to the Air Staff paper issued a few days previously, was that a Target 
Finding Force would necessitate the detailed planning and control of each 
operation at Command level, and therefore address one of the main failings in 
the direction of the bombing offensive to date (as perceived by the Air Staff). 
The second new point was a refutation of the ‘raid leader’ scheme initiated by 
Harris. Whilst conceding that a small number of the best crews in the lead 
squadron may successfully mark the target, it was suggested by the Air Staff 
that the majority of crews were of lesser ability and that their failure to 
accurately locate the target would only position potential decoys. The paper 
concluded with a repeat of the familiar concern in relation to the continuation 
of the bombing offensive: 
 
 “We must face the fact that our bombing has achieved only a small proportion 
of the results of which it is capable”, the paper concluded, “and that up to the 
present it has not exerted a decisive influence on the outcome of the war. If 
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we continue with our present methods we shall fail in our purpose; it will 
become increasingly difficult to oppose, truthfully and logically, the strong 
pressure to divert the bomber force to other strategical employment; and the 
doctrine of strategic bombing will remain unsubstantiated. The only possibility 
of success is considered to lie in the formation of a target finding force, and as 
time is the vital factor it is recommended that this be done without delay." 
 
Although this conclusion set out the Air Staff concerns in the starkest terms to 
that date, the real significance of this paper lies not in its content. Nearly all of 
the points made in this paper had been rehearsed in Bufton’s earlier letters, 
including the threat to the very continuation of the bombing offensive if no 
action was taken. However, these letters did not carry the weight afforded to 
official documents. The significance of this paper lies in the fact that it was 
filed as an Air Staff paper and therefore had the implicit backing of the Portal 
as Chief of Air Staff. In theory at least, this should have been sufficient to 
elevate the formation of a Target Finding Force to a level where Bomber 
Command could not fail to act. 
 
The views expressed in this paper were echoed by (then) Air Commodore 
Aubrey Ellwood, at that time Assistant Commandant at the Royal Air Force 
College. Ellwood, who had been Bufton’s immediate predecessor as Deputy 
Director of Bombing Operations, had attended a lecture at the College given 
by Bottomley and had been concerned to discover that the reluctance to 
accept suggestions on tactics made by the Air Staff, evident to him in late 
1941, was still prevalent. He had also been concerned by the reasons given 
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by Saundby for not forming a Target Finding Force. In June 1942, Ellwood 
delivered a paper to the Royal Air Force College setting out the arguments in 
support of the creation of a Target Marking Force73, in which he repeated a 
point also made in the Air Staff paper of 21 May that Bomber Command had 
already conceded the need for a specialisation in target marking by initiating 
the raid leader scheme. Ellwood concluded that it would be “manifestly 
absurd” for Bomber Command not to take the final step and form the Target 
Finding Force. 
 
Further support for the creation of a Target Finding Force also arrived from an 
unexpected quarter. Tizard had been sent a copy of the Air Staff paper The 
Target Finding Force, and in a letter dated 6 June 1942 had endorsed the 
conclusions therein. “I think”, Tizard confided to Bottomley, “that if you are to 
get worthwhile results in the bomber offensive you will have to develop a 
highly trained and efficient target finding force”74.  
 
At this point, early June 1942, Harris had still not responded to Bufton’s letter 
dated 8 May or the Air Staff paper of 25 May. Concerned at the lack of 
progress, Bottomley minuted Freeman with the suggestion that a further 
paper be prepared advocating the formation of a Target Finding Force75.  
However, Freeman was of the view that there was little to be gained from a 
long drawn out correspondence with Bomber Command. Freeman instead 
suggested to Portal that a conference should be held to discuss the subject, 
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to be attended by officers from Bomber Command and representatives from 
the Assistant Chief of Air Staff’ (Operations) Department 76.  Portal concurred 
and the conference was provisionally scheduled for the 11 June 1942 but was 
destined never to take place. The conference was at first postponed for 
reasons unrelated to the target finding force debate and then subsequent 
events rendered the need for the conference redundant before it could take 
place.  
 
Harris was clearly not about to have a Target Finding Force imposed upon 
him without a struggle and arranged for a conference with his own staff in 
order to prepare for the (anticipated) forthcoming conference with the Air Staff 
77. In opening his conference, Harris stated that he would he would like to get 
the views of the Groups on the formation of a Target Finding Force before 
discussing the subject with the Chief of Air Staff. Harris pointed out that 
bombing accuracy had improved since the introduction of GEE, but that it was 
important that no possible means of improving bombing accuracy was ignored 
and that many of the troubles might be cured if it was possible to form a 
Target Finding Force of sufficient size composed entirely of experts. Having 
thus given the impression that he was not averse to the formation of a Target 
Finding Force in principle, Harris then reeled off several reasons why a force 
of sufficient size could not be raised within the Command. To these, Harris 
added his standing objection in relation to the loss of promotion prospects for 
these crews selected for the force.  
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The Minutes of the meeting record that the A.O.C. of 3 Group, 
notwithstanding that his own ‘3 Group Flare Force’ was at that time engaged 
in illuminating the target area as part of the Shaker technique then being 
employed,  agreed the C-in-C’s remarks. Carr, the AOC of No 4 Group, 
previously on record as saying that target finding squadrons offered the ‘most 
favourable prospect’ of successful target location, did a complete volte-face 
and now agreed with the AOC of 3 Group. The majority of the Station and 
Squadron Commanders present, the latter including Freeman of No.3 Group 
and ‘Groucho’ Marks of No.4 Group, both of whom had indicated their support 
for a Target Finding Force in response to Bufton’s questionnaire of April 1942,  
now declared themselves against the formation of a Target Finding Force due 
to the “bankruptcy in crews and aircraft”. Dickins, Head of ORSBC, who had 
himself previously proposed the formation of special squadrons to ‘initiate 
raids and start fires’ in a memorandum produced in December 1941, 
remained silent on the matter. Dickins’ stance on this occasion later led to 
criticism by Blackett, Zuckerman and Freeman Dyson, the latter a junior 
member of ORSBC, who subsequently opined that Dickins was “a career Civil 
Servant” whose guiding principle was “to tell the commander in chief things 
that the commander in chief liked to hear”, such that the ORSBC was too 
timid to challenge any essential element of policy78, and to the comment by 
Hartcup that Dickins was “a highly competent civil service scientist, but did not 
have the stature or independence of mind of Blackett and Williams ”79. The 
position adopted by those who had previously supported the formation of a 
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Target Finding Force, and who now agreed with Harris that it was 
impracticable, is perhaps best described as disingenuous but is nonetheless a 
testament to the Harris’s forceful personality. 
 
Following this meeting, Harris wrote to Portal to confirm that he still opposed 
the creation of a Target Finding Force80. Harris began by stating that each 
Group Commander had brought with him his best Target Finding Squadron 
Commander and that all were “utterly opposed” to the formation of a Target 
Finding Force along the lines which hold favour in the Air Ministry” (emphasis 
added here and below). Their arguments, Harris continued, were that Bomber 
Command already had a Target Finding Force by electing the best squadrons 
and the best crews to lead attacks, and all were insistent that there was 
nothing in particular to be gained by these crews belonging to one Unit. Harris 
added that he had persuaded them to hold inter-Group Raid Leaders 
Conferences once or twice a month, at which the best crews leading attacks 
would suggest means of improving upon past performances. Harris also 
indicated that there was a universal desire that the best crews should be 
entitled to wear a special badge, a proposal with which Harris found himself in 
“full agreement”. Following the introduction of GEE, the main difficulty, Harris 
continued, was not finding the target but seeing the target, and considered 
that a target finding expert would have no better ability to see a target under 
conditions of haze and searchlight glare than anybody else (original 
emphasis). Harris also pointed to restrictions on foreign and colonial 
personnel, technical issues and obsolescent aircraft restricting the pool from 
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which crews for the Target Finding Force could be drawn, and expressed the 
opinion that crews drawn from the few remaining squadrons would therefore 
be below the standard of those in his Raid Leader scheme. Harris concluded 
by stating that his existing Raid Leader scheme “provides all the requirements 
of the Target Finding Force fanatic, bar living together in special Units”, and 
that all his AOC’s and their best squadron commanders were decisively and 
adamantly opposed to the ‘getting together requirement’. 
 
This is a remarkable letter. In effect, Harris had conceded the need for a 
Target Finding Force in principle; had accepted the need for the Target 
Finding Force to share information in order to improve technique, and had 
initiated a means of doing so; and had proposed that members of the Target 
Finding Force should be afforded special status. These were all features of 
the Target Finding Force proposed by the Air Staff. The only difference 
between Harris’ new position and the Air Staff proposal was the requirement 
that the Target Finding Force should be located close together. As the Official 
History points out, the debate had moved from one of principle to one of 
method81. 
 
Although the letter to Portal of the 12 June 1942 is sometimes referred to in 
secondary literature as being Harris’ definitive response on the subject of the 
Target Finding Force, Harris did in fact write a second letter the following 
day82. That letter, to which no reference is made in secondary literature, is a 
detailed response to the Air Staff letter dated 25 May 1942, in which Harris 
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attempts to explain the failures at Gennevilleirs, Rostock and Essen. The 
former failed, claimed Harris, because Gennevilliers was a small target that 
was difficult to find, and because the bombsight with which Bomber Command 
was equipped was unsuitable83. Harris blamed the failure of the first Rostock 
on the “wild behaviour of the Polish crews, but claimed that subsequent raids 
were successful, whereas the failure of the raids on Essen was attributed to 
the difficulty in seeing the target due to the industrial haze. “No target finding 
force”, Harris suggested, “ would overcome this obstacle”. 
 
Harris went on to say that “some success” had been obtained by using the 
best crews from all Groups to lead the attack and that the more unreliable 
crews ,who were “likely to drop incendiaries in the wrong place”, had been 
eliminated from the early stages of the attacks. Harris then points to a whole 
series of technical reasons why some of the aircraft types with which Bomber 
Command was equipped were unsuitable for use by a Target Finding Force84, 
with the result that a Target Finding Force would be largely drawn from a 
small number of squadrons equipped with the Stirling and the Wellington III. 
From this, Harris concluded that Bomber Command was not of sufficient size 
to form a Target Finding Force or, if a smaller force was formed, it would not 
be viable. Harris’ final point was refute the suggestion that his force was now 
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completely reliant upon the GEE navigation aid, claiming that some of the 
most successful attacks had been outside GEE range85.  
 
Again, some of the arguments advanced by Harris in this letter opposing the 
creation of a Target Finding Force could equally be advanced in support of 
the case for creating such a force.  In particular, Harris’ admission to using the 
best crews from all Groups to lead the attack and eliminating the more 
unreliable crews from the early stages of the attacks is tantamount to the 
creation of a Target Finding Force in anything but name. 
 
It was at this juncture that Portal at last entered the fray and on 14 June 
replied in detail to Harris’ letter86. Portal opened with a telling observation; 
 
“As I read your letter, both you and those of your Command with whom you 
have discussed the scheme, agree on the urgent need for finding some 
method of using the best of your crews to identify and mark the target so as to 
enable the remainder to concentrate their attack on it and thus avoid the 
present waste of effort which results from the majority of your attacks being 
dissipated over a wide area. I take it that you also agree that something must 
be done to prevent less expert crews from lighting fires in the wrong place 
during the first stage of an attack”. 
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Portal then made the observation that, whilst Harris opposed the formation of 
a Target Finding Force along the lines suggested by the Air Staff, the 
suggestions that followed in Harris’ letter all implied the admission that such a 
force was necessary without presenting a reasonable argument against the 
Air Staff proposal.  Portal noted that the proposals included the singling out of 
the crews with a distinctive badge, a proposal to which he (Harris) had so 
strongly opposed on the grounds that it would create a corps d’elite. On this 
point, Portal accepted that “to pack one unit with experts at the expense of 
other units which have to do the same job is most unsound and bad for 
morale” (original emphasis). Portal then made it clear that this was 
“emphatically not what we are proposing” and that, because the Target 
Finding Force would have an entirely different and far more difficult task than 
the ordinary “follow up” squadrons, there was a “need and a justification for 
having a formation containing none but expert crews”.  
 
Portal’s next observation was an equally telling one. “Over a period of three 
months”, noted Portal, “your attitude seems to have progressed from the 
complete rejection of the Target Finding Force proposal, through a Target 
Finding Squadron phase to this present raid leader suggestion. I cannot feel 
that it is logical that you should now reject the final and essential step of 
welding the selected crews into one closely knit organisation which, as I see 
it, is the only way to make their leadership and direction effective”. 
 
The remainder of Portal’s letter was largely devoted to rejecting the technical 
arguments advanced by Harris against the formation of a Target Finding 
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Force, whilst also taking the opportunity to remind Harris that the use of GEE, 
on which is raid leader scheme depended, was likely to be denied to Bomber 
Command within a few months. When that occurred, Portal considered, 
Harris’ raid leader scheme could not ensure the leadership which the average 
crews required to overcome their great and increasing difficulties. Portal did, 
however, seize upon Harris’ point about the difficulty of seeing the target at 
night which, he felt, was a convincing indication that the methods employed to 
date were “not equal to the occasion”. “What we need to aim at”, Portal 
continued, “is an effective degree of illumination and incendiarism in the right 
place and only in the right place. It is our opinion that this admittedly difficult 
task can only be done by a force which concentrates upon it as a specialised 
role, and which excludes those less experts crews whose less discriminating 
use of flares or incendiaries in the vicinity of the target have recently led so 
many of our attacks astray” (original emphasis). In the opinion of the Air Staff, 
said Portal, such a force would be analogous to that of the Reconnaissance 
Battalion of an Army Division and would “immediately open up a new field of 
improvement, raising the standard and thus the morale which could not fail to 
be reflected throughout the whole force”. Referring back to the Singleton 
Report, Portal concluded his letter with the familiar refrain that any failure to 
effect a radical improvement may well endanger the whole of the bomber 
policy. 
 
Interestingly, there are two versions of Portal’s letter in existence. The copies 
held in The National Archives87 and in the Harris Papers at the Royal Air 
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Force Museum88 both include a paragraph in which Portal appears to 
prevaricate when it comes to ordering Harris to form a Target Finding Force. 
This paragraph, which is not included in the copy of this letter held in the 
Portal Papers at Christchurch College, Oxford,89 gives a valuable insight into 
Portal’s character as a commander and to his relationship with Harris, and 
therefore warrants quoting at length90. 
 
 “….I fully recognise the practical difficulties”, the paragraph begins, “and, 
although I do not consider that the proposals which you have made go nearly 
far enough, I am reluctant to impose the Air Staff proposal upon you while you 
object so strongly to it. I would therefore like to discuss the subject with you 
tomorrow as a preliminary to holding the conference arranged for next 
Thursday, and I hope we shall be able to formulate an agreed scheme”.  
 
Here is a situation in which Portal, himself already on paper as an advocate of 
a Target Finding Force, fails to exert his authority in order to secure a 
proposal which originated from his own staff and which was widely, although 
as shown below not universally, supported in the Air Staff. The more 
generous interpretation of Portal’s actions is to suggest that his approach 
reflected what would now be termed a “collaborative” management style, in 
which the opinion of those concerned with technical matters was welcomed 
and evaluated as part of the decision making process. A less generous 
interpretation would suggest that this was an early indication of Portal’s 
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naivety and weakness as a military commander, especially when faced with a 
strong personality such as Harris’, a trait that some commentators claim 
would later resurface with the debate surrounding precision oil targets in 
1944. The debate between Portal and Harris about oil targets is covered in 
the Official History91 but is also covered in some detail by, amongst others, 
Gray, Hastings, Richards and Verrier. In his book, Hastings concludes that in 
this episode “…Portal finally showed himself unable to exercise authority over 
Sir Arthur Harris” 92, whereas Verrier describes Portal as being “impotent 
when dealing with his subordinate” 93 and Gray suggests that Portal 
was”…either naïve, suffering from wishful thinking or merely being 
placatory…”94. Richards takes a different view, being generally supportive of 
Portal’s actions95. The debate is also covered extensively in the doctoral 
thesis by Rex F. Cording, with Cording reaching the conclusion that Portal 
allowed a subordinate to flagrantly and repeatedly ignore Air Staff 
requirements and, by so doing, allowed questions to be raised about his 
leadership qualities and weakened his position as a leader96.   
 
Bufton, fearful that Portal had provided Harris with an escape route, 
immediately advised Freeman that he “…wished to disassociate himself from 
the possibility of a compromise”97.  Bufton’s reaction is itself a clear indication 
that Portal’s letter went out with this paragraph included, which therefore 
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raises the question about the status of the version held in the Portal Papers 
(and, indeed, to their wider validity).  There are a number of possible 
explanations for this, but two in particular would appear to present 
themselves. The first is that Portal had already decided that a Target Finding 
Force would be formed and omitted this paragraph from the final draft of the 
letter in order to appease Bufton following his (Bufton’s) note to Freeman 
disassociating himself from any possibility of a compromise.  One version of 
subsequent events would lend support for this possibility for, according to 
Bufton, on the same day that he wrote to Harris, Portal called to confirm that, 
following discussion with Freeman, the Target Finding Force would be formed 
and that he (Portal) would be meeting with Harris the next day to discuss the 
matter98. However, the fact that the letter went out with the additional 
paragraph included would militate against that possibility. 
 
A second, and more likely, possibility is that the original letter was drafted by 
Freeman in Portal’s absence, and that the paragraph was later added by 
Portal. There is some merit in this version of events, because Portal is known 
to have been on leave on the date that the letter was issued, not returning to 
duty until the 15 June. In his biography of Freeman, Anthony Furse relates 
how Freeman was deputising for Portal when he had occasion to call on 
Bufton and the matter of the Target Finding Force was raised. Freeman is 
said to have taken the file and, and after perusing the correspondence, 
indicated that he would take the matter up with Portal on his return. Freeman 
had previously advised Bufton that the only way with Harris was “to treat him 
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rough” and the copy held in the Portal Papers is consistent with that 
approach.  Portal’s letter is dated the day before he returned to duty, thereby 
raising the possibility that Freeman, with his more robust approach to dealing 
with Harris, had drafted the letter for Portal’s signature on his return, and that 
Portal had added the paragraph later. This scenario is favoured by Furse, 
noting that is was entirely in character that Portal should have added the 
paragraph on the copies held in The National Archives and the Royal Air 
Force Museum. Furse then goes on to suggest, somewhat improbably given 
that the copy in the Harris Papers includes the additional paragraph, that the 
fact that Harris then agreed so promptly to form a Target Finding Force 
implies that he received the version drafted by Freeman without that extra 
paragraph. Portal’s biographer, Denis Richards, is silent on this point, despite 
citing references to this letter in his book99.  
 
The other factor that points strongly to the fact that Harris received the copy 
with the additional paragraph is that the meeting referred to by Portal in the 
letter did indeed take place on the 15 June. There is no record of the 
discussion that took place, or of who attended the meeting, although it is likely 
that Freeman was also present100. The outcome, however, was that Harris 
was ordered to form a Target Finding Force, renamed at Harris’ insistence as 
the ‘Pathfinder Force’101, thus bringing to a conclusion a debate that lasted 
over six months. 
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The foregoing description of the events demonstrates that a number of 
individuals and organisations made significant, and at times crucial, 
contributions to the formation of the Pathfinder Force. It is entirely fair to say 
that Bufton was the main advocate of the ‘Target Finding Force’, and made 
most of the technical arguments in favour of a specialist unit. Accordingly, the 
lion’s share of the credit for the formation of the Pathfinder Force must go to 
him. However, as the Official History points out, it was not possible for the 
Deputy Director of Bomber Operations, as Bufton then was, to dictate to the 
Commander-in-Chief that a Target Finding Force be formed. Bufton must 
therefore have had support at all levels across the Air Staff, and it is therefore 
necessary to consider the role that others within the Air Staff played in the 
formation of the Pathfinder Force. 
 
Firstly, the contribution made by Baker, as Director of Bombing Operations, 
should not be underestimated. Baker appears to have been involved in the 
initial discussions about a Target Finding Force before Bufton joined the 
Directorate of Bombing Operations, including the meeting with Bennett in late 
1940/early 1941. It was Baker who considered that Bufton’s initial ideas for 
the creation of Target Finding Force were worth pursuing and who, by 
suggesting that his ideas should be sent demi-officially to Bomber Command, 
brought the debate to the table. The resulting paper, dated 29 November 
1941, was Bufton’s outline for a Target Finding Force and this would not have 
been produced or issued without Baker’s encouragement. It was Baker who 
subsequently wrote to Bottomley expressing concern that Harris might not be 
aware of the political and strategical issues faced by Air Staff, and who 
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instructed Bufton to prepare a paper that again stressed the importance of 
forming a Target Finding Force. In early March 1942, concerned at the lack of 
progress, it was Baker who asked Bufton to summarise the arguments in 
support of the creation of a Target Finding Force, and later it was Baker who 
advised Freeman that solving the problem of tactical control and co-ordination 
of the bomber force, which included the formation of a Target Finding Force, 
was most imperative if future bombing policy was to be effective. It is also 
likely that Baker provided much of the information, including meetings with 
personnel known to favour a Target Finding Force, to Justice Singleton and 
which may have contribution to Singleton’s inclination towards the creation of 
a Target Finding Force. Finally, it was Baker who responded to the paper by 
the J.I.C. by indicating that a successful bombing offensive could only be 
achieved if each operation was controlled at Command level in conjunction 
with a target marking force. The contribution made by Baker in terms of 
supporting and directing the efforts of Bufton, whilst not widely acknowledged, 
was nonetheless significant if not instrumental. 
 
The role played by Freeman as Vice-Chief of the Air Staff is a particularly 
interesting one. Apart from recommending a number of changes to a paper 
produced by the Air Staff following the publication of the Singleton report, 
Freeman remained silent during the early stages of the debate.  Freeman’s 
first important contribution came towards the end of the debate, when in June 
he persuaded Portal that there was little to be gained from a long drawn out 
correspondence with Bomber Command and that a conference should be 
held to discuss the subject. Although that conference never took place, this 
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intervention led to the sequence of events culminating in Portal’s letter of 14 
June and the subsequent meeting at which Harris was instructed to form a 
Target Finding Force. Freeman’s role in the letter of 14 June is also potentially 
pivotal, in that the evidence supports the contention that it was Freeman who 
drafted that letter. It is also likely that Freeman attended the meeting with 
Harris on the 15 June. It is this late intervention in the Target Finding Force 
debate which has led some commentators, notably Anthony Furse, Max 
Hastings and Richard Overy, to suggest that Freeman’s role was a decisive 
one. Furse suggests that “The deadlock between Bomber Command was only 
broken by Freeman’s decisive intervention in June” 102 and Hastings suggests 
that “Harris began to lose the battle when the file passed to Freeman, the 
Vice-Chief of Air Staff” 103. Overy suggests that “The crisis point came in June 
when Wilfred (Sic) Freeman, acting on Portal’s behalf as Vice-Chief of Air 
Staff, finally seized the initiative after weeks of fruitless arguments with Harris 
over tactical merits. He told Harris that he would have to accept the logic of a 
specialist force” 104.  
 
The interesting background to this is that Freeman himself did not support the 
concept of a Target Finding Force. “Personally,” he wrote in a minute to Portal 
on the 3 June, “I have never liked the idea of a Target Finding Force along the 
lines recommend (in Bufton’s letter dated 25 May), but nevertheless I believe 
we are now being forced to adopt it. In any event I can see little harm in giving 
it a trial”105. The irony, therefore, is that it was Freeman who played a decisive 
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role in persuading Harris to form a Target Finding Force, of which neither man 
was in favour. 
 
In contrast, the contribution made by Portal is less than impressive. Portal is 
on record as one of the earliest advocates of a Target Finding Force, having 
proposed the formation of as specialist target finding unit long before Bufton 
presented his own ideas. As early as April 1942, Portal had endorsed Bufton’s 
approach to operational pilots on the subject of the Target Finding Force and 
therefore must have been aware of the resistance that Bufton had been 
experiencing to his proposals. In view of his known support for the concept, it 
may have been expected that Portal could have used his position to progress 
the formation of a Target Finding Force, particular in view of the wider context 
in which the debate was taking place and the consequences should the 
results achieved by Bomber Command not improve. That he did not, and that 
it was left to Freeman to take up the mantle, reflects poorly on Portal and 
tends to suggest a weakness in management style. It also undermines the 
suggestion made by Portal’s biographer, Dennis Richards, that the 
“establishment of the Pathfinder Force was not the least of Portal’s services to 
the bombing offensive”106.  
 
The role played by Harris is, perhaps, the most interesting. Harris is usually 
portrayed in literature as being wholly opposed to the concept of a corps 
d’elite within Bomber Command and as being generally obstructive to all 
attempts to have the creation of a Target Finding Force imposed upon him.  In 
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particular, much is made of Harris’ dislike of the Directorate of Bombing 
Operations and of the ideas of a relatively junior officer (Bufton) being forced 
upon him. As Hastings observes, “Harris reserved his most virulent disdain for 
the Air Ministry’s Directorate of Bomber Operations, whose staff acted as the 
Chief of Air Staff’s personal advisors and agents in all matters relating to 
bombing policy”107. However, this does Harris an injustice. Much of Harris’ 
objection to the creation of a Target Finding Force was based on his own 
preference for having target marking squadrons in each Group, which he 
believed would “lead to a good deal of healthy competition and new ideas 
could be more easily tried out in this way”108. As the bombing offensive 
progressed, and Bomber Command expanded, Harris took the opportunity to 
implement his idea of having target marking squadrons in individual groups. 
Initially, this involved the creation of specialist target squadrons in No. 5 
Group but later both No. 1 Group and No.3 Group also established their own 
target marking capability. As will be shown in Chapter Six, the formation of the 
specialist target marking squadrons in No.5 Group did indeed result in 
competition with the Pathfinder Force and ultimately led to the development of 
more effective target marking techniques than those adopted by the 
Pathfinder Force109. It is arguable whether these improved techniques would 
have evolved had separate target finding squadrons not been formed within 
No. 5 Group and, albeit with the benefit of hindsight, this provides a 
vindication of Harris’ ideas.  
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It must however be recognised that, when the debate on the creation of a 
Target Finding Force was taking place in early 1942, Bomber Command was 
not of sufficient size to operate effectively at individual group strength and it 
was only the subsequent expansion of Bomber Command that made the 
formation of specialist target marking squadrons within individual groups a 
viable proposition. It should also be recognised that the techniques introduced 
by No. 5 Group were evolutions of techniques initially developed by the 
Pathfinder Force, and that neither No. 4 Group nor No. 6 Group established 
their own target marking squadrons, relying on the Pathfinder Force to mark 
targets throughout the bombing offensive.  The weakness of Harris’ position 
was therefore his failure to appreciate that in 1942 Bomber Command was 
simply not in a position to implement his own ideas about forming target 
marking squadrons in each Group and that the creation of a Target Finding 
Force, whilst necessary in order to improve operational efficiency in its own 
right, was also a necessary step towards the position envisaged by Harris 
whereby each Group would have its own specialist target finding squadrons. It 
is was a measure of Harris’ personality that, having adopted his position, he 
was not about to accept the proposals being put forward by the Directorate of 
Bombing Operations, and failed to accept the logic and merits of the 
proposals being put to him. This has led to Harris being unfairly depicted as a 
dogmatic, obstructive individual wholly at odds with the Air Staff, which 
obscures the fact this his own ideas had much merit and that it was only his 
timing that was misplaced.    
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Two key themes arise in coverage of the debate surrounding the creation of a 
Target Finding Force in secondary literature. Firstly, it is often claimed in 
secondary literature that Bufton’s letter of the 17 March 1942 was the opening 
salvo in the Target Finding Force debate: for example, Anthony Furse110, 
John Maynard111 and Charles Messenger112 all mention Bufton’s letter of the 
17 March as being the first in which he (Bufton) sets out his ideas on the 
Target Finding Force. As detailed above, that is evidently not the case. As a 
consequence, few accounts of the creation of Pathfinder Force refer to the 
gradual evolution of the idea from earlier beginnings. Moreover, although 
most accounts acknowledge the leading role played by Bufton, few accounts 
refer to the inputs of other individuals or organisations.  
 
This last point leads to the second key theme arising from the coverage in 
secondary literature: a tendency for authors to claim sole or principal credit for 
creation of the Pathfinder Force for one individual. Thus, as described above, 
Denis Richards ascribes the creation of the Pathfinder Force to Portal 
whereas, with more justification, Anthony Furse claims that the ‘deadlock’ 
between Harris and Bufton was only broken by Freeman’s intervention113. 
Others, such as Melinsky, attribute the credit for forming the Pathfinder Force 
almost exclusively to Bufton114 whereas Bennett claims that he himself sowed 
the seeds of the force that he would later lead. In the manuscript for 
Operational Research in Bomber Command (“the OR manuscript”), Dickins 
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claims that the ORSBC memorandum of the 22 December 1941 “appears to 
be the first reference to the possibility of a special Pathfinder Force”115. This 
quote is reproduced in full by Wakelam in his book The Science of Bombing, 
in a section of the book covering the early contributions made by ORSBC to 
the bombing offensive116. However, although made in good faith, the 
statement in the OR manuscript is patently inaccurate but is neither corrected 
nor put into context by Wakelam in his book, which is therefore misleading in 
describing the role played by ORSBC in the formation of the Pathfinder Force. 
 
From the other perspective, amongst those who support Harris, notably 
Saward117 and Messenger118, there is a tendency to focus on the exchange 
between Harris and Portal in June 1942 and to make little, if any, reference to 
the debate that preceded that exchange. Saward even goes so far as to 
suggest that the pathfinding principle promoted by Bufton was developed by 
Harris when he commanded a squadron in Iraq during the early 1920’s. This 
leads Saward to claim that the arrival of Harris at Bomber Command 
immediately led to a greater application of target-finding and target-marking 
principles.  As demonstrated here, this of course was not the case but 
Sawards’ claims nonetheless serve as an example of how the perspective of 
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individual authors can influence accounts of the debate surrounding the 
creation of the Pathfinder Force. 
 
The conclusion must be reached, therefore, that to date none of the accounts 
in secondary literature of the debate surrounding the creation of the 
Pathfinder Force have presented a comprehensive and objective analysis of 
that debate. This has inevitably led to misconceptions about the nature of the 
debate and the roles that various individuals played within it. It is also 
reasonable to conclude that none of the accounts place the debate into proper 
context, namely the serious question mark that hung over the continuation of 
the offensive at that time. In the absence of a proper analysis, and by 
considering the debate in a vacuum, the importance of the debate that took 
place and the eventual outcome has not to date been fully explored. 
 
The formation of the Pathfinder Force, and the basic techniques upon which 
all subsequent target marking would be based, are discussed in the next 
Chapter.  
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CHAPTER FIVE: PATHFINDER FORCE TARGET MARKING TECHNIQUES 
 
The previous chapter examined the events leading to the formation of the 
Pathfinder Force. This Chapter covers the development of target marking 
techniques in the period during which target marking was the sole provenance 
of the Pathfinder Force, and therefore covers the period from the 
commencement of operations by the Pathfinder Force in August 1942 until 
April 19441. This period encompasses the three ‘Bomber Battles’ of 
1943/19442, and covers a period in which the striking power of the bomber 
force increased significantly. Target marking techniques involving the use of a 
Master Bomber are considered in Chapter Seven and are therefore not 
covered in this Chapter, even if chronologically they occurred during the 
period under consideration here3. This Chapter examines the development 
and evolution of the various target marking techniques used by the Pathfinder 
Force, and will quantify the effect on bombing performance arising from the 
employment of those techniques. It will show that to a large extent the 
characteristics and limitations of the navigation/bombing aid employed 
dictated the target marking techniques that could be used in conjunction with 
it. The Chapter will also show that there was direct correlation between the 
target marking technique employed and the bombing performance achieved.  
The Chapter will identify the two phenomena that arose directly from the 
introduction of target marking techniques, known as the ‘Systematic Error’ and 
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the ‘Principle of Cumulative Distribution’, and will examine how the elimination 
or reduction of bombing errors resulting from these phenomena was 
fundamental to securing improvements in bombing accuracy. 
 
The Pathfinder Force (PFF) was formed on the 15 August 1942, under the 
command of (then) Group Captain Donald Bennett4. At the time of its 
formation, the PFF was composed of five squadrons, comprising of four 
‘standard’ squadrons, one drawn from each of the existing night Bomber 
Groups5, and a ‘special’ squadron then involved in the development of the 
Oboe bombing aid6.The four squadrons drawn from the Bomber Groups each 
flew a different aircraft type of aircraft, the performance of which varied 
significantly in terms of operational ceiling and cruising speed. This presented 
an immediate problem for the PFF in terms of co-ordinating the timing of the 
various elements of the target marking techniques, not least because of these 
aircraft types only the Avro Lancaster was capable of accepting subtle 
adjustments to speed in level flight7.  It followed that of the four types only the 
Avro Lancaster possessed the flexibility of airspeed to enable it to make up 
time lost to inaccurate wind forecast or navigational error, and therefore carry 
out the marking role at the appointed time.  There was also a significant 
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disparity in the serviceability rate of the four aircraft types. Consequently, in 
order to ensure that all elements of a technique were completed, it was 
necessary to employ only the most reliable type (the Avro Lancaster) on 
specialist roles involving only a few aircraft. The capability and flexibility of the 
early PFF techniques was therefore limited from the outset by these 
constraints.  
 
In the initial raids, the PFF employed a technique based upon the use of the 
flares which, in some respects, was similar to the Shaker technique8. The 
initial PFF element, known as ‘Finders’, were timed to arrive in the target area 
at zero hour minus one minute or zero hour minus two minutes. These aircraft 
dropped bundles of white reconnaissance flares at intervals of between eight 
to twelve seconds to form either three or five parallel lines, each some two 
miles apart. If the A/P was positively identified, a distinctively coloured marker 
flare was dropped to indicate the location of the A/P.  The next phase, the 
‘Illuminators’, dropped bundles of white reconnaissance flares at intervals of 
between two and five seconds over the A/P. There were two variations on this 
technique, dependant upon the strength of the wind at 2,000 ft (this being the 
height at which the flares would be burning at their strongest). In conditions of 
nil or little wind, the flares were placed in an arc on the far side of the A/P 
relative to the direction of approach. In conditions of strong winds, the flares 
were dropped in two parallel lines, one on each side of the A/P and each 
starting at about ½ mile short of the A/P. The direction of these lines was into-
wind, thus ensuring that the movement of the flares was along the lines and 
                                                 
8
 AIR14/2058 Bomber Command note,’ The Path Finder Force, Organisation and Work of the 
Path Finder Force’, 22 December 1942. This note was produced to advise Main Force crews 
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that the flares drifted past the A/P. It also ensured that the A/P was not 
obscured by smoke from the flares. In both variations, the Main Force aimed 
visually at the A/P as illuminated by the flares. This technique was not 
allocated a specific code-name, but was usually referred to in contemporary 
documents as the ‘Finder’ technique. It may be noted that in these initial raids 
there was no attempt to mark the A/P on the ground, and the role of the PFF 
was therefore to find and illuminate the target rather than to mark it. 
 
The first development of this technique came on the night of the 28/29 August 
1942 during a raid on Nuremburg in which, for the first time, the PFF marked 
the target with a marker bomb9. This raid is therefore an important milestone 
in the evolution of target marking techniques. The marker bomb used on that 
occasion was a ‘Red Blob Fire’. This was a crude adaptation of the casing of 
a 250lb incendiary bomb filled with a mixture of benzol, rubber and 
phosphorous, and was designed to ignite on impact with the ground. 
However, the Red Blob Fire was soon supplanted as a marker bomb with the 
introduction of the ‘Pink Pansy’, first used in the raid on Düsseldorf on the 
night of the 10/11 September 194210. This was a converted 4,000 lb High 
Capacity bomb casing, also filled with a mixture of benzol, rubber and 
phosphorous. The mixture in the Pink Pansy was treated with a dye such that 
it ignited with a distinctive brilliant pink flash, from which its name derived. 
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The drawback of both the Red Blob Fire and the Pink Pansy as marker bombs 
was that, following the initial brilliant flash upon ignition, the glow produced 
quickly faded. Consequently, some method had to be found of prolonging the 
period of time in which the A/P was marked for the Main Force.  The answer 
was for other PFF aircraft to drop incendiaries aimed at the initial glow of the 
marker bomb, thereby establishing a long-lasting point of aim for the Main 
Force.   These PFF aircraft were known as ‘Backers-up’ and were spread at 
regular intervals throughout the Main Force. However, as shown by the earlier 
Shaker technique, the drawback of this technique was that fires did not 
provide a distinctive point of aim and were prone to decoy. The use of 
incendiaries was therefore only a temporary expedient pending the availability 
of a more distinctive marker bomb. 
 
The introduction of the marker bomb heralded a change in the technique 
employed by the PFF, first introduced during the raid on Bremen on the night 
of the 4/5 September 194211. The PFF element was now split into three 
forces: ‘Illuminators’; ‘Visual Markers’ and ‘Backers-up’. It was now the 
Illuminators who used bundles of white flares to illuminate the target area and, 
as the name suggests, it was the role of the Visual Markers to identify the A/P 
visually using the light from the white flares, and then to mark the A/P with the  
marker bomb. A further variation introduced at this time was for the 
Illuminators to drop coloured flares to mark the extremities of the target area, 
red flares to mark the west of the target area and green flares to mark the 
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1942. See also Middlebrook and Everitt. The Bomber Command War Diaries, p306. 
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east12. At that time, the role of Backers-up was to drop all-incendiary loads on 
the marker bombs, with the Main Force instructed to aim for the marker bomb 
if visible or, if not, the conflagration produced by the incendiaries dropped by 
the Backers-up. This sequence of illumination, marking and backing-up would 
form the basis of most ground-marking techniques used by the PFF 
henceforth.    
 
In November 1942, Bennett held a conference at Pathfinder Force HQ to 
discuss the performance of the PFF during these initial raids13. Those 
attending were generally appreciative of the assistance given by PFF in 
locating the target but offered a number of criticisms of the methods 
employed. The main area of dispute concerned the use of flares. Nos. 1 & 3 
Groups indicated that the flares were too concentrated and that, particularly in 
conditions of ground haze, the glare from these flares made identifying the 
A/P difficult. These Groups considered that ground markers were preferable in 
such conditions, and also favoured the marking of a landmark near the target 
area from which a timed run could be made to the A/P. However, No. 5 Group 
took a different view and was opposed to ground marking. This Group 
considered that illumination of the A/P by flares was always preferred and 
instructed its crews to bomb at lower altitudes in order to ensure that the A/P 
was positively identified. No. 4 Group, represented on this occasion by (then) 
Wing Commander Cheshire, who would later play a leading role in the 
development of target marking techniques, took a different view again, stating 
that a marker without any illumination was the optimum solution. The 
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suggestion was also put forward by No 5 Group that one or two aircraft should 
be detailed to control the PFF and re-direct its effort if conditions required. 
This is the first official record found of reference to what would later become 
known as the Master Bomber technique14. The meeting does not appear to 
have reached a definite conclusion on any these points, although the ideas 
expressed would subsequently feature in the experiments made by PFF in 
refining their techniques. However, the differences in the preferred approach 
expressed at this conference would surface again once No 5 Group 
developed its own target marking techniques. 
 
The effectiveness of the initial raids led by the PFF was also the subject of a 
report produced by ORSBC15. The approach taken in this report was to 
compare the results achieved in the PFF led raids against results achieved on 
the same target prior to the formation of the PFF. The main findings were that 
six of the raids yielded better results and four yielded similar results. In five 
out of the six raids in which results were better than previously achieved, the 
results were 50% above expectation and in the sixth raid were 100% above 
expectation. Three of the raids were less successful than previous experience 
suggested, and in two of those raids the attack was completely ‘diverted’16 by 
the misidentification of the intended target by the PFF17. In good weather 
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conditions, the PFF had been successful in increasing the effectiveness of 
every raid which they led but in moderate weather conditions their 
involvement had not on any single occasion resulted in an improvement. 
Within GEE coverage, the operations led by the PFF had been more 
successful than previously but outside GEE coverage there was no 
improvement. The report noted that PFF was not at that time composed of 
experts, and concluded that the improvement achieved was therefore due to 
the employment of the target markers which, by preventing the scattering of 
bombing, had resulted in a greater concentration. A second report covering a 
total of 21 raids in the period from the first PFF led operations to late 
November 1942 generally reinforced these findings, and in particular noted 
that the PFF had never failed to improve upon expectations in good weather 
conditions but had never exceeded expectations in bad weather conditions18.  
 
This initial period of PFF operations, from inception until December 1942, is 
referred to in ORSBC reports as Phase 1 and covers the period when only 
limited navigation aids and primitive marker bombs were available19. 
Nonetheless, a number of key characteristics emerge. The first is that without 
the benefit of a navigation aid (at that time GEE), the target was still generally 
not positively identified. It follows that the employment of target marking 
techniques could have had no bearing on the outcome in terms of the 
percentage of bombs within 3 miles of the A/P where the target itself has not 
been located with the use of a navigation aid. This was an early indication that 
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the success of any target marking technique was itself dependant upon the 
accuracy and coverage of the navigation aid employed. The fact that results 
then exceeded expectations within GEE coverage indicates that the 
employment of target marking techniques resulted in greater concentration in 
bombing from the Main Force than was previously achieved, the clear 
implication being that when the target was positively identified with the aid of a 
navigation aid, target marking was very effective in enabling the crews of 
aircraft not so equipped to bomb the target accurately. The GEE navigation 
aid was of course an integral component of the earlier Shaker target marking 
technique, and the conclusion to be drawn must be that the improvement in 
results achieved by the PFF compared to those achieved previously was due 
to the relative distinctiveness of the marker bombs used by the PFF compared 
to the incendiaries used in the Shaker technique.    
 
However, the most significant characteristic identified by ORSBC was that the 
misidentification of the target by the PFF resulted in the entire attack being 
diverted away from the intended objective. This was an extreme example of 
the ‘Systematic Error’20. The Systematic Error was an entirely new 
phenomenon that arose directly from the employment of target marking 
techniques, and is of such significance to the development of those 
techniques that a detailed explanation of it is necessary here. 
 
Prior to the introduction of target marking techniques, each individual bomber 
crew would aim for the designated A/P of the raid. Irrespective of accuracy in 
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‘systematic errors’, the latter being errors inherent within any instrument, such as navigational 
or blind bombing aids.  
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relation that point, the bomb distribution around the A/P conformed to the 
principles of ‘Gaussian distribution’ or ‘normal distribution’. Gaussian 
distribution is a measure of probability of a single event occurring applicable 
where there are a large number of events. The Gaussian Distribution Function 
provides that 68% of all events will be within one standard deviation of the 
mean of all events. The Gaussian Distribution Function is shown graphically 
as a bell-shaped curve, in which the steepness of the curve reflects the 
number of events occurring close to the mean: - a large number of events 
occurring close to the mean results in a steep curve, a small number of events 
results in a shallow curve (see Diagram 18/ below). Prior to the employment 
of target marking techniques, the mean of the bomb distribution for the 
purposes of the Gaussian Distribution Function curve always corresponded to 
the M.P.I. of all the bombs dropped. Because bomb distribution prior to the 
introduction of target marking was usually widely dispersed around the A/P, 
the resultant Gaussian Distribution Function curve was typically shallow but 
nonetheless the mean always corresponded with the A/P21. 
 
                                                 
21
 For example, a Gaussian Distribution Function curve based on the figure quoted in the Butt 
Report that only one in five of the total sorties got within five miles of the target would be very 
shallow, almost flat, bell-shaped curve. 
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Fig 18/ Gaussian Distribution Function curves for bomb distribution. These curves relate to 
the attack on the marshalling yard at Aulnoye on the 25/26 March 1944, in which there were 
two separate A/P’s and therefore two curves were shown. Note that in both cases the range 
error (the distribution along the direction of flight) is greater than then line error (distribution 
across the line of flight). Note the steepness of the curve for Radial Distribution, indicating that 
this raid was well concentrated. Source: TNA AIR14/2692 ORSBC S.167 ‘The Distribution of 
Bombs Achieved in Oboe Groundmarking attacks on Marshalling Yards by Bomber 
Command between 6
th
 March and 11
th
 April 1944’, 16 May 1944. 
  
The employment of target marking techniques had two consequences for 
bomb distribution. Firstly, because crews aimed at the target markers rather 
than the A/P, the mean of the Gaussian Distribution Function curve no longer 
corresponded to the designated A/P but corresponded to the M.P.I. of bombs 
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around the target makers. Thus, if the target markers were displaced in 
relation to the A/P, the mean of the Gaussian Distribution Function curve 
would no longer corresponded to the designated A/P for the raid. The linear 
distance from the A/P to the M.P.I. of the bomb distribution around the target 
makers defined the extent of the Systematic Error. The second consequence 
was that bombing concentration improved with the introduction of target 
marking techniques. Consequently, the shape of the Gaussian Distribution 
Function curve changed, becoming steeper and with a narrower base.  
 
The combination of these two consequences was that, if the target markers 
were displaced in relation to the A/P, only a proportion of the bombs dropped 
on or close to the M.P.I. of the bomb distribution would fall on or close to the 
A/P. The proportion of bombs falling on or close to the A/P was a function of 
the extent of the Systematic Error and the degree of concentration achieved. 
The optimum result was a highly concentrated raid in which the M.P.I. of the 
target markers coincided with the A/P. In practice, the M.P.I. of the target 
markers rarely coincided exactly with the A/P but was often sufficiently close 
to it that the base of the Gaussian Distribution Function curve (i.e the bomb 
distribution) overlapped the A/P to a greater or lesser extent. In extreme 
cases, where the M.P.I. of the target markers was considerably displaced in 
relation to the A/P and the attack was well concentrated, no part of the base 
of the Gaussian Distribution Function curve overlapped the A/P and the target 
was missed altogether. The raid on Saarlouis described in the Introduction to 
this thesis is an example where the displacement from the A/P and the 
 248 
 
concentration of the bomb distribution was such that no bombs fell on the 
intended target. 
 
Increasing the number of aircraft that located the target and achieving a 
greater concentration of bombing had been two objectives long held by the Air 
Ministry and were two of the main motivations behind the creation of the PFF.  
It is therefore somewhat ironic that, whilst a greater concentration of bombing 
was achieved, because of the Systematic Error the introduction of the PFF 
initially resulted in an overall reduction bombing accuracy, which fell from a 
percentage of 35% of bombs within 3 miles of the A/P in August- September 
to 25% in October - November22. Consequently, from the very moment that 
target marking was introduced as a regular component of bombing raids at 
night, the challenge facing Bomber Command was to get the M.P.I. of the 
target markers to coincide with the A/P for the raid, and thereby reduce or 
eliminate the Systematic Error. 
 
The tools required to address the issue of the Systematic Error began to 
arrive at the end of 1942 with the introduction of the Oboe blind bombing aid23 
into operational use on the night of 20/21 December 194224. This was the first 
in a series of experimental raids in which the operational technique for use of 
Oboe was trialled including, at the beginning of January 1943, trials in which 
                                                 
22
 Harris, Despatch on War Operations, Part 5, Page 55, Table 10. 
23
 The principles of the Oboe blind bombing device are set out in Chapter 2, with a detailed 
technical description set out in Appendix 3. 
24
 TNA AIR14/3408 Final Raid Report No 226: Lutterade, 20/21 December 1942, 9 February 
1943. See also Middlebrook and Everitt. The Bomber Command War Diaries, p338. The first 
Oboe-aimed bombs were dropped by Squadron Leader H.E.Bufton and his navigator Flight 
Lieutenant E.L.Ifould of No 109 Squadron. ‘Hal’ Bufton was the brother of Sydney Bufton, who 
had championed the formation of a Target Finding Force. For more information on this series 
of trial Oboe raids, see Cumming, Beam Bombers, p.p. 87 to 95. 
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PFF Mosquitoes using Oboe provided ground-marking or sky-marking for 
small formations of heavy bombers. These raids proved that Oboe was highly 
accurate but also showed that Oboe was prone to technical failure. The Oboe 
system could in any event only control one aircraft every 10 minutes on each 
Channel and, with two Channels covering the Ruhr and one Channel covering 
the French ports, any failures of the equipment could result in a significant 
gap in the marking.  
 
The marking technique devised to overcome this issue was first suggested by 
ORSBC, which suggested that Oboe aircraft drop coloured markers at Zero 
hour and then subsequently at ten minute intervals25. This would, ORSBC 
advised, provide an “unmistakable mark over the target for a period of about 
five minutes” and, it was suggested, it would be an advantage if Oboe could 
drop markers at intervals of every five minutes. This report concluded with the 
recommendation that the use of Oboe as aid to the location of targets in the 
Ruhr should be put forward as an extremely urgent operational requirement.  
 
The original concept proposed by ORSBC was forwarded to the Air Ministry, 
which proposed several improvements to the proposal made by ORSBC 
including, most importantly, use of the Mosquito aircraft and the alterations to 
the marker bomb in order that it could be accommodated within the bomb-bay 
of that aircraft26. It was also the Air Ministry that actioned the duplication of the 
                                                 
25
 TNA AIR14/900 ORSBC Report S53 ‘The Operational Use of Oboe Mark 1 for Target 
Location’, 18 June 1942. It should be noted that the coloured markers referred to by ORSBC 
in this report were the Target Indicators in conjunction with which Oboe would eventually be 
used but which at the time were still under development. 
26
 TNA AIR14/900. Letter from Air Vice Marshal Bottomley, Assistant Chief of the Air Staff, to 
Air Marshal Harris, Officer Commanding-in-Chief Bomber Command, 25 June 1942. 
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ground stations in order that Oboe aircraft could mark the target once every 
five minutes, as recommended by the ORSBC27. The technique ultimately 
employed differed from that originally suggested by ORSBC insofar as 
Backers-up would drop secondary markers of a contrasting colour to replenish 
the primary markers between Oboe sorties, thereby ensuring the continuity of 
marking throughout the raid. The Main Force was instructed to aim for the 
primary markers if visible, or the M.P.I. of the secondary markers if not.  Using 
this technique, the first major raid in which Oboe provided ground-marking for 
the Main Force took place on the night of 27/28 January 1943, when 157 
aircraft made a concentrated raid on Düsseldorf28.  
 
A few days prior to the Oboe ground-marking raid, on the night of 16/17 
January 1943, Target Indicators (T.I.) 29 had been used operationally for the 
first time during a raid on Berlin. The T.I. solved the seemingly unsolvable 
conundrum of combining good ballistic qualities and a high terminal velocity 
without penetrating into the ground by packing pyrotechnic candles into a 
bomb casing but then, by using a barometric fuze, ejecting the pyrotechnic 
candles at a pre-determined height above ground level.  The pyrotechnic 
candles burned from the point of ejection from the parent projectile and would 
continue to burn on the ground, where they would form a distinctive pattern. 
                                                 
27
 Ibid. Letter from Air Vice Marshal Bottomley, Assistant Chief of the Air Staff, to Air Marshal 
Harris, Officer Commanding-in-Chief Bomber Command, 19 July 1942 
28
 TNA AIR14/1804 ORSBC Memorandum B.199, ‘Effectiveness of P.F.F. Phase II – January 
to March 1943’, 21 April 1943. This raid is also described as being successful in  Middlebrook 
and Everitt, The Bomber Command War Diaries, p348. 
29
 TNA AIR10/2393 PFF Special Marker Equipment, Air Publication 1661H, Vol 1, October 
1944. The correct technical nomenclature is ‘Bomb, A/C, Target Identification, 250lb, No 
1(followed by colour as appropriate)’ 
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The pyrotechnic candles were usually coloured red, green or yellow 30. The 
T.I. was constantly developed and, by February 1945, there were some 36 
different versions (referred to by ‘Serial Numbers’) 31 
 
One of the main advantages of the T.I. was that its ballistic characteristics 
were identical to those of a H.E. bomb for most of the trail32 and could 
therefore be aimed with a degree of accuracy nearly equivalent to a H.E.bomb 
(or, when used in conjunction with Oboe, the trail angle could be accurately 
calculated and input into the calculations). The limitation was that the trail 
angle changed abruptly at the point at which the pyrotechnic candles were 
ejected from the casing, going from a terminal velocity of 1,000 feet per 
second for the parent projectile to a terminal velocity of only 100/200 feet per 
second for the individual pyrotechnic candles. The latter would therefore 
cascade to the ground vertically rather than following the trail angle of the 
parent projectile such that, in still air, the pyrotechnic candles would land short 
of a bomb following a ballistic trail angle to ground level. Moreover, as a result 
of this low terminal velocity, the pyrotechnic candles were prone to drift and 
this resulted in T.I.’s being less accurate that an H.E.bomb of equivalent 
weight, particularly in strong winds. 
 
                                                 
30
 The convention was to refer to Target Indicators as ‘T.I.’ followed by the colour in brackets: 
i.e. T.I. (Red), T.I. (Green) and T.I. (Yellow). This convention is followed in this thesis 
31
 TNA AIR20/4813 Air Ministry, Directorate of Armament Requirement note ‘Summary of 
P.F.F. Special Weapons for target marking and illuminating’,1 February 1945. 
32
 The trail, or trail angle, was the path taken by a bomb or marker through the air after 
release. Due to the forward speed of the aircraft at the point of release, the trail angle initially 
included an element of forward motion which rapidly reduced and, subject to the height at 
which the bomb was released, eventually assumed a nearly vertical path.  
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Although the use of the T.I. introduced a number of new operational issues, 
this was the first time in the bombing offensive that Bomber Command had 
possessed a marker bomb capable of providing a distinctive point of aim. The 
introduction of the T.I. simultaneous with the introduction of Oboe and H2S 
completed the tools necessary for Bomber Command to become an effective 
force, and the importance of this as in intrinsic component of effective target 
marking techniques cannot be overstated.  
 
The second blind bombing/navigation aid, H2S, made its operational debut on 
the night of 30/31 January 1943 during a raid on Hamburg33.  However, 
whereas the use of Oboe could be relied upon to place the T.I.s close to the 
A/P, it was recognised from the outset that H2S would not be sufficiently 
accurate to replicate that degree of accuracy and that it was therefore 
necessary to devise a different marking technique for use in conjunction with 
H2S. The method initially adopted was an averaging technique whereby 
‘primary markers’ were dropped blind using H2S, thereby avoiding errors due 
to the misidentification of the target by visual means34. Backers-up were then 
instructed to drop secondary markers of a contrasting colour aimed visually at 
the M.P.I. of the primary markers. By these means, any errors in the 
placement of the primary markers would be averaged out, such that the M.P.I. 
of the secondary markers would coincide with the A/P. The Main Force was 
then instructed to aim at the M.P.I. of the secondary markers. 
                                                 
33
 TNA AIR14/1804 ORSBC Memorandum B.199 ‘Effectiveness of P.F.F. Phase II – January 
to March 1943’, 21
 
April 1943. This raid is also described by Middlebrook and Everitt The 
Bomber Command War Diaries, p350. The docks and the River Elbe presented a clear image 
on the H2S sets and the PFF were able to identify Hamburg from an average range of 23 
miles. However, the raid was not a success and bombing was scattered over a wide area. 
34
 This technique would later become known as Blind Parramatta. 
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One of the features of the averaging technique and subsequently of most of 
the target marking techniques used with both Oboe and H2S was that, if no 
primary markers were visible, PFF Backers-up and the Main Force were 
instructed to aim for the M.P.I. of all the secondary markers visible, an 
exercise known as ‘visual centring’. Up until this point of the bombing 
offensive, bomb aimers were instructed to aim for a single fixed point on the 
ground (i.e.the designated A/P, or individual marker bombs). However, visual 
centring required a different technique the difficulty of which was, until the 
Main Force became largely equipped with the Mk XIV bombsight in late 1943, 
exacerbated further by the limitations of Mk IX Course Setting Bombsight 
insofar as any small movements in the air resulted in large bombing errors35.   
 
The importance of visual centring was that, if successive aircraft aimed at the 
M.P.I. of the markers visible, the aggregate M.P.I. was itself subject to a 
cumulative error which rapidly became greater than that of the individual 
attempts. This was known as the Principle of Cumulative Dispersion36 and 
was a significant factor in determining bombing accuracy. Once the 
importance of visual centring became fully appreciated, considerable efforts 
were made to understand the psychological and physiological factors that 
contributed to the assessment of a complicated pattern of ground markers 
under operational conditions. In order to understand the contribution made by 
                                                 
35
 TNA AIR14/941 Instruction Notes on the Course Setting Bomb Sight Mark VIIIA. This 
version of the CSBS was functionally identical to the Mark IX. 
36
 TNA AIR14/2715 A.W.A. Paper ‘Notes on the Practical use of Marker Bombs’, undated. In 
explaining the principle of cumulative dispersion, the A.W.A. paper drew an analogy with 
pellets from a shotgun, in which the mean radius of the pellet pattern form a single shot is less 
than the average error in aim.   
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target marking techniques to the bombing offensive, it is essential to 
understand the reasons behind the difficulty in estimating the M.P.I. of a 
number of secondary markers over a relatively wide area and the implications 
of that difficulty to bombing accuracy. 
 
Starting in January 1944, the problem of visual centring became the subject of 
a series of detailed studies. A preliminary report by ORSBC concentrated 
upon the characteristics of T.I.’s and conditions within the target area in terms 
of fire, smoke, dust and haze37.  The primary conclusion was that the colour of 
the T.I. was the most notable recognition feature. The other key finding was 
that bomb aimers generally had difficulty explaining how they selected the T.I. 
estimated to be the M.P.I. of the marker pattern. The disturbing implication 
was that Main Force bomb aimers did not understand how the target marking 
techniques employed by the Pathfinder Force actually worked, and this 
prompted the publication by ORSBC of a simplified guide to the main 
techniques used by the Pathfinder Force for circulation to Main Force crews38.   
 
This guide, entitled ‘Bombing of Target Marking: Notes for the guidance of 
operational crews’, essentially set out the rationale for target marking. The 
guide stressed that the success or failure of any raid depended not only on 
the skill of the PFF to locate and mark the target but, to “an equal degree”, on 
the intelligent co-operation of every pilot, navigator and bomb aimer in the 
Main Force. It was emphasised that the responsibility of the bomb aimer was 
“doubly great” in this respect and, when faced by a multitude of T.I.’s on 
                                                 
37
 TNA AIR 14/1884 ORSBC Report ‘The visibility of Target Indicators with Special Reference 
to the Colour Vision Problem’, 9 January 1944. 
38
 RSMORA Dickins, Operational Research in Bomber Command, p.p. 62-63.  
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reaching the target area, posed the question to bomb-aimers ‘At which should 
I aim?’ In answer to that question, the remainder of the note explained the 
characteristics of T.I’s and stressed the importance of visual centring based 
upon all the T.I’s visible rather than relying upon a single set of markers39. In 
many respects, this was a remarkable document, not only because it sought 
to address one of the most important operational issues confronting Bomber 
Command through the equivalent of ‘distance learning’ but also because of a 
perceived need to address the concern that some crews were not relying 
upon target markers at all. 
 
Given the difficulties experienced by bomb aimers in assessing the M.P.I. of a 
pattern of ground markers, ORSBC considered it vital that further research 
was conducted into the psychological and physiological performance of bomb 
aimers in distinguishing target markers from the overall picture of the target 
area, and in assessing the centroid of a pattern of markers taking into account 
the inequalities in the prominence of the individual markers forming that 
pattern. Work on this latter aspect was to be carried out at Cambridge 
University40.   
 
In the interim, in May 1944 ORSBC conducted a detailed study of the 
characteristics and visibility of target indicators41. This study found that the 
visibility of Target Indicators depended on three broad factors: movement, 
colour and form on the ground. The movement was the result of the cascade 
                                                 
39
 TNA AIR14/2058 ORS 1(c) Note ‘Bombing of Target Marking: Notes for the guidance of 
operational crews’, 31 January 1944. 
40
 TNA AIR 14/1884 Minute 15, ORS 1 (c) to ORS 1, March 1944. 
41
 TNA AIR14/4140 ORSBC Report No 99 ‘The Visibility and Recognition of Target 
Indicators’, 6 May 1944. 
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of the individual candles to the ground, although this was for a limited period 
of time only. Once on the ground, the pattern of Target Indicators was usually 
obscured by buildings and ORSBC considered that recognition was usually 
made by colour rather than pattern in such circumstances.  
 
With these basic principles in mind, the ORSBC report  considered the 
recognition of Target Indicators in terms of the characteristics of the Target 
Indicator itself; the position of the Target Indicator on the ground; and the 
assessment by the bomb aimer. From an aircraft at the normal operational 
altitude of circa 20,000 feet, the typical sighting angle of Target Indicators on 
the ground was approximately 45º. It was found that, at this angle, 9 out of 10 
Target Indicators that fell within a built up area would be obscured by 
buildings, such that only 10% of the Target Indicators dropped would be 
visible to a bomb aimer. It was also noted that accurately placed Target 
Indicators tended to ‘flicker’ because, it was assumed, they were partly 
obscured by trees or by the internal structure of a damaged building.  By 
contrast, Target Indicators that fell on open ground were clearly visible and 
formed a distinctive ground pattern. In terms of the area bombing of towns, 
this created the paradox that inaccurately placed markers were more 
prominent than those that were accurately placed in the built-up area. 
Because bomb aimers were usually instructed to aim at the M.P.I. of all the 
visible Target Indicators, and given that only 10% of Target Indicators falling 
in built-up areas would be visible, there was a tendency for bomb aimers to 
assess the M.P.I. based largely upon the un-obscured and therefore more 
prominent Target Indicators that fell in open country. The corollary was that 
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the pattern of Target Indicators, and therefore the M.P.I. of those markers, 
would be distorted towards the more prominent markers in open country.  
 
ORSBC concluded that this was one of the causes of the phenomenon known 
as ‘creepback’, in which the bomb distribution moved progressively away from 
the A/P in the direction of approach of the bombers as a raid developed. In 
some cases, creepback could be extensive: in the raid on Berlin on the night 
of the 31 August/1 September 1943, the creepback extended some 30 miles 
from the A/P. Although Bomber Command often planned the raids so that the 
line of approach to the A/P overflew the built up area of a city, such that the 
creepback inflicted some damage there, creepback inevitably reduced the 
concentration of the bomb distribution at the A/P and therefore detracted from 
the efficiency of the attack42. 
 
The ORSBC report identified two main causes of error in the recognition of 
Target Indicators related to psychological or physiological factors. The first of 
these was the colour vision of bomb aimers, the minimum standard for which 
was ‘Defective-safe’. ORSBC concluded that bomb aimers with this lower 
standard of colour vision would be less capable of recognising Target 
Indicators, particularly where they were partially obscured by smoke. ORSBC 
accepted that requiring all bomb aimers to have normal colour vision would 
not be practical for other reasons but recommended that bomb aimers with a 
specialist role in target marking should only be accepted if they had normal 
colour vision. 
                                                 
42
 The Hamburg raids in July 1943 (OPERATION GOMMORAH) described below were a 
good example of this. 
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The main psychological factor was the concept ‘visual centring’ itself. The 
ORSBC report concluded that there were many reasons why bomb aimers 
incorrectly assessed the M.P.I. of the Target Indicators, the principal one 
being that the average bomb aimer was only able to pick out a proportion of 
the total number of markers that were visible at any one time. In this context, it 
should be noted that the pattern of Target Indicators was constantly changing 
as some markers burnt out and new markers were dropped. A further reason 
was the aforementioned obscuration of Target Indictors at the relatively 
shallow angle of view by smoke and buildings and, by comparison, the 
relative prominence of Target Indicators that fell on open ground. It was 
recognised that any decision by a bomb aimer to discard the former in 
preference for the latter would fundamentally alter the assessment of the 
M.P.I. of the distribution of Target Indicators.  
 
The ORSBC report recognised that visual centring was a difficult task for the 
average bomb aimer. One of the recommendations made was that, in the 
training of bomb aimers, less time should be spent on the identification of 
targets and more time devoted to visual centring. However, the research 
carried out by Cambridge University revealed a more fundamental 
psychological issue with visual centring43. This research concluded that there 
was a “capricious disregard” of certain markers and that there was no 
correlation between those markers that were ignored. These results were 
consistent with the earlier ORSBC finding that bomb aimers had difficulty 
                                                 
43
 TNA AIR14/1884 Minute 48, OIC ORSBC to T1, 7 July 1944. 
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explaining how they selected the T.I. estimated to be the M.P.I. of the marker 
pattern, and therefore validated the existing concerns in this respect.  
 
The researchers at Cambridge University offered a simplified but readily 
implemented solution whereby bomb aimers were instructed to aim for a point 
‘…..such that there were as many markers beyond it, as in front of it, and as 
many to the left as to the right of it’. A more comprehensive solution was the 
publication by the Air Ministry Psychology Unit at Cambridge University of a 
training package44 and, later, the introduction of a synthetic trainer for 
instructing bomb aimers of the Pathfinder Force in the visual centring of 
Target Indicators, although this was not extended to Main Force bomb 
aimers45.  These measures were a tacit acknowledgement that target marking 
techniques had fundamentally changed the nature of the bombing offensive. 
Nonetheless, notwithstanding the recognition that reliance on a ground 
pattern of Target Indicators to guide the Main Force was not without its own 
difficulties, these measures were not in place until almost the end of the 
bombing offensive. It follows that Bomber Command operated for a significant 
proportion of the bombing offensive with the majority of crews receiving no 
training in this important skill, the acquirement of which was an important 
component of overall bombing accuracy. 
 
In early 1943, and now equipped with Oboe and H2S, and with the benefit of 
proper Target Indicators, the PFF led a series of attacks against French, 
                                                 
44
 Ibid. Minute 51, ORS 4(d) to OIC ORSBC, 19 January 1945, covering the undated note 
‘Commentary for Use with Transparencies for the Air Ministry Bombing Teacher’. 
45
 TNA AIR20/7738 Flying Personnel Research Committee paper ‘The Sythentic Training of 
Pathfinder and Bombers in the Visual Centring of Target Indicators’, July 1945. 
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Italian and German targets. ORSBC referred to this series of raids as Phase II 
of the PFF operations although, in practice, much of this period was one of 
experimentation with target marking techniques.  The techniques trialled 
during this period, both with Oboe and H2S, were based on the two basic 
forms of ground-marking and sky-marking. In both cases, experimentation 
was based largely upon variations in timing and spacing of the various 
elements of each technique, particularly the Backers-up, in order to ensure 
continuity of marking throughout the raid. The general approach taken was for 
the first raid to be on a small scale using only PFF aircraft, with subsequent 
raids involving progressively larger Main Force components. For example, the 
first use of Oboe for sky-marking took place against Düsseldorf on the night of 
31 December 1942/1 January 1943 and involved only two Oboe Mosquitoes 
and 8 Lancasters, all from PFF, whereas the last in the series involved 3 
Oboe Mosquitoes and 80 Lancasters from Nos. 1 and 5 Groups46.  The former 
raid was a further milestone in the bombing offensive, in that it was the first 
occasion on which an aircraft aimed at a marker in the air as opposed to a 
point on the ground. 
 
One of the early innovations, first used on the night of 30/31 January 1943, 
was the preparation of dual marking plans for both ground-marking and sky-
marking on the same raid. This later became a standard feature of raid 
planning but at this time was part of the gamut of experiments on target 
marking techniques, which also included ground-marking by both Oboe and 
                                                 
46
 TNA AIR14/3410 Final Raid Report No 223: Dusseldorf, 31 December 1942/1 January 
1943, 24 February 1943. See also Middlebrook and Everitt  The Bomber Command War 
Diaries,,p.p. 340, 341 and 348 and Musgrove  Pathfinder Force, p25.. 
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H2S47 and sky-marking solely by H2S48. The interesting characteristic of 
these experiments is that they were essentially a case of trial and error and, 
other than the standard night raid reports produced by ORSBC, there is no 
evidence to suggest that these experiments were based upon scientific advice 
or anything other than the lessons learned by the operational units and PFF 
headquarters.  In view of the importance previously attached by the Air 
Ministry to the creation of a ‘Target Finding Force’ and the parallel 
establishment of a Bomber Development Unit, it is surprising that there was 
not a more formal framework in place for the evaluation of target marking 
techniques.   
 
In the event, some indication of the effectiveness of PFF led operations to that 
date was obtained at a further conference held at PPF Headquarters in 
February 194349. The two main issues raised by the Groups were the difficulty 
experienced by crews in estimating the M.P.I. of ground-markers and the 
timing of the marking components. In relation to the former, part of the issue 
was that the crews were not certain which markers should be taken into 
account and, because crews were unable to estimate the hypothetical centre 
of concentration, tended to focus on the most obvious marker. One of the 
reasons for this, it was suggested, was that crews did not have sufficient 
confidence in the Parramatta technique. In that context, the Groups 
                                                 
47
 TNA AIR14/3410 Final Raid Report No 256: Cologne 2/3 February 1943m 29 March 1943. 
See also Middlebrook and Everitt The Bomber Command War Diaries, p350. This raid was 
not a success to the cloud cover over the target. 
48
 Ibid. Final Raid Report No 264: Wilhelmshaven 11/12 February1943, 21 April 1943. See 
Middlebrook and Everitt The Bomber Command War Diaries, p353. On this raid, the 
skymarking was very accurate and a successful raid followed, aided in part by bombs falling 
on a naval ammunition store in which the subsequent explosion devastated an area of some 
120 acres of the naval dockyard and the town. 
49
 TNA AIR14/3062 Minutes of Conference held at Headquarters Pathfinder Force on 27 
February 1943. 
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complained that crews had received no training in estimating the M.P.I. of a 
group of markers and were not familiar with the PFF techniques.  The 
representative from No. 5 Group even went so far as to say that his Group still 
preferred the illumination of the target area to ground-marking. The greatest 
concerns were, however, in relation to the timing of the marking components. 
The Groups complained that the marking was frequently late, such that the 
Main Force arrived before marking commenced or there was insufficient 
interval between the first markers and the arrival of the Main Force. It was 
explained that this was to some extent due to the reliance on the Stirling 
aircraft for the initial marking (this because a significant proportion of the few 
H2S sets available were fitted in Stirlings50) which, because of the slow speed 
of the aircraft and its poor turn of speed, was unable to make up lost time. 
This was a familiar concern, and one that Bennett had expressed upon the 
formation of the PFF, but which would not be fully resolved until the heavy 
bomber element of the PFF was wholly equipped with the Lancaster. As 
before, aside from a general consensus that these matters would be 
addressed, there is no record of any actions taken following this conference 
although the timing of the marking component would be subject to continued 
experimentation and refinement as the offensive progressed.     
 
The effectiveness of the PFF during Phase II was comprehensively assessed 
by ORSBC in April 194351. The report adopted the same approach used in 
assessing the effectiveness of the PFF in Phase I and compared the results 
                                                 
50
 H2S was first fitted into the Handley Page Halifax and the Short Stirlings in PFF because 
Roy Chadwick, the Chief Designer at Avro, had initially resisted the fitting of H2S in the 
Lancaster. 
51
 TNA AIR14/1804 ORSBC Memorandum B.199 ‘Effectiveness of P.F.F. Phase II – January 
to March 1943’, 21 April 1943 
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achieved in the PFF led raids against results achieved on the same target 
prior to the formation of the PFF in similar weather52. ORSBC found that in the 
13 ground-marking raids during this period, the PFF located the target on 12 
occasions (92%) but that the A/P was only unambiguously marked on the two 
raids in which Oboe was employed exclusively. In these raids, the use of 
Oboe on its own resulted in a significant improvement in accuracy of the Main 
Force, with an average of 35% of bombs within 3 miles of the A/P compared 
with an average of 15% for the same target in raids pre-PFF53. In the 11 raids 
where H2S was used during Phase II, only on the 7 occasions (63%) where it 
was used in conjunction with Oboe was the A/P unambiguously marked.  On 
the remaining 5 ground-marking raids, in all of which H2S had been used 
exclusively, the markers were all in the wrong place.  Overall, where H2S was 
used on its own, accuracy of the Main Force declined in relation to pre-PFF 
operations on the same target, with just 9% of bombs being within 3 miles of 
the A/P compared with an average of 15% for the same target in raids pre-
PFF. ORSBC also found that in the 18 sky-marking raids during this period, 
the PFF had located the target on each of the 4 occasions for which data was 
available54. On each of those 4 occasions, the sky-markers had been dropped 
using Oboe only and the A/P was unambiguously marked, giving results for 
                                                 
52
 Ibid. The figures used by ORSBC in this memorandum did not include performance on 
Italian or French targets, or those achieved in raids on Berlin. These were considered to be 
not representative of the conditions encountered over Germany, with which the bomber 
offensive was largely concerned at that time. 
53
 Ibid. The figures used by ORSBC for raids pre-PFF relate to specific targets under similar 
weather conditions and therefore are not necessarily representative of bombing performance 
pre-PFF across all targets under all weather conditions. 
54
 Ibid. There was insufficient data on the remaining 14 skymarking raids to assess accuracy 
of the marking. 
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the Main Force some 300% better than would have been expected against 
those targets in similar conditions55. 
 
The ORSBC memorandum is further evidence of the intrinsic relationship 
between the accuracy of target marking and the blind bombing/navigation aid 
employed for the purpose of locating the target.  On no occasion during this 
period was the A/P not unambiguously marked when Oboe was used for 
ground-marking or sky-marking. This was due to the combination of the 
technical characteristics of Oboe and the distinctiveness of the T.I.  Oboe was 
a very accurate blind bombing device that had no significant systematic errors 
and only minor random errors. The use of Oboe ensured that the primary 
markers were dropped close to the A/P, with relatively little scatter of T.I.s 
away from the A/P. The resultant concentration of T.I.s around the A/P 
simplified the task of the Backers-up in terms of estimating the M.P.I. of the 
primary markers which in turn resulted in a good concentration of secondary 
markers around the A/P. The result was distinctive grouping of markers 
around the A/P that was easily visible to the Main Force crews.  
 
As expected, H2S had not achieved the same accuracy in the placement of 
the primary markers as Oboe. In fact, the results achieved had been 
consistent with the findings of the Bomber Development Unit (BDU) in training 
flights that the bombing errors using H2S tended to increase with the size of 
                                                 
55
 Ibid. On one of those raids, against the difficult target of Essen on the night of 9
th
/10
th
 
January 1943, 53% of markers were plotted within 3 miles of the A/P, compared with an 
expectation of 20% against this target in similar weather conditions.  
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the target attacked56. ORSBC established that the average probable error57 of 
1.5 miles of target markers dropped blind using H2S during Phase II 
corresponded almost exactly to the average size of all towns attacked 
(excluding Berlin) during this period. When Berlin was included, with its larger 
area, the average probable error increased to 2.0 miles. ORSBC found that 
there was no systematic error in relation to either range or track, such that the 
bomb distribution was essentially circular. The average probable error 
therefore resulted in markers being dropped not only close to the A/P but also 
at the edge of the target area and outside of it. The averaging technique 
initially employed had not been successful in providing an unambiguous 
marking of the A/P and, with relatively few primary markers scattered across 
the target area, some markers were more prominent than others. This lack of 
compactness in the pattern of markers not only made visual centring more 
difficult for the Backers-up, but also produced a tendency for any single T.I. to 
attract attention irrespective of its accuracy. As a result, H2S was more prone 
to the Principle of Cumulative Dispersion than was Oboe, and the disparity in 
terms of accuracy was exacerbated. 
 
The performance of H2S during this Phase II must be considered in the light 
of the fact that this equipment had only recently been introduced and that the 
number of Y-aircraft58 available for marking during this period was relatively 
low, averaging 13 per raid but never exceeding 16 and on occasions as low 
                                                 
56
 TNA AIR14/4597 ORSBC Report S.99 ‘The Operational Use of H2S, January to May 1943’, 
25
 
August 1943. 
57
 The Average Probable Error was the average radial distance of all variates, therefore 
including gross errors, measured either in relation to the Aiming Point or the Mean Point of 
Impact. 
58
 A ‘Y-aircraft’ was any aircraft fitted with H2S. 
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as 659. The version of H2S in use throughout Phase II, the Mk1, operated on 
the S-band wavelength with a beam width in azimuth of 6 degrees, this being 
the widest of any version of H2S used operationally. The Mk I represented the 
most basic version of H2S to be used operationally and suffered from the 
disadvantages of sharing in the pitch and roll of the aircraft (due to the rigid 
mounting of the scanner), the discrepancy between the actual range and the 
slant range of the target (due to the absence of scan correction), and the 
proliferation of ground returns, gaps and fades at steep angles of look (due to 
the properties of the truncated parabaloid scanner).  Because of these 
shortcomings, in addition to the inherent drawbacks of distortion due to partial 
ground return from objects on the ground and ‘shadow’ associated with the 
H2S system, the Mk1 version required considerable skill on the part of the 
operator to interpret the vague images presented on the Plan Position 
Indicator60. The Mk1 H2S was also unreliable and during the Phase II period 
only 55% of H2S sets were serviceable on arrival in the target area61, thereby 
further reducing the already limited number of Y-aircraft available for marking 
the target to an average of 7 per raid. This shortage of Y-aircraft was 
exacerbated by the fact that the two squadrons partially equipped with H2S 
operated the Handley Page Halifax and the Short Stirling aircraft respectively, 
with which it was not possible to achieve a high degree of accuracy in timing 
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 TNA AIR14/4597 ORSBC Report S.99 ‘The Operational use of H2S. January to May1943’, 
25
 
August 1943. 
60
 See Chapter 2 for a detailed technical description of the problems of roll stabilisation, slant 
range and distortion due to partial ground returns and shadow. 
61
 TNA AIR14/4597 ORSBC Report S.99 ‘The Operational use of H2S. January to May1943’, 
25
 
August 1943. 
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due to their inflexibility of airspeed at operational altitudes62. 
 
The conclusion reached by ORSBC was that H2S in its then current form (the 
Mk1) was not sufficiently accurate to permit the Backers-up and the Main 
Force from being instructed to aim at primary markers dropped by individual 
Y-aircraft63. It was therefore apparent that if H2S was to have a role in target 
marking a different role had to be found for it and this led ORSBC to make a 
number of recommendations on the use of H2S. The most significant 
recommendation arose from the observation that ground-marking had been 
more successful when the A/P was identified visually with the aid of flares 
dropped by Y-aircraft. Towards the end of Phase II, experiments had been 
made with the use of flares in the initial stage of the attack64. Instead of 
dropping primary markers blind using H2S, Y-aircraft had dropped flares over 
the target area and specially selected PFF crews (known as Visual Markers) 
had marked the A/P visually with T.I.s. The use of flares to illuminate the 
target area resulted in a significant increase in the percentage of bombs within 
3 miles of the A/P, with an average of 44% over the six raids where flares 
were used compared with an average of just 11% with the averaging 
technique. ORSBC therefore recommended that whenever weather conditions 
permitted the A/P to be identified visually, H2S should be used to illuminate 
the target area with flares. This became known as the Newhaven technique, 
                                                 
62
 Ibid. These squadrons were No 7 Squadron, equipped with the Short Stirling Mk I, and No 
35 Squadron, equipped with the Handley Page Halifax Mk II. The Stirling Mk I was equipped 
with ‘Exactor’ throttle controls which was particularly poor in this respect 
63
 TNA AIR14/3025 ORSBC Report B.151 ‘Review of H2S Groundmarking raids on Germany: 
February – April 1943’, 1 July 1943. 
64
 Ibid. 
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and would remain a standard technique used by the PFF throughout the 
bombing offensive.  
 
The use of flares as part of the Newhaven technique was of course 
dependent upon the ground detail being visible which, in northern Europe, is a 
comparative rarity. In order that targets beyond Oboe range could continue to 
be attacked with a reasonable degree of accuracy, it was necessary to 
develop ways in which H2S could be used effectively in conditions of poor 
visibility. ORSBC therefore also made a series of recommendations relating to 
the use of H2S when ground detail was not visible65.  The first of these was in 
response to an analysis of PFF crew reports, which revealed that on average 
only 27% of primary markers had been released ‘blind’ using H2S and that the 
remaining  63% had been aimed visually or by H2S with a visual check. 
ORSBC concluded that this had compromised the averaging technique, and 
emphasised that Y-aircraft should only drop primary markers blind using H2S.   
ORSBC had discovered a tendency for Backers-up to place their markers on 
the first primary markers encountered, with the result that marking was usually 
short of the A/P. To counter this, ORSBC recommended that an A/P was 
chosen at the far side of the target in relation to the direction of attack, and 
that Backers-up overshot the M.P.I. of the primary/secondary markers in order 
to counter any backward drift of the bombing and to avoid the Main Force 
being distracted by the first T.I. encountered.  
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Notwithstanding the difficulties with H2S and the five occasions where the 
Systematic Error resulted in the entire raid being ‘diverted’, the average 
percentage of bombs within 3 miles of the A/P increased to 36% during this 
Phase II period66. However, this improvement in efficiency only restored the 
efficiency of the Main Force to the level achieved immediately prior to the 
introduction of the PFF. The challenge facing Bomber Command was 
therefore to improve the target marking techniques based on Oboe and, in 
particular H2S, with a view to maximising the potential of those devices and 
overcoming the defects with those devices.  The end of Phase II was followed 
by the first of the ‘bomber battles’ of 1943, the ‘Battle of the Ruhr’. As Bomber 
Command embarked upon the Battle of Ruhr, the PFF had  standardised on 
three basic target marking techniques, known as ‘Newhaven’, ‘Parramatta’ 
and ‘Wanganui’67. Although there were numerous variations and subtleties, all 
PFF target marking techniques fell into one of these basic categories68. All of 
these codenames were prefixed by the term ‘Musical’ when Oboe was used 
for the initial marking and, later, by the term ‘Controlled’ when a Master 
Bomber was employed69.  
 
                                                 
66
 Harris, Despatch on War Operations, Part 5, Page 55, Table 10 
67
 Bennett Pathfinder, p.p. 153 and 154. The code names of Newhaven, Parramatta and 
Wanganui were chosen by Donald Bennett himself. Newhaven was the home town of 
Corporal Ralph, a W.A.A.F. clerk serving at Pathfinder Force HQ and Wanganui, in New 
Zealand, was the home town of (then) Squadron Leader Ashworth, a staff officer at Pathfinder 
Force HQ. Parramatta is a town near Sydney in western Australia and was chosen by Bennett 
in order to “keep the balance” but is not, as sometimes stated, his home town (Bennett came 
from Toowomba, near Brisbane). 
68
 TNA AIR14/2058 ‘The Path Finder Force – Its Duty and Aims’, undated.  This document is 
an Instruction Manual for Pathfinders crews which details all aspects of PFF operations, 
including target marking techniques; specialist Pathfinder roles; the role in individual crew 
members; and aircraft performance and operation. The descriptions of the target marking 
techniques given here are taken from this document. 
69
 Thus, for example, a ‘Controlled Musical Parramatta’ attack would a blind groundmarking 
raid in which Oboe was used to place the initial Target Indicators, with subsequent ‘backing-
up’ and Main Force bombing being corrected by a Master Bomber. 
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Newhaven was visual groundmarking. By definition, Newhaven was only 
employed when ground details was visible from the operational height. In a 
standard Newhaven attack, ‘Blind Illuminators’ first illuminated the target area 
with flares dropped ‘blind’ with the aid of H2S (on some occasions, Blind 
Markers would also drop T.I.s to indicate the target area, in which case they 
were known as ‘Blind Marker-Illuminators’) In a Visual Newhaven attack, 
‘Illuminators’ dropped flares visually with the aid of flares dropped in parallel 
lines over the target area, the latter being dropped ‘blind’ either by ‘Finders’ 
using H2S or by ‘Finders (D.R.)’ on E.T.A. over the target area as calculated 
using ‘dead reckoning’ navigation. In Musical Newhaven, there was no 
illumination of the target by flares and instead ‘Blind Markers’ dropped red 
T.I.’s in the target area ‘blind’ using Oboe. With the target area thus 
illuminated or marked, the A/P was then marked visually by Visual Markers 
(sometimes referred to as Primary Markers and, later, as Primary Visual 
Markers) with ‘primary markers’. Tests and operational experience showed 
that red was the most distinctive colour from operational heights, and 
therefore the primary markers were usually ‘TI Red’. The best contrast colour 
was found to green and therefore the secondary markers were usually ‘TI 
Green’. In most raids of this period, the raid instructions to Backers-up and the 
Main Force was to aim for the red TIs if visible or the M.P.I. of the Green TIs if 
not70.  
 
Visual Markers were the most experienced and able Pathfinder crews, and 
usually included a highly specialist bomb aimer. The Visual Markers were 
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 TNA AIR14/4140 ORSBC Report No 99 ‘The Visibility and Recognition of Target 
Indicators’, 6 May 1944.  
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followed by Backers-up, spaced at regular intervals throughout the raid, which 
dropped ‘secondary markers’ (aimed visually) of a contrasting colour over the 
primary markers if visible or, if not, the M.P.I. of secondary markers dropped 
by other Backers-up . In all cases, the Main Force was instructed to bomb the 
primary markers if visible or the M.P.I. of the secondary markers if not. 
 
Parramatta was blind groundmarking71. Parramatta was used when the 
ground was visible but ground detail was obscured by thin cloud or haze in 
the target area. In a Parramatta attack, there was no illumination of the target 
area and ‘Blind Markers’ opened the attack by dropping primary markers 
using Oboe or H2S. Backers-up, again spaced at regular intervals of about 2 
minutes throughout the raid, dropped secondary markers (aimed visually) of a 
contrasting colour over the primary markers if visible or, if not, the M.P.I. of 
other secondary markers dropped by other Backers-up. The Main Force was 
instructed to bomb the primary markers if visible or the M.P.I. of the 
secondary markers if not. 
 
Wanganui was sky-marking, and was employed when the ground was 
completely obscured by cloud. In a Wanganui attack, ‘Blind Markers’ dropped 
flares (known as Sky-markers or Point Release Flares) using Oboe or H2S, 
and were spaced throughout the duration of the attack to ensure that a 
continuous presence of Point Release Flares was maintained. The Main 
Force was instructed to aim at the Point Release Flares on a designated 
                                                 
71
 In some sources, Parramatta is erroneously spelt as “Paramatta”, but it is the same 
technique. 
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heading and at a designated speed and altitude, with wind speed set to zero 
on the bombsight.  
 
The Battle of the Ruhr covered the period between the 5/6 March 1943 to the 
30/31 July 1943, during which 43 major raids were mounted72. Two thirds of 
these raids were against towns in the Ruhr with, for tactical reasons, the 
remainder widely spread against targets in Germany and Italy. Middlebrook 
and Everitt suggest that Harris embarked upon the Battle of the Ruhr partly 
because any target in that area could be reached in the relatively short 
summer nights but also because the Ruhr was within the range of Oboe73. 
The majority of raids against the Ruhr towns would be carried out using 
Musical Parramatta and/or Musical Wanganui. The latter resulted in an 
average of 26% of bombs falling within 3 miles of the A/P with, on one 
occasion, 44% of bombs falling within 3 miles of the A/P74.  ORSBC 
calculated that the use of the Musical Wanganui technique had achieved 
results with 10/10ths cloud cover equivalent to those achieved previously 
under favourable conditions. Part of the reasons for this, it was concluded, 
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 Middlebrook and Everitt The Bomber Command War Diaries, p363. However, there is some 
dispute about the end date of the Battle of the Ruhr.. The AHB Narrative takes  the raid on 
Remscheid on the night of 30
th
/31
st
 July 1943 as being the end of the Battle of the Ruhr, not 
least because this was the last major attack on the Ruhr and also includes a heavy Oboe 
groundmarking raid on Essen a few nights previously. This is the same date adopted by 
Middlebrook and Everit. Other commentators, including Alan Cooper, also take this raid as 
marking the end of Battle of the Ruhr. However, Webster and Frankland consider that the raid 
on Aachen on the 13/14
th
 July 1943 marks the end of the Battle of the Ruhr on the basis that, 
although Aachen itself is not in the Ruhr Valley, this was the last major attack before the 
series of raids on Hamburg In his Despatch on War Operations, Harris includes the Essen 
and Remscheid raids in his summary of the Battle of the Ruhr. 
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 Ibid 
74
 TNA AIR14/1574 ORSBC Report S.102 ‘The Operational Use of Oboe Mk1A: December 
1942 to June 1943’, 31
 
August 1943. The most successful skymarking raid of this period was 
that against Oberhausen on the night of 14/15
 
June 1943 which, according the photographic 
evidence at the time, was assessed as causing ‘very severe damage’. The entry on this raid 
in Middlebrook and Everitt The Bomber Command War Diaries. p398 refers to report from 
Oberhausen, in which it was confirmed that markers were place directly over the centre of the 
town.   
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was that the automatic dropping of the point release flares using Oboe was 
initially very accurate and that the system allowed for the drift of the markers 
to factored into the release co-ordinates, thereby ensuring that the Point 
Release Flares would be over the A/P at the optimum time. The drawback 
was that the optimum period of time for an aircraft to ‘run-up’ on a Point 
Release Flare was 1½ minutes and that a two-Channel Oboe system only 
allowed the release of one Point Release Flare approximately every five 
minutes. There was no opportunity for ‘backing-up’ with sky-marking, and 
therefore any gap in the Oboe sky-marking due to equipment failure would 
result in the Point Release Flares either burning out or being out of position. 
Nonetheless, the results obtained with Musical Wanganui were a considerable 
improvement over previous results and, importantly, enabled the offensive to 
be usefully continued in weather conditions that would previously resulted in 
no operations being possible or only very limited results being achieved.   
 
However, the major improvement in bombing performance was achieved with 
Musical Parramatta which, against Ruhr targets, resulted in an average of 
54% of bombs falling within 3 miles of the A/P75. This was a function of the 
accuracy of the primary markers dropped using Oboe and the continuity of the 
primary marking. ORSBC estimated that the accuracy of the primary markers 
dropped by Oboe during this period ranged from about ¼ of a mile to 1 mile76. 
The highest degree of accuracy achieved during this period was 80% of 
bombs within 3 miles of the A/P and on no occasion did the percentage of 
bombs within 3 miles of the A/P fall below 25%, even in moderate weather 
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Ibid. 
76
 Accuracy in dropping of T.I.s could never match that of bombs due to the fact that TIs burst 
above ground level and therefore did not follow the ballistic properties of a standard bomb.  
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conditions. This represented a significant improvement compared with the 
equivalent figure of 23% for PFF led operations against the same targets prior 
to the use of Oboe particularly since the Ruhr, with a lack of distinctive ground 
features and an omnipresent industrial haze, has previously proved to be an 
elusive target.  The average figures quoted also concealed the fact that a 
significant proportion of the bombs falling were concentrated within an area 
much closer to the A/P than the 3 miles used as the standard measure, and 
ORSBC estimated that the Probable Radial Error was in the region of ½ mile 
with a Systematic Error of one mile from the A/P. The resultant concentration 
of bombing, 90% of which was within 1 mile of the A/P, caused substantial 
damage to the Ruhr towns: for example, in what Middlebrook and Everitt 
describe as ‘the outstanding success of the Battle of the Ruhr’, approximately 
1,000 acres of Wuppertal, equating to some 80% of the built up area of the 
town, were destroyed during a raid on the night of 29/30 May 194377. The 
bomb distribution plot for this raid is shown in Fig 19/ below, and 
demonstrates the concentration possible with Musical Parramatta 
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 TNA AIR14/3410 ORSBC Final Raid Report No 340: Wuppertal, 29/30 May 1943, 12 
August 1943. In addition to the usual difficulties associated with attacks on the Ruhr, the town 
of Wuppertal was spread along a narrow valley and therefore presented a particularly difficult 
target.  
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Fig 19/ Bomb distribution plot for the raid on Barmen-Wuppertal, 29/30 May 1943. Source: 
TNA AIR14/3062 ORSBC Report S.148 ‘The development in time of 17 raids on German 
towns in 1943’, 23 October 1943. 
 
ORSBC concluded that “the great success achieved by Oboe ground-marking 
raids as compared with other methods is directly attributable to the certainty 
with which primary T.I. markers can be placed within a fraction of a mile of the 
A/P, enabling the remaining aircraft to be categorically instructed to aim at a 
single salvo of T.I.s rather than at the M.P.I. of several”78. ORSBC further 
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 TNA AIR14/1574 ORSBC Report S.102 ‘The Operational Use of Oboe Mk1A: December 
1942 to June 1943’, 31
 
August 1943. 
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concluded that the disadvantage of Musical Parramatta at that time was that 
not all of the marking is carried out by Oboe aircraft, and that the accuracy 
with which secondary marking could be laid was considerably less than that 
achieved with Oboe aircraft. It was this lesser accuracy in secondary marking 
that had resulted in some scatter in the bomb distribution beyond the 3 mile 
zone. Although not expressed as such by ORSBC, this was a consequence of 
the Principle of Cumulative Dispersion resulting from human error in the visual 
aiming of the secondary markers and errors in the estimation by the Main 
Force of the M.P.I. of the less accurate secondary markers.  
 
In this context, ORSBC observed that accuracy increased steadily throughout 
the period under review, with the last two raids in the series resulting in 78% 
and 80% of bombs within 3 miles of the A/P respectively79. ORSBC concluded 
that this was largely due to improvements in the timing of the Oboe marking 
aircraft which, because a continuity of primary markers was maintained 
throughout the duration of the raid, enabled the Main Force to aim for the 
fixed position of the primary markers dropped using Oboe rather than having 
to estimate the M.P.I. of the secondary markers. Errors resulting from the 
Principle of Cumulative Dispersion were therefore avoided, resulting in greater 
accuracy and concentration close to the A/P. In the earlier raids in the series, 
the timing of the Oboe marking aircraft had been less accurate and there had 
significant gaps between successive aircraft using the same Channel, such 
that the Main Force had been obliged to estimate the M.P.I. of the secondary 
markers dropped by the Backers-up. The resultant bombing was prone to the 
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Principle of Cumulative Dispersion and consequently less accurate. ORSBC 
therefore concluded that achieving the optimum bombing accuracy with Oboe 
was dependent upon maintaining a continuity of primary markers and 
therefore emphasised the importance of increasing the number of Channels 
available.  
 
By the time that the ORSBC conclusion was published, the point had already 
been emphatically demonstrated in practice.  On the night of the 30/31 July 
1943, a total of only 275 aircraft attacked Remscheid, a previously unbombed 
town on the southern edge of the Ruhr80. A third Oboe Channel had just been 
introduced81 and Remscheid was the first occasion on which continuous 
primary marking had been maintained throughout the entire raid82. The 
primary marking was exceptionally accurate and, although only 871 tons of 
bombs were dropped, the British Bombing Survey estimated that 83% of the 
town was devastated.   
 
The importance of providing a single point of aim was evident and eventually 
lead to the development of variations of Musical Parramatta known as 
‘Preliminary Oboe Marking’ and ‘Continuous Oboe Marking’83. In the former, 
not less than 4 Mosquito aircraft would each drop T.I.s to provide an indication 
of the A/P, to serve either as the sole target marking or as a basis for full PFF 
marking. Continuous Oboe Marking involved the continuous dropping of T.I.s 
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 TNA AIR14/3410 ORSBC Final Raid Report No 389: Remsheid, 30/31 July 1943, 26 
September 1943 and Middlebrook and Everitt The Bomber Command War Diaries, p415.  
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 Cumming Beam Bombers, p110. 
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 TNA AIR14/1990 Memorandum Bomber Command HQ to Nos. 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8 and 100 
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over a period of approximately 8 minutes, in which these T.I.s would be the 
only markers dropped. These two techniques would later form an important 
component of the target marking repertoire against precision targets post D-
Day. It is also significant that Continuous Oboe Marking was the only ground-
marking technique in the bombing offensive to dispense with secondary 
marking and therefore in which the placing of the primary markers was fully 
automated. It was therefore the only ground-marking technique in which the 
estimation of the M.P.I. of the marking was not required, and which therefore 
removed the human error factor and avoided the effects of the Principle of 
Cumulative Dispersion.     
 
Towards the end of the Battle of the Ruhr, Bomber Command launched the 
first in a series of four major raids against Hamburg84. These raids, given the 
codename ‘OPERATION GOMORRAH’ at the time, would later become 
known as the Battle of Hamburg85. Hamburg was beyond Oboe range and 
therefore the PFF marking would be based on H2S. The Battle of Hamburg 
represents a microcosm of the fortunes of target marking techniques based 
on H2S and for that reasons the first three raids are set out in detail here86. 
 
                                                 
84
 These raids took place on the 24/25July; 27/28 July; 29/30
 
July; and 2/3 August 1943. 
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 OPERATION GOMORRAH was in part designed to take advantage of ‘Window’, strips of 
paper backed with metal foil dropped in bundles by the aircraft, which then dispersed in the 
airflow. Each strip produced an echo on the German radar screens equivalent to a heavy 
bomber, such that the German radar were swamped with false echoes and the defence 
system undermined.  For a detailed description of the Battle of Hamburg, see Lowe Inferno: 
The fiery destruction of Hamburg 1943 or Martin Middlebrook The Battle of Hamburg: the 
Firestorm Raid (London: Penguin Books, 1984:first published, 1980). Re-published by Pen & 
Sword Aviation in 2012 under the title Firestorm Hamburg: the facts surrounding the 
destruction of a German city 1943.  
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 The fourth raid was planned as a Wanganui attack due to the extensive cloud cover 
predicted, but in the event the bomber force encountered severe thunderstorms and less than 
half of the bomber force reached Hamburg. The bombing was widely scattered. 
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The location of Hamburg on the River Elbe, with an extensive area of docks 
on the south bank, provided a distinctive return on the P.P.I. of the H2S sets. 
In addition, there was a large lake in the centre of the city - the Alster lake87  - 
and, just to the north, a large area of open space known as the Stadtpark. 
Compared with the surrounding built-up districts, these areas of water and 
open space contained relatively few ‘corner reflectors’ and therefore provided 
distinctive dark patches on the P.P.I. that showed up well against the brighter 
built-up areas. The raid planners took advantage of this by designating the 
A/P at the southern end of the Alster lake for the first three raids, and between 
the northern end of Alster lake and the Stadtpark for the fourth raid.       
 
The weather for the first raid in the sequence was exceptionally clear and the 
PFF attempted a classic Newhaven attack88. Backers-up accompanied each 
wave of the Main Force and for the first time were to act as ‘Re-centerers’, 
specifically tasked with re-marking the A/P in an attempt to control 
‘creepback’. In the event, notwithstanding the clear conditions, the PFF 
marked five widely spaced areas at distances of between one and three miles 
from the A/P. A proportion of the Main Force bombed each of these disparate 
areas, with the majority (some 75%) bombing an area to the north-west of the 
A/P along the line of approach. However, a shown in Fig 20 below, because 
of the extent of the creepback (over 6 miles in length), only 45% of bombs fell 
within 3 miles of the A/P.  
 
                                                 
87
 There were in fact two lakes in the centre of Hamburg, both formed by the damming of the 
River Alster where is joined with the River Elbe.  The smaller of the two lakes – the Binnen 
Alster – was completely covered by camouflage during the war. 
88
 TNA AIR14/3410 ORSBC Final Raid Report No 383: Hamburg, 24/25 July 1943, 6 October 
1943. 
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Fig 20/ Bomb distribution plot for the raid on Hamburg, 24/25 July 1943. Note how the 
‘creepback’ extends back in the reciprocal direction to the line of approach and extends well 
beyond the built up area. The bomb distribution was this Newhaven raid may be compared 
that for the Musical Parramatta raid on Barmen-Wuppertal shown in Fig 22/. Source: TNA 
AIR14/3062 ORSBC Report S.148 ‘The development in time of 17 raids on German towns in 
1943’, 23 October 1943. 
 
For the second raid in the series, PFF marking was by the Parramatta 
technique89. On this occasion, the markers were well concentrated but were 
short of the A/P by between 1½ and 2½ miles (see Fig 21/ below). Because of 
the concentration of the initial marking, the Main Force bombing was also 
                                                 
89
 TNA AIR14/3410 ORSBC Final Raid Report No 386: Hamburg, 27/28 July 1943, 11 
October 1943. 
 281 
 
initially concentrated although the creepback developed later, such that again 
less than 50% of bombs fell within 3 miles of the A/P. Nonetheless, the initial 
concentration of bombing was one of the factors that contributed to the 
firestorm that developed in the eastern suburbs of Hamburg90. 
 
 
 
Fig 21/ Bomb distribution plot for the raid on Hamburg, 27/28 July 1943. Note that the 
bombing is more concentrated than that shown in Fig 23/ but is displaced from the A/P (i.e. 
there is a systematic error) Note also that ‘creepback’ has developed parallel with the 
direction of the line of approach. Source: TNA AIR14/3062 ORSBC Report S.148, The 
development in time of 17 raids on German towns in 1943, dated 23 October 1943. 
 
                                                 
90
 Other factors included a higher than usual percentage of incendiaries carried by the Main 
Force on that night, the warm weather over Germany in the weeks leading up the raid and the 
densely built up parts of the city on which the main bombing fell. 
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The third raid in OPERATION GOMORRAH was also a Parramatta attack91. 
The first primary markers were accurately placed close to the A/P but, 
although the range error was minimal, due to a strong crosswind subsequent 
marking was significantly to the east of the A/P, resulting in a line error of 
some 3 miles. The Main Force bombing was again well concentrated but short 
of main primary marking, resulting in a systematic error of over 3 miles to the 
north-east of the A/P. The majority of bombs nonetheless fell on residential 
districts of Hamburg, resulting in further substantial damage.    
 
In the first raid in the series, the initial dropping of markers and flares using 
H2S in the initial phase of the Newhaven technique resulted in the primary 
marking being divided into a number of separate groups. This included some 
accurate marking and bombing of the A/P in the early stages of the raid. 
However, post raid analysis showed that three PFF Visual Markers and some 
aircraft of the early waves of the Main Force returned photographs three miles 
east of the A/P and other aircraft in the first wave bombed some two-miles 
north-west of the A/P. The Backers-up were briefly able to re-center the raid 
due to an exceptionally well-placed group of T.I.s just 300 yards beyond the 
A/P but, as the raid progressed, secondary marking and bombing tended to 
drift back along the line of approach. ORSBC traced the resultant lack of 
concentration on the early scattered marking, which made it difficult for the 
Backers-up to identify the M.P.I. of the various groups of markers. The 
tendency was for the Backers-up to aim at the first markers encountered, 
hence initiating a creepback in the bombing that was accelerated by the Main 
                                                 
91
 TNA AIR14/3410 ORSBC Final Raid Report No 388: Hamburg, 29/30 July 1943, 12 
October 1943. 
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Force. This was a classic example of the Principle of Cumulative Dispersion in 
operation with the use of H2S for the initial target marking. 
 
In both Parramatta raids the M.P.I. of the marking was significantly displaced 
from the A/P. On the third raid of the series, this was due largely to the 
crosswind which resulted in a significant line error. Nonetheless, the fact 
remains that these errors occurred in relation to a target that, in theory at 
least, should have provided a number of distinctive features on the P.P.I. and 
yet this was not sufficient to enable the H2S operators to either accurately 
identify the A/P or compensate for crosswind. The result was that the 
Probable Radial Error92 for these raids was 2.6 miles which corresponded 
almost exactly with the mean radius of the city (2.5 miles)93. Expressed 
another way, less than half of bombs dropped were within 3 miles of the A/P 
and it was only the relatively large radius of Hamburg that meant that a large 
number the of bombs dropped were within the built up area of the city.  
 
OPERATION GOMMORRAH, and particularly the ‘firestorm’ raid of the 27/28 
July, are usually cited as examples of the destructive power of Bomber 
Command had obtained by 1943 and there is no doubt that the resultant 
damage to parts of Hamburg was substantial. However, it is instructive to note 
that this damage was still the result of only half the total bomb tonnage 
                                                 
92
 The Probable radial Error was the radius of a circle about the Aiming Point or the Mean 
Point of Impact within which 50% of the plotted bomb distribution are located. This was 
sometimes referred to as the “50% Zone” or the “50% circle”. 
93
 TNA AIR14/3025 ORSBC Report S.111 ‘Accuracy of H2S as a blind-bombing device’, 16
 
December 1943. The title of this report is somewhat of a misnomer because H2S was not 
used for blind bombing during this period and, as explained in the introduction to the report, 
the results discussed relate to the bombing performance of the Main Force on raids for which 
the target marking technique used was based on H2S.   
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dropped, the remaining half being wasted effort. This point is largely 
overlooked in secondary literature about the raids on OPERATION 
GOMMORRAH. This also makes for an interesting comparison with the 
devastation of 83% of the much smaller town of Remscheid (which occurred 
between the 3rd and 4th raids in the series) resulting from the use of Oboe to 
provide the primary marking, which serves to illustrate the extent to which the 
accuracy of the blind bombing device used to place the primary markers 
dictated the effectiveness of the raid by reducing the errors resulting from the 
Principle of Cumulative Dispersion.   
     
Following the Battle of Hamburg, Bomber Command faced a dilemma in 
terms of its target marking policy. With the longer winter nights approaching, 
Harris turned his attention to Berlin, which he had always considered to be the 
ultimate objective. However, Berlin was well beyond Oboe range and it was 
apparent that the version of H2S then in service (the Mk IIA) lacked sufficient 
definition to enable specific aiming points to be identified, particularly with a 
large urban area such as Berlin. For this reason, the Official History refers to 
the area beyond Oboe range as a ‘zone of relative inefficiency’ for Bomber 
Command94.  
 
The future policy to be adopted was discussed at a meeting on Radio and 
Navigation Policy held at Bomber Command HQ on 3 August 194395. It was 
generally agreed that whenever weather conditions were good enough to 
permit ground-marking, the Main Force should use H2S as a navigation aid 
                                                 
94
 Webster, and Frankland The Strategic Air Offensive, Vol II, p161. 
95
 TNA AIR14/1321 Minutes of meeting held at Bomber Command HQ on 3 August 1943 to 
discuss Radio and Navigation Policy.  
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but, having thereby ensured that they had identified the correct target, should 
aim at the ground-markers dropped by the PFF. However, when weather 
conditions did not permit ground-marking, those attending the meeting were 
generally split into two camps. The first, led by Sir Robert Renwick, Controller 
of Communication at the Air Ministry96, considered that H2S was primarily a 
blind bombing device and should be used as such by the Main Force. The 
other camp, led by Bennett, considered that H2S was primarily an aid to 
navigation and that the Main Force should navigate to the target area using 
H2S, but should then revert to PFF sky-marking for bombing. Bomber 
Command favoured urgent improvements to H2S and in particular pressed for 
the introduction of the 3cm Mk III version97, which offered much improved 
definition. The matter was settled in favour of Bomber Command when 
ORSBC indicated that, with the current version of H2S, it was unlikely that 
H2S was sufficiently accurate to distinguish aiming points in towns over 1½ 
miles radius which, of course, included Berlin. This conclusion illustrates that, 
at this key stage of the bombing offensive, H2S was not regarded as 
sufficiently accurate as a blind bombing device to dispense with even the least 
accurate of the target marking techniques. The target marking policy for the 
forthcoming Battle of Berlin was dictated by the relationship between the 
capability of the H2S navigation aid and the ability of the PFF to provide target 
marking for the Main Force within the limitations of that device.  
 
                                                 
96
 Sir Robert Renwick held the joint posts of Controller of Communications at the Air Ministry 
and Controller of Communications Equipment at the Ministry of Aircraft Production. 
97
 The Mk III was the 3 centimetre X-band version of H2S  with scan correction and roll 
stabilisation. 
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The period between the end the Battle of Hamburg and the beginning of the 
Battle of Berlin largely comprised raids beyond the range of Oboe and 
therefore within the ‘zone of relative inefficiency’. Consequently, H2S (MkIIA) 
was used for target marking in most of the raids in this period, including raids 
on seven major German towns. The results achieved in these raids showed a 
remarkable consistency in the relationship between the Probable Radial Error 
and the mean radius of the target town; with two exceptions, the Probable 
Radial Error was practically the same as the mean radius of the target (as 
shown in Table 8 below).  
 
Target  Probable 
Radial Error 
(Miles) 
Mean Radius 
(miles) 
Munster 1.2 1.1 
Hamburg 2.6 2.5 
Mannheim 1.3 2.0 
Nurnberg 1.8 1.9 
Munich 1.7 2.2 
Hannover 2.9 1.5 
Berlin 3.9 4.4 
 
Table 8/ Relationship between Probable Radial Error using H2S and mean radius of German 
towns. Source: TNA AIR14/3025 Operational Research Section Report S.111 ‘Accuracy of 
H2S as a blind-bombing device’, 16
 
December 1943. 
 
On the basis of these results, ORSBC concluded that when H2S was used by 
the PFF for target marking, the results achieved could not be expected to be 
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better than 50% of the bombs dropped falling within a circle the area of which 
is equal to the area of the town.  This was entirely consistent with the 
accuracy achieved by the bombing of Hamburg during OPERATION 
GOMORRAH and would apply equally to Berlin. In relation to the first 
exceptions to this rule, the Probable Radial Error for Mannheim was 
significantly less than the mean radius, which ORSBC concluded was due to 
this town being very compact and thereby resulting in a clear contrast 
between the built-up area and other ground returns on the P.P.I. In relation 
the Hannover, the opposite was the case with the Probable Radial Error being 
significantly greater than the mean radius due, ORSBC concluded, to 
Hannover being more spread out and consequently providing a weak contrast 
between the built-up area and other ground returns on the P.P.I.  The 
implication of these findings is that the Mk IIA version of H2S was only 
capable of achieving good levels of concentration against smaller targets, and 
certainly during this period H2S led attacks did result in significant damage to 
some of these smaller towns. 
 
It is instructive that the more successful raids using H2S in this period shared 
two common denominators: they were all Newhaven attacks in which the 
initial illumination by flares and the primary marking were exceptionally 
accurate. This enabled the Backers-up to keep the raid well centred and the 
Main Force to achieve a high degree of concentration. For example, in the 
Mannheim-Ludwigshafen attack on the 5/6 September 1943 some 74% of 
aircraft bombed within 3 miles of the A/P;  against the usually difficult H2S 
target of Hannover on the 8/9 October 1943 the figure was 79%; and against 
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Kassel on the 22/23 October 1943 the figure was 85%98.  In the latter raid, the 
concentration achieved resulted in a ‘firestorm’ developing. However, the 
bigger point is that Newhaven attacks required conditions of good visibility.  
These conditions rarely occurred, such that the ground detail was rarely 
sufficiently discernible for the Primary Visual markers to place the primary 
markers with the accuracy required to replicate the results achieved at 
Mannheim-Ludwigshafen, Hannover and Kassel. It follows that the majority of 
raids in the zone of relative inefficiency were conducted with blind ground-
marking or sky-marking, and these did not produce sufficient concentration to 
overcome the Principle of Cumulative Dispersion when H2S was employed in 
isolation.      
 
The corollary of these findings was that it became imperative that the 
resolution afforded by H2S was improved if the device was to provide 
effective target marking in the forthcoming Battle of Berlin. Berlin covered a 
large area, with a mean radius of 4.4 miles. In previous raids using H2S 
ground-marking, this had resulted in a Probable Radial Error of some 3.9 
miles99.  This level of accuracy tended to result in a large number of widely 
scattered fires which could be contained by the civil fire services and which 
therefore did not combine to form the larger conflagrations necessary to 
cause the widespread damage achieved during OPERATION GOMORRAH. 
However, within Berlin were two large areas of open space – the Tiegarten 
and Templehof aerodrome – which in theory should show up clearly on the 
                                                 
98
 Webster and  Frankland The Strategic Air Offensive, Vol II, page 135. 
99
 TNA AIR14/3025 ORSBC Report B.151 ‘Review of H2S Groundmarking raids on Germany: 
February – April 1943’, 1 July 1943. 
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H2S P.P.I. if resolution could be improved. There were also several large and 
distinctively shaped bodies of water close to the city – the Muggel See to the 
east, and the Havel See and Tegeler See to the west – which also should be 
easily distinguishable on P.P.I. given sufficient resolution.  
 
The introduction of a new version of H2S - the Mk III - was therefore 
potentially of vital importance to the forthcoming Battle of Berlin. The Mk IIII 
was the 3 centimetre X-band version of H2S with a beam width in azimuth of 
3 degrees, and therefore offered a significant improvement in resolution 
compared with the Mk IIA. The Mk III sets were first used operationally on the 
night of the 18/19 November 1943. However, this ‘significant improvement’ 
must be viewed in context because, although resolution was better than with 
H2S Mk IIA, as shown in Figure 25/ below the image on the P.P.I. still 
required skillful interpretation by the operator100. 
                                                 
100
    TNA AIR14/3062 ORSBC ‘Mk III H2S Intelligence Folder: Berlin’, June 1944. Intelligence 
Folders such as this were prepared for all major city targets and were used to provide 
navigators with an indication of how the target might appear on the P.P.I. of the H2S system. 
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Fig 25a Principal landmarks in and around Berlin. Note the distinct line of lakes to the west of 
Berlin (Tegel See; Havel; Wann-See and Templiner See), and the Gr. Muggel See to the 
south-east. Note also the large open space of Templehof aerodrome towards the centre of 
the city.  
 
 
 
Fig 25b Principal landmarks in and around Berlin. This P.P.I image was taken on the 
approach to Berlin from the west (the position of the aircraft is shown at the centre of the 
circle on the map to the right) and shows the distinct shapes of the Havel and the Wann-See. 
The Tegel See and the Templiner See are obscured by the ground returns. The image 
demonstrates the value of H2S as a navigation aid. 
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Fig 25c. Principal landmarks in and around Berlin. This P.P.I image was taken over Berlin 
itself (the position of the aircraft is again shown at the centre of the circle on the map to the 
right). Landmarks within the city itself are totally obscured by the ground returns, but the open 
space of Templehof aerodrome is clearly visible to the south-south-east of the aircraft’s 
position and the Tegel See can just be discerned to the north-west. This image highlights the 
difficulty of using H2S for blind bombing/marking.  
Source: TNA AIR14/3062 ORSBC ‘Mk III H2S Intelligence Folder: Berlin’, June 1944 
 
The other tactical ‘innovation’ for the Battle of Berlin was a target marking 
technique known as the ‘Berlin Method’. This was not in itself a new 
technique, having been used on occasions since the introduction of H2S, but 
became standard during the Battle of Berlin because of the difficulty in 
accurately forecasting the weather of this more distant target. The Berlin 
Method was a combination of the established Newhaven, Parramatta and 
Wanganui techniques in which marking was provided for one of the ground-
marking techniques and sky-marking at the same time. 
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In addition to the dual ground-marking and sky-marking, there were two 
elements that were a regular feature of the ‘Berlin Method’ at this time101. The 
first is ‘Special Blind Markers’, which were those PFF aircraft equipped with 
H2S Mk III and which dropped TI (Yellow) purely to indicate to the Backers-up 
that these were likely to be the most accurate of the primary markers. The 
other element is that blind marking continued throughout the raid, not just at 
the opening. This again was to reduce the extent of ‘creepback’ by providing 
the Backers-up with a constant supply of primary markers dropped blind by 
H2S, and therefore not influenced by the inevitable scatter of earlier 
secondary markers. These innovations were introduced in an attempt to 
overcome the inherent limitations of H2S where the target was a large urban 
area and to take advantage of the limited numbers of the higher resolution of 
the Mk III version that were available. 
 
The accuracy of H2S during the Battle of Berlin period was assessed by 
ORSBC in a report dated 13 August 1944102. The overall finding was that the 
Probable Radial Error for all H2S attacks was 2.0 miles and was therefore 
unchanged from that period covering OPERATION GOMORRAH and other 
raids beyond Oboe range. The significant difference, however, was that the 
mean radius of the towns attacked had fallen from 1.9 miles in the previous 
period to 1.5 miles, such that the percentage of bombs falling within 3 miles of 
the A/P fell from 50% to 34%. It may be noted that this period includes those 
Newhaven attacks in which the percentage of bombs within 3 miles of the A/P 
reached as high as 85%, which suggests some of the other raids achieved 
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 Martin Middlebrook The Berlin Raids, p115. 
102
 TNA AIR14/3026 ORSBC Report No S189 ‘H2S Blind Bombing Accuracy – Oct 1
st
 1943 – 
April 30
th
 1944’.  
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considerably less than the average of 34%. It may also be noted that there 
was no difference in performance between the Mk II and MK III versions of 
H2S in this respect103.  Although a large number of raids during this period 
would have been the carried out using the inherently less accurate sky-
marking technique, it must also be recognised that these results cover a 
period in which target marking techniques had been refined to address the 
limitations of H2S (including the ‘Berlin Method’), such that the results 
achieved were the optimum that could have been obtained with this device. It 
is therefore apparent that even the most advanced target marking techniques 
could not overcome the technical limitations of H2S and, notwithstanding the 
improved resolution offered by the Mk III, H2S was incapable of achieving an 
effective concentration expect in the most favourable circumstances.    
 
In his book Echoes of War, Lovell is quick to lay the blame for the poor 
performance of MKIII H2S on the PFF104.  According to Lovell, a visit to the 
PFF in March 1944 by one of his colleagues revealed that the relatively few 
MKIII sets then in service were being “scandalously treated in 8 Group” in 
that, instead of these sets being given preferential treatment with specially 
trained crews and priority marking as a special force, they were simply being 
put in as wastage rate aircraft and carried no more weight than ordinary S-
band equipment (i.e the MkIIA). However, the designation of those PFF 
aircraft equipped with H2S Mk III as Special Blind Markers as part of the 
Berlin Method indicates that Lovell is not correct in his assertion. Moreover, 
the results reported by ORSBC are separated between those aircraft using 
                                                 
103
 Ibid. ORSBC could offer no explanation for this, although it was suggested that this may 
have been the result of rushing the Mk III into service before it was fully tested. 
104
 Lovell, Echoes of War, p.p. 211 and 212. 
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the Mk IIA and MkIII equipments, and show that that there was no significant 
difference between the two. The assertion by Lovell is one example where his 
work Echoes of War is biased towards the achievements of H2S and is 
therefore not a totally reliable record of the performance actually achieved 
with H2S105.  
 
At the end of the period covered by this Chapter, ORSBC produced a wide-
ranging memorandum in which a number of recommendations were made for 
improving the efficiency of the PFF106. The initial observation was that the 
outstandingly successful attacks made by Bomber Command during this 
period were, almost without exception, achieved under conditions when visual 
identification and marking of the target had been possible. On that basis, 
ORSBC declared that the Newhaven technique was satisfactory and required 
no further modification. It was, however, concluded that the limited success of 
Blind Parramatta and Wanganui was directly attributable to the “difficulties 
inherent in the use of the present H2S apparatus” and that long-term policy 
should be to press continuously for the development of better equipment. In 
the interim, ORSBC considered that improvements could be made in the 
efficiency with which the (then) existing versions of H2S was used, and it was 
to this that the remainder of the memorandum was devoted. The 
recommendations made related to such matters as training, crew selection 
and the number of crews allocated to marking duties. The latter in particular 
                                                 
105
 Ibid. Lovell’s incomplete and inaccurate recording at page 215 of his book of a meeting 
concerning the future policy for the employment of H2S in April 1944,and his selective 
reference to the Brunswick and Ludwigshafen raids referred to in Chapter Two, are further 
examples.  
106
 TNA AIR14/3062 ORSBC Memorandum M64 ‘Recommendations for improving the 
efficiency of the P.F.F’, 25
 
August 1944. 
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raised significant questions about the size of the PFF required to mark more 
than one target per night, which would become an important consideration in 
the development of target marking techniques as Bomber Command turned to 
precision targets in the build-up to OPERATION OVERLORD.  
 
In an attempt to overcome the difficulties associated with Blind Parramatta, 
there was also a suggestion that when visibility was not good enough to 
permit visual identification of the A/P from 12,000 ft or above even heavily 
defended targets could be marked by low-flying Mosquitoes. This is an 
interesting suggestion in that, whilst to this point considerable effort had been 
devoted to exploiting ever-improving technology in order to improve efficiency, 
this appears to be an admission that under certain weather conditions the 
results required could not be attained using the latest technology then 
available. Consequently, pending the receipt of better equipment, the 
suggestion offered ORSBC attempts to circumvent the limitations of H2S by 
taking advantage of the human factor involved in visual marking at low levels 
in fast aircraft at night.  Although this suggestion was not taken up by PFF, it 
would later become integral to the target techniques evolved by No 5 Group 
(see Chapter Six). 
 
The key finding to emerge from the examination of target marking techniques 
in this Chapter is the direct relationship between the accuracy and 
concentration of bombing achieved and the characteristics of the navigation 
aid used. The comparative results achieved using the navigation aids 
available during this period, Oboe and H2S, has been obliquely referred to in 
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secondary literature and that sense, the general relationship is already known. 
However, even where the connection is made, the reasons behind this 
difference are not expressly stated or quantified. This reason relates to the 
Principle of Cumulative Dispersion.  In this respect, Oboe held a distinctive 
advantage over H2S in relation to target marking in that, in addition to being 
more accurate, it minimised the potential for human error (and, in the form of 
Continuous Oboe Marking, removed it altogether). By comparison, even with 
the most advanced target marking techniques, H2S was incapable of routinely 
achieving the accuracy and concentration of bombing possible with Oboe 
because it relied upon the estimation of the M.P.I., not only in terms of placing 
the primary and secondary markers, but also by the Main Force. As such, the 
target marking techniques that relied upon H2S were prone to human error 
and the inherent loss of accuracy and concentration due to the Principle of 
Cumulative Dispersion.  This important fact is largely overlooked in secondary 
literature when extolling the improvements in bombing performance resulting 
from H2S and, whilst this may not have been fundamental to the area 
bombing campaign, it would assume much more importance once precision 
targets assumed greater prominence as the bombing offensive progressed.   
    
The other finding is in some respects a surprising one, in that there was no 
formal framework for developing and refining the target marking techniques. 
This lack of a formal process for the development of target marking 
techniques may also to some extent explain why the Pathfinder Force did not 
initiate any significant advance on or deviation from the basic techniques that 
had become standard by early 1943. This failure to explore more fundamental 
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developments of the basic techniques is all the more surprising given that the 
Bennett was renowned for his technical expertise in all matters relating to 
aircraft and navigation. The Newhaven technique in particular proved to have 
significant potential for development but, in order to realise this potential, a 
means of overcoming the inherent obstacle to bombing accuracy and 
concentration resulting from the Principle of Cumulative Dispersion - that 
ground detail was rarely visible from standard operational altitudes - was 
necessary. This in turn required a significant departure from basic technique 
adopted up to that time and, whilst ORSBC had alluded to it in recommending 
improvements to the efficiency of the PFF, it is was left to No 5 Group to 
exploit this potential with their own target marking techniques. It is to the 
development of the target marking techniques developed by No 5 Group that 
the next Chapter is concerned.      
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CHAPTER SIX: NO 5 GROUP TARGET MARKING TECHNIQUES 
 
The previous chapter covered the principal target marking techniques 
employed by the Pathfinder Force. Between its inception in August 1942 and 
early 1944, the marking of targets was the sole province of the Pathfinder 
Force.  However, from January 1944, No 5 Group Bomber Command began 
to experiment with its own target marking techniques.  Although elements of 
the techniques employed by the Pathfinder Force were retained, the target 
marking techniques developed by No 5 Group involved a radical departure 
from those established techniques in two key respects - they were all 
predicated on marking by aircraft flying at low level and were controlled by a 
‘Master Bomber’.  The role of the Master Bomber would come to have wider 
application in the development of target marking techniques and for that 
reason is considered in more detail in the following Chapter. This Chapter 
concentrates upon the development and evolution of the principal target 
marking techniques employed by No 5 Group in which a point some distance 
from the A/P was marked rather than the A/P itself and which, for 
convenience, can be grouped under the generic term of ‘indirect marking’. 
This Chapter will offer a comparison of the results achieved by indirect 
marking with those achieved by the standard techniques employed by the 
Pathfinder Force, and will balance these results against the operational 
implications of indirect marking. It will also assess the contribution of indirect 
marking to the achievements of Bomber Command in the last year of the 
Second World War, including the infamous ‘firestorm’ raid on Dresden in 
February 1945. The evolution of its own target marking capability was a 
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source of considerable tension between the AOC of No 5 Group and the AOC 
of the Pathfinder Force, and the acrimonious exchanges between these two 
commanders was one of the most interesting aspects of Harris’ tenure as C-
in-C of Bomber Command. This Chapter will examine those exchanges in the 
context of Harris’ previous position in relation to the formation of the 
Pathfinder Force. 
 
The main techniques employed by the Pathfinder Force – Newhaven, 
Parramatta  and Wanganui – were all developed in the context of area raids 
on large towns and cities. Although the A/P was a precise point on the 
ground, in early 1944 an average of only 50% of bombs were falling within 3 
miles of the A/P and, whilst the resultant concentration was sufficient to cause 
considerable destruction in built-up areas, even with large towns a significant 
proportion of the bombs dropped uselessly in the countryside beyond the 
urban area1.  There were, however, a number of important small-scale targets 
outside of built-up areas, including a number of aircraft and aero-engine 
factories, which in accordance with the ‘Pointblank’ Directive of June 1943 
were to be given priority2. Not only were these small-scale targets, a number 
were in Occupied Territories where avoiding casualties in the civilian 
population was a political imperative. The accuracy possible with the marking 
techniques employed by the Pathfinder Force was not sufficient to ensure the 
                                                 
1
 The first two raids of ‘OPERATION GOMORRAH’, described in Chapter 5, were a good 
example of this, in which only 45% of bombs dropped fell within the built-up of area of 
Hamburg. 
2
 Webster and Frankland The Strategic Air Offensive, Vol IV, p158. The Pointblank Directive 
is reproduced in full in Appendix 23 of this work. This Directive, issued on 10 June 1943, 
requested Bomber Command to direct attacks to a number of objectives intended to reduce 
the strength of German day and night fighter forces including, inter alia, the “destruction of 
German air-frame, engine and component factories”.  
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destruction of such targets without excessive civilian casualties, and it was 
clear that different target marking techniques would be required against these 
‘precision’ targets3.  
 
That is not to say that the new techniques were devised by the deliberate 
application of known principles of target marking to the problem.  Rather, the 
origin of these techniques can be traced to experiments at unit level and, in 
particular, to one unit within No 5 Group. This unit was No 617 Squadron 
which, having suffered a series of costly failures following the Dams Raid, had 
struggled to find a meaningful role as a precision bombing squadron4.  In late 
1943 and early 1944, and by this time led by Group Captain Cheshire, No 617 
Squadron had been employed attacking V1 flying bomb sites in the Pas de 
Calais as part of OPERATION CROSSBOW, in which the targets were 
marked by Oboe mosquitoes of the PFF and bombing was from a high level 
using the Stabilised Automatic Bombsight (SABS)5 and single 12,000lb HC 
                                                 
3
 The term ‘precision’ is used here to differentiate this target set from the ‘area’ attacks on 
towns and cities upon which Bomber Command had largely concentrated until this time. In 
this context, the term ‘precision’ is a relative one and should not be equated to the pin-point 
accuracy achieved with modern day laser-guided weapons shown, for example, in television 
news reports on the Gulf Wars and the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. As will be shown in 
this Chapter, ‘precision’ in the current context was typically measured in hundreds of yards or, 
at best, tens of yards.   
4
 For details of the operations undertaken by No 617 Squadron following the Dams Raid, see 
W.J Lawrence No.5 Group RAF (London: Faber & Faber, 1951) and Alan W. Cooper Beyond 
the Dams to the Tirpitz (London and St Albans: Goodall Publications, 1991: first published 
London: William Kimber & Co, 1983). The operations undertaken by No 617 Squadron at this 
time are also covered in detail by Robert Owen, Considered policy or haphazard evolution? 
No.617 Squadron RAF 1943-1945, PhD thesis, University of Huddersfield, 2014. 
5
 Jonathan Falconer. Bomber Command Handbook 1939-1945 (Stroud: Sutton Publishing 
Limited, 1998), page 114.The Stabilised Automatic Bombsight (SABS) was a gyroscopically 
controlled tachometric bombsight capable of achieving greater accuracy that the MK XIV 
bombsight with which most of Bomber Command was equipped at this time. SABS was more 
complicated to operate and required a long straight and level approach, such that it was not 
suitable for Main Force operations. SABS was therefore issued to specialist precision 
bombing units, including No 617 Squadron, which used the Mk IIA, this version being 
specifically modified for precision bombing.  
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bombs6. As Robert Owen explains, the marking method employed derived 
from a technique originally devised by No 5 Group in conjunction with Bennett 
for the specific purpose of attacking the Rothensee Ship Lift on the 
Mittelleland Canal with the TALLBOY bomb and the attacks on the V1 flying 
bomb sites were an extended operational trial of this technique pending the 
availability of TALLBOY7. At the angle of cut in the Pas de Calais, the 
systematic error of TI’s dropped by Oboe was typically 300 yards but, using 
SABS, No. 617 Squadron was achieving an average Probable Radial Error of 
only 94 yards8. The Overall Systematic Error resulting from the combination of 
Oboe and SABS therefore resulted in the majority of the bombs completely 
missing the A/P, as exemplified by the attack on the V1 site at Flixecourt on 
the night of 16/17 December 1943, where the marking error was 350 yards 
but none of the 9 bombs dropped by No 617 Squadron were more than 100 
yards from the markers, and the target was missed entirely.  The combination 
of Oboe and SABS was not sufficiently accurate for consistently hitting those 
precision targets9. 
 
This led to the squadron devising its own marking technique in which Oboe 
was used to provide proximity markers but the A/P was illuminated by flares 
and then marked with a Red Spot Fire dropped from 8,000ft10.  The accuracy 
                                                 
6
 These HC (high capacity) blast bombs are not be confused with the later TALLBOY deep 
penetration bomb designed by Barnes Wallace of the same weight with which No 617 
Squadron are more usually associated, but which were MC (medium-capacity) bombs used 
for a different purpose. 
7
 Owen, Considered policy or haphazard evolution?. The TALLBOY (M = medium) was the 
12,000lb version deep penetration bomb designed by Barnes Wallace, whereas the 
TALLBOY (L-Large) later became known as the GRAND SLAM. 
8
 TNA AIR14/3411 ORSBC Final reports on operations, night raids, Nos.416-620 Vol. IV. 
9
. Ibid. 
10
 A Red Spot Fire was a 250lb bomb casing filled with cotton wool soaked in a solution of 
metallic perchlorate dissolved in alcohol. This device, officially designated T.I. Mk I Serial No 
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of that marker was then assessed by Cheshire and any corrections given to 
the squadron by VHF11. This new method was first used against the V1 site at 
Flixecourt on the night of 21/22 January 1944 with, in contrast with the earlier 
raid, considerable success12. As Robert Owen points out, some of this 
success must be attributed to the fact that the Red Spot Fire provided a single 
point of aim, which better suited the graticule of the SABS precision sight than 
the ground pattern covering some 100 yards produced by TIs13.  Nonetheless, 
it is reasonable to assume that the assessment of the primary marker and the 
use of VHF to broadcast corrections to the ‘main force’, both of which would 
become standard features of the techniques employed by No 5 Group, also 
played a part in demonstrating that target marking could be used against 
precision targets. 
 
In February 1944, No 617 Squadron was tasked with precision attacks on 
aircraft and aero-engine factories14.  These targets had originally been 
proposed by the Directorate of Bombing Operations prior to OPERATION 
CROSSBOW as a continuation of the campaign that had begun with the 
attacks on Montbeliard and Montlucon (see Chapter Seven) but, as Robert 
Owen explains, the target selection process was complex involving, amongst 
other things, the need to minimise civilian casualties being paramount15. The 
original marking technique using Oboe and SABS had been shown not be 
                                                                                                                                            
8 and not to be confused with the earlier Red Blob Fire, produced a single spot on the ground 
that lasted for between 15 and 20 minutes but without any great intensity. 
11
 No 617 Squadron aircraft had been fitted with VHF for the Dams Raid and was the sole unit 
equipped with VHF in Bomber Command at this time. 
12
 TNA AIR14/3411 ORSBC Final reports on operations, night raids, Nos.416-620 Vol. IV 
13
 Owen, Considered policy or haphazard evolution?. 
14
 TNA AIR20/8142 Cypher message Air Ministry to Bomber Command HQ ‘Industrial targets 
in occupied territories: selection for moonlight attack’, 8 February 1944. 
15
 Robert Owen, Considered policy or haphazard evolution? 
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sufficiently accurate but, with the results achieved using the refined marking 
technique and subject to clear stipulations, No 617 was given permission to 
attempt specified targets in this set16. The first of these attacks was on the 
Gnome & Rhone aero-engine factory at Limoges and introduced a further 
refinement to the technique employed by No 617 squadron. 
 
The attack took place on the night of 8/9 February 1944 in clear conditions 
and bright moonlight17. The initial marking, using 30lb incendiary bombs, was 
now carried out by Cheshire in a Lancaster from an altitude of 100ft. This 
initial marking was followed by two Red Spot Fires, dropped by the Deputy 
Leader from an altitude of 7,000ft.  These landed in the centre of the group of 
incendiaries, providing a clear point of aim for the bombing aircraft, which 
were then instructed to bomb by Cheshire. The first bomb scored a direct hit 
on the factory building, and in total ten of the eleven bombs dropped scored 
direct hits18.  The Final Raid Report confirms that the M.P.I. of the markers 
was in the middle of the factory and that the average bombing error around 
that point was 150 yards. The aero-engine factory was so severely damaged 
that production effectively ceased19.  
 
The attack on Limoges was important in terms of the development of tactics 
for low-level marking, and several lessons were learned from it. The first was 
that the aircraft used for the initial low-level marking needed to be more 
                                                 
16
 TNA AIR20/8142 Cypher message Air Ministry to Bomber Command HQ ‘Industrial targets 
in occupied territories: selection for moonlight attack’, 8 February 1944 
17
 TNA AIR14/3411 ORSBC Final Raid Report No 525: Limoges, 8/9 February 1944, 1 May 
1944. 
18
 These bombs were 12,000lb high-capacity blast bombs previously used against 
CROSSBOW targets. 
19
 Middlebrook and Everitt The Bomber Command War Diaries, p471. 
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manoeuvrable than the Lancaster in order to reduce the vulnerability of the 
marking aircraft20. The aircraft eventually selected was the de Havilland 
Mosquito, and No 617 Squadron was loaned two of these aircraft for this 
purpose21. The other key lesson was the importance of good communication 
between the Leader/Deputy Leader and the bombing force, effected by V.H.F. 
radio being installed in the squadron’s aircraft22. The importance of good 
communication would be reinforced on several occasions in this series of 
raids, notably in the attack on a factory at Bergerac when a new type of fuze 
resulted in the Spot Fires bursting in the air rather than on the ground, so that 
the markers had a different trail angle and consequently fell on the eastern 
edge of the target. Realising that the error caused could not be rectified by re-
marking the target, the Leader instructed the bombing force to approach the 
target from the east and aim at the misplaced markers with an intentional 
overshoot. The result was three out of the five 12,000lb HC bombs hit the 
target23. Similarly, in the attack on the aircraft factory Clermont-Ferrand, the 
Leader accidentally released his incendiaries short of the target24. The Deputy 
Leader placed his Spot Fires accurately and the Leader instructed the 
                                                 
20
 TNA AIR14/2062 Memo Headquarters No 54 Base to Headquarters No 5 Group 
‘Development of precision bombing by No 617 Squadron’, 16 March 1944. 
21
 RAFM, Aircraft Movement Cards. The two aircraft concerned (ML975 and ML976) were Mk 
BXVI bomber variants on loan from No 109 Squadron, PFF. This variant was equipped with 
two-stage supercharged Merlin engines and configured for high-altitude work, and not 
optimised for the low-level marking role. 
22
 It would be more accurate to say that this lesson was re-learned, in that the requirement for 
V.H.F. radio for control of other aircraft had become apparent when the squadron was training 
for the Dams Raid. 
23
 TNA AIR14/3411 ORSBC Final Raid Report No 556: Bergerac, 18/19 March 1944, 15 June 
1944 
24
 TNA AIR14/3411 ORSBC Final Raid Report No 554: Clermont-Ferrand, 16/17 March 1944, 
3 May 1944 
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bombing force to ignore the incendiaries and to bomb the Red Spot Fires, with 
all the larger bombs hitting the target25.  
 
The importance of controlling the bombing force was exacerbated by the 
nature of the weapon used, in this case the 12,000lb HC bomb, although the 
principle applies to any large bomb. The heavy bombers with which Bomber 
Command was equipped were only capable of carrying one such bomb and 
the size of the force employed was small, typically no more than 12 aircraft.  
Given the accuracy of the SABS, and that the bombing force would be unable 
to see ground detail at their bombing altitude, any misplacement of the 
markers inevitably resulted in the target being missed entirely.  The failure of 
the raid could only be averted by the employment of a ‘Marker Leader’ and 
the ability of that Leader (and/or Deputy) to observe the marking error and 
issue instructions to the bombing force to compensate for that error. It was 
this flexibility that was the advantage of the low-level technique employed by 
No 617 Squadron in relation to precision targets, and which represented a 
significant advance over previous techniques. The low-level technique was 
continually refined by No 617 Squadron, and eventually incorporated some 
elements of established target marking techniques. In particular, the use of 
flares to illuminate the target area for the Marker Leader and Deputy Leader, 
similar in principle to the Newhaven technique, became a regular feature of 
these attacks. The ‘flare force’ for these attacks was provided not by the 
Pathfinder Force but by No 106 Squadron, one of the squadrons in No 5 
                                                 
25
 These two raids are described in detail in W.J.Lawrence No.5 Group RAF, p.p. 159 to 162, 
with summaries in Middlebrook and Everitt The Bomber Command War Diaries, p481 and 
p482 respectively. 
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Group equipped with H2S and the A.P.I26.  This presented some difficulties, 
not least in terms of communication between the marker aircraft equipped 
with V.H.F. and the flare force. This led to a recommendation that a Master 
Bomber be employed for the whole force27.  Notwithstanding these difficulties 
and refinements, the basic technique remained unaltered and it was the 
identification and marking of the target at low level, together with the control of 
the attack by radio telephony, that resulted in the low-level technique evolved 
by No 617 Squadron being of such importance to the development of target 
marking techniques. 
 
At the time that the low-level technique was being developed by No 617 
Squadron, Bomber Command was turning its attention to targets in support of 
the forthcoming OPERATION OVERLORD28. One of the most significant 
target sets in the preparation for OPERATION OVERLORD was the so-called 
‘Transportation Plan’, which required the dislocation of the transport system in 
the Occupied Territories, including the railway system. Analysts had 
determined that the most vulnerable points of the railway system were the 
marshalling yards and had calculated that a density of 3 hits per acre was 
required to put a marshalling yard out action29.  The logical development was 
                                                 
26
 Air Position Indicator. The Air Position Indicator was a basic navigational instrument 
designed to provide greater accuracy in Dead Reckoning navigation by automatically and 
continuously indicating the position of aircraft in ‘still air’ conditions irrespective of any 
manoeuvres undertaken by the aircraft. 
27
 AIR14/2062 Record of conclusions reached at a conference held at RAF Station Woodhall 
Spa on 26
th
 March 1944 to consider the recent combined operations of Nos. 617 and 106 
Squadrons, 28 March 1944. 
28
 OPERATION OVERLORD was the code name given to the invasion of occupied territories 
in France 
29
 TNA AIR14/3012 ORSBC Report B.281 ‘Estimation of effort required against German 
marshalling yards’, 12 January 1945. This report makes retrospective reference to the 
estimate of the density of hits required to put a marshalling yard out of action made prior to 
OPERATION OVERLORD. 
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to employ the low-level marking technique devised by No 617 Squadron 
against marshalling yards in occupied territory. These targets required a 
larger force than a single squadron and this led to No 617 Squadron being 
used to provide marking for No 5 Group as a whole for attacks against the 
marshalling yards at Juvisy and La Chapelle, both within the Paris 
conurbation and surrounded by housing. The aircraft of the Main Force were 
not fitted with VHF and therefore were not in direct contact with the Master 
Bomber. Nevertheless, in both cases the bombing was well concentrated and 
civilian casualties relatively slight30. 
 
The second of these raids, that on La Chapelle on the night of 20/21 April 
1944, is also significant in the development of target marking techniques. By 
April 1944, TALLBOY was nearing operational readiness and the intention 
was that No 617 squadron would revert to an independent precision bombing 
unit31. The corollary was that No 617 Squadron would not be able to provide 
marking for No 5 Group. This was one of the factors that led to the transfer of 
three squadrons - the Lancaster-equipped Nos. 83 and 97 Squadrons and the 
Mosquito-equipped No 627 Squadron - from the PFF to No 5 Group to provide 
marking capability for that Group. This would be one of the more controversial 
episodes of the bombing offensive, and a return to the debate surrounding 
this is made below. In the interim, it may be noted that the raid on La Chapelle 
was the first in which No 5 Group used the new marking capability provided 
by these squadrons albeit, on that occasion, in conjunction with No 617 
Squadron. 
                                                 
30
 TNA AIR14/3411 ORSBC Final Raid Report No 581: Juvisy, 18/19 April 1944, 15 July 1944 
and Final Raid Report No 582: La Chapell, 20/21 April 1944, 23 July 1944. 
31
 Robert Owen, Considered policy or haphazard evolution?  
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The execution of the Transportation Plan called upon the resources of 
Bomber Command as a whole and therefore involved the entire gamut of 
target marking techniques available at that time. This provided ORSBC with 
an opportunity to compare the relative effectiveness of a variety of target 
marking techniques and the subsequent report provides an objective 
assessment of the effectiveness of the No 5 Group low-level marking 
technique32. This report compared the effectiveness of four target marking 
techniques, as follows: 
 
A/ Continuous Oboe, in which the marking of the target was constantly 
maintained by TI’s dropped by Oboe Mosquitoes at intervals throughout the 
raid. The markers dropped using those Oboe channels that were expected to 
be the most accurate were distinguished by the use of TI’s of a distinctive 
colour, with the Main Force crews briefed to aim at those in preference. 
 
B/ Musical Newhaven, in which the target was initially marked with 
proximity markers by Oboe Mosquitoes several minutes before Zero-hour. 
These markers would be used by illuminating aircraft to drop flares, in the light 
of which Visual Markers would mark then A/P with distinctive salvoes of TI’s. 
These TI’s would be backed-up throughout the duration of the raid with TI’s of 
a different colour. In some raids, a Master Bomber would direct the bombing 
                                                 
32
 TNA AIR14/4599 ORSBC Report S.154 ‘A Comparison of the Marking Techniques used on 
Marshalling Yard attacks’, 9 May 1944. 
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by radio telephone, in which case the technique would be known as 
‘Controlled Musical Newhaven’33.  
 
C/ Controlled Oboe, in which all the Oboe Mosquitoes attacked before 
zero hour, each using a different colour or type of TI according the accuracy 
expected using that particular Oboe Channel. The target would then be 
illuminated by flares, in the light of which a Master Bomber would asses the 
accuracy of the Oboe markers and direct the main force to bomb those 
markers. 
 
D/ Visual Groundmarking, in which the target was illuminated before zero 
hour by lines of flares, either dropped with the aid of proximity markers or by 
H2S. In the light of those flares, the A/P would be marked visually from low 
level using Red Spot Fires34. The accuracy of the Red Spot Fires would be 
assessed by a Master Bomber, who would call for the most accurately placed 
markers to be backed-up with further Red Spot Fires.  
 
The marking for the first three of these techniques was provided by the 
Pathfinder Force. The latter was the low-level marking technique developed 
by the No 5 Group, and was only used by that Group. 
 
                                                 
33
 This technique was a variation of the standard Newhaven technique but, because the small 
size of the target would be unlikely to be distinctive on the PPI of H2S and were within the 
range of Oboe, the latter was used to drop the proximity markers.  
34
 TNA AIR14/2692 ORSBC Report S.167 ‘The Distribution of Bombs Achieved in Oboe 
Groundmarking attacks on Marshalling Yards by Bomber Command between 6
th
 March and 
11
th
 April 1944’, 16 May 1944. In the earlier raids considered in this ORSBC report, the visual 
marking was carried out using Lancaster aircraft equipped with a MKXIV bombsight but from 
18/19 April onwards Spot Fires were dropped by Mosquitoes from a shallow dive using a 
gunsight.  
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In order to ensure a common basis for comparison, the ORSBC report 
assessed effectiveness on the basis of the ratio of the number of hits 
achieved to the number expected, this being a density of 4 hits per acre at the 
A/P35. In order to take account of the different bomb sizes used, the 
assessment was made on the basis of ‘equivalents’ assuming that all bombs 
were of the same weight36.  An alternative measure of effectiveness was also 
used in the report, this being the proportion of attacks that attained or 
exceeded 70% of expectation, this figure corresponding the expectation that 
70% of bomb craters could be plotted37. It followed that any raid on which the 
number of observed hits exceeded 70% of the expected number could be 
considered successful. The results obtained are summarised in the table 
below: 
 
 
Marking 
Technique 
 
No. 
of 
raids 
 
Bombs 
dispatched 
as % of 
estimate 
 
Bombs 
dropped 
as % of 
bombs 
 
Hits 
achieved 
as % of 
hits 
 
% of raids on 
which 
achievement 
exceeded 70% 
                                                 
35
 Ibid. This report was issued just after ORSBC Report S.154 and provided much of the 
detailed information absent from the earlier report. The origins of the figure of 4 hits per acre 
at the A/P are not explained in the ORSBC report, although this appears to relate to the 
expectation of the accuracy that was possible rather than the figure of 3 hits per acre deemed 
required to put a marshalling yard out of action. 
36
 The bomb loads for these attacks were almost exclusively comprised of 500lb and 1,000lb 
high explosive bombs, and varied according to the type of aircraft employed (the divided 
bomb bay of the Stirling precluded the carrying of large numbers of 1,000lb bombs). The 
destructive power of the 1,000lb was 1.5 times that of the 500lb bomb, such that the 
assessment was made on the basis that the bomb load was comprised entirely of 500lb 
bombs, with an equivalence factor built in to allow for the greater destructive power of the 
larger bomb.  
37
 The 30% of bomb craters that could not be plotted comprised of gross errors outside of 
photographic coverage and bombs within the main distribution that failed to explode. 
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required dispatched expected of expectation 
 
Continuous 
Oboe 
 
15 
 
93 
 
91 
 
57 
 
27 
 
Musical 
Newhaven 
 
5 
 
131 
 
93 
 
64 
 
40 
 
Controlled 
Oboe 
 
6 
 
89 
 
94 
 
79 
 
50 
 
Visual 
Groundmarking 
 
3 
 
110 
 
89 
 
93 
 
100 
 
All Techniques 
 
29 
 
99 
 
92 
 
66 
 
40 
 
Table 9/ Comparison of marking techniques used for attacks on marshalling yards. Source: 
TNA AIR14/4599 ORSBC Report S.154 A Comparison of the Marking Techniques used on 
Marshalling Yard attacks, dated 9 May 1944. 
 
It is clear from the above that the No 5 Group technique of Visual 
Groundmarking produced considerably better results than the three 
techniques employed by the Pathfinder Force, both in terms of the number of 
hits achieved as a percentage of hits expected and the percentage of raids on 
which achievement exceeded 70% of expectation38. Indeed, Visual 
Groundmarking was the only technique in which the number of hits achieved 
                                                 
38
 ORSBC acknowledged that the No 5 Group Visual Groundmarking technique had only 
been used on 3 occasions, but did not consider that this undermined the overall result. 
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was not significantly below the percentage of hits expected.  The ORSBC 
report does not consider the reasons for the greater effectiveness of the 
Visual Groundmarking technique and neither does it provide any information 
about actual bomb distribution: these considerations formed part of a 
subsequent ORSBC reports discussed below. Nonetheless, this report does 
confirm that the combination of low-level visual marking and control of the 
bombing by a Master Bomber was the most effective technique for attacking 
small targets and provides further evidence that the target marking technique 
employed was itself determinative of the outcome of a raid.  
 
Before leaving this ORSBC report, the effectiveness of the target marking 
techniques employed by the Pathfinder Force also requires consideration. 
Most noteworthy is that the results achieved using the Controlled Oboe which, 
whilst inferior to those achieved with Visual Groundmarking, nonetheless 
demonstrated the efficiency of that technique. This led ORSBC to recommend 
that Controlled Oboe should be used where it was not possible to use Visual 
Groundmarking, this being one of a number of occasions where operational 
research in relation to target marking techniques led to recommendations 
being made for future operations39. Also noteworthy was the comparative 
inefficiency of the Musical Newhaven technique with which, although the 
number of bombs dispatched significantly exceeded the percentage estimated 
to be required, the number of hits achieved as percentage of hits expected 
was considerably below that achieved by Visual Groundmarking. It is 
accepted that not all of these raids were undertaken as Controlled Musical 
                                                 
39
 The importance of operational research to the development of target marking techniques is 
discussed in more detail in Chapter 8. 
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Newhaven, and this would suggest that the absence of a Master Bomber 
resulted in a greater spread in the visual marking, such that the Principle of 
Cumulative Dispersion resulted in a lower concentration of bombing at the 
A/P. This supposition is supported by the results achieved using the 
Continuous Oboe technique, which did not employ a Master Bomber, and 
which were inferior to those achieved by both Controlled Oboe and Musical 
Newhaven. The implication was that the use of a Master Bomber was key to 
maximising the efficiency of target marking techniques, a contention that is 
examined in detail in Chapter Seven. 
 
As a target set, marshalling yards provided a relatively compact target area 
within which bomb distribution could be more accurately plotted than in 
relation to area targets. As a result, it is noticeable that the ORSBC reports of 
this period take a different form to those relating to area targets and typically 
include a more mathematical analysis of the bomb distribution. In particular, 
there is an increasing tendency in these reports to equate bomb distribution to 
the Gaussian Distribution Function. The ORSBC reports typically show the 
Gaussian Distribution curves in terms of the distance of bombs plotted in 
relation to line, range and radial distance from the M.P.I of the markers 
dropped, expressed as a percentage. The use of the Gaussian Distribution as 
a measure provides a more accurate picture of bomb distribution although, 
because the M.P.I. of bombs dropped did not usually equate to the A/P, it 
should be noted that the Gaussian Distribution curve does not necessarily 
equate to the bomb distribution around the A/P and therefore accuracy (i.e. 
the systematic error). 
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A report produced by ORSBC showed that the bomb distribution in relation to 
attacks on Marshalling Yards carried out using the Musical Parramatta 
technique closely conformed to Gaussian Distribution curves40. No similar 
analysis has been found in relation to other target marking techniques but, 
given that the earlier ORSBC report found Musical Parramatta to be by some 
margin the least effective of the four techniques studied, it may be assumed 
that the Gaussian Distribution curves would at least be similar to (if not better 
than) those for Musical Parramatta.  ORSBC found that the bomb distribution 
pattern resulting from Musical Parramatta attacks to be slightly elliptical, with 
the longer axis along the line of approach (i.e line error). This partly reflected 
the use of sticks of bombs rather than individually aimed bombs, but also the 
greater difficulty generally experienced by bomb aimers of assessing range as 
opposed to line. The mean Gaussian Distribution curves for the attacks 
examined by ORSBC are shown in Fig 26/ below, from which it can be seen 
that the curve in relation to bomb distribution across the line of flight is steeper 
and with a narrower base than that for bomb distribution along the line of 
flight, thereby resulting in an elliptical pattern of bomb distribution. 
 
                                                 
40
 TNA AIR14/2692 ORSBC Report S.167 ‘The Distribution of Bombs Achieved in Oboe 
Groundmarking attacks on Marshalling Yards by Bomber Command between 6
th
 March and 
11
th
 April 1944’, 16 May 1944. This report refers to the technique as Oboe Groundmarking, 
but for consistency the description Musical Parramatta is used here. 
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Fig 26/ Mean Gaussian Distribution curves for attacks of Marshalling yards using Musical 
Parramatta Source: TNA AIR14/2692 ORSBC S.167 The Distribution of Bombs Achieved in 
Oboe Groundmarking attacks on Marshalling Yards by Bomber Command between 6
th
 March 
and 11
th
 April 1944, dated 16 May 1944. 
 
The other notable feature shown in these diagrams is the actual extent of the 
range and line errors concerned, these being a mean line error of 370 yards 
and a mean range error of 490 yards. The average Probable Radial Error was 
510 yards. The average Systematic Error was 485 yards, the average Overall 
Systematic Error was 680 yards and 28% of bombs dropped were more than 
1,500 yards from the A/P. These figures are equally remarkable for two very 
different reasons. Firstly, they are a measure of the progress made since the 
introduction of the first target marking technique (Shaker) a little over two 
years previously which, at its most effective, only resulted in some 58% of 
bombs falling within 3 miles of the A/P41. Secondly, at the same time the 
results achieved were an indication of just how inefficient the bombing of the 
marshalling yards had proven to be42. One of the stated objectives of this 
ORSBC report was to assess the (then) current operational performance 
against expectations for the campaign against Marshalling Yards, in order to 
ensure that this important campaign was effectively completed prior to 
OPERATION OVERLORD.  Based upon the bomb distribution and accuracy 
achieved using Musical Parramatta, and in particular the unexpectedly high 
number of gross errors, ORSBC calculated that the number of aircraft 
dispatched would need to be increased by 43% if the required density of 4 hits 
per acre at the A/P was to be achieved. The obvious conclusion was that, 
notwithstanding the significant improvement in both bombing accuracy and 
                                                 
41
 See Chapter 3 
42
 In this context, the ORSBC accepted that continued improvements in technique would 
result in increased accuracy and bomb concentration. 
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concentration resulting from the development and evolution of target marking 
techniques, in April 1944 Bomber Command was still some way short of being 
a ‘precision’ force. 
 
It will be recalled that the target marking technique that came closest to 
achieving the required degree of efficiency was No 5 Group Visual 
Groundmarking, which had achieved 93% of the hits expected and was the 
only technique which had exceeded 70% of expectation on every occasion on 
which it had been used43. The technique considered in the ORSBC report was 
essentially a refinement of that originally employed by No 617 Squadron and, 
as such, the markers were aimed directly at the A/P. Due to the accuracy of 
this technique, it was found that the Spot Fires were often obscured during the 
later stages of the attack by smoke and dust from the first bombs, and as a 
result it had been observed that bombing was highly concentrated at the start 
of the attack but became more scattered as the raid progressed.  There were 
also several occasions where the Spot Fires had been extinguished by the 
blast from bombs bursting close by and this had necessitated the re-marking 
of the target mid-way through the attack. This raised the spectre that the re-
marking or backing-up of earlier markers could lead to confusion, especially if 
communication between Master Bomber and Main Force was poor.  It was 
also operationally disadvantageous not only to expose the marking aircraft to 
ground defences for a second time but also to keep part of the Main Force 
waiting in a target area in which night fighters could be present while the 
target was re-marked. The solution to these problems resulted in possibly the 
                                                 
43
 TNA AIR14/4599 ORSBC Report S.154 ‘A Comparison of the Marking Techniques used on 
Marshalling Yard attacks’, 9 May 1944. See discussion above. 
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most significant development in the evolution of target marking techniques: 
‘Offset’ marking (also known as ‘Vector’ marking), in which the markers were 
placed not at the A/P itself but at a prominent landmark nearby. ‘Offset’ 
marking was therefore the first in a series of techniques that fall under the 
generic term of ‘indirect marking’. 
 
‘Offset’ marking exploited the fact that the trail angle of a bomb is affected by 
wind speed and that it was therefore always necessary for bomb aimers to set 
the wind speed into the bombsight. ‘Offset’ marking was achieved by setting a 
‘false’ wind into the bombsight such that bombs aimed at the markers would 
fall instead on the A/P. The wind speed in the target area was found by a 
number of aircraft equipped with H2S and A.P.I., and the average ‘found’ wind 
speed transmitted to the Master Bomber. Using the average wind speed, the 
Master Bomber calculated the ‘false’ wind speed necessary to achieve the 
required degree of offset and would transmit this information to the Main 
Force. The point on the ground on which the markers would be aimed, usually 
a conspicuous ground feature some 300-400 yards from the A/P and known 
as the ‘Marking Point’, would be illuminated with flares (sometimes with a 
proximity marker dropped by Oboe) and marked visually from a low-level with 
Spot Fires.  Once the Master Leader was satisfied with the accuracy of the 
marking, the Master Bomber would instruct the Main Force to bomb on a 
designated heading by aiming at the Spot Fires with the false wind set on the 
bombsight. 
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The introduction of ‘Offset marking’ led to an immediate improvement in 
accuracy, both in relation to the earlier version of the No 5 Group technique 
but also in terms of the comparative accuracy of other target marking 
techniques. By the time that ‘Offset marking’ was introduced44, constant 
practice of and refinement in other target marking techniques had also 
resulted in an improvement in the accuracy of those methods and the 
comparative accuracy is shown in the table below45. 
 
 
 
Musical 
Parramatta 
 
All 
techniques 
 
Offset Marking  
 
 April  
 
 May  
 
 May  
 
June 
 
Proportion of Ineffectives, 
including early returns  
 
44% 
 
17% 
 
19% 
 
- 
 
Average Systematic Error 
 
485 yards 
 
175 yards 
 
110 
yards 
 
 
116 
Yards 
     
                                                 
44
 Offset marking was first used on the night of 8/9 May 1944 
45
 TNA AIR14/2692 ORSBC Report S.168 ‘Bombfall distribution of precision attacks carried 
out by No 5 Group 19
th
 April -31
st
 May’, 30 June 1944; TNA ORSBC Report S.167 ‘The 
Distribution of Bombs Achieved in Oboe Groundmarking attacks on Marshalling Yards by 
Bomber Command between 6
th
 March and 11
th
 April 1944’, 16 May 1944 and TNA 
AIR14/4599 ORSBC Report S.192. ‘Summary of analysis of day and night raids on small 
targets in occupied territory between March and September 1944’, 6 December 1944. This 
table is a compilation of data contained in these ORSBC reports although, because the 
parameters used in these reports varied, it has not been possible to provide data for all 
categories. In the interest of consistency, the terminology used in the table above has been 
amended from that in the ORSBC report. 
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Average Probable Radial 
Error 
480 yards 335 yards 265 
yards 
121 
yards 
 
Marking Error 
 
319 yards 
 
- 
 
135 
yards 
 
116 
yards 
 
Bombing Error 
 
361 yards 
 
- 
 
100 
yards 
 
121 
yards 
 
Average Overall Systematic 
Error 
 
680 yards 
 
380 yards 
 
235 
yards 
 
237 
yards 
 
Density of bombs at A/P per 
1000 bombs dropped 
 
2.20 
 
2.86 
 
5.43 
 
5.76 
 
Variability Coefficient 
 
- 
 
73% 
 
- 
 
44% 
. 
Table 10/ Comparative accuracy of target marking techniques. Source:  TNA AIR14/2692 
ORSBC Report S.168 Bombfall distribution of precision attacks carried out by No 5 Group 
19
th
 April -31
st
 May, dated 30 June 1944; TNAORSBC S.167 The Distribution of Bombs 
Achieved in Oboe Groundmarking attacks on Marshalling Yards by Bomber Command 
between 6
th
 March and 11
th
 April 1944 and TNA AIR14/4599 ORSBC Report S.192. 
 
 
It can be seen from the above that the Offset Marking technique resulted in a 
significant improvement in accuracy, reducing the Average Systematic Error 
to 110 yards compared with 175 for all techniques. The Offset Marking 
technique also resulted in a significant improvement in bombing 
concentration, reducing the average Probable Radial Error to 265 yards; this 
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was nearly half that resulting from the Musical Parramatta technique in the 
previous month. The result was a substantial reduction in the Average Overall 
Systematic Error, which fell from 680 yards with Musical Parramatta to 235 
yards when Offset Marking was employed. This latter figure was comprised of 
a Marking Error of 135 yards and a Bombing Error of 100 yards46. Bomb 
distribution was found to be slightly elliptical, with an average line error of 193 
yards and an average range error of 225 yards; this compares with average 
errors of 250 yards and 285 yards respectively for Visual Groundmarking 
before the introduction of Offset Marking. There was a further improvement in 
the Marking Error in June but, due to a slight increase in the Bombing Error47, 
the Overall Systematic Error marginally increased, albeit results with Visual 
Groundmarking remained significantly better than with other techniques. In 
particular, it may be noted that the density of bombs at A/P per 1000 bombs 
dropped achieved with Visual Groundmarking was nearly double that for other 
techniques, demonstrating the superiority of these technique both in terms of 
accuracy and concentration at the A/P. The Visual Groundmarking technique 
was also the most consistent of the target marking techniques employed, with 
a Variability Coefficient of 44% compared with 73% for other techniques 
 
In addition to overcoming the issues associated with the obscuration of 
markers by smoke from early bombs, ORSBC attributed the improved results 
                                                 
46
 TNA AIR14/2692 ORSBC Report S.168 ‘Bombfall distribution of precision attacks carried 
out by No 5 Group 19
th
 April -31
st
 May’, 30 June 1944. The equivalent results for June 1944 
are presented using different parameters in a later ORSBC Report and have not been 
included in this table. 
47
 TNA AIR14/4599 ORSBC Report S.192. ‘Summary of analysis of day and night raids on 
small targets in occupied territory between March and September 1944’, 6 December 1944. 
ORSBC noted that bombing error increased inversely in relation to the strength of defences 
and that this trend was more pronounced with ‘controlled’ techniques. This increase in 
bombing error was noted with all techniques and was largely attributed to increasing night 
fighter activity in the target area. 
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obtained by Offset Marking to the use of a Master Bomber to eliminate the 
influence of incorrectly placed markers and thereby provide a single point of 
aim. The provision of a single wind speed for input into the bombsight was 
also considered to reduce the spread of bombs by eliminating the variations 
that resulted when the wind speed input into the bombsight was calculated by 
individual crews or at Group level. However, none of this was itself new. It will 
be recalled that the provision of a single point of aim, essential to minimising 
the effect of the Principle of Cumulative Dispersion, was an important factor in 
the comparative concentration achieved using Oboe and H2S, and the 
broadcast of a ‘found wind’ had become a standard part of Bomber Command 
attacks during the Battle of Berlin48. The improvement resulting from Offset 
Marking can therefore be attributed primarily to the provision of a distinctive 
single point of aim that remained visible throughout the duration of the attack 
and, therefore, achieved the prime objective of any target marking technique.  
 
Nevertheless, in common with all other forms of Visual Groundmarking, Offset 
Marking was not without disadvantages. The Visual Groundmarking 
techniques employed by No 5 Group were all dependent upon the Marker 
Leader being satisfied that the Spot Fires were correctly placed. If the Marker 
Leader and/or Master Bomber were not satisfied, the marking procedure was 
repeated until the Marking Point was clearly marked49.  The delay 
necessitated the Main Force to wait in the target area, thereby negating one 
of the main benefits offered by Offset Marking in terms of the obviating the 
delay caused by the necessity to re-mark a target where the initial markers 
                                                 
48
 Harris, Despatch on War Operations 23
rd
 February 1942 to 8
th
 May 1945, p178. 
49
 Additional flare dropping aircraft were made available for this eventuality. 
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were obscured by smoke or dust from the first bombs. A dramatic 
demonstration of this drawback occurred during the raid on a military depot at 
Mailly-le-Camp on the night of 3/4 May 1944 when, although the initial 
markers were accurately placed, the Master Bomber was unable to transmit 
instructions to the Main Force due to interference on the designated radio 
frequency50. The attack was eventually initiated by the Deputy Master Bomber 
but the resultant delay enabled night fighters to reach the target area and 42 
Lancasters (11.6% of the force) were lost51.  It was this risk of heavy losses 
that led ORSBC to conclude that even though Visual Groundmarking resulted 
in greater bombing success and was the most reliable method, it did not 
follow that it was always best to employ this technique on defended targets52.  
This facet of the Visual Groundmarking technique would later raise questions 
about its future use against well defended German targets. 
 
The importance of good communication between Master Bomber, Marker 
Leader and the Main Force had already been realised and had resulted in the 
introduction of ‘Link’ aircraft as a standard feature of the Offset Marking 
techniques. The role of these aircraft, all from the Lancaster-equipped Nos. 83 
and 97 Squadrons, was to confirm that the instructions of the Master Bomber 
could be clearly heard and to re-broadcast the VHF transmissions to the main 
force in HF. As a failsafe, these aircraft were to transmit the instructions from 
                                                 
50
 TNA AIR14/3411 ORSBC Final Raid Report No 595: Mailly-le-camp, 3/4 May 1944, 29 July 
1944.  
51
 Middlebrook and Everitt, The Bomber Command War Diaries, p505. A detailed account of 
the Mailly-le-Camp raid, including the circumstances surrounding the interference with radio 
communications, can be found in Jack Currie, Battle under the Moon: the documented 
account of Mailly-le-Camp, 1944 (Wilmslow: AirData Publications Limited,1995).  
52
 TNA AIR14/4599 ORSBC Report S.192. ‘Summary of analysis of day and night raids on 
small targets in occupied territory between March and September 1944’, 6 December 1944. 
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the Master Bomber in Morse should the HF transmissions not be received by 
aircraft in the Main Force. The value of these Link aircraft was demonstrated 
during a raid on Darmsdadt on the 25/26 August 1944, when the Controller’s 
VHF failed and both Deputy Controllers were shot down en route to the 
target53. Control of the raid was assumed by ‘Link 3’, who recognised that the 
flares had been dropped too low and too far west. In the event, the Marker 
Leader could not identify the target and no marking was carried out. The 
bombing was widely scattered but the presence of the Link aircraft, and the 
initiative shown by Link 3, negated the need for the Main Force to linger in the 
target area and potentially prevented a repeat of the losses experienced at 
Mailly-le-Camp. 
 
However, re-transmission of instructions in HF caused delay and, because it 
was limited to a few pre-selected code words, the use of Morse code was not 
as flexible as the spoken word. Consequently, even before the Mailly-le-Camp 
raid had revealed the full extent of the problem, the AOC of No 5 Group, Air 
Vice-Marshal Sir Ralph Cochrane, had pressed for all aircraft in the Group to 
be equipped with VHF54. The Deputy C-in-C Bomber Command duly 
requested the provision of sufficient VHF sets to equip No 5 Group from the 
Air Ministry55. Following the difficulties experienced in controlling the main 
force in raids on Brunswick and Munich (see below), Cochrane repeated his 
request, claiming that “…we should have put another 50% of bombs around 
                                                 
53
 TNA AIR14/2083 Interim Raid Report: Darmsdadt, 25/26 August 1944; TNA AIR14/3411 
Final Night Raid Report No 697: Darmsdadt, 25/26 August 1944, 29 January 1945. 
54
 TNA AIR14/1255 Memorandum Headquarters No 5 Group to Deputy C-in-C Bomber 
Command, Headquarters Bomber Command ‘Supply of V.H.F. to aircraft in No 5 Group’, 17 
April 1944. 
55
 Ibid Letter from Deputy C-in-C Bomber Command, Headquarters Bomber Command to he 
Air Ministry, Supply of V.H.F. to aircraft in No 5 Group, dated 24 April 1944. 
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the aiming point” had the whole Group been fitted within VHF56. 
Notwithstanding that VHF sets were in short supply, Cochrane got his aircraft 
fitted at the rate of one operational squadron per week and - as shown below - 
Cochrane made good his claim in terms of the increased percentage of 
bombs around the A/P57.  
 
The other requirement for Visual Groundmarking was good visibility at ground 
level and it was this requirement that resulted in a higher Proportion of 
Ineffectives with this technique, as shown in the table above. For the 
purposes of that table, the Proportion of Ineffectives included gross errors, 
unexploded bombs and early returns58. The Visual Groundmarking technique 
resulted in fewer gross errors and it was therefore the early returns that 
contributed to the higher Proportion of Ineffectives with this technique. In 
practice, this meant that although the Visual Groundmarking technique 
produced better results than other target marking techniques under suitable 
conditions, under certain conditions Visual Groundmarking could not be 
employed at all. It follows that the Visual Groundmarking technique was not 
as reliable as other techniques and it was the view of ORSBC that other target 
marking techniques would continue to be required59. 
 
                                                 
56
 Ibid Memorandum Headquarters No 5 Group to C-in-C Bomber Command, Headquarters 
Bomber Command, Supply of V.H.F. to aircraft in No 5 Group, dated 28 April 1944. 
57
 TNA AIR14/1255 Letter from the Air Ministry to C-in-C Bomber Command, Headquarters 
Bomber Command, Supply of V.H.F. to aircraft in No 5 Group, dated 12 May 1944. 
58
 The Proportion of Ineffectives is normally defined as the proportions of bombs dropped that 
for a variety of reasons do not contribute to the normal bomb distribution. Bombs not dropped 
due to the early return of the aircraft would therefore not normally be included in this figure. 
59
 TNA AIR14/4599 ORSBC Report S.231 ‘A Comparison of high and low-level visual marking 
on defended German targets’, 28 April 1945. 
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The above analysis shows that the Visual Groundmarking technique, 
particularly when ‘Offset marking’ was employed, was the most efficient of the 
target marking techniques available to Bomber Command. However, this 
success had been achieved only against relatively lightly defended precision 
targets within Oboe range. The question therefore remained whether the 
technique would translate to heavily defended area targets in Germany 
beyond Oboe range (and therefore deprived of an accurately placed proximity 
marker to guide the initial illumination of the target area). Setting aside 
momentarily the question as to whether the low-flying marking aircraft would 
survive the German defences, the Visual Groundmarking technique would 
itself require some modification for area attacks.   
 
The essence of the technique remained unchanged, but now with the target 
being marked by low-flying Mosquitoes using a gunsight rather than a 
bombsight60. The second modification was that the dropping of the proximity 
marker were now undertaken by aircraft equipped with H2S and, from August 
1944, with their position confirmed using S.S. LORAN61. The illumination of 
the target was now in two phases, known as Flare Force I and Flare Force II, 
with the latter only being required if there was a delay in the initial marking 
procedure. The Marking Point, now some 1,000 to 2,000 yards from the A/P, 
was marked visually by ‘Marker Aircraft’ led by a Marker Leader using a T.I. 
(Red) and backed-up throughout the attack by T.I.s (Green). The accuracy of 
                                                 
60
 RAFM, Aircraft Movement Cards. The Mosquito Mk BXVI’s previously loaned to the 
squadron were bomber variants and therefore not equipped with gunsights. The low-level 
marking technique using a gunsight required the use of the fighter-bomber version of the 
Mosquito, the Mk FBVI, two of which (NS992 and NS993) were supplied to No 617 Squadron 
as replacements for the bomber variants previously provided. 
61
 The two squadrons involved, No 83 Squadron and No 97 Squadron, were those transferred 
back to No 5 Group from No 8 Group in April 1944. 
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the initial T.I. (Red) was checked by the Marker Bomber and, if not sufficiently 
accurate, would be cancelled by placing a T.I. (Yellow) over the errant marker.  
To assist in this, the Master Bomber controlled the operation (also using a 
Mosquito aircraft) from a height of some 1,000ft. The Main Force, now 
operating from a higher altitude of circa 17,000 ft as a concession to the better 
defended target set, was instructed to bomb on a designated track and to aim 
for the Marking Point but to release their bombs after a given number of 
seconds according to the distance of the Marking Point from the A/P.  In this 
respect, the technique was an extension of the ‘time & distance’ technique 
that Cochrane had advocated in April 1943 and employed by No 5 Group in 
the raid on the Peenemünde rocket research facility in August 1943, in which 
the start datum point was a marker rather than geographical feature (see 
Chapter Seven). 
 
This technique had in fact been used on two occasions prior to the 
commencement of the Transportation Plan, the first unsuccessfully against 
Brunswick on the night of 22/23 April 194462.  Although technically an 
operational failure, this raid is nonetheless of some importance in the 
development of target marking techniques, in that this was the first occasion 
on which the Visual Groundmarking technique had been used over a heavily 
defended city. Despite some initial problems with illumination by the flare 
force, the primary marking was accurate and the failure on this occasion was 
attributed to faulty communication between the Marker Leader and the Master 
Bomber. The technique was tried again with more success against Munich on 
                                                 
62
 TNA AIR14/3411 ORSBC Final Raid Report No 584: Brunswick 22/23 April 1944, 24 July 
1944. Further details are provided in Middlebrook and Everitt The Bomber Command War 
Diaries,p499.  
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the 24/25 April 194463, and then with considerable success on the 18/19 
September 1944 in a raid against Bremerhaven using a comparatively small 
Main Force of 206 Lancasters64.  
 
Just as the No 5 Group Visual Groundmarking proved to be the most effective 
target marking technique for precision attacks during the first half of 1944, so 
it would prove to be most effective in area attacks. An ORSBC report issued 
in April 1945 compared the high and low-level visual marking on defended 
targets in relation to accuracy, reliability and loss rates65.   The principal 
finding was that the average radial error of the TIs dropped using the No 5 
Group Visual Groundmarking technique was 299 yards, compared with 1058 
yards for high level marking using the Mk XIV bombsight (i.e the Controlled 
Newhaven technique). The low-level technique was found to be less 
dependent upon clear weather conditions and could often be carried out 
beneath10/10 stratus cloud which prevented high level marking: the report 
found that in conditions of 10/10 cloud cover below 10,000ft it was possible to 
mark the target on four out of six (66%) occasions using the low-level 
                                                 
63
 TNA AIR14/3411 ORSBC Final Raid Report No 586: Munich 25/25 April 1944, 20 July 
1944.  Further details are provided in Middlebrook and Everitt The Bomber Command War 
Diaries, p497. 
64
 TNA AIR14/3411 ORSBC Final Raid Report No 718: Bremerhaven, 18/19 September 1944, 
1 February 1945. Further details are provided in Middlebrook and Everitt The Bomber 
Command War Diaries, p499. 
65
 TNA AIR14/4599 ORSBC Report S.231 ‘A Comparison of high and low-level visual marking 
on defended German targets’, 28 April 1945. This report acknowledged that marking using 
the Parramatta technique was likely to be significantly less accurate beyond Oboe range 
because of the spread of markers using H2S, and consequently the results using that 
technique were not considered in the report. 
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technique but on only one in ten (10%) of occasions when the target was 
marked from the standard operational altitude 66.  
 
The findings of this ORSBC report are not in themselves surprising given the 
unambiguous point of aim provided by the Visual Groundmarking technique, 
but the conclusions of the report are of particular interest. These conclusions 
highlighted the importance of aligning the concentration of the bombing with 
the A/P, noting that the (then) current systematic error with high-level marking 
techniques was of the same order as the random bombing error at about 
1,000 yards.  The corollary was that a large bombing force was necessary to 
achieve the required density of bombs at the A/P, thereby resulting in a 
significant wastage of bombs. A further consequence was that, unless 
accompanied by a commensurate reduction in the systematic error, any 
improvement on the standard of bomb-aiming by the Main Force (thereby 
reducing the random bombing error) would actually result in a reduction in the 
percentage of bombs falling on the A/P. The report went on the conclude that 
the principal factor in determining the systematic error was the accuracy with 
which primary marking was accomplished and that, in the absence of a long 
range radar device comparable with the accuracy of Oboe, the only prospect 
of improving primary marking was with the Visual Groundmarking technique. It 
was also noted that this technique had the additional benefits of being more 
reliable than high level marking and, by employing a smaller bombing force, of 
reducing the wastage of bombs. It was accepted that the technique had been 
employed by a relatively small force specially trained in the procedures 
                                                 
66
 This is not the same as low level cloud, which reduced visibility close to then ground and 
prevented visual marking from a low-level, and which had caused some attacks to be 
abandoned during the build-up to OPERATION OVERLORD. 
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involved and acknowledged the difficulties that would be experienced 
transferring this technique to a larger force comprised of several Groups, 
although it is not clear whether the difficulty envisaged related to the use of 
the technique by a single large force or the use by several smaller forces from 
the various Groups. In any event, ORSBC did not consider the problems 
insurmountable and, in view of the advantages conferred by the low-level 
technique, recommended that consideration should be given to using this 
technique in “any future campaign against long-range targets”67. 
 
The ORSBC report is not only a ringing endorsement of the Visual 
Groundmarking technique, it was an indictment of the standard target marking 
techniques used by the Pathfinder Force and which had served Bomber 
Command so well during the middle years of the bombing offensive. It is also 
a testament to the speed of development of target marking techniques that 
those employed by the Pathfinder Force, which the previous year had been at 
the forefront of the Bomber Command inventory, were now considered inferior 
to a technique that had not been devised at that time. There is no record of 
any views expressed by Bennett or Cochrane about this ORSBC report but 
the obvious question that this report raises - that is, why the low-level 
technique was not adopted earlier - is addressed in the conclusion of this 
thesis. 
 
                                                 
67
 Given the timing of this report, April 1945, it must be assumed that this last remark related 
to the operations in the Far East, and this may have been one of the considerations that led to 
the selection of No 5 Group to form ‘Tiger Force’ for deployment in the Far East at the end of 
hostilities in the E.T.O. 
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However, even before the highly successful use of Visual Groundmarking on 
the Bremerhaven raid of 18/19 September 1944, a further variation of the 
basic technique had been employed. In this variation, the Main Force was 
divided into three sections, each of which would bomb the same single 
Marking Point using a given time overshoot.  The innovative aspect of this 
technique was that each of the three sections would bomb using a different 
heading, such that the bomb distribution was not centred on an Aiming Point 
but on an ‘Aiming Line’, this line being the arc of a circle with the Marking 
Point at its centre.  The size of the arc would be governed by the deviation 
between the headings on which the sections attacked. Using this technique, 
the bomb distribution could be varied by adjusting the size of the arc and/or 
increasing the number of headings employed: the former was achieved by 
increasing the deviation between the headings on which each section 
bombed.  This technique was known as ‘Line Bombing’ and was used by No 5 
Group until the end of 1944. 
 
Because of the absence of a defined A/P with the Line Bombing technique, 
the standard measure of accuracy and concentration at that time (the 
Systematic Error and Probable Radial Error respectively) could not be 
employed68.  The previously used measure of the percentage of bombs within 
3 miles of the A/P was similarly redundant. The effectiveness of Line Bombing 
was, however, demonstrated on the very first raid on which it was employed, 
against Königsberg on the 29/30 August 194469. The initial marking was using 
                                                 
68
 TNA AIR14/2693 ORSBC Report S.249 ‘Systematic Errors in Bomber Command 
Operations’, 16 October 1944. 
69
 TNA AIR14/3411 ORSBC Final Raid Report No 701: Königsberg, 29/30 August 1944, 
dated 28 December 1944. Königsberg is now Kaliningrad in Lithuania. 
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Red Spot Fires but these were assessed by the Controller as being inaccurate 
and, in accordance with the Marking Plan, a set of Green Spot Fires was 
dropped. These were assessed as being accurate and Main Force instructed 
to bomb the centre of the Green Spot Fires on the pre-briefed headings. 
Accordingly, aircraft of 52 Base bombed the M.P.I. of the Green Spot Fires 
with a delay of 22 seconds on a heading of 067º; those of 53 Base with a 
delay of 15 seconds on a heading of 040º; and those of 55 Base with a delay 
of 8 seconds on a heading of 102º 70. The result was that 86% of bombs fell 
within the target area, and 69% of the built-up area was destroyed. 
 
An even more convincing demonstration of the efficiency of Line Bombing 
was provided on the second occasion on which this technique was used, this 
being on the night of 11/12 September 1944 during an attack on Darmstadt by 
226 Lancasters and 14 Mosquitoes71. The Marking Point for the raid was a 
military exercise yard, a prominent landmark to the south of the town centre. 
Illumination of the target area began at 23:46 and almost immediately the 
Marking Point was identified by the low-flying Marker aircraft. The initial 
marking was accurate, with an average error of 290 yards; the closest TI was 
just 90 yards from the Marking Point, and no TI was further away than 440 
                                                 
70
 By 1943, with the rapid growth in the number of bomber airfields, it became apparent that it 
would be impractical to control up to fifteen airfields from a single Group headquarters and 
that some intermediate link was required. Bomber Command therefore instituted the ‘Base 
System’ in which the administration of up to six bomber squadrons was organised at a ‘Base’, 
usually comprised of one parent airfield and two subsidiary airfields. Each base was identified 
on a numeric basis composed of two characters, in which the first was the Group number and 
the second the number for the parent station. For example, No 54 Base was station 4 of No 5 
Group. No 54 Base was Coningsby, at which the specialist target marking squadrons of No 5 
Group were based (Nos. 83 and 97 Squadrons).  
71
 TNA AIR14/3411 ORSBC Final Raid Report No 712: Darmsdadt, 11/12 September 1944, 
31 December 1944.  
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yards72. At 22:52 hours the Master Bomber declared that Flare Force II was 
not required and at 23:56 hours the Main Force was instructed to commence 
bombing along the two pre-briefed headings. The entire raid, from the first 
flare dropped by Flare Force I to the last bomb load dropped by the Main 
Force, lasted 51 minutes. The resulting concentration of bombing produced a 
firestorm in which an estimated 12,300 people were killed and 70,000 made 
homeless, from a total population of 120,000 people73.  In his book Bomber 
Command, Max Hastings devotes an entire chapter to the Darmstadt raid and 
provided a detailed description of the raid, including both the technical 
aspects and the effects of the bombing on the civilians of Darmstadt. This raid 
has always been controversial because of the absence of any major 
industries in Darmstadt. In this context, it is notable that W.J.Lawrence, who in 
his book No.5 Group RAF is prone to lengthy descriptions of precision attacks 
carried out by No 5 Group, makes only passing reference to the Darmstadt 
raid and none at all to the civilian casualties74. This is surprising given that, in 
terms of target marking technique employed and the efficiency with which it 
was implemented, the Darmsdadt raid may be regarded as an exemplar of the 
efficiency attained by No 5 Group at that time. 
 
It is a testament to the speed of development of target marking techniques by 
No 5 Group that, within a month of the Darmstadt raid, Line Bombing was 
itself superseded as the primary form of Visual Groundmarking used by that 
Group. The latest and final development of this technique was a further 
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refinement of Line Bombing in which each aircraft was allocated a separate 
heading on which to attack and a different timed overshoot. The result was a 
bomb distribution not around a single Aiming Point or an Aiming Line, but a 
spread of bombs throughout an ‘Aiming Area’. The wedge-shape of this 
Aiming Area was a part of a circle between two lines drawn from the Marking 
Point, each with a maximum radius of approximately 2,400 yards. This 
technique was officially known as ‘Sector Bombing’ but colloquially as the ‘5 
Group Fan’. The timing and organisation required for this technique, and the 
precision with which it needed to be carried out, was an indication not only of 
the complexity to which target marking techniques had now evolved  but also 
the standard of proficiency of the Main Force crews that carried it out. 
 
As with Line Bombing, the absence of a defined A/P with the Sector Bombing 
technique meant that the effectiveness of this technique could not be 
measured in terms of the Systematic Error or the Probable Radial Error. 
However, some measure of the effectiveness of Sector Bombing can be 
gauged from the fact that some of the most devastating attacks carried out by 
Bomber Command during the entire Bombing Offensive employed this 
technique.  The first occasion on which Sector Bombing was employed was 
against Brunswick on the night of 14/15 October 1944 by a force of 233 
Lancasters with 7 Mosquitoes in the marking role75. This relatively small urban 
area had poor definition on H2S and had hitherto proved to be a difficult 
target, with four previous major Bomber Command attacks in 1944 causing 
little damage, including the previous attack by No 5 Group on the 22/23 April 
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1944 using the original Visual Groundmarking technique.  The use of Sector 
Bombing in the October raid resulted in 150 hectares of the historic town 
centre being destroyed, the level of devastation being such that local officials 
estimated that 1,000 bombers carried out the raid76. Similar levels of 
devastation were achieved against several other targets, including Heilbronn 
on the 4/5 December 1944 when 82% of the town’s built up area was 
destroyed77, although Karlsruhe escaped a similar fate in February 1945 when 
cloud-cover caused the raid to be a complete failure78. This latter raid serves 
as a reminder that, even with advanced target marking techniques such as 
Sector Bombing, the weather could still dictate the success or failure of a raid. 
 
However, the most dramatic example of the effectiveness of Sector Bombing 
was the firestorm raid on Dresden on 13/14 February 194579.  The attack on 
Dresden was in two parts, separated in time by about three hours, a tactic that 
had been successfully used in a number of Bomber Command raids in the 
preceding months80.  Given the previous success of the Visual 
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Groundmarking techniques, it was no coincidence that the first raid, tasked 
with providing an unmistakable conflagration for the second raid, was 
provided by No 5 Group.  The requirement for an unmistakable conflagration 
was due, in part, because Dresden was close to the Russian front line. The 
town was beyond the range of GEE and Oboe, and was expected to provide a 
poor response on H2S. The only navigation aid capable of confirming the 
precise position at that range was S.S. LORAN and No 5 group was the only 
Group so equipped81. 
 
Although successful from the outset, the Sector Bombing technique had 
undergone several refinements since first used the previous October. The first 
of these refinements related to the initial illumination of the target area.  The 
flares and the dropping of the proximity marker was still undertaken by Flare 
Force I with the aid of the Ground Position Indicator (G.P.I.)82, but now the 
later aircraft in Flare Force I were able to drop their flares either blind using 
H2S and S.S. LORAN or visually in the light of the first flares. Other than the 
proximity marker (now known as the ‘Primary Green’), the use of T.I.’s 
(Green) was discontinued and the Marking Point was now marked visually 
exclusively using T.I.’s (Red) at the beginning of the attack.  It had also been 
recognised that one of the consequences of the Master Bomber operating 
from a low-level was that he was not able to observe the ground marking as it 
would appear from the higher altitude at which the Main Force was operating 
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and which was potentially above cloud. The final refinement of the Sector 
Bombing technique was therefore the introduction of ‘Check’ aircraft, again 
Lancaster aircraft from Nos. 83 and 97 Squadrons, the role of which was to 
confirm whether the TI’s were visible at the higher altitude before the 
instruction to commence bombing was given.  
 
The Marking Point for the Dresden attack was a distinctive sports stadium to 
the west of the town centre, with the Aiming Area containing the whole of the 
historic ‘Old Town’.  The initial illumination by Flare Force 1 was on time and 
the Primary Green was accurately placed over an S-bend in the River Elbe.  
The first TI’s placed by the Marker Leader were within 100 yards of the 
Marking Point and these were accurately backed-up by TI’s Red by two other 
marker aircraft.  The Check aircraft confirmed that the TI’s Red were visible 
from above a thin layer of cloud over Dresden and, six minutes before zero 
hour, the Master Bomber was satisfied that marking was complete.  The 
Marker Leader and one reserve were instructed to remain in the target area 
as Long Stops83; the remaining five marking aircraft were sent home without 
having to drop their markers. The instruction for the Main Force to commence 
bombing was given by the Master Bomber two minutes before Zero-hour and 
seventeen minutes later the bombing was complete84.  
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There is some debate as to the effectiveness of this first raid; David Irving and 
Kevin Wilson85 both describe a very effective attack whereas Martin 
Middlebrook/Chris Everett86 describe it as being ‘moderately successful’ and 
Richard Overy as being ‘not very effective’87. However, some indication of its 
effectiveness may be gauged from the Final Raid Report, which confirms that 
the fires from the first raid were visible from a distance of 100 miles. 
Moreover, the second raid had been planned as a Controlled Newhaven to be 
carried out by the Pathfinder Force but, although the Illuminators dropped a 
succession of flares, the Master Bomber and Deputy Master Bomber were 
unable to identify the A/P in the light and smoke of the fires below. The Master 
Bomber therefore directed the TI’s Red and TI’s Green to be dropped on each 
side of the conflagration to mark the limits of the new point of aim, and 
directed successive waves of the Main Force to aim at these. It is impossible 
to know to what extent this improvised target marking contributed to the 
firestorm that developed at Dresden, but nonetheless the flexibility 
demonstrated by the Master Bomber in re-directing the Main Force is a further 
indication of the value of this technique. 
 
There were many circumstances that combined to result in the firestorm at 
Dresden, not the least being that the defences were negligible. This enabled 
the Main Force in both raids to descend to a much lower altitude for bombing 
than would normally be the case against a heavily defended city and also 
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reduced the tendency for the Main Force crews to bomb short of the A/P, 
thereby minimising ‘creepback’. These factors undoubtedly contributed to the 
good concentration of bombing required for a firestorm to develop. However, 
there can equally be no doubt that the target marking techniques played a 
significant part, particularly the conflagration started by the Sector Bombing 
technique used by No 5 Group in the first raid. Against a target outside Oboe 
range and with a poor response on H2S, and with S.S. Loran not itself being 
sufficiently accurate for blind ground marking techniques, the only technique 
which could have achieved the concentration necessary to start a firestorm (or 
at least provide conditions for the second raid to generate a firestorm) was by 
confirming the Marking Point visually from a low level.  This meant Visual 
Groundmarking, of which Sector Bombing was the most effective version, the 
irony being that the 5 Group techniques of visual groundmarking, which 
started as a technique employed by No 617 Squadron specifically intended to 
facilitate attacks on small precision targets such as aircraft factories, turned 
into the most effective technique for area attacks. 
 
This does, however, raise the obvious question: if the Marking Point was 
marked with such accuracy, why was Visual Groundmarking not used to 
attack specific points in Dresden rather than as a precursor to an area raid?  
The attack on Dresden was part of OPERATION THUNDERCLAP, one of the 
key objectives of which was the bombing of Berlin, Leipzig and Dresden, 
where heavy attack would cause great confusion in civilian evacuation from 
the East and hamper movement of reinforcements from other fronts88.  It is 
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apparent that the Visual Groundmarking technique was sufficiently accurate to 
achieve that objective by destroying the extensive marshalling yards to the 
east of the city centre. In the event, as David Irving points out89, the 
designated Aiming Area for the Dresden raid did not include the marshalling 
yards. Neither did it include any of the eighteen railway stations in the city or 
the Marienbrücke railway bridge over the River Elbe, across which the main 
railway lines all passed. An attack led by Visual Groundmarking would have 
been sufficiently accurate to have included these targets either individually, in 
relation to the Marshalling yards, or by aligning the Aiming Area to include the 
key transportation installations. In this respect, the raid on Dresden can be 
immediately distinguished from the raid on Munich by No 5 Group on 24/25 
April 1944, for which the A/P was the marshalling yards, albeit that the A/P 
was selected in the knowledge that stray bombs would fall in the built-up area 
of the city90. It is not within the remit of this thesis to debate whether 
OPERATION THUNDERCLAP was necessary or whether an area attack on 
Dresden was justified on other grounds.  The point made here is that target 
marking techniques, particularly Visual Groundmarking, provided an 
alternative to the area attack that could have secured the objectives of 
OPERATION THUNDERCLAP without resulting in the destruction of Dresden 
and thereby avoiding the political fallout that followed.  This is a point not 
widely considered in the extensive literature on the Dresden raid, but provides 
a further perspective in which the long-standing debate on the Allies’ conduct 
in respect of this raid may be viewed. 
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The success of the No 5 Group techniques should not be allowed to disguise 
the improvements that had simultaneously taken place in the techniques 
employed by No 8 Group.  This improvement was not achieved by the 
introduction of any new techniques, but rather by the refinement of existing 
techniques91 and a more efficient execution of those techniques.  To a large 
extent, the latter resulted from factors not related to the target marking 
techniques employed, including the employment of a smaller Main Force 
(thereby reducing ‘creepback’), lower bombing heights due to weaker 
defences and an improvement in bomb aiming resulting from greater average 
operational experience of the Main Force crews as loss rates declined. The 
degree of accuracy and concentration now possible with these techniques 
was demonstrated in a series of raids on smaller German towns that took 
place in the closing months of the bombing offensive.  The attack on 
Pforzheim on the night of 23/24 February 1945 was one of the most effective 
during this period92, with the post-war British Bombing Survey Unit estimating 
that 83% of the town’s built-up area was destroyed and resulting in the third 
highest death toll in Germany behind the firestorms at Hamburg and 
Dresden93.  The results achieved using the high-level target marking 
techniques of the Pathfinder Force in the closing months of the bombing 
offensive represent the pinnacle of efficiency capable with those techniques 
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but, as the table above shows, the level of accuracy achieved fell short of that 
achieved by the low-level techniques developed by No 5 Group. 
  
The development of specialist target marking techniques by No 5 Group, and 
to a lesser extent those developed by No 1 Group, resulted in a position 
whereby those Groups were capable of mounting independent raids at Group 
strength. The possibility of splitting the Main Force into two or more smaller 
streams had been one of the measures recommended in a report by ORSBC 
prepared as part of a wider review of tactics in response to an increased loss 
rate94, and had been well received both by Bennett at No 8 Group and 
Cochrane at No 5 Group95. Harris also supported the proposal to split the 
Main Force but made it clear that the size of the PFF could not be 
increased96.  It was this limiting factor, together with the limited availability of 
navigational aids such as H2S, that in large part dictated the standard tactic 
employed by Bomber Command of concentrating the Main Force into one 
large stream. However, following the introduction of Window97, the German 
night fighter force had adopted the practice of infiltrating the bomber stream 
and this had resulted in the significant increase in the overall loss rate98.  It 
was also at this time that Bomber Command was beginning to turn its 
attention away from the Battle of Berlin, and towards precision targets in the 
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build-up to OPERATION OVERLORD. Clearly, given the number of targets to 
be attacked and the short period of time in which they must be attacked, the 
continued practice of a single bomber stream would have been impractical. 
Bomber Command was therefore obliged to split into smaller forces, each of 
which would require a target marking component. The success of the low-
level target marking techniques devised by No 5 Group from February 1944 
provided Harris with an alternative to those provided by the Pathfinder Force 
and therefore offered one means by which the split of the Main Force could be 
facilitated. 
 
It was a combination of these factors that led Harris to take one of the more 
controversial  - or, as Hastings99 termed it, ‘one of his more imaginative’ - 
decisions of his tenure as C-in-C Bomber Command: the transfer in April 1944 
of the two Lancaster squadrons and one Mosquito squadron from the 
Pathfinder Force to No 5 Group. The sequence of events leading up to this 
decision is set out in the Air Historical Branch Narrative100, and Bennett 
himself recounts that he was first advised that the use of the low-level marking 
technique was under consideration in a telephone conversation with Harris101. 
Bennett had resisted the idea, successfully as he thought at the time, on the 
basis that a fast, low-flying aircraft could not identify and mark a target in a 
densely built-up area at night. However, Bennett then found himself being 
summoned to HQ Bomber Command to receive the “frigid and formal 
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notification” from Harris that Nos. 83 and 97 Squadrons (Lancaster) and No 
627 Squadron (Mosquito) were being transferred to No 5 Group102.  
 
Bennett had gained the impression that the transfer of these squadrons was 
an experiment and within a couple of weeks made his first attempt to get his 
squadrons returned. Bennett began by saying that “I naturally do not wish to 
propose any view as to whether 5 Group are capable of working out correct 
pathfinder procedures”, surely an intimation that be believed otherwise, and 
claimed that the detachment had already affected PFF by taking some of the 
few H2S Mk III aircraft available103. Shortly after receiving this letter, Harris 
requested a note from Cochrane on the marking methods being developed by 
No 5 Group. In reply, Cochrane sent a detailed summary of the 5 Group 
technique and stated that the recent success of these methods was down to a 
well-trained flare force (i.e Nos. 83 and 97 Squadrons) together with the low 
level marking by No 627 Squadron104.  Whether Harris was convinced by this 
is not clear but nonetheless the squadrons remained in No 5 Group. However, 
Bennett had no intention of letting the matter rest there, and soon afterwards 
wrote to Harris asking him to re-consider the detachment of the Pathfinder 
Force Squadrons and urging him to return them as soon as possible105. Harris 
was still not persuaded and so, in a move that on its face held little prospect of 
success, Bennett visited Cochrane himself to ask for his two Lancaster 
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squadrons back. It would appear that this visit was without the C-in-C’s 
knowledge because, in a letter to Harris describing the meeting, Cochrane 
explained that the squadrons were gaining experience and “doing good work 
with the Master Bombers”, such that he would not wish to see the 
organisation broken up106. In the event, Cochrane won the day and Harris 
confirmed that he “had no intention of returning these two squadrons to the 
Pathfinder Force for the present or, as far as I can see for an indefinite period, 
if at all”107. Bennett finally learned that he would not be getting his squadrons 
back towards the end of July, when Harris confirmed that the detachment of 
Nos. 83 and 97 Squadrons should be regarded as “permanent 
detachments”108. 
 
In his autobiography, Bennett describes the decision to transfer part his force 
to No 5 Group as a …’tremendous slap in the face to a Force that turned 
Bomber Command from a wasteful and ineffective force to a mighty and 
successful one’109. Bennett believed that the PFF had “proved to be a vital 
factor in making the bomber offensive successful. It changed night bombing 
from something somewhat doubtful into a concrete and most powerful 
weapon” 110. Bennett also perceived that the transfer of these squadrons 
meant that, in the eyes of the rest of Bomber Command, “the pathfinders had 
apparently failed”111. Whilst this may be putting the complaint too high, there 
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can be no doubt that, as the Official History points out, the predominance and 
prestige of the Pathfinder Force was much reduced as a result of the transfer 
of three squadrons to No 5 Group112.  Indeed, a number of commentators, 
notably Hastings113, point out that the morale of the Pathfinder Force declined 
as a result of this and the subsequent success of the No 5 Group techniques 
in the closing months of the bombing offensive albeit, as shown in the 
improvement in efficiency shown by No 8 Group over thus period, this does 
not appear to have compromised the efficiency of the Pathfinder Force. 
 
The transfer of these three squadrons to No 5 Group also re-ignited the 
debate that surrounded the formation of the Pathfinder Force. Harris had 
advised Portal of the transfer of these squadrons on 11 April 1944 and, 
according to Portal, in so doing had stated that his (Harris) only opposition to 
the creation of the Pathfinder Force was that it would have been premature at 
that time. That did not accord with Portal’s recollection of events but he 
offered to check his records before commenting further. Portal replied formally 
to Harris on the 12 April 1944, confirming that; “I cannot find anything to 
substantiate your contention that the only opposition in your Headquarters to 
the formation of the PFF was that it would be premature. On the contrary, the 
arguments used against the scheme were that it would offer no advantage 
over the then existing procedure and would have serious disadvantages 
inseparable from the formation of a corps d’ẻlite. It is quite true to say that the 
opposition in Bomber Command resulted largely from the attitude of the 
Group Commanders, who were said to be ‘utterly, decisively and adamantly 
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opposed to the Air Ministry proposal. I quite realise that the success achieved 
by the PFF has been greater through the introduction of Oboe than it could 
have been without this particular aid, but this was not the point under 
discussion’. Portal concluded by saying that ‘On reading your letter to Bufton 
on the 17 April 1942, and his reply of 8 May 1942, I see no reason to modify 
my opinion as to where the credit lies for the Air Ministry share in what had 
been achieved. I hope that you will agree to have a talk some time with 
Bufton”114. 
 
If Portal had hoped that this would be the end of the matter, he was to be 
disappointed. Denying that he had ever claimed that his opposition to the 
formation of the Pathfinder Force was only one of prematurity, in a reply dated 
14 April 1944 Harris also stated that he had personally always maintained an 
open mind on the subject but that it was his Group Commanders who had 
been ‘…utterly opposed to the formation of a corps d’ẻlite on Bufton’s lines’. 
Harris re-affirmed that he personally had always favoured a system of 
pathfinding that did not drain the Groups of their best crews. Recalling his 
conversation with Portal on the 11 April, Harris firstly conceded that he had 
regarded the formation of the PFF as being premature in 1942 and that he 
believed that he been proved correct by subsequent events. In particular, he 
asserted that it was only the availability of Oboe and H2S in 1943 that had 
made the PFF worthwhile. Harris then stated that he was not convinced that 
the formation of the PFF as a single entity had been the best solution for 
target location and marking and the alternative had always been, and still 
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was, to form a pathfinder element in each Group to meet Bomber Command’s 
requirements without accepting the obvious disadvantages of a corps d’ẻlite 
creaming off the entire Command for one formation. In this context, Harris 
explained that it was now tactically necessary to split the bomber force in 
order to confuse and disperse the enemy defence system, and that the 
preparations for OPERATION OVERLORD required attacking multiple 
objectives on any one night. In these circumstances, Harris considered, the 
load of the Pathfinder Force was becoming unsupportable and, with that, it 
would become impossible for Bennett or any other single commander to keep 
pace with the inevitable demands placed upon him. In any event, Harris 
pointed out, “….in Bennett as an individual we have already far too many 
eggs in one basket” and that this was a problem to which he had already 
devoted much thought115.  
 
In relation to the last point, Harris explained that “After examining it at length 
with my Staff, with Bennett and Cochrane, I decided some days ago to detach 
back to 5 Group two Lancaster PFF Squadrons which 5 Group supported in 
PFF, plus one Mosquito IV (non-Oboe) Squadron for use as ‘lowmarkers’. 
Major reasons for this are that 5 Group is the biggest force and Cochrane is 
the most progressive and technically and tactically expert of my Group 
Commanders. His Group can therefore form one effective force, or even two, 
on its own during a combined attack on multiple objectives. He will also be 
free to use his own initiative in methods of training, pathfinding and marking, 
which he has exploited with outstanding success on some of the smaller 
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targets in France and Italy in the recent past”. Harris concluded this section of 
his response by indicating that it might prove desirable to extend this principle 
to other Groups, depending upon the personal ability of individual Group 
Commanders, and that he already had in mind the intention of making No 3 
Group an independent force using the G-H blind bombing device. 
 
Having dealt with issues surrounding the formation of the Pathfinder Force, 
Harris then went on the launch a scathing attack on Bufton who, it will be 
recalled, was Director of Bombing Operations and who had been the prime 
advocate for the formation of a target finding force, and whose methods, 
Harris complained, “…are rammed down our throats whether we like them or 
not”. Harris then returned to a familiar theme from the Pathfinder debate, re-
stating his view that “…. more weight is given to his (Bufton) opinions as a 
junior officer 2 years out of the Command than to the considered opinion of 
the Commander’s concerned on the spot and responsible for the outcome of 
events”. Although Portal had no intention of interfering with Harris’ decision to 
transfer the squadrons to 5 Group, correspondence on the role played by 
Bufton carried on for some time and, in the context of the sometimes troubled 
relationship between Harris and the Air Ministry, it is this aspect of this 
exchange that has received most coverage in secondary literature116. 
However, in the context of the development of target marking techniques, this 
exchange reveals much about the reasons behind the transfer of the 
squadrons from the Pathfinder Force to No 5 Group. 
 
                                                 
116
 See Probert, Bomber Harris, p.p. 267 to 269 and Saward, ‘Bomber’ Harris, p.p. 240 to 244. 
 350 
 
With the benefit of hindsight, these reasons appear to be sound.  In the event, 
the transfer of these three squadrons to No 5 Group resulted in operational 
advantages that outweighed the loss of morale to the crews of the Pathfinder 
Force. In particular, the development of different target marking techniques by 
No 5 Group, together with those developed by No 1 Group and the use of the 
G-H blind bombing device in daylight raids by No 3 Group, resulted in a 
tactical diversification within Bomber Command that would not have occurred 
otherwise and became fundamental to the success achieved by Bomber 
Command in the build-up to OPERATION OVERLORD, as well as against a 
wide range of precision and area targets in the closing months of the bombing 
offensive. Thus, as the Official History states, this diversification of target 
marking techniques greatly increased the operational ability and versatility of 
Bomber Command, and therefore the prospects of strategic air offensive117. 
Moreover, as Harris pointed out, one of the reasons why he opposed the 
formation of the Pathfinder Force in 1942 was that he envisaged the benefits 
that would result if each group had its own target marking capability rather 
than forming a single corps d’elite. In transferring the three squadrons to No 5 
Group, Harris was taking the first opportunity to implement a tactical solution 
that he had long held to be the correct one. In this Harris was proved correct 
and Bennett was proved to be wrong. Bennett himself always believed that in 
making this decision Harris was unduly influenced by Cochrane and his 
loyalty to him as a result of previous service associations118, and some 
commentators have also argued this to be the case119. But this does a 
                                                 
117
 Webster and Frankland The Strategic Air Offensive against Germany, p130. 
118
 Bennett, Pathfinder, p177.  See also Jackson, Pathfinder Bennett, p.p. 88 and 89. 
119
  Bramson, Master Airman, p.p. 90 and 91. 
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disservice to Harris. The final decision to transfer the three squadrons out of 
the Pathfinder force was unequivocally Harris’, and was consistent with his 
own previously expressed views about each Group having its own target 
marking capability. Harris has not been afforded due credit in secondary 
literature for improvement in operational efficiency and performance that 
resulted from that decision. 
 
The point Harris made in terms of the workload that Bennett personally, and 
the Pathfinder Force as a whole, would have been under in the build up to 
OPERATION OVERLORD and the period immediately following was also a 
valid one. One particular operation demonstrates the point, this being an 
attack on eight separate coastal batteries involving the marking of eight 
individual Aiming Points at 20 minute intervals over a period of nearly three 
hours120. The attack was a Controlled Musical Newhaven with a Master 
Bomber for each separate A/P and a ‘Long Stop’ to cover the entire attack. 
The planning for this raid, involving the calculation of eight Oboe co-ordinates 
and a marking plan for each A/P, involved a considerable effort by PFF 
Headquarters and the operation itself, which required eight Master Bombers, 
eight Deputy Master Bombers as well as eight sets of Primary markers and 
backers up. This represented a considerable administrative and 
organisational effort, and left no spare capacity in the Group. The extension of 
target marking capability to No 5 Group therefore provided Bomber Command 
                                                 
120
 This operation took place on 10 September 1944 and is described in detail by Sean Feast 
in Master Bombers: the Experiences of a Pathfinder Squadron at War 1944-1945 (London: 
Grub Street, 2008). The eight individual A/P’s were each named after cars (Alvis I to IV, 
Bentley I and II, and Buick I and II). 
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with enhanced capacity within Bomber Command and eased the burden on 
the Pathfinder Force. 
 
Harris’ indication that it might prove desirable to extend target marking 
capability to other Groups, depending upon the personal ability of individual 
Group Commanders, is also an interesting one. In addition to No 5 Group, No 
1 Group also acquired its own target marking capability although this did not 
involve the transfer of a squadron away from the Pathfinder Force121. In the 
case of No 1 Group, this was achieved by forming a Special Duties Flight 
comprised of one specially selected crew from each squadron in the Group. It 
is noteworthy that there is no indication that this creaming off of selected 
crews from the individual squadrons generated the same opposition to the 
creation of a corps d’ẻlite as did the formation of the Pathfinder Force itself or 
whether, following the success of No 617 Squadron in the target marking role, 
this was no longer considered as being undesirable. The new unit, officially 
titled 1 Special Duties Flight (1 SDF) but more usually known as the ‘Binbrook 
Flight’, first operated in a successful attack on the Maintenon ammunition 
dump on the night of 30 April/1 May 1944122 and thereafter provided target 
marking for a number of raids in which the entire attacking force was provided 
by No 1 Group. Similarly, No 3 Group, whilst usually employed in the blind 
bombing role using G-H, also possessed a target marking capability using that 
device. These three Groups were all equipped fully equipped with the Avro 
                                                 
121
 Patrick Otter 1 Group: Swift to Attack: Bomber Command’s Unsung Heroes (Barnsley: Pen 
& Sword Aviation, 2012), p.p. 162 and 163.  
122
 TNA AIR14/3411 Raid Report No 592, 4 September 1944. Details of the raid on Maintenon 
are taken from Middlebrook and Everitt The Bomber Command War Diaries, p503. 
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Lancaster123. It is interesting, therefore, that neither of the remaining two 
Groups in Bomber Command, No 4 Group fully equipped with the Handley 
Page Halifax and 6 Group, largely equipped with the Handley Page Halifax 
but with two squadrons equipped with the Avro Lancaster Mk II124, developed 
their own target marking capability. There is no technical reason why the 
aircraft with which these groups were equipped could not have performed 
target marking and, whilst no evidence has been found to prove or disprove 
the supposition, the comments made by Harris suggest that it was quality of 
the Group Commanders that prevented these Groups from developing their 
own target marking capability. Given the success enjoyed by No 5 Group in 
this respect, and to a more limited extent No 1 Group, this would appear to be 
the only reason why Harris did not extend the principle of independent target 
marking capability to these Groups in accordance with his stated preference 
at the time of the formation of the Pathfinders and as re-asserted in the 
exchange with Portal in April 1944. 
 
The most interesting aspect of Harris’ comments is his contention that the 
only opposition to the formation of the PFF was that it would be premature. 
Portal was correct in finding no evidence in earlier correspondence to that 
effect. This would suggest that Harris’ concession that he had regarded the 
formation of the PFF as being premature in 1942, and that he believed that he 
been proved correct by subsequent events, was his retrospective assessment 
                                                 
123
 In all cases, the Lancasters operated by these groups were the Rolls Royce Merlin 
powered MkI or Mk III versions. 
124
 The Mk II version of the Avro Lancaster was powered by the Bristol Hercules radial engine 
and, in addition to possessing a lesser performance than the Rolls Royce Merlin powered Mk 
I and Mk III versions (in particular, a lower operational ceiling and shorter range), could not 
accommodate H2S because of the bulged bomb bay fitted to this version.  
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of the achievements secured by the Pathfinder Force. This in itself is not an 
accurate assessment of the early achievements of the Pathfinder Force, the 
employment of which had generally resulted in a greater concentration in 
bombing (see Chapter Five). However, Harris was correct in his assertion that 
the Pathfinder Force had only become fully effective (or, as Harris termed it, 
‘worthwhile’) with the introduction of H2S and Oboe. As shown in Chapter 
Five of this thesis, it was the introduction of these devices, particularly Oboe, 
and the evolution of target marking techniques in conjunction with them that 
transformed the performance and destructive capability of Bomber Command. 
This is not to say that the period of time between the formation of the 
Pathfinder Force in August 1942 and the introduction of H2S and Oboe early 
in 1943 was entirely redundant; as described in Chapter Five, the early 
operations led by the Pathfinder Force did generally result a greater 
concentration of bombing than had been achieved beforehand. Perhaps more 
importantly, many of the techniques that were employed successfully in 
conjunction with H2S and Oboe were evolved in that period, and many of the 
lessons learned contributed to the success achieved using those devices. 
Nevertheless, Harris’ retrospective assessment that the Pathfinder Force only 
became worthwhile once Bomber Command was equipped with suitable 
navigational aids is an early recognition of the fundamental relationship 
between the value of target marking techniques and the performance of the 
navigation aid on which they are based.  
 
The indirect marking techniques evolved by No 5 Group represented a 
significant divergence in the development of target marking techniques.  The 
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basic techniques used by the Pathfinder Force, in addition to being based on 
a single and direct A/P, were based upon the application of science and 
technology to the problem of providing a distinctive point of aim. By contrast, 
the indirect marking techniques evolved by No 5 Group, particularly those that 
involved an initial low-level marking phase, relied to a much greater extent on 
the ‘human factor’ including, amongst others, the judgement of distance from 
the A/P and communication skills. However, whilst these human factors were 
an integral part of the No 5 Group techniques, they were not entirely exclusive 
to them and could be applied in some measure to the more scientific 
approach used by the Pathfinder Force. In particular, the use of an 
experienced ‘Master Bomber’ to control and direct an attack was a feature not 
only of all the target-marking techniques employed by No 5 Group, but was 
also increasingly used by the Pathfinder Force as part of their standard 
repertoire of target-marking techniques. The following Chapter will trace the 
introduction of the ‘Master Bomber’ into target marking techniques and will 
seek to evaluate the contribution made by this technique to performance 
achieved by Bomber Command.   
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CHAPTER SEVEN:  THE ROLE OF THE MASTER BOMBER 
 
 
The low level marking techniques developed by No 5 Group described in the 
previous Chapter all shared a common element: the marking and main forces 
were controlled by a ‘raid leader’ using radio telephony to commentate on the 
accuracy of marking and bombing, and to issue instructions to either identify 
the most accurate markers or, if necessary, to correct errors in the marking. 
The use of radio telephony in this way was not exclusive to No 5 Group, being 
used extensively by No 8 Group and, to a lesser extent, No 1 Group. The 
technique was developed and refined over time, and was known by a variety 
of different names, including ‘Raid Leader’, ‘Raid Commentator’, ‘Raid 
Controller’ and ‘Master of Ceremonies’: for present purposes and in the 
interests of clarity, the technique will be referred to here using the generic 
term of ‘Master Bomber’.  However, despite frequent reference to Master 
Bombers in secondary literature, nowhere in that extensive body of literature 
has an attempt been made to quantify or critically assess the role played by 
Master Bombers in the outcome of the bombing offensive. This Chapter will 
examine the introduction and development of the Master Bomber as a 
component of target marking techniques, and will evaluate the contribution 
made by the use of a Master Bomber to the accuracy and efficiency of those 
techniques as the bombing offensive progressed. As such, it will seek to 
rectify a glaring omission in the secondary literature of the bombing offensive. 
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As with the formation of the Pathfinder Force, there is some debate over the 
first use of the Master Bomber technique. The first reference to a Master 
Bomber found is in the autobiography of Wing Commander Bill Anderson, 
who was one of the original staff on the formation of the PFF1. In his 
autobiography, Anderson indicates that he first proposed the concept of a 
Master Bomber as a Staff Officer at Bomber Command HQ in 1941 but the 
idea had been firmly rejected2. Anderson resurrected the idea when a Staff 
Officer at PFF HQ although, according to his autobiography, his idea was not 
intended to improve accuracy but was “almost entirely about morale raising” 
through the use of encouragement for less experienced crews. Anderson 
recalls that his idea was tried on the second raid mounted by the Pathfinder 
Force (against Frankfurt on the night of 24/25 August 1942), in which Wing 
Commander Pat Daniels acted as ‘Master of Ceremonies’. However, although 
Daniels believed the bombing to be south of the target, he was unsuccessful 
in diverting the bombing onto the correct A/P3. Anderson explains in his 
autobiography that the concept of the Master Bomber was shelved until 
suitable equipment was received and, whilst Sean Feast suggests that Wing 
Commander Daniels was authorised to make a further attempt during a raid 
against Munich in March 1943, this was thwarted by the weather conditions4. 
 
As described in Chapter Six, the employment of a Master Bomber was one of 
the suggestions made at a conference to discuss the performance of the then 
                                                 
1
 Anderson Pathfinders, page 57. 
2
 No copy of the minute Anderson claims to have written on this subject has been found. 
3
 ‘Master of Ceremonies’ was one of the several alternative names for a Master Bomber. The 
Master of Ceremonies on the Frankfurt raid was Wing Commander Pat Daniels, who would 
later become one of the most able and experienced of the Master Bombers. 
4
 Feast The Pathfinder Companion, p57.   
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nascent Pathfinder Force in November 19425. The suggestion, which was put 
forward by No 5 Group, was that one or two aircraft should be detailed to 
control the PFF and re-direct its effort if required. The minutes of this 
conference do not record whether those attending were made aware of the 
apparent failure of the ‘Master of Ceremonies’ to re-direct bombing during the 
raid on Frankfurt a few months previously and there is no evidence to show 
that the suggestion made by No 5 Group was acted upon. Nonetheless, as 
will evident from the following, No 5 Group became one of the leading 
exponents of the use of a Master Bomber to direct raids. 
 
There is therefore a general acknowledgement that the first occasion on 
which a bombing force was controlled by radio telephony was the Dams Raid 
on 16/17 May 1943, and this leads some commentators to attribute the first 
use of the Master Bombing technique to this operation6. However, on that 
occasion Wing Commander Guy Gibson used radio telephony primarily to 
order the crews taking part to begin their individual attacks on to a single, 
previously specified target for which the small force had been specifically 
trained7. This was a significantly different exercise to the direction of a large 
bomber force for the purposes of bombing an ever-changing pattern of 
markers on the ground. Consequently, whilst the Dams Raid may have 
initiated the use of radio telephony to direct a bomber force, it can not be 
                                                 
5
 TNA AIR14/3062 Minutes of Conference of Group Officers and BQD Commanders held at 
Wyton on the 28
th
 November 1942 at 11:00 hours. See Chapter Five. 
6
 Feast The Pathfinder Companion, p57. Sean Feast is amongst those that have expressed 
this view. 
7
 There are numerous published accounts of the Dams Raid and the use made of radio 
telephony during that operation. The sources referred to here were: James Holland Dam 
Busters; The race to smash the Dams 1943 (London: Bantam Press, 2012); Lawrence, No.5 
Group RAF; John Sweetman The Dambusters Raid: (London: Arms and Armour Press, 
revised paperback edition 2003); and Colin Ward et al. Dambusters: the definitive history of 
617 Squadron at war 1943-1945 (Walton-on-Thames: Red Kite Publishing, 2003). 
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considered to be the first use of a Master Bomber in the generally recognised 
sense. 
 
The first occasion on which a Master Bomber was used to control a main 
force raid took place shortly after the Dams Raid on the night of 20/21 June 
1943, when a force of 60 Lancasters of No 5 Group attacked the former 
Zeppelin works at Friedrichshafen, on the shores of Lake Constance. It is 
significant that this first use of a Master Bomber was made by No 5 Group 
and not, as perhaps might have been expected, by the PFF. This is further 
evidence of the development of precision night bombing by No 5 Group and 
that it was the use of radio telephony in the Dams Raid, which was a 5 Group 
operation, led directly led to the first employment of a Master Bomber to 
control a main force raid.  
 
The former Zeppelin works at Friedrichshafen was by that time engaged in the 
production of components for radar sets and was considered to be a genuine 
bottleneck in the production of these sets. However, the factory presented a 
very small target deep into Germany and a daylight raid would have incurred 
prohibitive losses. Precision bombing at night would therefore be necessary. 
This presented a number of particular operational difficulties and a special 
plan of attack, codenamed ‘OPERATION BELLICOSE’, was evolved to tackle 
them8. The attack was to be in two parts. The early aircraft would bomb TIs 
placed by a small number of aircraft provided by No 8 Group, the accuracy of 
which was first to be checked by the Master Bomber. It was, however, 
                                                 
8
 TNA AIR20/782. This file, titled ‘Operation Bellicose’, contains records relating to the 
preparation and operational orders for the raid. 
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recognised that such a small target would quickly be obscured by the smoke 
and dust generated by the early bombing. When that point was reached, the 
later arrivals would be instructed by the Master Bomber to undertake ‘time & 
distance’ runs from a prominent landmark on Lake Constance, to be identified 
by the light of flares dropped by one of the pathfinder aircraft.  
 
The ‘time & distance’ technique, which it will be recalled had been attempted 
with limited success by No 4 Group as early as June 1940, was included at 
the behest of Cochrane of No 5 Group. Cochrane had first proposed the idea 
to Harris in January 1943 when AOC No 3 Group, suggesting a timed run 
from a distinctive landmark some 10 miles from the A/P9.  Harris was not 
initially receptive, indicating that he wanted to determine whether markers laid 
down by scientific methods would give better results than bomb aiming by 
visual recognition of the A/P10. However, as AOC No 5 Group, Cochrane 
continued to refine his ideas and proposed low-level marking to provide the 
start point for the timed run where there was no distinctive landmark, this on 
the basis that it was easier to mark a point from low level outside the 
defended target area than the A/P itself11.  OPERATION BELLICOSE would 
be the first significant use of the time & distance method, and to ensure 
accuracy the bombing at Friedrichshafen was to take place at the unusually 
low heights of between 5,000ft and 10,000ft. 
 
                                                 
9
 TNA AIR14/3522 Letter from Air-Vice Marshal R.A.C. Cochrane, AOC No 3 Group, to C-in-C 
Bomber Command, 12
 
January 1943. 
10
 TNA AIR14/3522 Letter from C-in-C Bomber Command to Air-Vice Marshal R.A.C. 
Cochrane, AOC No 3 Group, 5
 
March 1943 
11
 RAFM Harris Papers, H59 Letter Cochrane to Harris, 28 April 1943. 
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OPERATION BELLICOSE suffered an early set back when the Master 
Bomber’s aircraft developed engine trouble before reaching the target area 
and control was handed over to the Deputy Master Bomber. Further problems 
arose when the active defences caused the Deputy Master Bomber to order 
an increase in the altitude from which bombing was to take place by some 
5,000ft above the heights originally allocated. Unbeknown to the Deputy 
Master Bomber, the wind speed was significantly greater at the new bombing 
altitude than that stated in the Operation Order.  The increased wind speed 
caused the TIs dropped by the first two pathfinder aircraft to fall short of the 
target but the third set of markers were accurately placed and, having 
checked them, the Deputy Master Bomber ordered bombing to commence. 
The bombing was accurate and, as expected, the accurately placed markers 
were soon obscured. The Deputy Master Bomber therefore ordered the switch 
to the time & distance method for the remainder of the attack. Post-raid 
reconnaissance revealed that some 10% of bombs dropped hit the small 
factory and much damage was caused12. 
 
The success achieved by OPERATION BELLICOSE would not have been 
possible without the presence of a Master Bomber (or, in that case, the 
Deputy Master Bomber). The complexities of the attack, including the 
assessment of the initial marking of a small target and the switch in bombing 
technique whilst the raid was in progress, necessitated an element of control 
that would not have existed if individual crews were reliant upon instructions 
                                                 
12
 Middlebrook and Everitt The Bomber Command War Diaries, p 399. Middlebrook also 
suggests that, although not known to the Allies at the time, the factory had been selected as 
one of two locations for the production of components for the V2 rocket and this caused some 
disruption to that programme. See Middlebrook The Peenemunde Raid, p51. 
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issued at the initial briefing for the raid. The increase in bombing altitude was 
a real-time decision made in direct response to unexpectedly strong defences, 
and could not have been pre-planned. Similarly, although the change in 
bombing altitude itself caused some difficulties, these were overcome by the 
ability of the Master Bomber to assess the initial marking and initiate the 
necessary adjustments. The obvious lesson was that the increasing 
complexity of target marking techniques in turn demanded a greater degree of 
control than had previously been employed if they were to be successful. 
 
It was this degree of control that led to the Master Bomber technique being 
employed in one of the most important raids of the bombing offensive: the 
attack on the rocket research establishment at Peenemünde, on the Baltic 
coast, known as ‘OPERATION HYDRA’13. The Peenemünde site was of such 
importance as a target that special tactics would be needed, similar in concept 
to those used in the Friedrichshafen raid. However, that raid had been carried 
out by a relatively small force, comprising only about 10% of the average Main 
Force raid at that time. OPERATION HYDRA would involve the entire Main 
Force and control of a force of this size presented its own difficulties, not least 
in terms of the duration of a main raid and the risk to the Master Bomber in 
terms of being in the target area for that period of time.  
 
                                                 
13
 TNA AIR20/4040 Although the attack on Peenemünde was allocated the codename 
‘OPERATION HYDRA’, unlike other operations of this period the records for this raid are not 
referenced under that codename. It is also noteworthy that there is no copy of the Operation 
Order for the Peenemünde raid in the TNA files. Some of the detail of the attack referred to in 
this Chapter is taken from the copy of the original Operation Order reproduced as Appendix 1 
in Middlebrook, The Peenemunde Raid. 
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It is therefore unsurprising that the first use of a Master Bomber in a full scale 
Main Force attack was a rehearsal for OPERATION HYDRA against the 
relatively ‘soft’ target of Turin. This raid took place on the night of 7/8 August 
1943, the Master Bomber chosen being Group Captain J.H.Searby, then 
commanding No 83 Squadron, one of the founder squadrons of the Pathfinder 
Force14. Notwithstanding that the most recent operational use of a Master 
Bomber was by No 5 Group, and that the only attempt by the Pathfinders to 
employ a Master Bomber was the abortive attempt of a year previously, this 
choice of No 8 Group officer was deliberate because OPERATION HYDRA 
would involve the whole of the Main Force. The ORSBC report for the Turin 
raid refers to the use of a ‘Raid Commentator’, commenting that this appeared 
to give the Main Force crews “great confidence” and successfully directed 
aircraft to bomb the correct markers15.  
 
In his autobiography Everlasting Arms, Searby recalls that the idea of a 
‘Master of Ceremonies’ had been postulated by Bennett as a means of 
gaining tighter control over bombing performance in normal Main Force raids 
in terms of improved concentration and fewer wasted bombs16. The use of a 
Master Bomber is another example of the tension between No 5 Group and 
No 8 Group and clearly rankled with Bennett who, in his own autobiography, 
complains that No 5 Group had been allowed to use a Master Bomber on the 
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 Searby, The Everlasting Arms, p139. Searby was not aware that he was taking part in a 
trial run for the Peenemünde raid and recalled that his only contribution over Turin was to 
seek to correct the ‘creep-back’ that had developed 
15
 TNA AIR14/3410 ORSBC Final raid Report No 396: Turin, 7/8 August 1943, 4 October 
1943.  
16
Searby, The Everlasting Arms, p139. 
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“easy undefended target of Friedrichshafen”, apparently forgetting that his 
own group had employed the technique without success a year previously17.  
 
The experiment was not repeated and a Master Bomber would not be used 
again until the Peenemünde raid itself on the 17/18 August 194318. The rocket 
research establishment at Peenemünde was situated on a peninsula formed 
by the River Peene and the Baltic, and was located south of the large and 
distinctively shaped Rügen Island. At the tip of the Peenemünde peninsula 
was a small island, Ruden Island. The combination of the distinctive land 
shapes and areas of water was expected to present a good image on the 
P.P.I. of the H2S-equipped Pathfinder aircraft19. The operation required 
attacks on three separate parts of the rocket research establishment: the 
Experimental Works; the V2 Production Works; and the housing estate. These 
three targets were broadly aligned on a north-south axis, such that an 
approach down the distinctive east coast of Rügen Island would take the 
bombers directly over Ruden Island and all three targets. The marking plan 
was a complicated one, in three consecutive but separate phases, but was 
essentially a Controlled Newhaven attack.  
 
Blind Markers would initially drop Red Spot fires at the northern tip of Ruden 
Island to provide a start point for the approach to the target; these would be 
refreshed at regular intervals throughout the raid. The Blind Markers of the 
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 Bennett Pathfinder, p171. 
18
 TNA AIR14/3410 ORSBC Final Raid Report No 404: Peenemünde, 17/18 August 1943, 20 
October 1943. A detailed description of the Peenemünde raid may be found in Middlebrook, 
The Peenemunde Raid 17/18. 
19
 At that time, all Pathfinder aircraft were fitted with the MkII version of H2S. 
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First Wave were then to drop a combination of TIs Red to serve as proximity 
markers to identify the general target area for the Visual Markers and flares to 
illuminate the A/P for the Visual Markers, this being the housing estate and 
the southernmost of the three target areas. The Visual Markers were to mark 
the exact A/P with the Primary Markers (TIs Yellow), to be backed up by 
Secondary Markers (TIs Green). The instructions to the main force were to 
aim at the TIs Yellow if visible, and the M.P.I. of the TIs Green if not. 
 
The novel element of this raid was that, at the completion of the First Phase of 
bombing, the A/P had to be shifted from the housing estate to the V2 
Production Works for the Second Phase. The shifting of the A/P whilst the 
attack was in progress had never been attempted before and was to be 
undertaken at a pre-specified time by the most experienced crews in each 
Pathfinder squadron, specially selected as designated ‘Shifters’. The 
technique used was a variation of what would later become known as ‘Offset 
marking’ (see Chapter Six) whereby a deliberate and precisely calculated 
false wind vector was set on the bomb sight20. By aiming at the M.P.I. of the 
Secondary Markers of the First Phase, the TIs Red of the Shifters would fall 
on the A/P for the Second Phase, this being one mile further back along the 
line of approach than the A/P for the First Phase. These would then be 
backed-up with TIs (Green) which, because the A/P was a mile short of the 
A/P for the First Phase, should appear as a separate and distinct pattern. 
 
                                                 
20
 Setting a height on the bombsight lower than the height at which the aircraft was actually 
flying would result in an undershoot. Conversely, setting a height on the bombsight higher 
than the height at which the aircraft was actually flying would result in an overshoot. 
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The process was then to be repeated again for the Third Phase, the A/P for 
which the target was the Experimental Works. In addition, the aircraft of No 5 
Group would use the time & distance technique, starting from the northern tip 
of Rügen Island and using the landmarks on the east coast of the island to 
check time and heading. The timed run would start from Ruden Island, which 
would be marked by Red Spot fires. However, this was not to be a purely time 
& distance attack. The No 5 Group crews were instructed that, at the end of 
their time & distance run, they should aim for the Pathfinder TIs unless these 
were obviously misplaced. If the crews were unsure about the accuracy of 
these markers, they were to be guided by the instructions of the Master 
Bomber and only if no markers were visible, or the Master Bomber advised 
that the markers were misplaced, was the time & distance method to be used 
alone. 
 
The accuracy of marking and bombing in each phase was to be checked by 
the Master Bomber or, if for any reason the Master Bomber was not able to 
communicate with the Main Force, by the Deputy Master Bomber. This 
complicated plan, if successful, would result in the bombing migrating 
northwards over three separate A/Ps, each one mile part, over a time period 
of 40 minutes. 
 
As with the Friedrichshafen raid, the attack on Peenemünde started badly 
when the Blind Markers failed to place the Red Spot Fires accurately on the 
northern tip of Ruden Island. The difficulty was caused by the unexpectedly 
poor return presented by Ruden Island on the P.P.I. of the H2S sets, which 
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caused the Blind Markers to mistake the Peenemünde peninsula for Ruden 
Island, an error of some two miles. The result was that the majority of the 
proximity markers and flares dropped by the Blind Markers were displaced by 
a similar distance to the south of the target for the First Phase (the housing 
estate) where, by coincidence, they fell on a labour camp exactly two miles 
further south. This error was compounded by at least one of the Visual 
Markers, although two of the five Visual Markers did place their T.I.s (Yellow) 
on the correct A/P. The result was two distinct groups of markers, the larger 
being the inaccurately placed markers two miles south of the correct A/P. The 
error was quickly spotted by the Master Bomber, who broadcast instructions 
to the Main Force to ignore the incorrectly placed T.I.s (Red), but this took 
time and some of the early arrivals bombed the inaccurately placed markers 
before the instructions could be broadcast. 
 
After the initial confusion, the Backing-up proceeded normally and the A/P 
remained marked throughout the 15 minutes of the Main Force bombing of 
the First Phase. This was crucial for the next phase of the attack, because the 
TIs Green of the Backers-up would provide the reference point for the 
‘shifting’ of the marking onto the target for Phase Two of the attack. However, 
despite the accuracy of the Backing-up, only one of the marker-loads dropped 
by the Shifters was accurately placed, the other five either undershooting or 
overshooting by nearly a mile. As before, the error was quickly spotted by the 
Master Bomber, who instructed Main Force to aim for the accurately placed 
marker. At this stage, another problem became apparent, in that an 
unexpectedly strong crosswind at ground level was drifting the cascading 
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markers to the east.   The Master Bomber had detected this towards the end 
of the first wave but his efforts to instruct Main Force to take account of the 
draft in the markers met with only limited success.  
 
The dilution of the marking effort due to the crosswind was to present 
difficulties for the Third Phase, and the shifting of the marking at the end of 
Phase Two was even less effective than with the first phase. Two of the 
marker loads overshot the target by some 1,000 yards but the other three 
overshot by a considerable distance, some landing as far south as the A/P for 
the First Phase. The situation was exacerbated by the fact that the Master 
Bomber was focusing on the drift of the markers in the preceding phase and 
failed to notice the error in the marking, and issued no instructions to correct 
the error. This is significant, in that the No 5 Group crews in the Third Phase 
were only to rely upon their time & distance run if no markers were visible, or 
the Master Bomber advised that the markers were misplaced. The approach 
along the east coast of Rügen Island had provided good checks and most 
crews were able to make accurately timed runs. However, presented with the 
sight of the Pathfinder Markers, and with no indication from the Master 
Bomber that these were misplaced, many No 5 Group crews aimed at the 
misplaced markers instead of relying upon their time & distance runs. Later 
analysis would show that those No 5 Group crews that did rely on their time & 
distance runs were more accurate than those that relied upon the Pathfinders 
markers21. 
                                                 
21
 Middlebrook The Peenemunde Raid. In his book, Middlebrook suggests that Air Vice-
Marshal Cochrane, AOC of No 5 Group, was annoyed that his Group had not been allowed to 
attack Peenemünde on its own using just the time & distance technique. According to 
Middlebrook, Cochrane had been convinced that Peenemünde would have been totally 
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The Friedrichshafen and Peenemünde raids have been set out in some detail 
here because they both demonstrate the benefits and problems associated 
with the control of large bomber forces by a Master Bomber. In both raids, the 
Master Bomber was able to detect initial errors in the target marking to correct 
those errors through instructions to the later marking crews and the Main 
Force. In the Peenemünde raid, the Master Bomber was also able to detect 
the error in the first ‘shift’ in the A/P and to correct that error also. In relation to 
such small targets, it may be reasonably concluded that the attacks would 
have substantially failed had a Master Bomber not been employed. In both 
raids, the Master Bomber was able to detect changes in wind strength and 
direction and, at least to some extent, to compensate by issuing instructions 
to the Main Force and thereby improve both the accuracy and concentration 
of the bombing. 
 
The other benefit concerns one of the reasons why a Master Bomber was first 
proposed by Wing Commander Anderson in 1942: the effect on morale. In his 
book The Peenemunde Raid 17/18 August 194322, Martin Middlebrook 
includes a number of quotes from aircrew that took part in the Peenemünde 
raid, all of which refer to the boost in morale provided by hearing ‘a calm, 
authoritative English voice encouraging the crews and providing guidance on 
the markers to aim for’. It is impossible to quantify the effect this may have 
had on the overall bombing performance, although it is a reasonable 
assumption that this effect was a positive one. 
                                                                                                                                            
destroyed by using of that technique, rather than just damaged. This was an early example of 
the differences between Cochrane and Bennett. 
22
 Ibid. p.p. 128 and 129. 
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The main problems arose from the work load imposed upon a single Master 
Bomber in controlling a large bomber force in an ever-changing tactical 
situation. In the Peenemünde raid, for example, by focusing upon the drift of 
the markers due to the crosswind, the Master Bomber failed to spot the error 
in the marking for the Third Phase. It is clear that the Master Bomber for the 
Peenemünde raid did lose control over the Main Force towards the end of the 
raid, although any consequences of that must be weighed against the benefits 
gained by the positive control achieved in the initial phases. The clear 
indication, however, is that attempting to control a large bomber force was not 
a viable proposition and that, rather than seek to ‘control’, the role of the 
Master Bomber was more properly one of guiding or directing the attack. 
 
The common denominator linking the Friedrichshafen and Peenemünde raids 
was that they were small scale precision targets. Although a Master Bomber 
had been employed on an area attack on Turin, that was primarily a trial for 
OPERATION HYDRA and it remained to be seen if the Master Bomber 
technique was suitable for full scale Main Force raids on the German area 
targets that were the main focus of Bomber Command at this time.  
 
The primary reason for using a Master Bomber in area raids was to reduce 
the ‘creepback’ of the Main Force bombing. There were three causes of 
creepback. The first was derived from the characteristics of the Target 
Indicator itself; in terms of its position on the ground and the assessment by 
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the bomb aimer23. The second was the practice of some crews faced with the 
defences in the target area to release their bomb load on the first markers 
visible, and therefore not necessarily at the M.P.I. of the marking pattern. The 
third, related reason, was a function of searchlight activity over the target 
area, the presence of which denied bomb aimers clear sighting of the pattern 
of markers.  The M.P.I. of the marking pattern was therefore not always 
apparent and, in many cases, this led bomb aimers to focus on the most 
prominent TI visible. This would typically be the closest, and hence bombing 
and marking would tend to move progressively along the line of approach. 
 
As related in Chapter Five, the initial response to the phenomenon of 
creepback was the introduction of ‘Recenterers’. These were experienced 
Pathfinder crews detailed to re-mark the A/P and would typically drop markers 
with a slight overshoot in order to bring bombing back onto the A/P, a 
technique which, in isolation, met with only limited success.  The introduction 
of the Master Bomber in area attacks was intended to add a further dimension 
to this technique by instructing the Main Force crews which markers to aim for 
and to encourage crews to continue over the target area until the most 
accurately placed markers were observed. 
 
The use of a Master Bomber in a raid on an area target was first tried on a 
raid on Berlin on the night of 23/24 August 194324.  The Master Bomber on 
                                                 
23
 See Chapter Five. 
24
 TNA AIR14/3012 ORSBC Final Raid Report; Berlin, 23/24 August 1943.  
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that occasion was again provided by No 8 Group25 and the marking plan was 
a Controlled Parramatta. Perhaps learning from the experience at 
Peenemünde, the Master Bomber was only to control the first ten minutes of 
the raid and, in particular, to comment on the accuracy of the TI’s dropped by 
the Blind Markers. In the event, the raid was only partially successful and, 
despite the corrections issued by the Master Bomber, the majority of the 
markers and bombing fell to the south-east of the A/P. The ORSBC Interim 
Raid Report noted that weather conditions prevented visual identification of 
ground features and considered the Master Bomber to have been completely 
ineffective. This led ORSBC to recommend that the Master Bomber technique 
should only be used as part of the Newhaven technique where ground detail 
was visible. 
 
A Master Bomber was again employed on the next major raid, against 
Nuremburg on the night of 27/28 August 1943, but with no more success than 
in the Berlin raid a few days previously26. The initial Pathfinder marking was 
accurate but an extensive creepback developed, and much of the bombing fell 
in open countryside. The Master Bomber had detected the creepback but was 
unable to persuade crews to move the bombing forward, partly because only 
about one quarter of the crews could hear his instructions.  
 
The use of a Master Bomber in these two raids can only be judged to have 
had little success, but the next raid on which a Master Bomber was employed, 
                                                 
25
 The Master Bomber on this occasion was Group Captain Johnny Fauquier, at that time 
commanding No 405 Squadron, and who would later lead No 617 Squadron on precision 
attacks.  Fauquier had been one of two Deputy Master Bombers on the Peenemünde raid 
26
 TNA AIR14/3012. The Master Bomber on this occasion was Wing Commander Ken Burns, 
who had been the Deputy Master Bomber on the previous Berlin raid. 
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against the Dunlop rubber factory at Montluçon in Central France, was entirely 
successful27. The raid, carried out in good visibility and bright moonlight, was 
carried out from an altitude of 5,000ft. The defences were light, and the initial 
marking was generally accurate. However, one TI (yellow) was dropped very 
wide in error and the backing-up with TI (Red) was widely scattered. The 
success of the raid was therefore attributed to the Master Bomber, who 
noticed the errors and directed the Main Force bombing onto the accurate 
markers. Nevertheless, ORSBC estimated that the damage to the factory, 
which was completely destroyed, was caused by just 2% of the aircraft taking 
part. 
 
No formal analysis of the role of the Master Bomber in these attacks has been 
found. However, in his book The Berlin Raids: R.A.F. Bomber Command 
Winter 1943-44, Martin Middlebrook quotes two of the Master Bombers who 
took part in these raids28. Both express the opinion that the main difference 
between precision targets such as Peenemünde and large city targets such 
as Berlin lies in the extent to which ground features were visible. This was 
partly due to the weather conditions. The precision attacks all took place in 
conditions of bright moonlight, whereas the area attacks took place in the non-
moon period. The bombing altitude was also a factor, in that individual ground 
features are generally not visible from above 4,000ft even in conditions of 
bright moonlight and that no ground features are discernable above 
                                                 
27
 TNA AIR14/3012 ORSBC Report B.165, 29 September 1943. 
28
 Martin Middlebrook The Berlin Raids: R.A.F. Bomber Command Winter 1943-44 (Penguin 
Books, 1990), page 95. The two Master Bombers quoted are Group Captain John Searby, 
Master Bomber for the Turin and Peenemünde raids, and Wing Commander Ken Burns, who 
had been the Master Bomber for the Nuremburg raid and Deputy Master Bombers on the 
Berlin raid. 
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12,000ft29. At that time, operational heights of circa 20,000 feet were typical 
for area attacks and it follows that the Master Bomber operating at that height 
would not be able to discern individual ground features. A further factor was 
the intensity of the defences, particularly searchlight activity, which hindered 
visibility of the ground. A combination of these factors reduced the ability of a 
Master Bomber to assess the accuracy of the marking in area attacks, which 
in turn reduced the extent to which corrections could be made.  
 
There is plenty of anecdotal evidence in personal accounts of the bombing 
offensive to suggest that the use of a Master Bomber did assist in 
encouraging crews to press on to the A/P in the face of strong defences in the 
target area.  Martin Middlebrook quotes the navigator of a Lancaster crew 
taking part in the Berlin raid of 23/24 August 1943 who, speaking of the 
Master Bomber on that occasion, Group Captain Fauquier, said that: “He had 
an excellent R/T voice that came over loud and clear to all we later talked 
with. It no doubt helped to calm jittery nerves and, I believe, it helped produce 
a better concentration of bombs on the Aiming Point”30. The similar comments 
cited above in relation to the Peenemünde raid tend to support that view. 
 
There is, however, no empirical evidence to counter the conclusion of the two 
Master Bombers quoted by Middlebrook that the role was a refinement that 
made little difference, simply because the ground could not be seen. Indeed, 
this is supported by the facts. The most successful large-scale Main Force 
                                                 
29
 See Chapter 1 for a discussion on the visibility of ground features at night. 
30
 Middlebrook, The Berlin Raids, p65. The abbreviation ‘R/T’ is this quote refers to ‘radio 
telephone’. Group Captain ‘Johnny’ Fauquier had been the Deputy Master Bomber on the 
Peenemünde raid and would later lead No 617 Squadron during the period was equipped with 
the ‘Tallboy’ and ‘Grand Slam’ bombs.  
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raids of the period, including the substantial destruction of the main Ruhr 
towns31 and the firestorms raids on Hamburg and Kassel32, were achieved 
without the presence of a Master Bomber. The success of these raids all 
resulted from accurate primary marking, combined with effective backing-up 
by secondary marking, all achieved without assistance from a Master Bomber. 
Where raids failed, the main reason was the spread of the primary marking 
and the inability of the Pathfinders to create a distinctive point of aim. In those 
cases, the Principle of Cumulative Dispersion ensured that the raid was not 
concentrated and that creepback developed. The limited evidence from the 
two failed attempts to control a large Main Force with a Master Bomber 
suggests that, due to the inability of the latter to see ground detail at the 
operational heights employed, no substantial benefit resulted from the 
technique. Although no formal decision to discontinue the employment of 
Master Bombers has been found in documentation, the small-scale Montluçon 
raid would be last occasion on which a Master Bomber was used until the 
reversion to tactical targets in the build-up to OPERATION OVERLORD six 
months later. 
 
The build-up to OPERATION OVERLORD and in the months following 
involved an entirely different target set to the area attacks Bomber Command 
had focused upon previously. Beginning in March 1944, Bomber Command 
switched to tactical targets in support of the planned invasion, these being 
                                                 
31
 TNA AIR14/3011 Final raid Reports Report No 340 Wuppertal 29/30 May 1943 12 August 
1943 and No 389: Remsheid, 30/31 July 1943, 26 September 1943. See also Middlebrook 
and Everitt,The Bomber Command War Diaries, p394 and p415 respectively. These raids 
were regarded as the outstanding successes of the Battle of the Ruhr. 
32
 TNA AIR14/3411 Final Raid Report No 451 Kassel 22/23 October 1943, 6 January 1944. 
See also Middlebrook and Everitt, The Bomber Command War Diaries, p440. The raid on 
Kassel (569 aircraft) resulted in the second firestorm of the bombing offensive.  
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small precision targets such as marshalling yards, storage depots, V-weapon 
sites and, occasionally, synthetic oil plants 33. The operations at this time 
generally involved smaller bomber forces, typically between 100 and 350 in 
strength34. In order to ensure efficiency and accuracy, and to minimise civilian 
casualties in occupied countries, these attacks were generally conducted at 
lower bombing altitudes than the area attacks (typically 8,000 to 10,000ft).  
The attacks on these target sets therefore had many similarities with the 
precision attacks at Friedrichshafen, Peenemünde and Montluçon in which 
the use of a Master Bomber had proved beneficial. 
 
The target marking used in these operations encompassed the whole range of 
techniques developed until that point but, because the typical bomber strength 
allocated to individual targets was reduced, there was an increasing tendency 
for some of the Bomber Groups to act independently, especially Nos. 1 and 5 
Groups, both of which possessed their own target marking capability35. This 
enabled a direct comparison of the various target marking techniques to be 
made, including the difference, if any, made by the employment of a Master 
Bomber36.   The following table is a summary of the results. 
 
                                                 
33
 Although in support of the planned invasion, these operations were not in direct support of 
land forces on the ground and, in the strictest sense, these targets were therefore ‘strategic’ 
rather than ‘tactical’ targets. However, the term ‘tactical’ is used here to differentiate from the 
strategic bombing that Bomber Command had been largely conducting up until that time 
34
 Middlebrook and Everitt The Bomber Command War Diaries.. This figure had been 
calculated by averaging the size of the raids listed in this work, which itself is based on the 
Final Raid Reports held in The National Archives and may therefore be considered to be 
reliable. 
35
 Otter, 1 Group: Swift to Attack, p162. In the case of No 1 Group, this was provided by the 1 
Group Marking Flight, based at Binbrook. 
36
 TNA AIR14/2692 Operational Research Section Report S184 ‘Bombing Accuracy of 
Bomber Command against lightly defended targets’, 20 September 1944. The table 
reproduced above is based upon that in this report, although information in that table not 
directly relevant to the point under discussion has been omitted for clarity.  
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Target marking technique 
 
Proportion of 
Ineffectives 
 
Systematic 
Error 
 
Random 
Error 
 
Musical Parramatta 
 
17% 
 
330 yards 
 
320 yards 
 
Controlled Musical 
Parramatta 
 
16% 
 
230 yards 
 
420 yards 
 
Controlled Newhaven 
 
18% 
 
355 yards 
 
455 yards 
 
5 Group Visual 
Groundmarking 
 
16% 
 
205 yards 
 
370 yards 
 
5 Group Offset 
 
19% 
 
370 yards 
 
365 yards 
 
Table 12/ Comparison of target marking techniques against lightly defended targets. Source: 
TNA AIR14/2692 ORSBC Report S184 ‘Bombing Accuracy of Bomber Command against 
lightly defended targets’, 20 September 1944. 
 
Comparison of the results achieved with these various techniques provides an 
interesting insight into the value of the Master Bomber. The first observation 
relates to the Musical Parramatta technique of ground marking with and 
without the use of a Master Bomber. The constant in all these attacks was 
that the use of TIs dropped blind using Oboe and it may be noted that the 
Systematic Error of the initial Oboe ground marking was 330 yards (i.e. that 
for Musical Parramatta). Because the target sets for all these raids were of a 
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similar range and at a similar angle of cut in relation to the Oboe ground 
stations, it is reasonable to assume that the accuracy of the initial marking in 
the Controlled Musical Parramatta raids was of the same order. The reduction 
in the Systematic Error of 100 yards, or nearly one third, for the Controlled 
Musical Parramatta attacks can therefore only be attributed to the presence of 
a Master Bomber. The most likely explanation for this improvement in 
accuracy is the ability of the Master Bomber to assess the accuracy of the 
initial Oboe Marking and to direct the Main Force onto the most accurate 
marker, and to ignore obviously misplaced markers.  
 
It is, however, interesting to note that whereas the Systematic Error in attacks 
based on Oboe ground marking was reduced by the use of a Master Bomber, 
the Random Error increased. The Random Error was the measure of bomb 
scatter about the M.P.I. or, in other words, the measure of concentration. The 
increase in the Random Error is counter-intuitive, in that the role of a Master 
Bomber was to direct the Main Force onto the most accurate markers and 
thereby provide a single point of aim for the Main Force. In theory, this should 
have reduced the effect of the Principle of Cumulative Dispersion and thus the 
Random Error, thereby resulting in greater concentration. The answer to this 
apparent discrepancy lies in the practice of some Master Bombers of marking 
the A/P visually in addition to the initial Oboe marking. ORSBC calculated that 
the prospect of visually aimed markers being closer to the A/P than a group of 
four of more Oboe dropped markers was slight, and that this practice led to 
some scatter of the bomb distribution. This later led to the recommendation 
that the primary role of the Master Bomber should be to direct the bombing 
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onto the most accurate marker and that visual marking should only be 
attempted when there was a failure in the Oboe marking37.  
 
A second observation arising from the above table concerns the Controlled 
Newhaven and the 5 Group Visual techniques. In most respects these 
techniques were similar, relying on Target Indicators aimed visually in the light 
of flares dropped blind using H2S38. The main difference was in the height 
from which the markers were dropped and the accuracy of the marking 
assessed by the Master Bomber. In the Controlled Newhaven, in which the 
marking was provided by No 8 Group, the Primary Visual Markers and the 
Master Bomber operated at a similar altitude to the Main Force bombing. In 
the 5 Group Visual Groundmarking technique, the marking was carried out at 
low level, as was the assessment of the marking by the Master Bomber. The 
result was that the Systematic Error and the Random Error were significantly 
lower for the Visual Groundmarking technique compared to the Controlled 
Newhaven technique used by No 8 Group.   
 
The reason for this improved accuracy and concentration is the now familiar 
one: the lower altitude at which the Master Bomber flew in the Visual 
Groundmarking technique enabled a more precise assessment of the 
accuracy of the Primary Markers to be made and corrections to be issued to 
Backers-up. The resulting accuracy and concentration of the marking 
                                                 
37
 TNA AIR14/2692 Operational Research Section Report S193 ‘The accuracy of visual 
marking on lightly defended targets’, 12 December 1944. 
38
 In the standard Newhaven technique, the flares were usually by H2S and this was the also 
case with this particular target set. However, because of the poor response given by the 
relatively small targets on the PPI of the H2S sets, and given the relatively short range, in 
some of the attacks on this target set the flares were dropped using GEE. 
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provided, if not a single point of aim for the Main Force, at least a more 
compact pattern of markers from which the M.P.I. had to be estimated. This 
reduced the effect of the Principle of Cumulative Dispersion and thus the 
Random Error, thereby resulting in improved initial accuracy. The smaller 
Main Force used in these raids enabled the Master Bomber to retain control 
over the Main Force bombing, thereby achieving greater concentration.   
 
The final observation to be made in relation this table is that the Proportion of 
Ineffectives tended to be lower when a Master Bomber was used. The 
Proportion of Ineffectives is the proportion of bombs dropped that for a variety 
of reasons do not contribute to the normal bomb distribution. This included 
bombs dropped so far outside of the main bomb distribution that they were 
classed as Gross Errors39. One of the main causes of Gross Errors was 
bombs aimed at misplaced markers. The reduction in Gross Errors in 
‘Controlled’ attacks was a direct result of the ability of a Master Bomber to 
detect misplaced markers and to issue instructions to Main Force crews to 
ignore them. The reduction in the Proportion of Ineffectives, and the 
consequent increase in the efficiency of Bomber Command attacks, was one 
of the most important benefits derived from the Master Bomber technique. 
 
The role of correcting gross errors was formally incorporated into target 
marking techniques with the introduction of the ‘Long Stop’. The ‘Long Stop’ 
was both the name given to a TI dropped to indicate the limit of the bombing 
area and the title given to the crew specifically detailed to drop that marker. 
                                                 
39
 The other main contributor the Proportion of Ineffectives was ‘dud’ bombs that failed to 
explode on impact. 
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The technique was introduced following a bombing error made in the direct 
support of ground forces in the Normandy battle area when, on 14 August 
1944, part of the bombing fell amongst positions held by Canadian Forces40. 
The Long Stop technique was to drop a line of TI’s Yellow, beyond which the 
main force must not bomb, or to cancel gross errors by placing a TI Yellow 
over them. In addition to dropping these markers, the Long Stop would 
monitor the bombing and, if necessary, could stop the raid (in which 
eventuality, the instructions of the Long Stop would be in addition to and take 
precedence over those of the Master Bomber).  The technique was first used 
on 10 September 1944 during a remarkable raid in which eight individual 
coastal gun batteries were targeted, each with an individual A/P and Long 
Stop41.  It was a testament to the degree of control possible using the 
combination of a Master Bomber and Long Stop that Bomber Command was 
able to attack a series of targets in such proximity to each other and to the 
British ground forces. These raids against smaller targets highlight the true 
value of a Master Bomber, particularly those against precision targets such as 
oil refineries and marshalling yards, in which the control exercised by the 
Master Bomber in terms of eliminating gross errors and directing the bombing 
onto the most accurately placed markers made a significant difference to the 
effectiveness of the raid. 
 
In summary, it can safely be stated that the inclusion of a Master Bomber 
could optimise the effectiveness of a raid. This was particularly the case 
                                                 
40
 Middlebrook and Everitt, The Bomber Command War Diaries, p562.  
41
 Feast The Pathfinder Companion, p.p. 153 and 154. This raid was carried out by 992 
aircraft in total, with each individual A/P being allocated codenames after makes of cars (Alvis 
I to IV, Bentley I and II, and Buick I and II). 
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where both the target and the bomber force were relatively small, such that 
the Master Bomber could evaluate the progress of the raid and exercise 
control over the Main Force. As Bomber Command increasingly shifted away 
from large scale area attacks on major conurbations towards attacks by 
smaller forces on lesser towns and precision targets, the role of the Master 
Bomber would assume increasing importance and made a significant 
contribution to the effectiveness of Bomber Command in the last year of the 
bombing offensive.  
 
It would, however, be erroneous to assume that the role of the Master Bomber 
was a pre-requisite to effectiveness or a guarantee that a raid would be 
successful. If the initial target marking was inaccurate or the markers widely 
spaced, there were limits to the extent to which a Master Bomber could 
recover the situation. It was, therefore, the accuracy and concentration of the 
primary marking that ultimately dictated the effectiveness of a raid. An 
effective Master Bomber could maximise the concentration of bombing on that 
primary marking and reduce the wasted effort due to gross errors. But it was 
beyond the scope of the Master Bomber to direct the bombing when the 
ground was obscured by cloud or smoke, or the bombing area too large or the 
spread of bombing too scattered to direct bombing to any single part of it. 
There was also the fact that, as shown by ORSBC, the presence of a Master 
Bomber could itself result in an increase in the Random Error at the A/P due 
to inaccurate visual marking the A/P in addition to the primary blind marking. 
The contribution made by the introduction of Master Bombers therefore must 
be viewed in this context, and against the inability of a Master Bomber to 
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control the larger bomber forces used against the area targets that occupied 
Bomber Command throughout a large period of the bombing offensive. 
Looked at in this way, the role of Master Bomber can at best be described as 
a qualified success.   
 384 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
At the end of the bombing offensive, the Operational Research Section at 
Bomber Command (ORSBC) produced a report on the effect of the 
development of navigational and blind bombing techniques on the efficiency 
of bombing operations during the Second World War1.  The report was largely 
descriptive, and charted the improvement in bombing efficiency throughout 
that part of the bombing offensive for which data was available2. The report 
defined ‘efficiency’ as being the number of bombs dropped within 3 miles of 
the Aiming Point (A/P) and included a graph to show the improvement in 
efficiency over the course of the offensive. That graph is reproduced below as 
Fig 27/. It can been seen from this graph that the efficiency of Bomber 
Command night attacks - the  term ‘efficiency’ is readily transposable with the 
term ‘accuracy’ - improved from a total of 24% in August 1942 to 96% in April 
1945, the latter date being effectively the end of the bombing offensive3. This 
significant improvement in accuracy was one of the main factors that turned 
Bomber Command from the ineffective instrument of the early war years into 
a formidable striking force capable of devastating a substantial proportion of 
an urban area in a single night or attacking precision targets such as oil 
refineries.  
                                                 
1
 TNA AIR14/2693 ORSBC Report S252 ‘The effect of the development of navigational and 
blind bombing techniques on the efficiency of bombing operations during World War II (Aug 
1941-May1945),15 October 1945. 
2
 Ibid. For the purposes of the ORSBC report, the data was derived from night bombing 
photographs taken from August 1942. Night bombing photographs had been available since 
the summer of 1941, but no explanation is given in the ORSBC report as to why the analysis 
did not include data from that year. 
3
 The last operation carried out by Bomber Command was on the night of 2/3 May 1945, 
although this was a one-off operation and bombing offensive effectively ceased a week 
beforehand, on the night of 26/27 April 1945. The figures in the OSBC report represent the 
first and last months of the bombing offensive for which data was available. 
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Fig 27/  Improvement in efficiency (accuracy) of Bomber Command night attacks August 1942 
to April1945. 
 
It may be noted that the graph in Fig 27/ is annotated with reference to the 
first use of the main navigation and blind bombing aids used by Bomber 
Command - GEE, Oboe and H2S. The ORSBC report focuses upon these 
aids and, whilst it makes reference to target marking techniques throughout, it 
does not seek to relate the aids used to the development of target marking 
techniques. This graph does, however, provide a convenient vehicle for 
exploring the question that underpins this thesis: to what extent did the 
development of target marking techniques contribute to the improvement 
made in the accuracy of Bomber Command night raids? 
 
This thesis has demonstrated that the improvement in the accuracy of 
Bomber Command shown in Fig 27/ was the result of the introduction of target 
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marking techniques. Two key points may immediately be drawn from the 
improvement in accuracy shown on this graph. The first is that the 
improvement in accuracy was neither progressive nor linear. There are a 
number of points throughout the bombing offensive where there were step 
changes and reverses in the improvement in accuracy. The second key point 
is that these step changes and reverses can all be directly related not to the 
introduction of a particular navigation aid or blind bombing device per se, but 
rather to the target marking technique that was associated with it. Thus, the 
step change from April 1942 to June 1942 corresponded to the introduction of 
GEE and the Shaker technique (see Chapter Three of this thesis), whereas 
the significant step change that occurred between April 1943 and June 1943 
corresponds to the Battle of the Ruhr and the introduction of Oboe in 
conjunction with the Musical Parramatta technique (see Chapter Five of this 
thesis). The step change that occurred between February 1944 and April 
1944 corresponds with the introduction of the improved H2S Mk III and the 
consequent improvements in the Newhaven and Parramatta techniques in 
association with it (see also Chapter Five).   The sustained improvement that 
took place from June 1944 onwards was to a large extent predicated upon the 
introduction of the improved Oboe Mk II and the provision of mobile Oboe 
ground stations advancing into Europe following OPERATION OVERLORD, 
with the consequent increase in Oboe coverage and the more widespread use 
of the Musical Parramatta technique. In addition, the improvement in accuracy 
during this period resulted in part from the introduction of the indirect bombing 
techniques introduced by No 5 Group (see Chapter Six of this thesis). 
Although not associated with a particular navigation aid or blind bombing 
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device, the improvement in accuracy achieved using indirect bombing was 
nonetheless a direct result of the application of a target marking technique.  
 
Similarly, the period in the bombing offensive during which accuracy 
stagnated, and even declined, can be explained by reference to the use of 
navigation aids and the associated target marking technique. The period of 
stagnation between August 1942 and April 1943 corresponds to that between 
the jamming of GEE, and therefore the effective cessation of the Shaker 
technique, and the introduction of Oboe and Musical Parramatta. This was 
therefore a period during which there no navigation aids or blind bombing 
devices to provide an initial indication of the A/P. As described in Chapter 
Five, it was also during this period that the Pathfinder Force came into being 
and the use of target markers first became a standard feature of target 
marking, and thus the first time during the offensive in which crews were 
instructed to aim at a marker rather than a point on the ground that they had 
identified themselves. The dip in accuracy between October and December 
1942 therefore corresponds with the first occurrence of the ‘Systematic Error’ 
which displaced the M.P.I. of the bomb distribution from the A/P and which, 
until the use of target markers, had not been a feature of Bomber Command 
attacks. 
 
In parallel with the improvement in accuracy, there was a commensurate 
increase in concentration. The latter may be measured in two ways: absolute 
density, this being the tons per square mile at the A/P and therefore a 
measure of the scale of the attack: and relative density at the A/P, this being 
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the absolute density per 1,000 tons dropped. Relative density is therefore 
independent of the scale of attack, and is a measure of both accuracy and 
concentration. It is therefore the relative density at the A/P that is of primary 
interest here. 
 
From 1943 onwards, ORSBC monitored both the absolute and relative density 
achieved in Bomber Command attacks on major German towns4. The 
headline figures showed a relative density at the A/P of 33.4 tons per square 
mile per 1,000 tons dropped in 1943, rising to 173.5 tons per square mile per 
1,000 tons dropped in 1944. This represents an increase in relative density at 
the A/P of 140.1 tons per square mile per 1,000 tons dropped, a 5.2 fold 
increase. 
 
The improvement in accuracy and concentration achieved by Bomber 
Command throughout the bombing offensive may be attributed directly to the 
introduction of target marking techniques in conjunction with navigation aids 
or blind bombing devices. Moreover, as the graph shows, there was a causal 
relationship between the degree of accuracy achieved and the navigation aid 
or blind bombing device employed and the target marking device associated 
with it. The development of target marking is in essence the story of the use of 
technology in conjunction with human actions to address, as Air Commodore 
Coningham termed it as early as December 1939, the never ending struggle 
to circumvent the law that human beings cannot see in the dark. 
 
                                                 
4
 Air Ministry (Air Historical Branch monograph), Operational Research in Bomber Command 
(1949), Table 1, p.110 
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Most of the principal techniques for target marking approached this problem 
with the application of science. It was the technical characteristics of the 
particular navigation/blind bombing aid employed that dictated the target 
marking technique associated with it.  These characteristics resulted in 
considerable differences in the profile of the target marking technique. In turn, 
the target marking techniques associated with these various devices resulted 
in significant differences in the amount of human interaction required and, 
therefore, the potential for the introduction of gross errors.  
 
The blind bombing aids that were sufficiently accurate to place a primary 
marker in close proximity of the A/P, specifically those based on signals from 
ground stations and particularly Oboe, provided a distinctive and 
unmistakable point of aim. As pointed out by ORSBC, the success achieved 
by Oboe ground-marking raids was directly attributable to the certainty with 
which primary markers could be placed within a Probable Radial Error of ½ 
mile of the A/P5. This incurred an immediate advantage in that both the 
backers-up and Main Force aircraft could be categorically instructed to focus 
on a single point of aim rather than at the M.P.I. of several markers, and 
immediately minimised the effect of the Principle of Cumulative Dispersion.  
 
However, when used to provide primary marking, Oboe required the initial 
primary marker(s) to be backed up at regular intervals by secondary markers 
dropped visually (this was the Musical Parramatta technique). The drawback 
of the Musical Parramatta technique was that the secondary marking was not 
                                                 
5
 TNA AIR14/1574 ORSBC Report S.102, ‘The Operational Use of Oboe Mk1A: December 
1942 to June 1943’, 31 August 1943. 
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carried out by Oboe aircraft and that the secondary marking necessary to 
maintain a continuity of marking for the Main Force was carried out visually.  
The accuracy of the secondary marking was considerably less than that 
achieved with the primary marking by Oboe aircraft and it was this lesser 
accuracy in secondary marking, together with the effect of the Principle of 
Cumulative Dispersion with the Main Force bombing, that resulted in the 
overall figure of 54% of bombs falling within 3 miles of the A/P. The potential 
for gross error in attacks led by Oboe was therefore largely confined to errors 
generated by the assessment of the M.P.I. of the T.I.s by Backers-up and the 
Main Force crews. However, because of the initial accuracy of the primary 
marking the influence of the Principle of Cumulative Dispersion was 
minimised.  As a result, attacks led by Oboe groundmarking were consistently 
accurate and concentrated, and were consistently amongst the most 
successful attempted by Bomber Command. 
 
The importance of removing the potential for gross error due to human action 
is best demonstrated by the successive improvement in results achieved 
throughout the Battle of the Ruhr using the Musical Parramatta technique 
where, following the introduction of a third Oboe Channel, an attack on 
Remscheid became the first during which continuous primary marking had 
been maintained throughout the entire raid. The primary marking was 
exceptionally accurate, with the result that 83% of the town was devastated.  
The importance of providing a single point of aim was reinforced by the 
subsequent development of a variation of Musical Parramatta known as 
Continuous Oboe Marking, in which the only markers dropped were primary 
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markers using Oboe, and which was the only groundmarking technique where 
the dropping of every marker was fully automated6. Continuous Oboe Marking 
was therefore the only target marking technique in which the estimation of the 
M.P.I. of the marking was not required, and which therefore entirely removed 
the human error factor and avoided the effects of the Principle of Cumulative 
Dispersion during the marking phase.     
 
By contrast, those navigation aids that were based on the principles of 
hyperbolic navigation (principally, in the context of target marking, GEE) and 
the H2S airborne radar were not sufficiently accurate to place a T.I. in close 
proximity of the A/P. The use of these devices therefore required a different 
target marking technique in which the A/P was either first illuminated with the 
use of flares dropped blind (Shaker and Newhaven) 7 or T.I.’s were dropped 
blind to form a pattern around the A/P (Parramatta) 8.   The Shaker, 
Newhaven and Parramatta techniques all required considerably more human 
interaction than the Musical Parramatta technique using Oboe.  In relation to 
the Newhaven technique, this human interaction first occurred at the critical 
initial identification of the A/P and the dropping of the primary markers. 
Consequently, in addition to being considerably less accurate than Oboe in 
terms of placing the initial primary markers, the target marking techniques that 
relied upon GEE or H2S provided greater opportunity for the introduction of 
gross errors through human interaction as the raid progressed. In accordance 
                                                 
6
 The only other target marking technique that was fully automated was Musical Wanganui. 
This was a sky-marking technique in which the flares were dropped using Oboe but, as with 
all skymarking techniques, was in inherently less accurate than ground-marking techniques. 
7
 TNA AIR14/3293 ORSBC Report S30  ‘The operational use of Gee III: The use of flares in 
conjunction with GEE’, 24 January 1942 
8
 TNA AIR14/3025 ORSBC Report B.151, ‘Review of H2S Groundmarking raids on Germany: 
February – April 1943’, 1 July 1943. 
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with the Principle of Cumulative Dispersion, the initial wide spread of primary 
markers was compounded at each stage of marking and Main Force bombing. 
As a result, these techniques were inherently less accurate than Musical 
Parramatta directly because of the characteristics of the navigation/blind 
bombing aid upon which they were based and the consequent extent of the 
human interaction required to implement those techniques.  
 
The target marking techniques described above all approached the problem 
of providing a single and unmistakable point of aim with the application of 
science in the first instance followed to a greater or lesser degree by human 
interaction to mark the A/P. The most successful of these techniques, Musical 
Parramatta, minimised the extent of human interaction and in some versions 
eliminated it entirely. It may therefore appear paradoxical that the most 
effective target marking techniques developed during the bombing offensive - 
those generically known as ‘indirect bombing’ - not only deliberately marked a 
position away from the A/P but also relied exclusively upon human action to 
provide the primary marking (see Chapter Six). In these techniques, the role 
of science was generally confined to providing illumination of the target area 
through the use of flares in order that the Marking Point (as opposed to the 
Aiming Point) could be accurately marked. The subsequent actions, including 
the calculation of the ‘false wind’ for setting of the bombsights of the Main 
Force aircraft, involved a significant human input that, in theory, should have 
introduced the potential for significant gross errors. 
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In practice, the reason why indirect bombing was successful was that it 
provided a single and unmistakable point of aim for the Main Force and, 
consequently, minimised the effects of the Principle of Cumulative Dispersion 
from the very outset. This was in part due to the benefit resulting from the 
markers not being obscured by smoke and dust from the bombing, but was 
principally due to the fact that the Marking Point was clearly visible from the 
low level at which the marking was carried out. Indirect bombing was, simply 
put, an effective means of circumventing the law that humans cannot see in 
the dark by the simple expedient of initial target marking from an altitude at 
which ground detail was visible.   
 
It is noteworthy that in all its forms indirect bombing relied upon 
communication between a Master Bomber, the marker aircraft and the Main 
Force. This was a fundamental component of the technique and required a 
number of human inputs, including matters of judgement in terms of 
assessing the accuracy of the primary marker in relation to the Marking Point. 
On the face of it, the reliance of the technique on human judgement may be 
considered to introduce the potential for gross errors and therefore be 
susceptible to the Principle of Cumulative Dispersion. However, the principal 
benefit of the Master Bomber in these techniques was to direct the Main 
Force bombing on to the most accurately placed markers, this therefore being 
an example where human interaction worked positively in conjunction with the 
technology rather than negatively. This was only possible because the Master 
Bomber was operating at an altitude at which ground detail was visible and 
was therefore in a better position to judge accuracy than the Main Force 
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operating at altitudes from which no ground detail was visible. The 
transmission of this information to the Main Force therefore obviated the need 
for the Main Force crews to make a similar judgement on an individual basis. 
By these means, the number of individual actions by the Main Force crews 
was significantly reduced and this had the effect of reducing the effects of the 
Principle of Cumulative Dispersion. This was one of the factors that 
underpinned the success of the indirect bombing techniques. 
 
The foregoing demonstrates that it was the accuracy and concentration of the 
primary marking that ultimately dictated the effectiveness of a raid and that 
was primarily a function of the science and technology involved in the primary 
marking. It was for this reason that target marking techniques were constantly 
refined and improved throughout the course of the bombing offensive in an 
attempt to provide an unmistakable point of aim as close to the Aiming Point 
(or Marking Point) as possible. Due to the technologies involved, 
groundmarking techniques developed during the course of the bombing 
offensive fell into two broad categories: those in which the primary markers 
were dropped blind (Parramatta and Musical Parramatta) and those in which 
the primary markers were dropped visually in the light of flares dropped blind 
(Shaker, Newhaven and indirect bombing). This in turn dictated the methods 
by which these techniques were developed over the course of the bombing 
offensive. 
 
In relation to those techniques in which the primary markers were dropped 
blind, the development tended to concentrate upon the objective of providing 
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continuous primary marking throughout the duration of the attack. This was 
achieved primarily by increasing the number of Oboe Channels that were 
available to ensure that the primary markers dropped by Oboe were 
replenished before the original markers burnt out, the ultimate iteration being 
Continuous Oboe Marking. For all other versions of Musical Parramatta, the 
improvements made were secured by improvements in the timing of the 
backing-up and the disposition of the Main Force throughout the duration of 
the raid. The only other significant refinement to the Parramatta and Musical 
Parramatta techniques was the use of a Master Bomber which, as described 
above, improved concentration of the primary markers by directing the Main 
Force to the most accurate of the primary markers. 
 
Those techniques in which the primary markers were dropped visually in the 
light of flares dropped blind, in this context Shaker and Newhaven, were 
dependent upon the timing of the initial illumination, the primary marking and 
the secondary marking. Refinements to these techniques therefore tended to 
concentrate upon the timing of these key elements, particularly the time 
between the illumination of the target area and the dropping of primary 
markers. This was particularly true of the Shaker technique (see Chapter 
Three), in which the main focus for experimentation was the duration of ‘flare 
period’, albeit that the short lifespan of GEE restricted the extent to which this 
flare period was varied9. This experimentation was continued in the early raids 
led by the PFF, in which the use of a marker bomb was also first employed10.  
                                                 
9
 TNA AIR14/1769 Operational Research Section, ‘Note on attacks on Essen March 8/9
th
 – 
June 8
th
/9
th
’, 24 July 1942. 
10
 Middlebrook and  Everitt. The Bomber Command War Diaries, p304; Feast. The Pathfinder 
Companion, p19; and Musgrove Pathfinder Force, p16. 
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The Newhaven technique was used over an extended period of the bombing 
offensive, and the refinements in this technique included the provision of blind 
marking continued throughout the raid rather than just at the opening and the 
use of a Master Bomber (see Chapter Five). 
 
There was also a further imperative to the development of target marking 
techniques, this being the need to reduce the spectre of the Systematic Error. 
The proportion of bombs falling on or close to the A/P was a function of the 
extent of the Systematic Error and the degree of concentration achieved. A 
key objective of the development of target marking techniques was therefore 
to maintain the maximum concentration in the bomb distribution whilst at the 
same time minimising the Systematic Error by aligning the M.P.I. of the bomb 
distribution with the A/P.  The concentration of the bomb distribution was itself 
a function of the Principle of Cumulative Dispersion, such that any technique 
which reduced the effect of the Principle of Cumulative Dispersion also 
reduced the base of the Gaussian Distribution Function curve and increased 
the steepness of that curve. This in turn increased the importance of 
minimising the Systematic Error to ensure that Gaussian Distribution Function 
curve overlapped the A/P to the greatest possible extent. Consequently there 
was an important counter-working relationship between the Principle of 
Cumulative Dispersion and the Systematic Error. This was a paradox that 
persisted throughout the bombing offensive and it was this paradox that the 
development if target marking techniques sought to reconcile.  
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There are two themes that emerge from the development of target marking 
techniques as the bombing offensive progressed. The first is that the overall 
profile of the techniques remained fundamentally unaltered from the inception 
of target marking, albeit that there was an early realisation that more than one 
target marking technique was usually required on any one raid (i.e. the ‘Berlin 
method’). The basic profile of the Parramatta technique remained that of 
primary marking undertaken automatically by Oboe or H2S, interspersed by 
secondary marking as necessary. It was only late in the bombing offensive, 
when more Oboe Channels became available, that secondary marking was 
phased out in favour of continuous primary marking. This is a classic example 
of improvements in technology facilitating a change in the profile of the target 
marking technique associated with it. In relation to techniques based upon the 
illumination of the ground by flares, the basic profile of  ‘illuminators’, ‘target 
markers’ and ‘followers’ remained present right from the Shaker technique to 
the complex ‘Berlin Method’ of 1943/44. The technique was refined over time 
with the inclusion of specific roles, including ‘Primary and Secondary Visual 
Markers’, ‘Supporters’ and ‘Visual Centerers’, but the overall profile remained 
unaltered.  
 
This point also held true for the development of the indirect bombing 
techniques developed by No 5 Group. These techniques shared the common 
element of a ‘Marking Point’ away from the target itself but only with ‘Offset 
Marking’ was this in relation to a precise Aiming Point. The later variations of 
indirect bombing involved firstly an Aiming Line (‘Line Bombing’) and then an 
Aiming Area (‘Sector Bombing’), both fundamentally different concepts to 
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marking a precise Aiming Point that underpinned the techniques used by the 
Pathfinder Force (see Chapter Six). The profile of the technique did not itself 
alter significantly between these techniques, being essentially illumination 
from high level followed by marking of the target at a low-level, all under the 
control of a Master Bomber. It was therefore in the application of a timed 
overshoots and the allocation of separate headings that these techniques 
were evolved. The significant factor, and the one which distinguishes the 
development of these techniques from those developed by the PFF, was the 
extent to which the technique evolved within the overall profile. Each 
subsequent variation of the basic technique, from Offset Marking to Line 
Bombing and then to Sector Bombing, represented a significant advancement 
over the previous one, both in terms of complexity and effectiveness. 
Moreover, not only were these techniques evolved to become the most 
effective used by Bomber Command, they were developed over a remarkably 
short time period.  
 
This ‘root and branch’ approach to the development of target marking 
techniques serves to highlight the disparity between the innovative approach 
of No 5 Group, in which the individual skill and judgement of the crews was at 
the forefront, with the successive application of minor refinements to an 
established technique adopted by the PFF. It also highlights the potential of a 
different approach to the relationship between the application of technology 
and human actions in target marking techniques. The profile of the techniques 
developed by the PFF, in this context primarily Newhaven and Parramatta, 
was dictated by the navigation or blind bombing aid used. It followed that 
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apart from minor refinements, the causal relationship between the navigation 
or blind bombing aid used and the associated target marking technique 
determined that the overall profile of the technique was effectively fixed. The 
use of technology required a fixed A/P that could, initially at least, either be 
input into the Oboe system or which provided a distinctive feature for H2S.  
Moreover, at the altitude at which the PFF typically operated, the role of the 
Master Bomber was limited by the fact the ground detail was not visible. By 
contrast, although the use of either GEE or S.S. Loran was required to fix the 
location of the marker aircraft before commencing the individual marking runs, 
indirect bombing techniques developed by No 5 Group were not dependent 
upon technology to provide the initial marking. This allowed for considerably 
more flexibility and initiative on the part of individual marking crews, and also 
enabled the Master Bomber to ensure that the Marking Point had been 
accurately marked. Without this degree of certainty of the initial Marking Point, 
the deviation between the headings on which each section bombed and the 
allocation of different time overshoots to aircraft within each section would not 
have been effective. This degree of certainty in relation to the accuracy of the 
primary marking was considered by ORSBC to be the primary reason behind 
the success of the low-level technique11, and the flexibility provided by the 
low-level technique to the individual marking crews to achieve this could not 
have been replicated by the greater reliance placed upon science with the 
techniques employed by the PFF. 
 
                                                 
11
 TNA AIR14/4599 ORSBC Report S.231 ‘A Comparison of high and low-level visual marking 
on defended German targets’, 8 April 1945. 
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The other theme that emerges from the development of target marking 
techniques is that comparatively little of the evolution of these techniques 
arose from trials and experimentation. The basic profile of what eventually 
became to be known as Newhaven was established by the two ‘CRACKERS’ 
exercises in February 1942 (see Chapter Three). However, from that point on, 
the evolution of the technique for using flares to illuminate the target area for 
primary marking was evolved by experimentation at unit level on actual 
operations, notably in relation to the length of the ‘flare period’, both in terms 
of the use of Shaker and refinement of that basic technique without GEE that 
took place in Phase 1 of operations by the PFF. The technique was further 
refined for use with the H2S system, but the technique employed was to a 
large extent that originally suggested by ORSBC. Similarly, the profile of 
primary and secondary marking for use with Oboe was the result of a 
recommendation by ORSBC. There is no evidence to suggest that the basic 
target marking techniques were evolved as a result of trials undertaken 
specifically devised for that purpose, for example by the Bomber Development 
Unit, or that the subsequent refinement of those techniques arose from 
anything other than operational experience by the PFF. Moreover, there is no 
evidence of any formal structure within the PFF to develop target marking 
techniques.  
 
This absence of any formal structure for the development of target marking 
techniques is one of the most surprising outcomes from this thesis. In part, 
this may be explained by the need to constantly refine target marking 
techniques in response to rapidly changing operational circumstances and 
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technical developments. There is also the question of accurately recreating 
the conditions of a live target area under practice conditions in order to 
conduct realistic tests. It is, however, debatable as to whether the lack of 
structured testing made any difference to the development of target marking 
techniques. Aside from perhaps determining the optimum ‘flare period’, which 
was the original purpose of the two ‘CRACKERS’ exercises, and the 
frequency of secondary marking, it is difficult to envisage what other benefits 
structured testing of target marking techniques would have achieved. It is 
therefore possible that learning from operational experience, with the benefit 
of scientific analysis provided by operational research, was the best and 
indeed only way in which target marking techniques could be developed.  In 
this respect, the development of target marking techniques is an example of 
what Tizard considered to be far the greatest contribution that scientists could 
make in wartime, in terms of doing everything possible to improve the 
operational efficiency of equipment and methods then in use12. 
 
It was the improvement in accuracy through the application of target marking 
techniques that underpinned the main achievements of Bomber Command. 
The first ‘Thousand Bomber Raid’ on Cologne in May 1942, which was one of 
the main turning points in the bombing offensive, was initiated by a small 
GEE-equipped force to drop incendiaries to start fires for the following aircraft. 
The Battle of the Ruhr, which culminated in some of the most accurate and 
destructive raids of the entire offensive, was predicated on the use of the 
Musical Parramatta technique. The firestorm at Hamburg was the result of a 
                                                 
12
 IWM Tizard Papers, HTT 298. 
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complicated Parramatta technique in association with H2S, and the attack on 
the rocket-research establishment at Peenemünde was achieved using a 
complicated attack profile in which the A/P was shifted under the control of a 
Master Bomber and re-marked on three occasions. The significant 
contribution of Bomber Command in the build-up to OPERATION 
OVERLORD in terms of hindering the movement of troops through the 
Transportation Plan and the bombing of coastal batteries, arguably one of the 
most important aspects of the bombing offensive, was based on the 
application of variations of the Musical Parramatta technique and the use of 
indirect bombing by No 5 Group. Similarly, setting aside the debate 
surrounding the extent of Bomber Command’s contribution to the oil offensive, 
those attacks on oil installations that did take place were relatively successful 
and this was due to the application of the suite of target marking techniques 
available to Bomber Command by that stage of the offensive. Finally, the high 
level of destructive power of which Bomber Command was capable at the 
close of the offensive, as exemplified by the firestorm raid at Dresden and the 
destruction of a sizeable proportion of smaller towns such as Pforzheim, was 
founded upon the effectiveness and efficiency of the target marking 
techniques available. This thesis has shown that none of these achievements 
would have been possible without the advent and development of target 
marking techniques. 
 
Moreover, the contribution made by the development of target marking 
techniques was not confined to the main achievements identified above. 
During the majority of the bombing offensive, specifically from 1942 onwards, 
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target marking was an ever-present feature of Bomber Command night raids. 
This applied equally to the overall objective of undermining the morale of the 
enemy civil population, and in particular that of the industrial workers, that 
underpinned much of the bombing offensive. One of the main advantages 
conferred by the introduction of target marking techniques was the ability of 
Bomber Command to operate in weather conditions that would otherwise 
have prevented bombing operations taking place or which, if they did take 
place, would have been largely ineffective. This applied mainly to the 
Parramatta technique of blind groundmarking which, provided that the ground 
was visible, allowed effective attacks to take place in conditions of poor 
visibility that would otherwise have yielded poor results. This was particularly 
important in the main industrial centres of Germany, notably the Ruhr, which 
were prone to industrial haze. As revealed by the Butt Report of 1941, prior to 
the introduction of target marking the presence of thick industrial haze 
resulted in only one aircraft in every fifteen getting within 5 miles of the target. 
The development of target marking techniques, in the form of Musical 
Parramatta, allowed these areas to be attacked with up to 80% of bombs 
falling within 3 miles of the target and resulting in considerable levels of 
destruction within the target area during the Battle of the Ruhr. 
 
This principle was taken even further with the advent of the Wanganui 
skymarking technique, which enabled raids to take place even in conditions 
where all ground detail was obscured by 10/10nths cloud cover. Bombing 
accuracy and concentration never equalled that achieved in conditions where 
the ground was visible, although on occasions the Musical Wanganui 
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technique achieved a Radial Standard Error of 910 yards and an Average 
Systematic Error of 950 yards13. This was sufficient to inflict useful damage on 
urban areas. There were also occasions during the bombing offensive, such 
as the raid on Wilhelmshaven on 11/12 February 1943, where the standard 
Wanganui technique with flares dropped blind using H2S achieved significant 
results14.  The development of the Wanganui skymarking technique therefore 
enabled the bombing offensive to continue on a greater number of nights than 
would otherwise have been possible, and in so doing to exert greater 
pressure on the German defences and the morale of the civil population. 
Considering also that the effectiveness of the German defences effectively 
prevented operations during the moon period, and that this reduced the 
number of nights on which Bomber Command could operate, the extension of 
the capability of Bomber Command to operations against cloud covered 
targets was an important contribution to the effectiveness of bombing 
offensive. 
 
It should also be recognised that the tactic of the ‘bomber stream’ could not 
have functioned without target marking. The bomber stream was initially 
conceived as a means of mutual defence for the bombers in passing through 
the ‘Kammhuber Line’, the German defence system whereby night fighters 
were individually controlled within geographically defined ‘boxes’. By passing 
as many bombers as possible through one ‘box’ in the Kammhuber Line in the 
shortest possible time, the opportunity for night fighters to intercept individual 
                                                 
13
 TNA AIR14/2693 ORSBC Report S.251 ‘Bombfall distribution in attacks on German Targets 
through 10/10nths cloud’, 23 November 1945. 
14
 TNA AIR14/3410 Final Raid Report No 264: Wilhelmshaven, 11/12 February 1943, 21 April 
1943. See also Middlebrook and Everitt The Bomber Command War Diaries, p353.  
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bombers was much reduced. A large number of aircraft passing over the 
target in a short period of time also had the advantage of overwhelming the 
defences in the target area and reduced losses to anti-aircraft fire, as well as 
overwhelming the civil defences and allowing the fires started to take hold. 
The benefits resulting from compacting aircraft into a bomber stream resulted 
in a progressive shortening of the duration of the attack, from approximately 
1½ hours in the first of the 1,000 bomber raids on Cologne in May1942 to less 
than 20 minutes in an attack on the same city in October 1944 involving 905 
aircraft15. The corollary of this was that the crews within the bomber stream 
were denied the opportunity to search for the A/P on an individual basis, not 
only in terms of the disintegration of the bomber stream that would have 
resulted but also in the interest of minimising the risk of collisions. It was 
therefore essential that crews within the bomber stream were able to identify 
the A/P as quickly as possible and without having to make any significant 
deviation in heading. The only way in which this was could be achieved was 
through the provision of an unmistakable point of aim, visible from a sufficient 
distance for the bomb aimer to track onto the A/P within the limitations of the 
bomb sight being used, through target marking. It follows that the tactic of the 
bomber stream, which enabled Bomber Command to reduce losses to within 
acceptable rates for the majority of the bombing offensive and which was 
essential to achieve the concentration of bombing required, would not have 
been possible without the development of target marking techniques.  
 
                                                 
15
 TNA AIR14/3408 Final Raid Report No 74 Cologne 30/31 May 1942, 15 July 1942; TNA 
AIR14/3410 Final Raid Report No 755 Cologne 30/31 October 1944, 17 February 1945;See 
also Middlebrook and Everitt The Bomber Command War Diaries. The 1,000 bomber raid in 
May 1942 is recorded at page 271, the attack on Cologne on the 30/31 October 1944 is 
recoded on page 611. 
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There was one further contribution made by target marking techniques that 
arose directly from the causal relationship between the navigation aid or blind 
bombing device employed and the outcome achieved. This was the ability to 
calculate the likely outcome of a raid by reference to the anticipated number 
of bombs that would fall on the A/P depending upon the target marking 
technique employed. This was achieved by applying a ‘Comprehensive 
Planning Factor’ to establish the weight of attack to be despatched in a single 
raid in order to achieve a 50% chance of securing not less than one unit 
density at the A/P. For precision attacks, the unit required was usually 
expressed as bombs per acre; for area attacks, the unit required was 
expressed as tons of bombs per square mile. The Comprehensive Planning 
Factor, based upon analysis of target photographs, varied according to the 
target marking technique. Thus, for example, for precision attacks the 
Comprehensive Planning Factor for Musical Parramatta was 948 bombs per 
acre, for Controlled Oboe it was 244 bombs per acre and for Visual 
Groundmarking it was 190 bombs per acre. The equivalent Comprehensive 
Planning Factors for area attacks was 1.469 tons per square mile, 0.366 per 
square mile and 0.297 per square mile respectively16.  The technique was 
equally applicable to individual raids and a series of raids where the A/P 
remained the same throughout.   
 
The presence of a Comprehensive Planning Factor associated with particular 
target marking techniques conferred two advantages in terms of the forward 
planning of bombing operations. Firstly, if it was known that a particular target 
                                                 
16
 TNA AIR14/2693 ORSBC Report S.227 ‘Practical Methods used in forward planning of 
bombing operations’, undated.    
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marking technique was to be employed because of the characteristics of the 
target (for example, it was within Oboe range or, as in the case of Hamburg, 
was particularly suited to H2S), then the precise bomb load required to 
achieve the required unit density at the A/P could be accurately calculated. 
This enabled those commanding the bombing force to make informed 
decisions on the number of aircraft that needed to be despatched, taking into 
account the bomb lift required and the bomb lift capacity of the aircraft types 
to be used, which in turn informed decisions about the weight of the fuel 
necessary and/or the route to be taken to the target. Secondly, if the 
characteristics of a target were such that the bomber commander had a 
choice of target marking methods available, such as the attacks on 
marshalling yards as part of the Transportation Plan in the build-up to 
OPERATION OVERLORD (Controlled Oboe or Visual Groundmarking), the 
Comprehensive Planning Factor informed which of those target marking 
techniques was the most efficient in terms of the resources at disposal.  The 
value of the forward planning capability conferred by the Comprehensive 
Planning Factor in these respects is explicitly acknowledged by Harris in his 
Despatch on War Operations17. These advantages would not have presented 
themselves if the Comprehensive Planning Factor used in this raid planning 
was not dictated by the causal relationship between the navigation aid 
employed and the associated target marking technique.  
 
There has been much debate by historians as to the contribution made by the 
bombing offensive to the outcome of the Second World War, with some 
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 Harris, Despatch on War Operations, p88. 
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authors taking the view that the air offensive (including the contribution made 
by the American Eighth Air Force) was a decisive element in explaining Allied 
victory18 and contributed much to the pacific foreign policy of post-war 
Germany19. It is not within the remit of this thesis to enter that debate. 
However, the point made here is that the contribution made by Bomber 
Command to the air offensive, whatever that may have been, would not have 
materialised without the development of target marking techniques. This is a 
factor in determining the contribution made by Bomber Command that has not 
received the recognition deserved in subsequent analysis of the air offensive, 
primarily on the grounds that secondary literature has tended to attribute the 
improvement in bombing accuracy purely to the introduction of navigation aid 
and has consistently failed to identify and recognise the causal link between 
the navigation aid and target marking.   
 
There is, however, a certain irony in attributing credit to target marking for the 
contribution made to the night offensive mounted by Bomber Command. The 
formation of a dedicated Pathfinder Force specifically for the purpose of target 
marking originated, in the minds of the Air Ministry at least, as a method of 
eventually moving away from area attacks towards precision targets (see 
Chapter Four). In the event, for much of the bombing offensive target marking 
techniques were used exclusively in relation to area attacks and, by the close 
of the conflict, had assumed the optimum level of proficiency in relation to 
such attacks. The development of target marking was in effect hijacked by 
Bomber Command as a means of perfecting the technique for area attacks 
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 Overy, Why the Allies Won,  p163. 
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 Andrew Roberts The Storm of War: a new history of the Second World War (London: Allen 
Lane, 2009), p460. 
 409 
 
rather than moving towards attacks on precision targets originally envisaged 
by the Air Ministry, and it was not until Bomber Command was forced to do so 
with the change to tactical targets in the build-up to OPERATION OVERLORD 
that it eventually turned its attention to precision targets20.  
 
This raises the obvious question: why did Bomber Command continue with 
area attacks when it possessed the capability to carry out precision attacks? 
Indeed, there were those involved in the prosecution of the bombing offensive 
who considered that Bomber Command possessed the capability of precision 
attack, notably Bufton, who believed that Bomber Command “…could have 
done so had they wished..” and “…given to the PFF the enthusiastic support 
and the overriding priority to the selection of crews that they later gave to 617 
Squadron” 21. Bufton also believed that Bomber Command could have 
developed a low-level marking technique in 1942 had they had the vision - he 
possibly had the very successful attack on the Renault factory at Boulogne-
Billancourt in March 1942 in mind (see Chapter Three) - and goes on to 
lament that the PFF was formed “over the dead body’ of the Commander-in 
Chief, and its activities were directed not to the attack of precise targets but to 
the attack of cities”.   
 
The same conclusion was reached by the British Bombing Survey Unit 
(BBSU) post-war which, in the context of a discussion on navigational and 
bombing accuracy as a prelude to the presentation on the effects of the 
Combined Bomber Offensive, questioned whether the lessons learned by the 
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 Setting aside, for this purpose, the occasional precision attacks that took place throughout 
the bombing offensive, notably those conducted by No 617 Squadron. 
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 CCAC Bufton Papers, File 5/13 Letter Bufton to Martin Middlebrook, 7 September 1972. 
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precision attacks in the build-up to OPERATION OVERLORD could have led 
to precision attacks earlier had there been a different priority of target set 
been adopted22. The BBSU suggested that the answer to this question should 
be answered in the positive23.  
 
The views expressed by Bufton and the BBSU must, however, be treated with 
some caution. Bufton was a committed advocate of precision bombing and, 
throughout his tenure as Deputy Director (then Director) of Bomber 
Operations at the Air Ministry, had harboured the belief that area attack was 
only a temporary phase through which Bomber Command would have to pass 
before it could revert to precision attack once the tactical problems of doing so 
had been solved. This was evident in the papers that he prepared in relation 
to the formation of a Target Finding Force, in which he opined that a system 
of flare dropping “…..might have a far reaching effect on our planning and 
enable us to undertake effectively the complete destruction of vital factories, 
synthetic oil plants, and to attack at night such targets as the battleships at 
Brest, which at present we find ourselves incapable of doing” 24.  It is therefore 
not surprising that Bufton considered that Bomber Command could have 
embarked on precision attacks earlier than it did. 
 
The BBSU did not, as Sebastian Cox termed it, have an easy birth25. When it 
eventually came into existence, the two leading appointments were Air 
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 TNA AIR10/3866 Report of British Bombing Survey Unit ‘The Strategic Air War against 
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Commodore Pelly as its Head and Professor Zolly Zuckerman as Scientific 
Advisor. As Cox points out, both had a background in the Supreme 
Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF) in the build up to 
OPERATION OVERLORD and that it was hardly surprising that the final 
report of BBSU strongly reflected the favourable view held within SHAEF of 
the importance of transportation as a target system in the bombing 
offensive26.  As a target system, transportation required precision bombing 
and hence the belief that Bomber Command could have turned its attention to 
precision bombing sooner is consistent with the support by the BBSU for that 
target set. The final report of the BBSU was not subject to independent review 
or objective scrutiny, and the support given by the BBSU in relation to 
precision bombing must be viewed in this context.   
 
The answer to the question why Bomber Command continued with area 
attacks when it possessed the capability to carry out precision attacks is, 
essentially, two-fold. Firstly, there was an element of tactical capability driving 
strategic direction in that, for a significant part of this period, Bomber 
Command was simply not technically capable of successfully attacking 
precision targets in Germany. Indeed, it was the growing realisation during 
1941 that Bomber Command was incapable of attacking precision targets at 
night that led to a switch to area targets. However, once navigation and blind 
bombing aids became available, it was the causal relationship between these 
aids and the associated target marking techniques that dictated the degree of 
precision of which Bomber Command was capable. The Shaker technique 
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 Ibid, page xxi 
 412 
 
using GEE was simply not capable of achieving the accuracy necessary to 
attack precision targets. Insofar as the question relates to targets within Oboe 
range, the accuracy and concentration achieved in preparation for 
OPERATION OVERLORD was predicated upon continuous primary marking, 
which in turn required three Oboe Channels.  This did not became available 
until June 1943, but there is no reason why the refinements to the basic target 
marking techniques based on Oboe that were made in 1944, including 
Continuous Oboe Marking and Controlled Oboe, could not have been 
introduced considerably earlier if attention had been turned to precision 
targets.  The situation is equally clear cut in relation to techniques based upon 
H2S. The best version of H2S to see widespread operational use was the Mk 
III, which did not become available until November 1943. But even with this 
version, the average Probable Radial Error achieved was 2.0 miles and it 
follows that at no point was H2S sufficiently accurate for precision attack.  
.  
Different considerations apply in relation to the indirect bombing techniques 
developed by No 5 Group. These techniques arose from the development at 
unit level (specifically No 617 Squadron) of low-level marking. Although much 
of the credit for the subsequent expansion of this technique into more widely 
applicable forms must rest with the Air Vice-Marshal Cochrane, AOC of No 5 
Group, it was an accident of timing that the opportunity to do so arose when it 
did. Moreover, a significant element of the low level marking technique relied 
upon the marking crews being able to positively fix their location at high 
altitude before making a rapid descent to low level for the marking phase. This 
could have been achieved using GEE for short range targets but it was not 
 413 
 
until S.S. Loran became available that this was possible over Germany. 
Consequently, low level marking was never a viable proposition against the 
target sets specified in the Casablanca and Pointblank Directives, even if the 
PFF had the vision to develop it, and only became viable towards the end of 
the bombing offensive. Consequently, there is no reason to suggest that these 
techniques and the significant improvements that resulted in terms of 
accuracy and efficiency could have been applied to precision targets earlier 
than was the case. 
 
The second reason why Bomber Command did not switch to precision attack 
sooner relates to the strategic direction of bombing offensive.  The Butt 
Report of August 1941 had confirmed the extent to which Bomber Command 
was failing to reach even area targets, and this cemented the policy of area 
bombing. From February 1942, this policy was then pursued enthusiastically, 
to the point of obsession, by Harris as C-in-C of Bomber Command. Whilst 
Portal and the Air Staff were responsible for the strategic direction of the 
bombing offensive, tactical decisions were made by Bomber Command. The 
Casablanca Directive of January 1943 specified a number of primary 
objectives, the priority being German submarine yards but also including oil 
plants and the German aircraft industry, although in each case these 
objectives had been placed in the context of “….undermining the morale of 
the German people”27. However, in a letter to Portal dated 6 March 1943, 
Harris stated his interpretation of the Casablanca Directive as it applied to 
Bomber Command as being “…the progressive destruction and dislocation of 
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the German military, industrial and economic system aimed at the 
undermining the morale of the German people”28.  The Official History points 
out that this minor but significant amendment had fundamentally changed the 
meaning of the Directive, such that undermining the morale of the German 
people became the primary objective29. The Air Staff do not appear to have 
realised the implications of this wording, which entitled Harris to pursue his 
policy of area bombing. Moreover, whilst the Pointblank Directive of June 
1943 had sought to focus on the aircraft industry as a prelude to the 
forthcoming invasion of Europe30, as Gray and others have pointed out Portal 
was singularly ineffective in forcing Harris to comply with primary objective of 
that Directive31. However, that Harris chose to ignore the Pointblank Directive 
by focusing on Berlin and other cities unconnected with the aircraft industry, 
and that the Air Staff failed to control Harris in this regard, is a different point. 
For the purposes of this discussion, the relevant point is that many of the 
target sets specified in the Casablanca and Pointblank Directives were 
beyond Oboe range and within the ‘zone of relative inefficiency’ for Bomber 
Command32. Consequently, although by 1943 there was a growing opinion 
within the Air Staff that selective and precise night attack could be more 
effective, in practice the development of target marking techniques during this 
period took place in the context of a strategical direction of the bombing 
offensive predicated upon area bombing as a means undermining the morale 
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of the German people and which underpinned the Directives issued during 
that period.  
 
There is also a further point that should be considered in relation this 
question: even if target marking techniques could have been employed 
against precision targets earlier in the bombing offensive, it does not follow 
that the results achieved would have equalled or even approached those 
achieved in the last year of the conflict. The reason for this is that target 
marking did not take place in a vacuum. There were a multitude of factors that 
also contributed to the accuracy of attacks and which did not remain constant 
over the duration of the bombing offensive. Two of the more important factors 
were the altitude at which bombing took place and the experience of the 
crews involved. Research conducted by ORSBC established that the most 
significant reduction in bomb aiming errors by operational crews using the Mk 
XIV bombsight occurred between 16,000 feet and 12,000ft, reducing from 191 
yards at an altitude of 20,000ft to 155 yards from 12,000 feet 33. Research 
also established that bombing accuracy improved significantly with the 
operational experience of the crews, although the average bomb aiming error 
made by operational aircrew remained some 50% worse than that of ‘skilled 
personnel’34. Both of these variables improved converse to the strength of the 
defences. It must therefore be recognised that the sustained improvement in 
accuracy from June 1944 onwards was in part due to a weakening in the 
German defences that occurred at that time, a point that is conceded by the 
British Bombing Survey Unit in reaching its conclusion that a switch to 
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precision bombing could have been made earlier than it was35. Similarly, it 
must also be recognised that the targets during this period were, on the 
whole, less well defended that the major cities attacked during the area 
offensive of 1943 and early 1944. This enabled the altitude at which Main 
Force bombing to take place to be progressively lowered to an average of 
12,000 feet, with the commensurate improvement in bombing accuracy. At the 
same time, the loss rate of heavy bombers fell sharply from between a range 
of 3% and 5% that had persisted since 1942 to below 1% in October 1944, 
and thereafter remained between 1% and 2% for the remainder of the 
offensive36. This significant reduction in the loss rate of bombers resulted in 
an overall improvement in average operational experience of bomber crews in 
the last year of the bombing offensive. These two factors, both individually 
and cumulatively, contributed to the improvement in bombing accuracy in the 
last year of the bombing offensive.  This is not to say that the importance of 
target marking was in any way diminished by the improvement in accuracy 
resulting from these factors. At no stage in the bombing offensive did the 
typical altitude at which Main Force bombing take place descend to the height 
at which ground detail is visible at night. It follows that the improvement in 
accuracy resulting from the decrease in bombing altitude and increase in 
operational experience would not have occurred to the same extent in the 
absence of target marking. In that sense, the improvement in accuracy 
resulting from those factors built upon the benefit of target marking but would 
not have taken place without it. The answer, then, to the question as to why 
Bomber Command continued with area attacks when it possessed the 
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capability to carry out precision attacks is the combination of these three 
factors.  
 
A related, and in some respects a more prescient question, is whether target 
marking techniques would have ever been employed in precision attacks had 
Bomber Command not been tasked with attacking precision targets in the 
build up to OPERATION OVERLORD. There is no evidence to suggest that it 
would37. Although this is an ex post facto conclusion, the development of 
target marking techniques up to that point had been based on the application 
of science to the marking of area targets from a high altitude. The target 
marking techniques themselves had evolved since the introduction of the 
basic Newhaven and Parramatta techniques, but even the most advanced 
form of these techniques - the complex ‘Berlin method’ - was directed towards 
area targets. In proposing the formation a Target Finding Force in late 
1941/early 1942, the Air Ministry had accepted area bombing as an interim 
measure pending the development of techniques for precision bombing.  
However, apart from the occasional attack on specific targets of particular 
importance, such as rocket research facility at Peenemünde in August 1943 
and the former Zeppelin works at Friedrichshafen (see Chapter 8), which were 
special cases, there were few attempts to use target marking technique for 
precision targets. There is no indication that, prior to the tactical necessity for 
bombing precision targets in the build up the OPERATION OVERLORD, the 
application of target marking techniques was moving Bomber Command away 
from bombing of area targets towards precision targets.  
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This is perhaps best demonstrated by the obstinate refusal of Harris to attack 
the ball bearing works at Schweinfurt. Some indication of the importance 
attached by the Air Staff to these ball-bearing works may gleaned from the 
fact that, despite being well beyond GEE range, the town of Schweinfurt was 
included in the February 1942 Directive as alternative target for area attack38.  
There followed sustained pressure from the Air Staff to attack this town, all of 
which Harris resisted, partly on the grounds that Schweinfurt was a small town 
with no distinctive navigation features and therefore difficult to locate with the 
navigation aids then available39.  This led Harris to conclude that the 
destruction of Schweinfurt by night - and in this context it is important to note 
that Harris was referring to the whole town and not just the ball-bearing works 
- was “tactically impracticable”40.  This exchange culminated in an 
exasperated Bufton expressing the opinion that Bomber Command “…is 
operating a policy of its own and is disregarding both the policy and precise 
instructions for its implementation….”41. The ball-bearing works at Schweinfurt 
were exactly the type of ‘vital factory’ that Bufton and the Air Ministry had in 
mind when proposing the formation of a Target Finding Force but Harris’ 
continued refusal to attack it was typical of his approach to precision targets 
and, in the face of considerable pressure to do so, Harris was disinclined to 
attack it. Consequently, with Bomber Command adopting this position and 
Portal lacking the ability to enforce the Air Ministry policy, there is nothing to 
suggest that the development of target marking techniques would have 
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developed for use against precision targets without the tactical necessity 
brought about by OPERATION OVERLORD and therefore fulfil one of the 
raison d’ětre advanced by the Air Ministry for the formation of a specialist 
target finding force in the first instance.  
 
In the interest of balance, it must also be recognised that the navigation and 
blind bombing aids on which the principal target marking techniques were 
based were not the only technologies that influenced the efficiency and 
effectiveness of those techniques.  The success of the principal target 
marking techniques was to a large extent dependent upon accurate timing, 
not only by the various marking components but also the prompt arrival of the 
Main Force at the point in time at which the marking most effective. The timing 
chart for a raid on Kassel in October 1943 (see Fig 28/ below) illustrates this 
point and demonstrates the complexity of timing over the course of a typical 
Bomber Command night raid at that time42. In particular, it may be noted that 
the distribution of the Main Force aircraft within that raid corresponded closely 
not only with the primary marking but also with secondary marking provided 
by the ‘backers-up’ throughout the planned duration of attack. This required a 
high standard of time keeping, both by the Pathfinder Force and the crews of 
the Main Force. 
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Fig 28/ Timing chart for the raid on Kassel, 22/23 October 1943. The marking technique for 
this raid was planned as a combination Parramatta and Newhaven, but the Visual Markers 
were able to identify the A/P and the raid progressed as a Newhaven. Note that the timing of 
the ‘Backers-up’ was staggered to ensure that T.I.s were burning throughout the planned 
duration of the Main Force attack. The ‘Y’ denotes aircraft fitted with H2S. Source: TNA 
AIR14/4597 ORSBC Report S115 ‘The use of H2S as an aid to navigation’, 4 December 
1943. 
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This timing was largely achieved through the use of a number of electronic 
and other devices that became available to assist in navigation. These 
included the Air Position Indicator (A.P.I) and the Ground Position Indicator 
(G.P.I.), both of which not only provided an indication of the position of the 
aircraft but also facilitated the accurate calculation of wind speed. The latter 
was a vital component in navigation and an essential input into the bombsight, 
as well as being necessary for the calculation of the ‘false wind’ as part of the 
indirect bombing techniques evolved by No 5 Group. The timing of raids was 
also facilitated by the navigation functions of GEE, S.S.LORAN and H2S. 
Indeed, ORSBC concluded that, used correctly, the Main Force squadrons 
were capable of using H2S to provide accurate fixes of inland towns on more 
than 80% of occasions and of coastal features on 95% of occasions43. 
Although the majority of heavy bombers in Bomber Command were not 
equipped with H2S until late 1944, this device was nonetheless of 
considerable and increasing value as a navigation aid as the bombing 
offensive progressed, with concentration achieved over the target compared 
to planned concentration improving from 48% in 1943 to 70% in April 194544  . 
Furthermore, the indirect bombing techniques of No 5 Group would not have 
been possible if the marking aircraft had not been fitted with S.S.LORAN in 
order to establish their position at their cruising altitude before descending to 
low level for the marking runs. The expansion of the Continental Gee Chain 
into Europe post D-Day also facilitated accurate time keeping over a large 
part of Germany in the closing months of the bombing offensive in areas 
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where the use of GEE had been denied to Bomber Command since 1942 by 
jamming of the signals from home-based ground stations.  
 
There was, however, one form of technology without which target marking 
could not have functioned: that generically known as the marker bomb.  The 
objective of target marking was to provide an unmistakable point of aim. 
There can be no doubt that the development of an effective marker bomb was 
fundamental to the contribution made by target marking techniques to the 
bombing offensive. In particular, the advent of the Target Indicator, 
coincidentally simultaneous with the first operational use of Oboe and H2S, 
transformed the efficiency of target marking. The development of the Target 
Indicator, including the more accurate ‘low-bursting’ version and the ‘short-
tailed’ version for fitting in the bomb bay of the Oboe Mosquito, were some of 
the more important advances in the target marking techniques. The 
development of the Spot Fire for use in the low-level marking techniques 
practised by No 5 Group was also an important innovation in terms of target 
marking techniques. Similarly, the development of the reconnaissance flare, 
particularly the ‘Hooded Flare’ to reduce glare from above, was essential to 
the Newhaven technique. The importance of the reconnaissance flare and the 
marker bomb in its various forms to target marking techniques cannot be 
overstated but, conversely, these technologies would have been ineffective, 
and indeed counter-productive, without the development of target marking 
techniques to exploit their ability to provide an unmistakable point of aim. 
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It must therefore be recognised that these various technologies combined to 
improve the accuracy of bombing and the efficiency of target marking 
techniques. The key point, however, is that these technologies were not by 
themselves capable of fulfilling the role played by target marking and 
therefore do not detract form the vital contribution made by target marking 
techniques to the outcome of the bombing offensive. Rather, these 
technologies worked in conjunction with the principal technologies on which 
target marking techniques were based to optimise the contribution that those 
techniques made to the bombing offensive. In that respect, the application of 
these technologies to target marking highlights the point made by authors 
such as David Edgerton, Guy Hartcup, Phillips O’Brien and Richard Overy 
about the importance of technology to the outcome of the Second World War 
in terms of a numerical advantage in trained manpower and industrial output 
not being sufficient in itself, with the science lead held by the Allies being 
critical.   
  
Whilst acknowledging the importance of a range of technologies employed by 
Bomber Command, this thesis has shown that it was the development of 
target marking techniques that enabled Bomber Command to circumvent the 
law that human beings cannot see in the dark.  As this thesis has 
demonstrated, the function of any target marking technique in this respect 
was to provide an unmistakable point of aim whilst overcoming the combined 
effects of the Principle of Cumulative Dispersion and Systematic Error. The 
ability of any target marking technique to fulfil this function was itself in turn 
inextricably linked to the particular characteristics of the navigation or blind 
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bombing aid employed and with which it was associated. The development of 
target marking techniques was to a large extent the development of this 
causal relationship. This thesis is the first work to precisely define that causal 
relationship by detailed reference to the technical characteristics of each 
navigation aid, there being no equivalent definition or analysis of that 
relationship in published material. It has also shown that the improvement in 
bombing accuracy and concentration was a result of the application of target 
marking techniques in conjunction with those navigation aids. This is in itself 
represents a departure from the views normally expressed in secondary 
literature which tend to suggest that the improvement in accuracy and 
concentration resulted from the introduction of the navigation aid per se, and 
in that respect also this thesis breaks new ground.  
 
However, the extent to which the application of the various technologies used 
in target marking required human interaction should not be underestimated. 
The balance between technology and human action could vary significantly, 
as shown by the contrasting scientific approach of the techniques used by the 
PFF and those adopted by No 5 Group based primarily on the individual 
judgement and skill of the crews involved. The development of target marking 
techniques is therefore not only concerned with the use of technology to solve 
the problem of providing an unmistakable point of aim: it is the story of the 
interaction between technology and human action to produce results that 
underpinned the outcome of the entire bombing offensive. 
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In order to arrive at this conclusion, this thesis has descended into layers of 
detail in relation to target marking that sit below that found in the hierarchy of 
published literature on the subject. It has considered concepts that are not 
addressed in this secondary literature, but which are fundamental to a 
complete understanding of the role played by target marking in the outcomes 
of the bombing offensive. Thus, for the first time, concepts such as the 
Systematic Error, Gaussian Distribution, Probable Radial Error and the 
Principle of Cumulative Dispersion have been considered alongside 
operational factors such as the visibility of Target Indicators, the visual acuity 
of bomb aimers, the ability of bomb aimers to assess the Mean Point of 
Impact of a rapidly changing pattern of markers and the role of the Master 
Bomber.  This thesis has drawn these factors together, in a way not be found 
in any existing literature on the bombing offensive, and has assessed how 
they relate to the causal relationship between the particular characteristics of 
the navigation or blind bombing aid employed and with which it was 
associated.   
 
The key question asked posed at the outset of thesis was: what difference did 
the introduction of target marking techniques make to the performance and 
efficacy of Bomber Command? In answer to that question, this thesis has 
shown that the improvement in bombing accuracy over the course of the 
bombing offensive was not, as frequently alluded to in secondary literature, 
the result of the introduction of navigation aids such as Oboe and H2S. There 
was an additional component required to bridge the gap between the law that 
human beings cannot see in the dark and the ability of blind bombing to fulfil 
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the tactical and strategic objectives of Bomber Command, this being the 
provision of an unmistakable point of aim for those crews that did not have the 
benefit of navigation aids. Target marking provided that additional component, 
and the fundamental importance of that to explaining the achievements of the 
bombing offensive has not received the recognition that it deserves. This 
thesis has corrected that omission and, in so doing, has ploughed its own 
furrow to provide a valuable new perspective on the outcome of the bombing 
offensive. 
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GLOSSARY 
 
 
Aiming Area The bomb distribution resulting from Sector 
Bombing, the shape of which was a part of a 
circle between two lines drawn from the 
Marking Point. 
 
Aiming Line The bomb distribution resulting from the Line 
Bombing technique, being the arc of a circle 
with the Marking Point at its centre.   
 
Aiming Point   The point on the ground that is the briefed 
 target for the raid. Usually abbreviated to 
 A/P. 
 
Air Position Indicator Navigation aid based upon the Distant 
Reading Compass. Usually abbreviated to 
API. 
 
Air Speed The speed of the aircraft relative to air in 
which it is flying i.e the speed at which the 
air meets the aircraft. Note that due to the 
effect of the wind this may not be the same 
as the ground speed of aircraft. Air speed 
can be measured as Indicated Air Speed 
(IAS), this being the speed shown on the Air 
Speed Indicator (see below), or True Air 
Speed (TAS), this being the Indicated Air 
Speed corrected for difference in air 
pressure and/or temperature. The latter is 
required for accurate navigation. 
 
Air Speed Indicator Basic flight instrument that shows the air 
speed of the aircraft. Usually abbreviated to 
ASI. 
 
Altitude The height of an aircraft above sea level or 
ground level. 
 
Attitude The inclination of an aircraft in relation to the 
horizontal. The attitude of bomber aircraft 
would, within limits relative to the centre of 
gravity, vary according to the weight of 
bombs carried and the weight/distribution of 
fuel remaining. 
 
Average Radial Error The average radial distance of all variates, 
measured either in relation to the Aiming 
Point or the Mean Point of Impact. 
Sometimes referred to as the Average 
Probable Error.  
 
Azimuth The position around the horizon. 
 
Backers-Up Pathfinder crews detailed to replenish or 
reinforce Target Indicators placed by the 
Primary Markers. 
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Baillie Beam Lorenz-type directional navigational beam 
generated by ground stations, along which 
aircraft could track. 
 
Ballistic Errors Distance of variates from the Aiming Point 
caused by the miscalculation of the ballistic 
properties of bombs or markers, or by 
interference with the bomb or marker during 
fall. 
 
BENITO British code name for the German Y 
Verfahren navigation system. 
 
Berlin Method Target marking technique in which the 
Pathfinders marked the target using by 
Parramatta ground marking and Wanganui 
sky marking simultaneously. Main force 
crews were briefed to aim at the Parramatta 
ground markers if visible and the Wanganui 
skymarkers if the ground markers were not 
visible.  
 
Blind Bombing Release of bombs without visually identifying 
the target, using navigation aids to 
determine position. 
 
Blind Bombing Cherbourg Series of bombing operations in late 
1940/early 1941 against the RUFFIAN 
transmitters located on the Cherbourg 
peninsular, using the German beams as a 
guide to the target and (in some cases) an 
early variant of OBOE for blind bombing. 
Usually abbreviated to B.B.C. 
 
Blind Marker-Illuminators Blind Illuminators that also dropped TI’s 
(usually TI Yellow) to identify the target area 
for the Visual Markers 
 
Blind Marking Release of Target Indicators or Flares 
without visually identifying the target, using 
navigation aids to determine position. 
 
Bomb Density Actual tons of bombs per square mile falling 
within any given area. N.B. this should not 
be confused with “Density of Bombing” (see 
below) 
 
Bomb Distribution The scatter of bombs around the Mean Point 
of Impact 
 
Bombing Error The systematic error of the bombs dropped 
(as distinct from the Markers dropped). 
 
Bradshaw navigation Derogatory RAF slang for poor navigation, in 
which crews were derided for following 
railway lines to find their target or 
destination. Derived from the inventor of 
railway timetables, George Bradshaw. 
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Broadcast Winds A system introduced in mid-1943 where wind 
vectors were calculated by experienced 
navigators during the course of an operation, 
and relayed to Group headquarters as 
“found winds”. The found winds from a 
number of navigators were then collated and 
averaged, and then re-broadcast to the Main 
Force as “Group” winds. 
 
Broody Hen Early form of receiver used in experimental 
versions of OBOE. 
 
Check aircraft Pathfinder aircraft tasked with reporting on 
the visibility of markers from the altitude at 
which the Main Force bombed. 
 
Concentration     The number of aircraft bombing within a 
given time limit. 
 
Continuous Oboe Marking A variation of Musical Parramatta involving 
the continuous dropping of Target Indicators 
over a period of approximately 8 minutes, in 
which those Target Indicators would be the 
only markers dropped.  
 
Controlled A prefix applied to any target marking 
technique when a Master Bomber was 
employed; e.g Controlled Newhaven. 
 
Cope A successful sortie involving GEE, G-H, 
H2S, or OBOE. Crew were said to have 
‘coped’ if bombs or markers were dropped 
blind using this equipment. 
 
Creepback The tendency for the bomb distribution to fall 
progressively shorter of the Aiming Point 
towards the direction of the bombers’ 
approach as a raid progressed. 
 
Cross Trail Path taken by a bomb or marker through the 
air, taking into account the effect of cross 
wind. 
 
Cross Wind Any wind that is not a head wind or tail wind. 
 
Dead (or Deduced) Reckoning Navigation using three vectors. The first 
vector is the course and airspeed of the 
aircraft, thus giving the theoretical position of 
the aircraft in conditions of zero wind. This is 
known as the air position vector. The second 
vector is the direction and speed of the wind, 
this being known as the wind vector. These 
two vectors were computed to produce a 
third vector, this being the track and ground 
speed of the aircraft. It was this third vector 
that dictated the progress of the aircraft over 
the ground. Usually abbreviated to D.R. 
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Delta OBOE OBOE navigation aid with the facility to 
automatically guide aircraft onto the required 
course. 
  
Density of Bombing Percentage of all aircraft claiming to have 
attacked a given area which actually 
bombed within that area. N.B. this should not 
be confused with “Bomb Density” (see 
above) 
 
Directional Stability The tendency of an aircraft to align itself with 
the direction of the airflow. 
   
Distant Reading Compass A gyroscopically stabilised magnetic 
compass in which the compass sensor unit, 
known as the Master Compass, was 
positioned in the aircraft so as be unaffected 
by the magnetic effect of the bomb load. The 
compass instrument(s) used by the aircrew 
to indicate the heading of the aircraft, known 
as the Repeater Compass, being located 
remotely from the sensor unit and were 
synchonised with the Master Compass. 
Usually abbreviated to D/R Compass or 
D.R.C. 
 
Drift The extent to which an aircraft, bomb or flare 
is deviated from its original course due to the 
effect of the wind. 
 
Effective Weight of Attack The weight of bombs delivered to the 
vulnerable area of a target. 
 
Error Ellipse A regular oval shape, the shape being that 
resulting when a cone is cut by an oblique plane 
that does not intersect the base, within which any 
given percentage of the bombs fall. Usually 
depicted as an oval within a percentage of 50% 
ob bombs fell, and therefore known as the 50% 
ellipse. 
 
Estimated Weight of Attack The minimum weight of attack necessary to 
destroy the social and industrial structure 
within selected areas (towns), measured in 
tons of bombs per square mile or tons of 
bombs per population number. 
 
Finders Pathfinder crews briefed to drop long sticks 
of flares at the opening of a raid for the 
purpose of identifying the general target area 
for the Illuminators. 
  
Flying Errors Distance of variates from the Aiming Point 
caused by inaccurate flying of the aircraft. 
 
Followers Pathfinder crews with no target marking 
duties but taking part in a raid as part of the 
Main Force. New Pathfinder crews were 
usually detailed as Followers for their first 
few sorties in order that their navigation and 
time-keeping abilities could be assessed. 
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Found Winds The wind vectors obtained during an 
operation by experienced navigators and 
relayed to Group Headquarters as part of the 
Broadcast winds system or the Master 
Bomber in the Visual Groundmarking 
technique. 
  
Gaussian Distribution   A measure of probability of a single event 
occurring applicable where there are a large 
number of events. The Gaussian Distribution 
Function provides that 68% of all events will 
be within one standard deviation of the mean 
of all events. The Gaussian Distribution 
Function is shown graphically as bell-shaped 
curve, in which the steepness of the curve 
reflects the number of events occurring close 
to the mean: - a large number of events 
occurring close to the mean results in a 
steep curve. Commonly known as ‘normal 
distribution’  
 
GEE Electronic navigation aid, based on the 
principle of hyperbolic navigation. Commonly 
referred to in contemporary reports as 
TR1335 or Gee. 
 
G-H  Radar navigation aid that used 
transmissions made from equipment carried 
in the aircraft and re-radiated by two ground 
stations. Sometimes referred to as GEE-H or 
Gee-H. 
 
Gross Error An error in bomb fall that is significantly 
greater than the main concentration of 
bombs, and as such readily identified as an 
error and non-typical of the average bomb 
fall. 
 
Ground Marking The placing of pyrotechnics on or close to 
ground level for the purpose of marking a 
target. 
 
Ground Position Indicator Navigation aid based upon the Air Position 
Indicator. Usually abbreviated to GPI. 
 
Ground Speed  The speed of the aircraft over the ground, 
taking into account the effect of wind. 
 
Group Winds The wind vectors broadcast by Group 
Headquarters as part of the Broadcast winds 
system. 
 
‘H’ An early electronic navigation aid involving 
two ground stations, each consisting of a 
transmitter and receiver, with a transmitter 
and a receiver in the aircraft. 
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H2S Radar navigation aid, employing ground 
facing centimetric radar housed in a cupola 
beneath the aircraft.  
 
HEADACHE British code name for the German 
Knickebein navigation system. 
 
Heading Direction in which the aircraft is pointing, 
measured as a compass bearing. 
 
Head Wind A wind in the opposite direction to the 
heading of the aircraft. 
 
Hooded Flare A flare designed not to cause glare when 
viewed from above. 
 
Illuminators Pathfinder crews briefed to drop short sticks 
of flares for the purpose of illuminating the 
Aiming Point in order to assist Primary 
Markers in locating the Aiming point visually. 
 
Indirect Marking A generic term used to describe the target 
marking techniques employed by No 5 
Group in which a point some distance from 
the Aiming Point was marked from which the 
Main Force would make a time and distance 
bombing run to the target. 
 
Ineffectives Bombs dropped that for a variety of reasons 
do not contribute to the normal bomb 
distribution. 
 
Initial Equipment The number of pieces of equipment, usually 
in relation to aircraft but also applying to 
bombing and navigation aids, with which a 
Group, Squadron or Unit was equipped upon 
formation (or, in relation to bombing and 
navigation aids, first supply). Usually 
abbreviated to I.E. 
 
Instrumental Errors Distance of variates from the Aiming Point 
caused by faults in the navigation or 
bombing system, or by faulty calibration of 
that equipment. 
 
“J” Beams Spurious Baillie Beam transmissions used 
by the British in an attempt to deceive the 
Germans about the true nature and purpose 
of the GEE navigation system. 
 
Kammhuber Line The German defence system whereby night 
fighters were individually controlled within 
geographically defined ‘boxes’ 
 
Knickebein German blind navigation system using two 
intersecting radio beams.  
 
Lateral Stability Stability of an aircraft in the rolling plane. 
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Line Bombing Bombing technique where aircraft of the 
Main Force were detailed to aim at an offset 
marker on a given heading. 
 
Line Error The distance of the Mean Point of Impact of 
the bombs or markers from the Aiming Point, 
measured as a line perpendicular to the 
briefed heading for bombing.  
 
Link aircraft Aircraft tasked with checking that VHF 
communication from the Master Bomber to 
the Main Force were received.  
 
Longitudinal Stability The stability of an aircraft in the pitching 
plane. 
 
Long Stop A ground-marker bomb (usually yellow) 
dropped to mark the limit of bombing or to 
cancel stray T.I’s. The term was also applied 
to Pathfinder crews detailed to perform these 
tasks. 
 
Loran (S.S.Loran) Electronic navigation aid that used 
simultaneous pulsed systems from two 
ground stations, one Master and one Slave, 
with the time difference between the pulsed 
signals being measured by equipment 
carried in the aircraft.  
 
Lorenz beam Blind approach system using two adjacent 
radio beams directed on slightly diverging 
paths, one transmitting Morse ‘dots’ and the 
other Morse ‘dashes’, arranged such that the 
two beams slightly overlapped. Where the 
two beams overlapped, the dots and dashes 
combined to produce a steady note zone 
(the ‘equisignal’) that progressively narrowed 
towards the source of the transmissions. 
Aircraft navigated by flying down the steady 
note zone until they reached the transmitter.  
 
Main Force The numerically superior element of the 
bombing force guided to the target by the 
Pathfinders 
 
Marker Leader Experienced bomber pilot tasked with 
placing Spot Fires and assessing the 
accuracy of all Spot Fires placed as part of 
the Visual Groundmarking technique. 
 
Marking Error The systematic error of the markers dropped 
(as distinct from the bombs dropped) 
 
Marking Point A point on the ground away from the Aiming 
Point on which the markers would be aimed 
as part of the No 5 Group Visual 
Groundmarking technique. 
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Master Bomber Experienced Pathfinder whose role was to 
direct the Main Force whilst a raid when in 
progress 
 
Master of Ceremonies Unofficial term used by the Main Force 
crews referring to the Master Bomber. 
 
Mean Point of Impact The mathematical centre of the bomb 
distribution. Usually abbreviated to MPI. 
 
Meteorological Errors Distance of variates from the Aiming Point 
caused by the miscalculation of the wind 
vector. 
  
Musical A prefix applied to any target marking 
technique in which the OBOE precision 
bombing aid was used; e.g Musical 
Parramatta 
  
NEWHAVEN Target marking technique using ground 
markers aimed visually using illumination 
from flares dropped by H2S. The prefix 
‘Musical’ was applied when used in 
conjunction with Oboe. 
 
Nil Wind A weather condition in which wind speed 
was zero. Nil Wind is the only condition in 
which the heading and track of the aircraft 
are the same, and in which the actual 
ballistic profile of a projectile is achieved 
Also known as Still Air. 
 
Normal Distribution    See Gaussian Distribution. 
 
OBOE Generic term for a variety of ground-
controlled precision bombing systems.    
 
Offset Marking Target marking technique employed by No 5 
Group in which a point some distance from 
the Aiming Point was marked (known as the 
‘Marking Point’) rather than the Aiming Point 
itself.  
 
Overall Systematic Error The combination of the Marking Error and 
the Bombing Error 
 
OVERTURE The code name given to OBOE sorties in 
which only high explosive bombs were 
dropped. 
 
PARRAMATTA Ground marking technique using H2S or 
OBOE employed when visibility was not 
adequate for the Aiming Point to be 
identified visually. The prefix ‘Musical’ was 
applied when used in conjunction with Oboe.  
 
Pathfinder Crew detailed to mark the target for the Main 
Force. 
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Point of Aim A point on the ground, marker or pattern of 
markers on which the Main Force crews 
were briefed to aim. Note: this should not be 
confused with the Aiming Point. 
 
Point Release Flares Parachute flares, usually primarily red or 
green and projecting stars of the contrasting 
colour (i.e. red with green stars, green with 
red stars). Also known as Skymarkers. 
 
Preliminary Oboe Marking A variation of Musical Parramatta in which 
not less than 4 Mosquito aircraft would each 
drop between 1 and 4 Target Indicators Is to 
provide an indication of the A/P, either as the 
sole target marking or as a basis for full PFF 
marking. 
 
Primary Green Alternative name given to the Proximity 
Marker 
 
Primary Visual Marker The most experienced and able Pathfinder 
crews detailed to ground mark the target 
visually, usually including a highly specialist 
bomb aimer. Sometimes referred to as 
Primary Markers. 
 
Principle of Cumulative Dispersion A principle whereby if successive aircraft 
aimed at the M.P.I. of all the markers visible, 
the aggregate M.P.I. was itself subject to a 
cumulative error which rapidly became 
greater than that of the individual attempts. 
 
Probable Radial Error Radius of a circle about the Aiming Point or 
the Mean Point of Impact within which 50% 
of the plotted bomb distribution are located. 
Sometimes referred to as the “50% Zone” or 
the “50% circle”. 
 
Proportion of Ineffectives The proportions of bombs dropped that for a 
variety of reasons do not contribute to the 
normal bomb distribution. 
 
Proximity Marker A TI, usually green, dropped blind by H2S or 
Oboe to guide the Primary Visual Markers or 
a Marker Leader to the general vicinity of the 
Aiming Point. 
 
Radial Standard Error    The square root of the mean of  
 the square of the radial distance. Otherwise 
known as the square root mean error or the 
standard deviation. 
  
Random Error The measure of bomb scatter about the 
Mean Point of Impact. 
 
Range Error  The distance of the Mean Point of Impact of 
the bombs or markers from the Aiming Point, 
measured along the briefed heading for 
bombing. 
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Rate One Turn A turn which completes 180º in one minute 
and therefore a complete 360º turn in two 
minutes. Also known as a Standard Rate 
Turn. 
 
Re-centerers Pathfinder crews detailed to re-mark the 
Aiming Point if the pattern of bombing goes 
astray during a raid. 
  
Release Errors Distance of variates from the Aiming Point 
caused by the delay in the release of a bomb 
or marker from the aircraft release 
mechanism. 
 
Release Point Point at which Main Force crews released 
their bombs when the sky marking technique 
was employed. Also the term used for the 
point at which bombs were automatically 
dropped using OBOE or G-H. 
 
RUFFIAN British code name for the German X-
Verfahren navigation system. 
 
Salvo(es) The practice of dropping two or more bombs, 
Target Indicators or flares at the same time. 
 
SAMPSON Technique for blind bombing using the GEE 
navigational aid. 
 
Sector Bombing Variation of Line Bombing, where aircraft of 
the Main Force were detailed to bomb on 
different overshoot times. 
 
Service Ceiling The maximum altitude that an aircraft could 
reach in normal operating conditions (i.e 
aircraft in clean configuration; engines 
operating at normal power; full petrol and 
bomb load).   
 
SHAKER Target marking technique in which 
incendiary bombs were dropped using the 
GEE navigational aid to guide following 
aircraft not so equipped. 
 
Sky Markers Parachute flares, usually primarily red or 
green and projecting stars of the contrasting 
colour (i.e. red with green stars, green with 
red stars). Also known as Point Release 
Flares. 
 
Sky Marking Marking technique used when cloud cover 
obscured the ground, involving the placing of 
parachute flares released at a position 
ascertained with the H2S or OBOE 
navigation aids, at which the Main Force 
aimed. Also known by the codename 
WANGANUI. 
 
Spot Fire A type of Target Indicator that provided a 
single spot of red or green light. 
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Standard Blind (later Beam) Approach Lorenz-type approach system used at 
Bomber Command airfields. Usually 
abbreviated to S.B.A.   
 
Standard Deviation A measure of variability used in statistics 
and probability theory, which shows how 
much variation or dispersion there is from 
the average and upon which the Gaussian 
Distribution Function is based. In relation to 
target marking, Standard Deviation is used 
as a measure of the scatter of bombs around 
the Mean Point of Impact, and therefore as a 
measure of the concentration of bombing. 
 
Stick (of bombs) The practice of dropping two or more bombs, 
Target Indicators or flares at pre-set 
intervals, typically of one quarter of a 
second, thereby producing a line of equally 
spaced strikes on the ground or a line of 
flares in the sky. 
 
Still Air A condition where the wind speed is zero. 
‘Still Air’ is the only condition in which the 
heading and track of the aircraft are the 
same, and in which the actual ballistic profile 
of a projectile is achieved. Also known as Nil 
Wind. 
 
Supporters Pathfinder crews detailed to bomb the target 
at the same time as the Primary Markers to 
reduce the conspicuity of the latter to the 
defences 
 
Systematic Error  A function of target marking, the Systematic 
Error is the distance of the Mean Point of 
Impact from the Aiming Point, measured as 
a direct line.  
 
Systematic Errors Errors that are inherent within a system and 
are therefore constantly repeated.  
 
Tail Wind A wind in the same direction as the heading 
of the aircraft. 
 
Target Indicator A bomb that ejected a number of pyrotechnic 
candles for the ground marking of targets. 
Usually abbreviated to T.I. 
 
Terminal Velocity    Maximum speed reached by a bomb or 
marker during its fall to the ground. 
 
Time and Distance The release of bombs or markers based on 
flight time from a well defined landmark or a 
Target Indicator placed for that purpose, 
calculated using groundspeed, wind 
direction and distance to the target. 
 
Track Direction of travel of an aircraft over the 
ground. 
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Trail (or Trail Angle)    Path taken by a bomb or marker through the 
air after release. 
 
TRINITY Code name for a series of attacks on the 
German battleships Scharnhorst and 
Gneisenau when at anchorage at Brest in 
late 1941/early 1942 using an experimental 
version of OBOE. 
 
Turn and Slip Indicator A basic flight instrument which recorded the 
rate at which the aircraft was turning and the 
amount a ‘slip’ or yawing movement in the 
turn. 
 
UNISON Code name for a series of bombing raids in 
1942 featuring a high proportion of 
incendiaries. 
 
Variates The term used in the calculation of bomb 
distribution for the individual bombs or bomb 
loads that comprise the bomb distribution. 
 
Vector Marking Alternative name for Offset Marking 
 
Visual Centerer A Backer-up tasked with reducing the spread 
of marking or correcting gross errors in the 
placement of markers. 
 
Visual Centring The judgment made by bomb aimers in 
estimating the M.P.I. of the pattern of 
markers. 
 
Visual Groundmarking Technique devised by No 5 Group for 
marking targets visually from a low level. 
 
Visual Marker Experienced Pathfinder crews detailed to 
ground mark the target visually. Later termed 
Primary Markers or Primary Visual Markers. 
 
WANGANUI Target marking technique using sky markers 
released at a position ascertained with the 
H2S or OBOE navigation aids. The prefix 
‘Musical’ was applied when used in 
conjunction with Oboe.  
 
WINDOW     Codename given to metal strips dropped 
from a bomber aircraft to confuse the German radar 
 
Wind Vector     Variable composed of the strength and 
direction of the wind. 
 
X Gerät      Instrument carried in the aircraft associated 
with the X Verfahren navigation system 
 
X Verfahren German automatic blind navigation system 
comprising one master beam transmission to 
provide approach guidance to the target, 
intersected by three beam transmissions at 
fixed intervals to the target.     
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Y-aircraft Any aircraft fitted with the H2S navigation 
aid. 
 
Yaw(ing) Movement of an aircraft such it is not aligned 
with the direction of the airflow. 
 
Y Verfahren German blind navigation system comprising 
two separate beam transmissions from the 
same ground station to measure the 
aircraft’s bearing and range. 
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